Political competition and contestability: a study of the barriers to entry in 21 democracies by BISCHOFF, Carina S.
 
 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Competition and Contestability 
 
A Study of the Barriers to Entry in 21 Democracies  
 
 
By 
 
Carina S. BISCHOFF 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with 
A view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the 
European University Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
Jury Members:  
 
Prof. Stefano Bartolini (University of Bologna, Supervisor) 
Prof. Richard Katz (Johns Hopkins University) 
Prof. Peter Mair (European University Institute) 
Prof. Philippe C. Schmitter (European University Institute, Professorial Fellow)  
 
 
Florence, November 2006 
 
Political Competition and Contestability
- A study of the Barriers to Entry in 21
Democracies
by
Carina S. Bischo¤
Ph.D., Electrical Engineering, University of New Mexico, 2006
Abstract
The thesis o¤ers a theoretical clarication of the concept of political competition and
an empirical study of one of its dening dimensions, namely contestability. In the rst
part, the relevant literature is subjected to a critical review with an eye to arriving at
a model of competition suited to an empirical study of its e¤ects. The model proposed
focusses attention on the incentives political actors aspiring to positions of power
have to win votes. Two dimensions are singled out as crucial for such incentives.
The rst is the degree of contestability. That is, how open the political arena is to
the entry of new competitors. The second dimension, vulnerability, addresses how
closely incumbent governments are faced with the threat of losing o¢ ce.
The second, and main part of the thesis, is devoted to the empirical study of
contestability by examining the barriers to entry for new parties in 21 democracies.
Four barriers are identied and measured in turn. The rst two determine access to
competition for votes. The Registration barrier captures the costs of participation,
v
while the Recognition barrier tries to identify costs and opportunities involved in
becoming known to the public. Unlike the other barriers, several indicators are
proposed to capture it. The next two determine the di¢ culties involved in winning
seats. The Representation barrier measures this by the properties of the electoral
system, while the Accessibility barrier takes the interaction of electoral behaviour
and the electoral system into account. Finally, the individual and combined strength
of each of the barriers to entry are investigated on the number of new parties entering.
The results suggest that the relative importance of the barriers varies considerably,
but also that they together explain a considerable amount of variation in the entry
of new parties. The implications of the ndings are nally evaluated in light of
competitive theory.
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Introduction
Competition is a key term in politics. Commentaries on day-to-day politics and sci-
entic works alike are replete with references to competition. It is used to describe
and invoked to explain individual behaviours as well as collective outcomes. Unfor-
tunately, it is almost as ambiguous in meaning and indeterminate in e¤ect as it is
ubiquitous in use. It triggers a wide range of associations from responsiveness, wealth
and e¢ ciency to selshness, cynicism and conict. One cannot help wanting to nd
out what this thing competitionactually is and what its e¤ects are. A review of the
scientic literature reveals that the term competition is used in many di¤erent and
often contradictory ways and that its e¤ects are more often assumed than actually
studied.
The concept of competition thus presents us with multiple puzzles. At the most
basic level, there is the simple question of what it is exactly. That is, how do we
dene competition in a clear way that enables us to distinguish it from other related
phenomena? No less important, if we want to study it, is the question of how to
recognize it in the real world of politics. What does it look like and how do we
know if there is more or less of it? An impressive variety of empirical measures of
competition can be found in the literature. Part of this variety can be traced back
to di¤erences in the understanding of what competition is, but the practical solu-
tions proposed to capture same property in highly di¤erent institutional settings is
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an equally important source of di¤erences. Naturally, addressing these issues of de-
nition and measurement is motivated by a set of theoretical expectations concerning
the role of competition in democracy. Some political theories cast competition in the
role of a magic elixir with the potency to transform personal ambitions and power
struggles in the political arena into a system perfectly tuned to respond to popular
interests. If competition were in fact such an alchemy of politics, knowledge of what
- if anything - might enhance it in political systems becomes crucial. Others have
expressed greater scepticism of its projected benevolent e¤ects and have been more
inclined to seek explanations for good democratic performance elsewhere. Diverg-
ing visions of human nature and behaviour typically lie at the root of di¤erences in
expectations, but opposing views on the e¢ cacy of the constraints imposed by our
environment also lead to di¤erent conclusions. Ultimately, however, the question of
the e¤ects of competition in democracy is an empirical one that we can only hope to
answer through systematic comparative research.
Identifying possible e¤ects of political competition is not a simple task, however.
In the causal chain leading from competition to democratic performance several
individual linkscan be identied. Faulty theoretical as well as practical tools for
capturing and placing each one of these links in its proper place can easily lead to
the wrong conclusions. Recognizing that addressing the full question of whether
competition matters to political outcomes would be too ambitious for this research,
I propose instead to prepare the ground for such an analysis. In the following, this
will be done by rst addressing the theoretical and conceptual problems posed by
such an empirical study and secondly by an empirical study of one of its dening
dimensions.
The rst part of the thesis aims to arrive at a clear denition of competition and
propose a model suitable for comparative empirical research. Chapter 1 begins with
a brief review of the meanings and sources of ambiguity surrounding the concept of
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competition and its role in democracy. The frequent use of economic analogies and
the conceptual overlap between competition and democracy are seen to undermine
clarity in the discourse on the topic. Furthermore, a summary of empirical studies
of competition reveals di¤erences at the theoretical, as well as the practical levels.
While there is a fundamental conceptual accord in one strand of these studies, namely
those concerned with the study of competition within the U.S., the commonalities
are much less salient in the studies that span di¤erent types of political systems.
Moreover, in the latter type, multi-dimensional understandings of competition are
suggested, while the former stick to a one-dimensional conception. In order assess
what dimensions of competition are the critical ones for investigating its e¤ects, four
theoretical models of competition are consulted.
The rst model, namely that of perfect economic competition, has arguably been
a richer source of outcome related expectations than a provider of precise ideas to
guide empirical research. Its dening features are simply not comparable to political
realities, and it has therefore only little to o¤er. The next economic model considered
has undoubtedly been a much more prolic source of useful concepts and predictions
for political research. By portraying political competition as an activity occurring
in a space dened by policy positions, Downs provided a framework where economic
insights could be applied to political phenomena (Downs, 1957). It is argued, how-
ever, that di¢ culties related to derivation of precise predictions regarding outcomes,
as well as in simply applying the model across di¤erent political systems, make it un-
suitable for a comparative study of the e¤ects of competition. The two next models
reviewed are found to be more fertile in this sense. Both identify a number of com-
petitive dimensions, which are possible to measure empirically in di¤erent political
contexts, and furthermore give rise to predictions related to behaviours and out-
comes. The rst, proposed by Strøm, draws explicitly on game theoretical concepts
to identify key properties of political competition (Strøm, 1992). The second, devel-
oped by Bartolini, is more detached from the rational actorassumptions embedded
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in the three previous conceptions, and the dimensions identied are developed in
close dialogue with political realities (Bartolini, 1999 & 2000).
After this review of theory, a short denition of political competition is proposed,
which identies the e¤orts political actors make to win electoral support as a means
to winning or retaining o¢ ce and/or inuence as its salient feature. Variation in
the intensity of competition is seen to derive from the actual incentives they have to
make such e¤orts in di¤erent contexts. Returning to an evaluation of the dimensions
proposed in the literature, two are singled out as crucial to political competition
understood as an incentive structure. The rst is contestability, which seeks to
capture the degree openness of the political arena to the entry of new competitors.
Or conversely, the extent to which represented political actors are shielded from the
threat of new contestants by barriers to entry. Such barriers remove the incentive to
pre-empt potential threats by continuously making e¤orts to secure electoral support.
Every single theory of competition assigns crucial importance to this dimension.
Nonetheless, it is virtually absent from every empirical study of political competition
ever made. The second dimension, vulnerability, seeks to identify the extent to which
incumbent governments are threatened with take-over by an opposition. Naturally,
no government in a democracy is formally immune from such a threat, but there
is wide variation in how imminent or remote the prospects of turn-over are. Many
studies of competition have hypothesized that the more comfortable governments
are in their positions, the less pressure there is on them to engage in competition for
electoral support. Unlike contestability, vulnerability is - in some form - present in the
vast majority of studies of competition. Almost all operationalize it in one political
context (U.S.) and the challenge for comparative research lies in the comparative
measurement across di¤erent political systems. In the following, only the empirical
measurement of contestability will be attempted, however.
The remainder of the thesis addresses the question of how contestable democra-
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cies are. In order to measure this, it is suggested that the level of di¢ culty involved
in registering as a participant at elections, in becoming known to voters, and nally
in winning representation must be assessed. Four di¤erent types of barriers corre-
sponding to these three challenges are identied; the rst two target the openness of
competition for votes. The Registration Barrier simply addresses the requirements
for participation at elections, while the costs - and opportunities - new parties have
for becoming known to the public are the topic of the Recognition Barrier. The two
next barriers concern the openness of the competition for seats. The Representa-
tion Barrier addresses how electoral rules may exclude new and smaller competitors
from representation, whereas the Accessibility Barrier tries to answer the question of
how accessible the parliamentary arena is by considering the inter-action of electoral
rules and voter behaviour. It is suggested to investigate the e¢ cacy of the existing
barriers - and the validity of the measures developed - on the number of new parties
actually participating, winning votes and seats. The possible e¤ects of the barriers
on democratic performance are not investigated, however.
In Chapter 2 the practical parameters of the research are set. 21 democracies,
mainly in the period 1950-2000, are selected for the study on the basis of the longevity
of democratic institutions and similarity with respect to socio-economic conditions.
Not so much because of the demands of the present question posed but with an eye to
adding on the other dimension of competition and investigating performance e¤ects
later on. Furthermore, the research is limited to the barriers to entry for the lower
houses of parliament. A number of methodological issues concerning prediction of
the dependent variable - the number of new parties entering - are considered, and
nally a number of precise hypotheses are proposed to serve as tests of the e¤ects of
each of the barriers. In the following chapters, each of the barriers is then studied in
turn.
The empirical analysis commences with Chapter 3, which is devoted to describ-
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ing and measuring the Registration Barrier. The requirements parties have to full
in each of the 21 countries in order to obtain a place on the ballot are compared,
and the challenges posed by the construction of a single indicator of the costs im-
posed are subsequently addressed. This includes bridging di¤erences in the type of
requirements used, as well as dening what we mean by ballot access. The division
of the electoral arena into separate districts necessitates considering whether ballot
access in one district is su¢ cient or whether more have to be included. The decision
taken determines how costs of ballot access should be measured, as well as which
criteria should be applied in counting the number of new parties participating. The
approach taken, and evidence found by previous studies on ballot access is reviewed,
and an indicator of the costs of registration is proposed. Finally, its e¤ects on new
party participation are investigated.
Ignorance of new parties, and what they have to o¤er, is the obstacle to entry
addressed by the Recognition Barrier, which is explored in Chapter 4. Compared
to the registration barrier, it is innitely more complex to capture and the chapter
therefore begins with an extensive discussion of factors which may impede or facilitate
the recognition of new parties by the electorate. The issue is approached from two
di¤erent angles. First, the opportunities parties have for transmitting information to
the public and how these vary across countries and time are considered. Second, the
role played by the electorates as recipients of information on politics is discussed as
a determinant of successful communication. On basis of the discussion, ve specic
hypotheses are singled out for further study. The rst two concern the ow of
information reaching citizens via the mass media. The amount of information on
politics citizens are exposed to through the mass media, as well as the extent of
bias in this information, is hypothesized to inuence how easily new parties may
manage to emerge from obscurity. The next three hypotheses try to capture the
costs facing parties in attempts to communicate directly with the electorate. This
is seen to be determined by the presence of state support for campaigns, as well as
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the independent costs of reaching the electorate. Finally, the combined e¤ects of the
individual barriers are investigated, and on basis of the results, a single indicator of
the recognition barrier is proposed.
The Representation Barrier is analysed in Chapter 5. The question at stake here is
how electoral systems inuence the chances for new parties to obtain representation.
The starting point of the discussion is a very di¤erent one from that of the previous
chapters as the issue at hand can hardly be characterised as `virgin territory. Rather,
there is an extensive literature dealing with electoral rules and their e¤ects on repre-
sentation. The chapter therefore begins with a review of the indicators proposed in
the literature to capture the extent of disadvantage imposed on the representational
chances of new and smaller parties. Problems related to capturing variety among
systems, as well as validity, haunt indicators based on classication schemes and ob-
served vote-seat disproportionality respectively, while issues of practical estimation
are instead seen to trouble the electoral thresholds. It is argued that the threshold
approach that seeks to estimate the vote shares necessary to obtain seats has advan-
tages as measures of the representation barrier, and the problems of estimation are
therefore sought resolved. In the process, a new indicator is proposed and measured,
its validity tested and performance compared to other indicators. Finally, the e¤ects
of the representation barrier on the entry of new parties are investigated.
The last of the barriers, the Accessibility Barrier, is the topic of Chapter 6.
Essentially, it addresses the same question as the representation barrier, namely
how di¢ cult it is for new parties to obtain representation. Where the representation
barrier frames the problem in mechanicalterms, that is, how institutional rules may
prevent parties from gaining access to the representative institutions; it is argued here
that electoral behaviour should also be taken into account. The extent of electoral
availability- or openness to consider voting for di¤erent parties- can be seen as an
independent source of constraints. A measure of electoral availability is therefore
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selected (observed volatility), and problems of its validity are addressed before the
variation across countries and over time is presented and discussed. To capture the
accessibility of the parliamentary arena to new parties, it is argued that the number
of available voters is not su¢ cient, however. An indicator taking the electoral barrier
and the extent of availability into account is therefore suggested. Prior to testing
e¤ects of the accessibility barrier thus measured on party entry, the independent
e¤ects of the electoral system on this aspect of electoral behaviour is also investigated.
The concluding analyses are contained in Chapter 7. First, the ndings of each of
the chapters are summarized, and then the joint e¤ects of the barriers are assessed.
This is done in three ways; Firstly through a general multivariate analysis, where the
impact of individual barriers is assessed when the e¤ects of others are simultaneously
taken into account. Secondly, by investigating whether the barriers have synergistic
e¤ects and thirdly, by exploring the presence of non-linear, level dependent e¤ects.
After this, developments in barriers and party entry over time are described. Finally,
results of the statistical analyses are discussed. The limits of the model are evaluated
and the lessons learned from extreme cases of high and low barriers and poorly
predicted cases discussed to shed light on the statistical ndings. Finally, the value
of the results and the barrier indicators for further empirical work on the e¤ects of
political competition is assessed.
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Chapter 1
Political Competition: Theories,
Concepts and E¤ects
1.1 Usage, Ambiguity and Main Debates
Competition is used to refer to a wide array of phenomena in politics. It is used
in reference to the behaviour of individual or collective actors in di¤erent settings,
as well as to describe whole systems of interactions. In this way, the same term is
used to describe interest group politics, that are classied as competitive or non-
competitive, to distinguish democracies with competitive party systems from non-
democratic ones which lack this feature, to characterise specic democratic party
systems on the basis of the degree or nature of the competition occurring within it,
or to describe the behaviour of individual parties or candidates striving to gain votes,
positions, power or other prized items. It is obvious that the actual features of these
situations, that is the context, the observed behaviours and outcomes encompassed
by the same term, vary greatly.
However, not all applications of the term competition to politics will be consid-
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ered in the following. The context in which competition will be discussed here is
exclusively that provided by democratic elections to governing bodies of geograph-
ically bounded areas. This excludes for instance such aspects as the inter-action
of elites in non-democratic polities, the dynamics of interest group processes or in
short all political activities in which democratic elections do not play a central role
in determining the competition. But placing it within this context does not do away
with the ambiguity of competition. It just narrows its scope of application a bit.
Many authors discussing political competition thus refer to the democratic context
specied above, but di¤erences in conceptualisation of what this process means per-
sist. A number of scholars have addressed this problem; Strøm writes that Despite
general interest in competitive democracy. . . .discussions of political competition and
its consequences generally have proceeded without a clear and explicit conception of
their subject(Strøm, 1989a: 278). Bartolini seconds this perception when stating,
its [competition] exact theoretical connotations and the type of empirical phenom-
ena that it indicates are imprecise(Bartolini, 1999: 436) and Ware further comments
that the idea of competition itself is one which often generates much confusion in
discussions of democracy(Ware,1989: 1).
Most of the ambiguity and debate concerning competition just referred to appear
to stem from three sources; the rst arises from the fact that competition is used
to refer to phenomenon that can be distinguished analytically as well as empirically.
This problem could be addressed mainly by a linguistic exercise. That is, specifying
the di¤erent meanings intended and applying di¤erent terms to them.
The second source of ambiguity is contextual. It mainly stems from the wide-
spread use of terms and theories derived from the economic context to describe the
political arena. Commenting on this Ware writes, behind most theories of electoral
competition lies an analogy that is drawn from perfect competition in economics
(Ware, 1979: 35). Certainly, the economic-spatial analogy developed by Anthony
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Downs has been an abundant source of analogies. In the seminal work An Economic
Theory of Democracy, Downs explicitly used a spatial model of economic competi-
tion as the basis for the development of the political equivalent (Downs, 1957). Given
that economic theories make clear assumptions about the preferences and behaviour
of actors in competitive settings, it is also possible to deduce predictions pertaining
to the operation of the system as a whole. The expectation that competition furthers
benecial outcomes in the political arena as it does in the economic one stems from
such analogies. As Boyne put it, just as competition between rms in private mar-
kets is supposed to ensure the e¢ cient provision of services required by consumers, so
competition delivers the policies desired by the electorate(Boyne, 1998: 210). The
extent to which economic analogies are tenable and inform us of political realities is
highly controversial, however. While a great deal of confusion has denitely arisen
from careless application of economic terms, the literature seeking to compare and
contrast the political and economic systems has contributed to a clarication of the
meanings and consequences of competition in politics (Bartolini 1999, 2000; Strøm
1992a, 1992b; Ware 1989,1979, Miller, 1983).
A third source of confusion and debate relates to the role ascribed to competi-
tion in relation to democracy. At one level competition is conceived of as a dening
characteristic of democracy, not of direct democracy, but of the representative type.
One of the rst to attribute such a central role to competition was Schumpeter, who
by dening the democratic method as that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the peoples voteclearly emphasized the indispensable role
of competition for democracy (Schumpeter, 1954: 269). And similar positions can be
found in the writings of many other contemporary political thinkers. The following
statements illustrate this point well: the competitive electoral context, with several
political parties organizing the alternatives that face the voters, is the identifying
property of the contemporary democratic process(Powell, 1982: 3),to talk today
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about democracy is to talk about a system of competing political parties(Robert-
son, 1976: 1), democracy denotes a system of government that meets three essential
conditions: [the rst being] meaningful and extensive competition among individuals
and organized groups (especially political parties) for all e¤ective positions of gov-
ernment..(Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1988: xix-xxvii), modern political democracy
is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in
the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooper-
ation of their elected representatives(Schmitter & Karl 1991: 76). As Ware writes
even those who have rejected the Schumpeterian model have often argued that the
availability of alternative parties competing for power is a distinguishing feature of
democracy(Ware, 1989:1). One problem that arises in this connection is of a con-
ceptual nature where the distinction between democracy and competition becomes
blurry. Bartolini comments that the large conceptual overlap between democracy,
democratic electionand competition is problematic as it generates a great deal
of confusion, with the result that sometimes competition is equated with democracy
and vice versa(Bartolini, 1999: 446). What is meant by attributing competition
with a dening role is mostly the presence of contestable elections (c.f. below). But
placing competition at the core of democracy also has a normative dimension, where
the expected consequences of such interactions are evaluated in light of democratic
values. It is this type of expectations that motivate Elkins to say that `the measure-
ment of inter-party competition may be viewed as the critical procedural datum in
assessing the degree of democracyof a given system(Elkins, 1974: 682). In other
words, more competition means more democracy1.
The most positive representation of the e¤ects of competition is the Downsian
economic model, which predicts that it will lead to maximal responsiveness to the
1Schattschneider similarly conferred a key role to competition. He wrote, the peo-
ple are powerless if the political enterprise is not competitive. It is the competition of
political organizations that provides the people with the opportunity to make a choice
(Schattschneider, 1961: 137).
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popular will. The Schumpeterian perspective is more cautious. Competition is here
viewed more as a protective device that allows voters to hinder the development of
tyranny than as a measure to ensure actual responsiveness to preferences. The greater
scepticism is rooted in an unimpressed view of peoplesperformance in the political
realm. As Schumpeter claims the typical citizen drops to a lower level of mental
performance as soon as he enters the political eld, he argues and analyses in a way
which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interest2.
This perspective, which sees competition as an inadequate method for overcoming
asymmetries of power and knowledge between the electorate and the political elite,
nds support in the writings of many political theorists (Strøm, 1992: 381-83)3. As
Ware writes Party competition may contribute towards the democratic character of
a regime, but if it were the only element of popular input into the decision making
of the state, it would surely constitute a very limited form of democracy. Party
competition cannot be equated with Democracy(Ware, 1989: 21). Finally there are
also political theorists that perceive competition not only as inadequate, but as a
directly negative feature distorting rather than improving the political process (e.g.
Mansbridge, 1983).
The possible e¤ects of political competition have not been a moot point conned
to theoretical debates, however, but have inspired a considerable amount of empirical
research. A number of scholars have sought to dene and measure competition
empirically with an eye to identifying positive - or negative - e¤ects, as well as its
2cited in Miller (1983:138)
3Janowitz and Marvick, for instance, emphasize voters ability to choose as well as the
quality of the political elite as determining factors for the outcome of competition. They
write Political Competition makes it possible for the people to choose between alternative
leadders who appeal for the privilege of representing them. If the alternative is a choice be-
tween demagogues, the electorate su¤ers; If the choice is between statesmen, the electorate
gains. The quality of results is not guaranteed by the presence of competition. Under
modern conditions, competitive elections increasingly have the potentiality of becoming
devices of mass manipulation and increasing di¢ culties are encountered in producing the
political consensus necessary for e¤ective government in modern society (1955-56)
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causes. As will be discussed below, a review of this literature reveals on the one hand
relatively congruous conceptions and measurements of competition among scholars
studying di¤erences within political units in the U.S., but also a scarcity of studies
that compare competition across di¤erent national systems as well as signicant
di¤erences in conceptualization and measurement among these.
1.2 Empirical Studies: E¤ects, Causes and Mea-
sures
An obvious di¢ culty in gaining an overview of the empirical studies of political com-
petition is related to the vagueness of the concept, as discussed above. Just about
any study of democratic politics can be classied as a study of political competition.
The attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of empirical work exploring the
causes and e¤ects of competition is therefore to some extent doomed at the out-
set. However, before discussing the theoretical models of competition, it is useful to
briey examine the works that explicitly use the term political competition, dene
the concept and attempt to capture variation in this across political units. In the fol-
lowing a brief description of the types of outcomes and preconditions that have been
linked to greater competitiveness will rst be presented. Afterwards, the di¤erences
in conceptualization and measurement will be discussed.
A number of studies use competition as an explanatory factor to explain dif-
ferences in outcomes. Most of these rely on the argument that increased competi-
tion leads to greater responsivenessof politicians to the interests of the electorate.
Such responsiveness can arguably manifest itself in greater economic growth (Strøm,
1989b, Mesquito et al, 2001), higher levels of public spending, redistribution or gener-
ally liberal policies (Barilleaux, 1997; Holbrook &Van Dunk, 1993; Comiskey, 1993),
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lower levels of corruption (Coppedge, 1993; Meier & Holbrook, 1992; Grzymala-Buss,
2003) or result in general rather than narrow subsidies to industry (Verdier, 1995).
Some argue, however, that it is doubtful whether competition can be directly linked
to certain outcomes and see its e¤ects mediated by its context. This context can
be dened in terms of political cleavages. Jennings, for instance, argues along these
lines when he says that class-based and non-class based political competition pro-
duces quite di¤erent sets of welfare policy outcomes(Jennings, 1979:427). In one
study the idea that e¤ects are mediated by context is explicitly incorporated since
the e¤ect of competition is expected to be a reduction of the e¤ect of party ideology
on policies (Boyne, 1998)4.
Apart from directly inuencing policy outcomes, several have argued that it en-
hances the democratic process by leading to greater media attention and thus higher
levels of awareness and knowledge (e.g. Kahn & Kenney, 1999). Likewise several
studies have linked competition to higher turnout at elections (Wilnger & Rosen-
stone, 1980; Hofstetter, 1973; Lane, 1959; Holbrook & Van Dunk; Quaile, 1993; Hill
& Leighley, 1993). In addition to its intrinsic value, some argue that higher turnout is
conducive to higher responsiveness by enlarging the group whose interest the elected
need to consider (Hofstetter,1973; Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993). It is also discussed
that competition can have a positive e¤ect on popular perception of legitimacy and
satisfaction with democracy, as well as reduce alienation and social tensions. Typi-
cally it is the alternation in power of di¤erent parties that is supposed to have such
e¤ects on popular attitudes (see Elkins, 1974). Not all propose that the e¤ects of
competition lie in greater responsiveness or in a more involved and satised citizenry.
Some have instead linked it to higher campaign spending (Rosenthal, 1995) or simply
to greater turnover of party leadership (Strøm, 1993). But it is evident that there is
4Boyne argues that competition does not have an independent substantive e¤ect. As
he writes competition is simply the vehicle, not the driver, and has only a mediative, not
an additive e¤ect(Boyne,1998:211)
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a clear tendency to propose that competition engenders a number of positive e¤ects
related to electoral attitudes as well as the quality of the representation.
Finally, there are studies that investigate why there are di¤erences in competitive-
ness. Some look at the socio-economic conditions conducive to the type of electoral
behaviour necessary to sustain competitive parties. Both the extent of vote switching
and the balance of preferences for di¤erent party alternatives are at stake. Greater
diversity, urbanization, the size of the population, the degree of wealth and level of
education have for example been examined as determinants for greater competitive-
ness (e.g. Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Dye, 1966; Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Patterson &
Caldeira, 1984; Strøm1989b; Koetzle, 1998). Electoral behaviour is not the only pos-
sible determinant, however. The organisational strength of the parties themselves,
the costs of campaigning or ability to raise funds is also used to explain competitive-
ness or the lack thereof (Abramovitz, 1991; Barilleaux, 1986; Patterson and Caldeira,
1984).
Reviewing comparative studies on di¤erences in competition across political units
within the U.S. reveals a fundamental agreement in the approach taken by scholars in
the eld, although there is considerable variety in the concrete measures proposed5.
The harmony consists in the denition of competition as some form of closenessor
equalityin size of the competing parties, which is supposed to capture the degree of
competitive pressure parties are under. The variation between the studies lies mainly
in whether closeness of competing parties is measured in seats or votes, as well as
what unit of analysis is chosen - that is, state or district level (casting candidate or
party in the role of the competitor), legislature or government (see Holbrook & Van
Dunk,1993; Barrilleaux, 1998 for a discussion of these di¤erences). Another source
5Studies of competition in the U.S. include Stokes and Iversen, 1962; Dawson&Robinson,
1963; Hofstetter,1973; Elkins, 1974; Ray& Havick, 1981; Westlye, 1983; Barriellaux,
1986,1997; Jacobson, 1987; Schantz, 1987; Banks, 1989; Squire, 1989; Abramovitz, 1991;
Ansolabehere, Brady & Fiorina, 1992; Hill&Leighly, 1993; Berry&Canon, 1993; Aistrup,
1993; Holbrook&Van Dunk, 1993; Koetzle, 1998; Kahn&Kenney, 1999).
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of variation concerns whether closeness of competitors can be captured only by the
proximity in votes/seats won, the rate of observed turn-over, or whether the extent
of vote swings and thereby the potential for change in distribution at upcoming
elections should also be considered (see Elkins,1974; Jacobson, 1987).
When we move to cross-national studies of competition, the commonalities dwin-
dle, however. There are relatively few studies that use a cross-national research
design in studies of political competition. Firstly, some studies investigate e¤ects of
political competition, but in reality they employ measures that are identical to or
closely resemble those that dene democracy. For instance, two recent studies claim
that political competition leads to more responsive political performance - measured
by economic growth and redistribution. Both, however, employ measures which in-
clude the extent of the franchise and observance of the democratic rules of the game
(Mesquita et al., 2001; Pinto & Timmons, 2005)6. But there are also a number of
studies that examine di¤erences in competitiveness within the group of democratic
countries. First, there are some studies that use a very simple measure of compe-
tition, namely the number of elections held. The more frequent the elections, so
the argument goes, the more competitive pressure there is on those who govern to
respond to votersinterests (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Swank, 1988). A less simple ap-
proach inspired by the Americanmethod equates competitiveness with the evenness
with which the popular vote is divided between parties. Greater equality between
the competitors is seen as a guarantee that none of the actors can dominate and has
been used in a number of studies trying to link competitiveness with redistribution
(e.g. Swank, 1983; Hicks and Swank, 1985). A di¤erent type of equalityis sought by
Verdier in a study linking competition to more responsive policies. Instead of look-
ing at the equality of the distribution of votes between the parties, he is concerned
with the correspondence between the vote share and the share of government. The
6The study by Mesquita et al. also employs a measure of alternation to measure di¤er-
ences in competition, however.
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ideal competitive situation is dened by a perfect correspondence between the two,
that is equality between vote share and share of government time (Verdier, 1995).
A more complex approach to the concept is taken by Strøm, who identies three
dimensions/measures of competitiveness, namely electoral volatility, incumbency ef-
fect and alternation. He argues that there is no adequate single measure of electoral
competitiveness in multi-party systemsand it is therefore necessary to use a battery
of three indicators design to capture di¤erent dimensions of electoral competitive-
ness(Strøm, 1989b: 6). Volatility indicates the changes in support from one party
to the next, and according to Strøm, increases the competition for votes between
parties (as also discussed in the Americanliterature). With respect to incumbency,
he argues that elections are more contestable - i.e. open to entry of outsiders -
if voters tend to shift away from incumbents (governments) than if the opposite is
the case. Finally, observed alternation in government also signies a dimension of
competitiveness, as governments have a risk of losing power and the opposition an
opportunity to win it. However, a signicant problem in the approach taken is that
the intercorrelations of the three indicators are very low, and Strøm also writes that
this indicates that they are really separate dimensions(Strøm, 1989b: 10). In an-
other study where Strøm examines the causes of competition rather than its e¤ects,
he adds other dimensions and indicators to the above-mentioned. The dimension of
contestability is again included, but here it refers to how easily new/small parties can
get access to the electoral market. This is measured by the strength of the electoral
system and by the fractionalization of the party system (supposed to result from the
former) (Strøm, 1989a: 283). Also in addition to alternation, he includes a measure
of responsiveness denoting the proportion of winnersamong parties participating
in the rst government formed after an election. Winners are dened as those who
have increased their share of seats or simply any absolute majority. Finally, he in-
cludes volatility, but this time not measured in terms of votes but of seats. Each
of the indicators chosen has a clear logic behind it, but due to the low correlation
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between them, and the lack of some form of hierarchy of importance, it is di¢ cult to
clearly distinguish systems that are highly competitive from those that are not. A
more unied approach to measuring competition in multi-party systems is taken by
Comiskey in his study of the impact of political competition on public spending. Like
Strøm he employs di¤erent indicators of competition, but all are aimed at capturing
the extent of closeness of competitors. The uniqueness in the approach taken lies
in his critique that parties are commonly assumed to be the competitors, but that
for many multiparty systems it is more appropriate to regard coalitions of parties as
the true competitors. The measures he suggests reect the closeness of competing
parties or coalitions in terms of vote as well as their alternation in power.
The existence of di¤erent dimensions of competition and the multiplicity of pos-
sible indicators proposed to capture the degree of competitive pressure exerted on
political representatives - especially in cross-national research - make it necessary to
consult the theoretical basis for competition theory, in order identify an appropriate
model on which the empirical study of competition can be built.
1.3 Theoretical Models of Competition
Several theoretical models have - directly or indirectly - been used or referred to
in analyses of competition in the democratic context. In the following, the salient
features of these will be presented and their suitability for empirical comparative
studies of competition assessed. The rst two are based on the economic models
of competition, the third draws on game theory and the nal one is developed in a
discussion of competition in a political context.
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1.3.1 Non-spatial economic analogies
The economic conception of competition, which as mentioned has exerted a profound
inuence on the study of politics, rests primarily on a number of strong assumptions
concerning agency. The agent, economic man, has thus been endowed by theory
with a number of attributes and preferences that render his behaviour predictable.
In brief, he is rational, which means that he seeks to maximize his own utility, and
furthermore by virtue of being perfectly informed, he consistently chooses the most
e¤ective means available to achieve this end. A number of ancillary assumptions con-
cerning the exogenous origin of preferences, their consistency and transitive nature
also form part of the theory7. Depending on the structural features of the market in
which this agency is expressed, di¤erent models of competition can be deduced.
The paradigm case is that of perfect competitionand references to the laud-
able e¤ects of competition typically refer to this model. To realize the projected
perfection in markets, a number of structural conditions have to be met, however.
The most prominent of these being a uniform, as well as rival and excludable prod-
uct, a very high number of both buyers and sellers in the market, no costs of entry
for new suppliers, and no externalities in the transaction8. When these conditions
are met, minimum cost production is ensured. Moreover, if perfectly competitive
markets exist for all goods and services in the economy, a Pareto optimal allocation
7Preferences are conceived as exogenously given, meaning that they cannot be inuenced
by factors within the competitive system. The consistency of preferences implies that the
same choice is alwasy repeated when identical options and circumstances present themselves
and nally, transitive preferences means that preferences can be compared and prioritised.
8A good is rival, when its consumption by someone prevents others from likewise con-
suming it, and excludable means it is possible to prevent someone else from consuming it.
An apple is typical example of a rival and excludable good while listening to the BBC in
Londin is not. For non-rival goods, adding an extra consumer doesnt cost the producer
anything and competition will force the price changed towards zero. For non-excludable
goods the market fails do to free-riding. No externalities means that costs and benets of
transactions are carried exclusively by suppliers and buyers, its presence can sead to over-
or under production of a good.
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of resources in society would obtain without the necessity of any central planning.
In addition to creating perfect responsiveness to individual consumer interests, it is
this capacity of perfect competition to produce a perfect order out of thousands of
uncoordinated individual actions that makes it so enticing9. As Bartolini comments,
competition is legitimized from the collective point of view through its capacity to
overcome tensions between subjective and objective goals(Bartolini, 1999: 441).
An attempt to systematically apply this model of competition to the political
arena is practically doomed to fail, however. Behavioural assumptions aside, and
even disregarding the lack of an equivalent to price in politics and the fact prefer-
ences are inevitably expressed more crudely (one vote summarizing preferences for
many di¤erent policies and behaviours), there is not a single one of the structural
assumptions pertaining to the perfect market which would bear comparison. Clearly,
the producto¤ered by the political equivalents of suppliers is neither uniform, nor
can it be described as rival and excludable; there are clear externalities involved in
the transaction, the number of suppliers is not very high, and nally few would con-
tend that there are no costs of entry in politics. Held to these standards, competition
in politics could ex ante be labelled a paradigm case of market failure.
While perfect competition may have given rise to analogies used for electoral com-
petition, there is also an absence of works that explicitly draw on this framework. To
the extent that the model has played a role, it has more been as a provider of justi-
cation for competition, than as a framework supplying concrete ideas for empirical
work. Some of its individual features appear in theoretical and empirical work on
politics, however. Primarily it is the emphasis on barriers to entry, a property which
is not exclusive to perfect competition, however, but is shared by other economic
models. The signicance of barriers lies in the projected e¤ects of costs of entry on
the e¢ ciency of established suppliers in the market. The higher the costs of entry, the
9Conditions are described in Begg, Dornbush and Fisher (1994) and Penguin Dictionary
of Economics (1992)
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more opportunity existing suppliers have for colluding on sub-optimal performance
standards (lower quality/higher prices) without risking that new suppliers enter to
take over their market shares. A second feature also related to the possibilities for
collusion is the number of suppliers. The number of suppliers is at times used as
a proxy for low barriers in economic analysis (Williamson, 1975). The reason for
this is that when the number of suppliers is very high, collusive strategies would be
di¢ cult to make and enforce. Therefore, even with high costs of entry we can expect
that suppliers perform optimally when their number is very high. In the study by
Strøm, referred to above, barriers to entry were sought captured both by the size of
the electoral system as well as by the degree of fragmentation of the party systems -
an approach which is reminiscent of these arguments, although no explicit reference
to this is made (Strøm, 1989a). The approach is not unproblematic, however, as the
numbers in most party systems would still give ample opportunity for negotiating
collusive agreements. In markets with a high number of suppliers, the numbers are
typically so high that it is practically impossible to reach agreements, and at the
same time keep them out of the public eye. But with numbers around 5-10, it is
probably not practical feasibility that prevents such deals from being struck although
they may of course be di¢ cult to keep for other reasons. One other work, namely
that of Verdier, appears to refer to the model of perfect economic competition when
he denes his political equivalent. He writes, In a perfectly competitive electoral
system, a partys percentage of time in government should be proportional to its
share of the popular vote. Any gross deviation from this strict equality indicates a
slide towards political monopoly(Verdier, 1995: 25). The model of perfect compe-
tition proposed is juxtaposed to its opposite, namely the monopoly. At one level the
thinking is entirely logical. If a party claims the prize of government disproportion-
ate to how much it is in demand, then one can say that peoples preferences for the
composition of government are not met. Perfect competition is equated with perfect
responsiveness, which in turn is interpreted as parties-in-government proportionate
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to parties-demanded. Realizing of course that it is not possible to have a political
system that responds to all electoral preferences at the same time, Verdier suggests
a measure which estimates the correspondence of a partys time in government with
its share of the votes. To devise meaningful estimates longer time periods are there-
fore needed. The problems in this approach arise from the fact that Verdier does
not consider how the measure corresponds to incentives conferred upon parties. Per-
fectly stable collusive systems, where government power is shared among the parties
emerge as perfectly competitive. Switzerland, where the main parties distribute the
government post between themselves according to a xed-formula and arguably co-
operate rather than compete, would score high on the index. Moreover, estimates
can hide variation in structures within time periods. It does not distinguish between
systems with stable monopolisticperiods, where one or a group of parties is securely
in power, followed by a shift to another party or coalition, and those where shifts
in governing parties or coalitions are a regular occurrence. As Milder comments in
work of an earlier date, the Most competitive situation is not just one in which the
two parties have an equal length of time in o¢ ce, but one in which they also take
turns in being in o¢ ce(Milder, 1974: 441).
Due to the blatant incongruence between the assumptions of perfect competition
and the reality of political systems, particularly with respect to numbers and product
di¤erentiation, some authors have suggested that oligopolistic competition provides
a more suitable analogy (Ware, 1974). For oligopolies, there is, however, no single
theory, since the behaviour of oligopolistic rms is determined by the reaction and
behaviour of their rivals, and the assumptions they make about those reactions
(Bannock et al., 1992: 312). It is therefore a more demanding approach and more
di¢ cult to derive precise predictions on the basis thereof. Application of a model
of oligopolistic competition to politics has, to my knowledge, only been carried out
within the framework of spatial theory, however. The assumptions and empirical
applications of that model will be discussed below.
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1.3.2 The Spatial Model
The economic model that is widely applied to the political context is not that of stan-
dard economic competition, but rather that of economic competition in space. This
model was developed by Anthony Downs in his seminal work An Economic Theory
of Democracy(1957). In it, Downs constructs political spaceby hypothesizing that
all political issues can be ordered on a linear scale running from zero to one hundred.
In other words he assumes that every issue can be placed on one dimension, which
he denes to be how much government intervention in the economy should there
be?(Downs, 1957: 116). This dimension is meant to capture the political positions
associated with what is commonly known as the right- and the left-wing. By giving
it the denition of how much.., Downs makes it conceptually possible to think of
these policies as points on an ordinal scale. This move was ingenious in removing
fundamental conceptual problems involved in comparing products o¤ered by rms in
the economy with policies promised and adopted by parties and governments. The
spatial conception thus paved the way for analyses of party competition employing
instruments from the economic tool-kit (and sharing its assumptions on agency).
Building on this conception, it is assumed that voters can identify a preferred
point on this scale. Furthermore they are expected to know where each party is
located, which requires the actorsperception of the space to be the same. Moreover
each voter is expected to give the party representing the position closest to their
ideal point their vote, which is dubbed the proximity assumption. Regarding the
conguration of voters individual utility proles, these are assumed to be single
peaked and symmetrical, which means that they have a single highest position and
that they decline on either side of this optimal point. This is particularly crucial since
without single-peakedness it would be impossible to create summary measures of the
electorates views as a whole (Dunleavy & Ward, 1991: 92). And the construction of
such representations the aggregate distribution of preferences (ADP) is crucial
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for the modelsability to predict the structure of competition that develops. In the
basic model that Downs constructs the ADP is presented as being similar to a normal
distribution that is with one peak and declining on each side.
Party competition under these conditions consists of a strategic positioning on a
given point on the scale in order to maximise the number of votes. If two parties
compete under these conditions, the model predicts that they will converge with
respect to their policy platforms toward the median voter, which is dened as the
voter with exactly the same number of people holding more left-wing as right-wing
attitudes on each side. When preferences are unidimensional the median voter is
also a Condorcet winner that is an alternative that cannot be beat by any other.
Since a partys movement away from this point will cause a loss of votes to the rival
party, it is expected that competition will induce the two parties to approach this
position. Downsmodel in this way confers a number of benecial properties to the
process of competition. It predicts that parties will be perfectly constrained by the
popular will and thus o¤ers a model for realising a perfectly responsive democratic
leadership. The median voter outcome will minimise the aggregate policy distance
between the electorate and government and in this way preferences according to
Downs are represented in the best possible way. Furthermore, as Strøm points out,
the model also has the two additional virtuesof securing moderation as parties are
concerned with winning the support of voters in the centre, and of policy continuity
between successive governments, even if these are formed by di¤erent parties. This
is because both parties converge in equilibrium and because this position tightly
constrains their behaviour in government. Hence all governments should pursue
identical policies. The only cause of policy di¤erences between government would be
changes in voter preferences over time(Strøm, 1992: 379).
The model outlined above is simple in its basic assumptions and is therefore
also clear in its results. However, when more complexity is added to the model,
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deviation from the median voter as well as lack of stability is predicted. Factors
related to the electoral preferences and decision making such as rational abstention
or non-single-peaked ADP curves, as well as the competitive conditions such as
threat of entry and more than two parties all give rise to deviations from the median
voter outcomes likely (Dunleavy & Ward, 1991: 94). Furthermore, with more than
two parties the predictability and stability of outcomes is diminished since pure
political competition over seats or votes need have no Nash equilibrium [reecting
a position/strategy none of the actors have an incentive to move away from] with
three or more parties(Schoeld, 1997: 279). The picture is further complicated by
the admission of more than a single dimension. And the obvious point to make in
this regard is that there is no reason to assume that there is only one dimension
in politics (e.g. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Laver & Hunt, 1992; Budge, Robertson
& Hearl, 1987). The most important departure from the one dimensional model is
that a median need not exist in two dimensions. That is, when there is more than
one dimension a median outcome may not be possible regardless of voter and party
behaviour (Mckelvey, 1986). Another consequence of multiple dimensions is that it
opens up the question of salience. As Laver writes If we characterise a party system
in terms of a single dimension of ideology, then the salience of this dimension is
not a relevant issue. . . .Once we move beyond a single dimension we cannot avoid
consideration of the changes in party competition that may be produced by changes
in the relative salience of the policy dimensions(Laver, 1989: 319). The e¤ects
of this, he suggests, is to make electoral competition the interaction of conicting
attempts to manipulate the salience of particular issue dimensions that are favourable
to particular parties(ibid.). This perspective departs from the basic tenet of the
spatial model, where space is xed given by voter preferences that are exogenous to
the system of party competition.
The second set of complications arises when the model is confronted with the
institutional context of real political systems. That is probably the main reason why
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so little empirical work has been done in this area. Ordeshook remarks that spatial
analysis has moved only modestly beyond modelling the simplest possibilities two-
candidate plurality rule elections, exogenously imposed amendment voting agendas
and the formation of majority parliamentary coalitionsand furthermore that there
is precious little generalized theory about alternative institutional structure or expe-
rience with applying elements of spatial theory to more complex political systems
(Ordeshook, 1997: 247-8).
However, he does contend that simple majoritarian processes, even if they do
not yield Condorcet winners, or some other simple equilibrium of strategies, generate
powerful incentives for the approximate convergence of policy by the two candidates
or parties that are assumed to be competing(Ordeshook, 1997: 256). This e¤ect
depends on the electoral system, however. Schoeld, commenting on the British
context, is more cautious and concludes that a form of weak convergencerather
than the strong Downsian conversionis to be expected (Schoeld, 1997: 278).
Instead he asserts that in order for the median voter convergence forces to operate
optimally, a PR-system (as it implies low barriers to entry) with only two parties is
required (Schoeld, 1997: 294). However, this particular situation is highly unlikely
to arise since PR-systems tend to be associated with multiparty systems. In a mul-
tiparty system the outcome does not follow directly from electoral results, and the
process of government formation must therefore also be considered (Laver, 1989). In
one of the few studies that try to use the spatial framework in a comparative analy-
sis of government formation, Laver and Hunt only nd core parties in one country,
namely Sweden (but also in Belgium given that parties belonging to either of the two
language wings only go into government together), but here it is found that it does
enter government. But in the many that do not have a core party, the approach has
much less to say about party composition of the eventual government(Laver & Hunt,
1990:99). Testing the predictions of the spatial model is inherently di¢ cult. For as
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Laver and Hunt point out such testing depends upon assuming a policy space of a
certain dimensionality. Yet, as we have seen, there is no very satisfactory manner of
estimating the dimensionality of any policy(Laver & Hunt, 1990: 119).
Apart from the di¢ culties that arise in application, when the basic features of the
spatial model are accepted, a number of problems also arise from the assumptions of
the theory itself. While I cannot go into details with these here, I think it is worth
mentioning a few of them. First, to construct the ADP curve that is essential for
the spatial model it must be assumed that voters have symmetrical utility proles.
This can, however, be seriously questioned. In fact Dunleavy and Ward contend
there is absolutely no reason to suppose that a majority of voters have symmetrical
utility proles(Dunleavy & Ward, 1991: 92). With multi-peaked preferences, the
proximity assumption of spatial theory is hence called into question. Each person
might have di¤erently shaped indi¤erence curve contours and the party which parties
are considered close would vary from one person to another. The second set of
considerations arises from the di¤erences that are likely to exist between actors in
the perception of space. In fact the extent to which relevant decision-makers can
be said to operate within the same spatial conceptual frameworkcan be questioned
(Ordeshook, 1997: 250). Furthermore, in the case of multidimensionality, Laver
and Hunt point out that the rst sweeping assumption that tends to be made by
many theorists is that every individual in the system trades o¤ the various policy
dimensions in the same way. . . If we do not make such an assumption, then there
are as many di¤erent maps of the system as there are sets of relative weights of the
dimensions and manners of trading these o¤ ultimately as many di¤erent maps
as there are individuals (Laver & Hunt 1990: 18). And in fact they claim that
there is strong evidence that di¤erent actors do in fact attach di¤erent weight to
di¤erent ideological dimensions. This suggests the use of a single spatial map of
any policy system is a considerable oversimplication(ibid.). Thirdly, and most
importantly, there is the question of what the points on the scales refer to. The
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meaning of points in between is described by indi¤erence relations between the other
points in the system. But as Ordeshook points out the whole issue of convergence
to centrist policies hinges on what such policies actually consist in. Hence he says
that the validity of centrist policy outcome depends on the assumption that such
policies exist(Ordeshook, 1997: 259). To my knowledge, no one has properly tried to
address this question. Finally, on a related note, there is a highly uneasy relationship
between the spatial scales and redistributory motives. As Ordeshook comments,
if voters conceptualize policy in redistributional terms so one persons gain can
only come at the expense of someone else, the usual spatial representation may
be inappropriate. When the things a government supplies are perfectly divisible,
transferable and in constant supply, we can require one dimension for every person or
household to represent preferences and ideal points are widely scattered and located
on the vertices of the constraint that denes feasible policy. In this event there
is no reason to suppose that candidates or parties converge to anything. . . .the only
prediction we can o¤er about nal outcomes is that each candidate tries to form some
majority coalition and proposes to expropriate all things from those excluded from
the coalition(Ordeshook, 1997: 260). While the above comment depicts an extreme
situation, it touches on a crucial point. A party may thus both represent some sort
of median point of the scale of liberal versus interventionist economic policies, and at
the same time favour large subsidies for the farmers that traditionally vote for them.
If in government the subsidies are likely to be implemented, but they are hardly a
median outcome in the spatial sense.
Naturally, this brief discussion does not do justice to the theory and range of
literature on spatial competition, but it should be su¢ cient to lend support to the
few basic conclusions relevant for the development of this research project. The rst
is that it is extremely di¢ cult to use the spatial framework for cross country com-
parisons of competitive performance. The number of specic conditions necessary
to arrive at the essential median voter prediction is unlikely to be met in very many
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countries or in any one for that matter. Furthermore the notion of median voter is
elusive both in theoretical terms as well as when trying to captureit empirically.
The assumptions on both party and voter behaviour predicts responsiveness, but
the problems of operationalizing the spatial framework create problems for render-
ing it plausible that the virtue the competitive interaction is supposed to engender,
namely responsiveness, is indeed achieved. It often appears to operate as an im-
plicit assumption rather than a fact to be proved. That is, in the studies referred to
above, the party which the median voter casts her vote for is by denition seen as
responsive to this voter. Two studies, by Huber and Powell (1994) and Powell and
Vanberg (2000) respectively, investigate the responsivenessthesis empirically. Here
the self-placement of voters on a left-right scale is correlated with expert placements
of the governing parties on the same scale. The somewhat surprising nding is that
the multiparty and PR electoral systems tend to produce more congruence than two
party majoritarian ones. The dimension of identiability of future government at
election time separated from other dimensions appears to prevent rather than foster
congruence (Huber & Powell, 1994). However, since the problems involved with re-
gard to dimensionality of the political systems are not overcome, I think this is not
a fruitful avenue for research on the e¤ects of competition.
Finally, competition in the spatial conceptualisation is fundamentally a descrip-
tion of party behaviour in seeking votes and o¢ ce. For instance, if one party con-
sistently wins the majority or is placed at the median and is consequently always
represented in government then the logic of the spatial framework forces us to view
its position as the result of competition. The result of having two parties alternating
should yield the same outcome, namely the median. The spatial model therefore
o¤ers no real way of seeing political systems as either more or less competitive. That
is, unless the two party model with two close competitors is seen as the perfect com-
petition and deviations from this, whatever their cause, as less competitive. But
then the theory does not o¤er any guidance for how to measure it in terms of degrees
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of competitiveness.
1.3.3 A Game Theoretical Model
The next model of competition draws explicitly on game theory. It therefore lies close
to the economic models in terms of basic notions of agency, but in the adaptation
o¤ered by Strøm, he focuses on its structural features and discusses how these may
apply to the political context. As in the other models, a central feature is the issue
of barriers and the costs of entry, which is presumed to inuence the incentives of
those already playing the game. Strøm writes, Political contestability constrains..
each player to take into account the options of any potential competitors. For those
who deal in votes, that means pleasing voters enough to keep out new parties and
candidates(Strøm, 1992). However, he goes on to specify, easy entry is no guar-
antee for competitive politics. Instead, he argues that it signies potential, rather
than actual competition(Strøm, 1989: 279). Strøm then uses the term situational
competitivenessto refer to competition proper separate from the dimension of con-
testability, i.e. the question of barriers to entry. The framework is provided by game
theory and the application he proposes di¤ers from the models described above by
being explicitly concerned with structures conferring incentives on suppliersrather
than with a complete modelling of the competitive interactions and their results. It
is therefore a model, which approaches competition not simply as a set behavioural
trait that under certain circumstances leads to specic outcomes, but rather as a
property that varies in intensity according to the structures in place.
Strøm describes three factors, which inuence the incentives faced by the players
in a game and thus the degree of competition between them. As he writes: Compet-
itiveness..pertains to the strategies, states of nature and payo¤s of particular games.
This is further claried as follows: situational competitiveness has three dimensions:
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payo¤ variability, strategy determinacy, and player indeterminacy. Payo¤ variability
refers to the variation of payo¤s to the various players across their sets of strategies.
The more variation of payo¤s, the greater the competitiveness. Strategy determinacy
refers to the extent to which strategy choice, rather than states of nature, a¤ects the
payo¤s for each player. The more strategy choice matters relative to states of nature,
the more competitive the game. Player determinacy refers to the extent to which the
payo¤ distribution systematically favours certain players over others(Strøm, 1992:
385-386).
The conceptualisation has two distinct advantages. Firstly, if we wish to study
the e¤ects of competition in democratic politics, it is an advantage that competition
is not dichotomized, but rather conceived as present in di¤erent degrees of strength.
Secondly, while the model is abstract and non-contextualised, it is directly applicable
to political realities that are widely perceived to impact political processes.
Payo¤ variability (PV), or simply how much can be gained or lost, is for instance
not the same in all democratic regimes. In some countries the di¤erence between
winning and losing is between control of government and being completely outside
inuence. In other systems access to the rewards o¢ ce and inuence is not an either
or, but contains many shades of grey. Parties outside government may still wield con-
siderable policy inuence and sometimes government o¢ ces are widely shared among
the parties yielding few real losers. Such di¤erences can arise from party behaviour,
in which case they may be challenged by new parties aided by the electorate, but
they may also simply result from a constitutional design that divides power across
institutions10.
The second dimension is that of strategy determinacy (SD). In simpler terms, it
poses the question of how much it matters what parties do for what they achieve.
10This di¤erence is for instance discussed by Lijphart and captured in the distinction
between consensus and majoritarian democracies (Lijphart, 1997)
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This touches on a number of crucial questions primarily concerning voter behaviour
that are neglected in the economic models. By assuming rationality - or some variant
thereof - it is simply taken for granted that parties can win through adopting strate-
gies that are to votersliking. However, if voters, for instance, identify strongly with
certain parties, the attempt to win more votes may accomplish little more than alien-
ate the original electoral base. The question is not only quantitative, however, but
also touches on the question of what strategies lead to the desired outcomes. Once
the possibility that voters may not respond rationally to what parties o¤er is opened
up, the questions of whether viable strategies are cosmeticones (such as changing
the image of the party, increasing campaign spending, selecting a charismatic leader
gure etc.) or substantial (changing positions on policy issues, combating corrup-
tion etc.) emerge. If voter rationality is not assumed, the outcomes of competitive
incentives cannot be specied in advance. It is therefore an open question whether
increased competitiveness leads to better or poorer political performance.
The nal dimension of situational competitiveness identied by Strøm is the
degree of equality of opportunity to winand the closeness of the electoral race,
which he calls player determinacy (PD). The dimension addresses the question of
whether any other party than the actual incumbents have a real chance of winning
(Strøm, 1992: 386-390). This dimension is identical to that employed in the American
literature, as discussed above. The theory is that the closer non-incumbents are to
potentially winning, and the more present the threat of losing is to incumbents, the
more likely are they to exert e¤ort, that is to act in ways that can secure them the
outcome.
The main drawback of the model is that it is neither discussed how the three
dimensions interact with each other nor how they relate to the underlying dimension
of contestability. That is whether it is possible to have maximal competitiveness
on all dimensions simultaneously or in fact how to interpret di¤erent patterns 
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say high PV, low SD, high PD with low PV, low SD, high PD. In combination
with contestability it theoretically yields 8 possible patterns. With di¤erent possible
patterns, how do we prioritize them in terms of importance? On this question, Strøm
is silent. It can be argued, however, that if strategy determinacy (the possibility to
inuence outcome) is low/absent - for whatever reason - then high pay-o¤ variability
and low player determinacy (i.e. close race) will make absolutely no di¤erence to
outcomes. That is, unless we assume that the actors make more e¤ort to respond
to electoral interests even if such e¤orts will have no e¤ect. This would seem highly
irrational, however. Moreover, regarding pay-o¤ variability, it is easy to see that no
payo¤ variability undermines the incentives to make an e¤ort. However, are actors
expected to try harderwhen there is greater payo¤ variability? In order to support
such an argument it seems assumptions have to be made which relate e¤ort costs
to expected utility. For instance if the e¤ort costshave a maximum which is always
below the lowest expected utility can it then still be expected that increases in utility
will have the e¤ect of increasing e¤ort or will maximal e¤ort not always be made?
These points are important, since the indicators of the di¤erent dimensions of are
unlikely to co-vary. This was also a problem in Strøms empirical studies referred to
above. Although none of these was a direct application of this model, they contained
elements of it. Before exploring these points further, however, the nal contextual
model developed by Bartolini will be discussed.
1.3.4 A Four-dimensional Contextual Model
The next conceptualisation of political competition is the highly contextualized
model proposed by Bartolini. Unlike the other models, it is developed in a di-
aloguewith political realities, and aims to identify those features of democratic
systems that would be conducive to responsive outcomes. Bartolini identies four
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conditions or dimensions that can play this role. As he writes if politico-electoral
competition is meant to grant the unintended value of political responsiveness, then,
in both logical and empirical terms, the following conditions need to be met: (1)
electoral contestability; (2) electoral availability of the voters; (3) decidability of the
electoral or policy o¤er; and (4) electoral vulnerability of the incumbents(Bartolini,
1999: 454-55). The dimensions overlap somewhat with Strøms model, but there are
signicant di¤erences.
The dimension of contestability is conceptualized in a way that is congruent with
the approach taken by Strøm, and is also associated with potential rather than actual
competition. The di¤erence in the treatment of contestability here is twofold. On
the one hand, contestability is directly discussed in relation to its impact on the
other dimensions of competition (c.f. below). On the other, potentially benecial as
well harmful e¤ects accruing from variation in contestability are considered. While
it is recognized that high barriers to entry facilitates collusion between parties, it is
considered that such collusion may stabilize the functioning of the political unit and
even preserve it - at least in the context of certain electoral preferences.
The second dimension is electoral availability. Some degree of willingness to
substitute parties for each other, expressed as electoral availability, constitutes a
prerequisite for having competition at all. This means that availability, much like
contestability, can be interpreted as a precondition to rather than competition proper.
It is also presented as an indicator of openness of the market on the demand side,
while contestability signies openness of the market on the supply side. Concerning
the question of the e¤ect on the strength of competition, Bartolini argues that we
can simply assume that, ceteris paribus, the higher the level of potential availabil-
ity, the higher the potential level of competition(Bartolini, 1999: 465). But as with
contestability, positive as well as negative e¤ects are considered. While some avail-
ability is necessary, it is also argued that a certain amount of vote identication and
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vote stability is necessary to allow parties to plan the o¤er(Bartolini, 2000: 58).
This is reminiscent of Hirshmans argument that if consumers exitoptions are too
sensitive to performance, it will undermine the possibilities for rms in the market
to improve their products and thus in the long run the foundation of competition
itself (Hirshman, 1970). The extent of voter availability is not the only, nor nec-
essarily the most important consideration, however. Certain characteristics related
to where - in policy terms- footloose voters are located as well as how decisions are
made must be taken into consideration, if outcomes are to be predicted. Availability
of the median voter can be expected to have di¤erent consequences for competition
than availability at the margins. But the logic of choice, concerning prospective
and retrospective evaluation, as well as the role of expressive versus instrumental
motives also determines outcomes (Bartolini, 1999: 461-466).
The third dimension is decidability, which refers to the extent to which clear
di¤erentiated choices are o¤ered to voters. The factors that a¤ect decidability include
both di¤erentiation and clarity of party platforms, as well as the character of the
party system itself, as it impacts on the choice of government. The argument for
including this dimension is that voters give information on their preferences through
their choice of parties, and if this choice is not meaningful, it undermines the voter
input. Without provision of choice, information cannot be fed into the system. If
parties therefore consistently present voters with vague platforms, the latters choice
of party is not only made di¢ cult, but it is also not a meaningful input to dene
what responsive outputs might be, as Bartolini argues, we cannot simply assume
that parties o¤er what people want. Competition cannot be about the price or
quality of the product o¤ered for the simple reason that there is no price in politics,
and with respect to quality, the fact that there can only be one supplier of public
goods at a time, comparisons of alternatives on this basis are not practically feasible.
Competition in politics must therefore be about di¤erences in productsto have any
meaning. As with other dimensions, it is discussed that while di¤erentiation of what
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packages a party proposes to voters is necessary, there is no apparent advantages
of increasing di¤erentiation, however. While decidability is necessary, it is not easy
to determine an optimal level. On the one hand, obfuscation of platforms or strong
collusion by politicians to restrict the agenda can make the choice meaningless but
on the other hand, extreme di¤erences may polarise the system and make it di¢ cult
to formulate policies and if governments change to attain some degree of consistency
in the longer run.
The nal dimension, which Bartolini calls vulnerability, refers to the degree to
which incumbents are under a real threat of loosing. It is therefore essentially the
same as the closenessconception, which is employed as a measure of competition in
the American context, as discussed above. It is emphasized (as others have also done)
that any projected behavioural e¤ect does not depend on the objective distance(in
seats or votes) between incumbents and challengers, nor the actual turn-over in o¢ ce
but rather to the risk of losing: The general idea of the uncertainty of the electoral
outcomerefers to the psychological e¤ect linked to the absence of safety, rather than
the actual result. Closeness and uncertainty may not result in turnover but still
provide their supposed e¤ect on competition(Bartolini, 2000: 52). The question
is thus, as earlier discussed, how to bridge the gap from objective characteristics of
a situation to the individual assessments of it which is not immediately accessible
to the observer. Bartolini discusses that measures must take into account the two
conditions of identiability of government and opposition on the one hand, and a
level of electoral availability large enough to turn government into opposition on the
other. The dimension of vulnerability is, however, the only one where a higher score
more unambiguously seems to strengthen competition.
An advantage of Bartolinis conceptualisation compared to Strøms is that the
relationship between the dimensions is explicitly considered. He thus argues that it is
not realistically possible to maximise/minimise each of them to create an ideal type
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of perfect political competition, since each dimension impinges on the other, not in
a linear and additive way, but rather in a contradictory one(Bartolini, 2000: 57).
Therefore di¤erent models are bound to emerge. For instance the Downsian model of
two party competition maximize vulnerability, postulating high availability, but they
also imply low contestability and, at the same time, the irrelevance of decidability,
which tends to zero, while the consociational model is characterized by much higher
contestability and modest decidability but, at the same time, it necessarily implies
reduced electoral availability and blurred vulnerability. (ibid: 60-61). In light of this
it is argued that an empirical model of competition should. . . take the form of a set
of hypothesis concerning the trade-o¤ between the dimensions and the consequence
of such tradeo¤s (ibid: 61).
1.4 Components of an Empirical Model
1.4.1 Dening Political Competition
Which of the dimensions and measures discussed above should be included in a model
t for a comparative study of political competition depends on how we understand
and dene the concept. As discussed above, di¤erent approaches can be taken. It
can be argued that these primarily di¤er with respect to whether they primarily
view competition as a means for producing certain outcomes, or whether it rst and
foremost is seen as a type of behaviour induced by the desire to reach certain ends
under a given set of constraints. In the former representation, political competition
is a systemic property, which is dened by the generation of outcomes that are in
conformity with electoral preferences/interests. Inspiration is in this respect drawn
directly from the economic context. This approach is perhaps most clearly expressed
in Verdiers denition of perfect competition as equal to perfect responsiveness. As
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discussed, he denes responsiveness as perfect correspondence between partiesvote
shares and their share of government (over time). The incentives parties have are
not considered but are simply assumed. The spatial model of competition follows a
similar logic. The perfectly responsive system is, as discussed, reached under certain
structural conditions, one with two parties competing for the median voter. When
the competitive system deviates from this, perfect responsiveness is not attainable.
Parties are simply assumed to compete, and cannot do this more or less. In a sense,
one can say that the reasoning is backwards, that is responsiveness is posited as
the end result, and then one goes back to see what conditions must be met in the
political arena for this goal to be reached. In this manner, Bartolini also explicitly
deduces his competitive dimensions by examining what the necessary preconditions
to responsiveness are, but the discussion doesnt lead to a clear idea that this is a
likely - or even possible - scenario in politics.
The other approach is characterised by a focus on the behaviours of actors trying
to reach a particular end. This approach is, for instance, taken by Strøm, who in
his game theoretical model analyses competition exclusively in terms of incentive
structures, which can be expected to inuence behaviour. If we want to study dif-
ferences in the intensity of competition, we have to identify the nature and strength
of the incentives faced by the players. And, as discussed, there are several possible
sources of variation in incentives for those who seek political o¢ ce. This approach
to competition is also dominant in the American studies discussed above. What the
measures proposed try to capture in di¤erent ways is in fact the strength of such
incentives. As Holbrook and Van Dunk argue, an indicator should represent the
degree to which elected o¢ cials feel pressure from the electorateand they go on to
explain that elected representatives can only be expected to be responsive due to
risk of defeat(Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993: 959). The same position is expressed
by Milder, who writes that the assumption is that the possibility of gaining control
of the decision-making machinery inuences the behaviour of the out-party and the
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constant threat of being put out of o¢ ce inuences the behaviour of the in-party
(Milder, 1974: 433). Uncertainty, or risk, is key if we want to predict behaviour. As
Strøm writes Competition is fundamentally a matter of risk. The more competition,
the greater the risk. Risk is further specied as the threat of failureand it is stated
that the more intense the competition, the more acute the threat of failure(Strøm
1992: 390-91). The emphasis on risk and uncertainty stands in stark contrast to
the Downsian model. In his model a party occupying a median position in a party
system is not under risk of loosing as long as it stays put(given there is no major
shifts in public preferences). The emphasis on risk deviates from assumptions of
perfect (or near perfect) information that spatial models rely on.
For an empirical study of competition, I would argue that the important feature
to focus on is the incentive structure. Firstly, it can be argued that the conditions
that need to be fullled to obtain responsive outcomes are both so numerous and in
many cases di¢ cult to capture empirically that trying to include these in an empirical
study makes little sense. Secondly, if we want to know what e¤ects competition has
for political processes and outputs, it is necessary to separate the concept we measure
from its expected consequences. Standard denitions of competition often include
both. For instance, a typical dictionary denition of competition reads: the e¤ort of
two or more parties acting independently to secure the business of a third party by
o¤ering the most favourable terms(Meriam-Webster Dictionary). It thus refers to
equally process and outcome. The actors try to reach their goal by o¤ering the most
favourable termsand responsiveness to third party interests is thus assumed. In the
rst and parsimonious denition o¤ered by Bartolini, references of this nature are
not present. Competition is dened as a parallel and independent e¤ort to achieve
the same prize. The term parallel simply implies that there must be more than
one actor, while independent implies the absence of cooperation between competitor
as well as the exclusion of coercive means to obtain the prize. However, the third
party is entirely missing from the denition. In the subsequent detailed description
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of the dening characteristics of competition, the third party enters but in a limited
capacity: based on the individualistic principle and, as such, not requiring formal
subordination of such a principle to overarching goals (removing the problem of how
autonomous actors can dene and agree upon such goals); based on interaction among
actors who aim at the same goal and can dene their interests to be independent of
one another; avoiding the resorting to direct use of force and menace; putting the
prize continuously and repeatedly at stake; and nally, characterized by benecial
unintended e¤ects for third parties. The role of the third partylies solely in being
recipient of benecial unintended e¤ects. I would argue, however, that it is necessary
to actively include consideration of the choice of the third party as determining
who gets the prize, and see this third party as a dening part of the competitive
interaction. Only in some sports do we have a situation where the competitors alone
determine the outcome. The prize is allocated almost mechanicallyin the sense that
criteria are pre-dened and known: whoever scores more goals, reaches the end of
the lane rst etc., wins. The role of third parties is solely to determine whether there
has been a breach of rules. Consequently, the only source of uncertainty stems from
predicting the performance of the competitors. However, with respect to competition
in the realm of economics or politics, there is a third party present, who controls the
allocation of the prize. The demand is not an impersonal machine, but people who
make decisions according to what they are seeking. In standard economic theory
competition has been construed as revolving around the question of price by assuming
that demand in a particular market is only sensitive to price. In this way, it is possible
to standardizethe prize-allocation mechanism, as if it were a law of nature rather
than a choice made by human beings. In politics, such a conception makes little
sense.
A brief denition of political (democratic) competition that would satisfy the
need to focus on incentives and leave possible e¤ects out might be formulated as the
e¤ort to win electoral support made to obtain legislative power and/ executive o¢ ce.
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It is naturally implied that the e¤ort made is constrained by the democratic rules.
If we want to identify what makes parties or candidates make more or less e¤ort, we
have to focus on the incentives they have to do so. Furthermore, by simply stating
that the e¤ort is directed at winning votes, the denition is silent on what strategies
might win such votes. Policies that respond to voters preferences and interests
are one possibility, but it is not the only one. More cosmetic changes in party
image, communication strategy and greater spending on campaigns may accomplish
exactly the same. In the denition proposed, the coveted prize is legislative power
and/or government o¢ ce. In some systems, such as the U.K., the two invariably go
together, while in others parties can choose to remain outside government o¢ ce, but
still wield considerable inuence. In light of the fact that many suggest that both
policy inuence and o¢ ce are important goals for parties, it is reasonable to dene
both as rewards. With this denition in mind, I shall return to the discussion of
what aspects to consider.
1.4.2 The Sources of Incentives
The question that now needs to be addressed is what structures strengthen or weaken
incentives for political actors to win votes. Several possible theoretical and practical
approaches have been described. In the following, I shall rst discuss which theoreti-
cal dimensions confer incentives on the competitors, and therefore should be included
in an empirical study of competition. Secondly, I shall briey address the usefulness
of the operationalmeasures of competition proposed in empirical studies that are
not directly covered in the discussion of theoretical dimensions.
Contestability and Barriers to Entry
Firstly, contestability and the issue of barriers to entry is mentioned as a pivotal
dimension in all the theoretical models of competition, although it is only included
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in two of the empirical studies discussed above (Strøm, 1989a+b). There is general
agreement in the theoretical debate that barriers inuence the incentives competitors
have with respect to responding to their electoral base. In light of this, it is odd that
it is completely it is completely neglected in the American empirical studies on the
e¤ects of competition.
As discussed, the primary e¤ect of the threat of entry is to prevent collusive
behaviour. If established parties were to suspend competition and thus collectively
enjoy the benets of power without facing the constant risk of losing it and without
the ceaseless pressure to respond to elecoral wishes, we could expect new parties to
emerge and challenge their positions. That is, unless the barriers to entry are so
high that this is an unrealistic scenario. It is not only the responsiveness of the party
system as a whole that may be inuenced by the barriers, however. Since parties
are rarely simply substitutable, each party may enjoy a sort of monopoly situation
as the representative or agent of a given section of the electorate. The awareness
that a new party cannot easily arise to challenge it can work as an invitation to
slack. Particularly if other parties in the system may be in a di¢ cult position to
compete for its voters for fear of distancing themselves from their own electoral base
Incentives to keep voters pleased are simply weak under such conditions. When new
parties are prevented from entering, both individual and collective party behaviour
may therefore be inuenced.
Apart from the e¤ects barriers supposedly have on incentives and party behav-
iour, the degree of contestability also plays a signicant role in shaping other di-
mensions of competition through its direct impact on the magnitude of the party
system. When it is easy for new parties to form and gain access to representative in-
stitutions, the likely result is a higher number of parties represented. This, Bartolini
discusses, is in turn likely to have a negative e¤ect on the dimensions of vulnera-
bility and decidability - to which we could also ad payo¤ variability - by blurring
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the choice of government, alternation and clarity of governmental alternatives (Bar-
tolini, 1999&2000). While it is not impossible for multiparty systems to organise in
distinct coalitions that compete for government, a less clear pattern of co-operation
and competition is often seen. Conversely, low contestability is likely to increase
vulnerability as well as payo¤ variability but perhaps also has a negative e¤ect on
decidability by a di¤erent mechanism, namely that of convergence of platforms in
two party systems. For studies of competition, it is thus a crucial dimension, and the
extent to which it interacts with other dimensions is in itself an important question
for empirical research.
Vulnerability
The other dimension, which directly confers incentives to win votes, is the di-
mension of vulnerability, closeness or in Strøms model player indeterminacy.
The di¤erent terms used refer to the same basic concept, namely the degree of pres-
sure incumbents are under from take-over by the opposition. Higher uncertainty of
prospects of remaining in power for incumbents and indeed higher chances of win-
ning for the opposition can be expected to increase their e¤orts of both parties to
win electoral support. As mentioned, several objective features are important to
determine this uncertainty of outcomes.
The presence of a clearly identiable alternative to the current winnersis a pre-
condition, and the higher the likelihood that it can win, the stronger the incentives
to make e¤orts to secure electoral support. This likelihood can be seen as determined
by how many votes have to change to alter the outcome, as well as the possibilities
for this to be realised. As Elkins discusses, the distance in votes (or seats) between
incumbents and opposition, is not su¢ cient to predict probabilities, since even small
di¤erences can be very stable. Knowledge of the number of potential vote switchers
is therefore equally important. He writes the extent to which potential loose voters
exceed or fall short of observed party di¤erences in vote or seat shares indicates
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the likelihood of turnover(Elkins, 1974:689). But as several of those employing
measures trying to capture the uncertainty factor have pointed out, it is subjective
perceptions that create incentives. While risk can be described as an objective feature
of situations in terms of probabilities, the important thing in behavioural terms is how
the situation is perceived by individuals (Milder 1974). For constructing a measure,
the only possibility is to rely on objective features, however, and the validity may
therefore su¤er11. Finally, a crucial question is how to identify the competitor,
which for some systems poses more of a challenge than it does in others. This
question will be further discussed below.
Properties of the Electorate (Availability)
Both Strøm and Bartolini identify the characteristics of electoral choice as a in-
dependent dimension in itself. Strøm conceptualizes it as strategy determinacy,
which concerns whether it matters what parties do for what results they achieve. If
voters identify so rmly with particular parties that their votes cannot be obtained
by others, strategy determinacy would, for instance, be very low. Electoral avail-
ability in Bartolinis model refers basically to the same reality of whether voters are
exible in their choices or not. As discussed qualitative dimensions concerning what
inuences voterschoice is also analyzed in both models, however12. The question is,
11In this context, a study by Koole and Van Praag of Dutch parties in the 1950s is
interesting (1990). The authors claim that the dutch case of the 1950s shows that party
elites are uncertain about the outcomes of elections, although the Dutch party system had
been characterised (afterwards) as a very stable one. They also argue, however, that such
mismatchof elite perceptions and public attitudes is unlikely to occur after polling has
become normal.
12As presented above, Strøm, for instance, discusses that the important aspect is that
voters respond to party strategies in contradiction to being inuenced by random factors.
Simply being available is not su¢ cient to provide parties with incentives to change their
behaviour. If choices are random - in relationship to party actions - there is no incentive
for them to act. Bartolini, on the other hand, discusses the signicance not only of how
many voters are available, but also where - in spatial terms - they are located, since this
may be crucial for how they may inuence party strategies and outcomes. Also the extent
to which voters rely on retro-spective voting inuences what parties can hope to gain from
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however, whether it should be included as a separate dimension. Firstly, regarding
the qualitative aspects pertaining to how voters reach decisions (e.g. whether what
parties do or say inuences their decisions, whether they vote pro- or retrospectively)
this is virtually impossible to incorporate in a comparative analysis of competitive-
ness. While they inform us of the strength of the incentives parties have to make an
e¤ort, they are di¢ cult to capture empirically. Moreover, even if voters are moved
by random factorsunrelated to the political substance, or emphasize parties past
behaviour over their present promises, we cannot be sure that party behaviour will be
inuenced by this fact. It is not implausible that a lack of knowledge of what moves
voters makes political elites assume that their performance in many areas actually
makes a di¤erence and adjust their behaviour accordingly whether this objectively
helps their situation or not. Secondly, regarding the quantitative dimension, I would
argue that the number of available voters is primarily a supportingfactor for den-
ing the strength of competition rather than an independent source of incentives. As
discussed above, the extent of vote swings are important to vulnerability in relation
to whether they are su¢ cient to switch the places for incumbents and opposition.
Availability is, in other words, necessary to capture vulnerability. In relation to
contestability, availability is also important to evaluate how credible the potential
threat of new parties is, but as will be further discussed later, whether parties are
threatened by new parties depends on whether vote swings are large enough to make
it possible for them to obtain seats in the representative institutions. It is necessary
to consider electoral availability to assess competitiveness in both respects, but it is
di¢ cult to see that the extent of availability plays a role separate from this.
Pay-o¤Variability
Strøms dimension of payo¤ variability is an obvious candidate for inclusion in
a model of competition since it can be hypothesized to have a direct e¤ect on the
changing their positions on policy.
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e¤orts exerted by parties. As discussed, the concept addresses the di¤erences between
what is gained by the winners and losers of the contest. However, while analytically
distinct from the concept of vulnerability (or player determinacy), two problems arise
if we include it in an empirical analysis.
Firstly, there is signicant empirical overlap between the two concepts since the
same conditions tend to give rise to both. It is, for instance, di¢ cult to imagine a
situation characterized both by high vulnerability and low pay-o¤ variability. For
vulnerability to be high, it requires a clearly identiable government and opposition
as well as high uncertainty of whether the incumbent government can stay in o¢ ce
after the next election. Having prospects of clear turn-over in government would
also imply high pay-o¤ variability however, unless we imagine that government and
opposition simply share power - a scenario that is di¢ cult to imagine if the two
competing parties/coalitions are identiable and therefore separate. On the other
hand, the type of power-sharing arrangements between parties, where the outcomes
of elections do not strongly inuence who gets what afterwards must be described by
low vulnerability as well as low pay-o¤ variability. Secondly, there is the question of
how to prioritize the separate e¤ects of the two dimensions on the incentives of parties
to engage in competition for votes. For instance, how do we perceive a situation of
high pay-o¤ variability and low vulnerability? A simple scenario is one where there
are two clearly identiable parties/coalitions, but where one has a strong and stable
lead over the other, and the prospect of turn-over is therefore low. Do government
and opposition still have strong incentives to make e¤orts simply because there is
a strong di¤erence in pay-o¤s between winners and losers, even if the prospect of
a change of fortunes is very remote? If we believe that is the case, then it is hard
to imagine a situation which does not confer strong competitive incentives. I would
therfore argue that proximity to success/failure is the more important dimension,
and further that since a threshold of di¤erence in the situations facing parties after
an election is necessary for the term vulnerability to make sense, it does not make
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sense to include pay-o¤ variability as an independent dimension.
Finally, it is also interesting to observe that higher structural pay-o¤ variability
has in fact been linked to stronger incentives for inter-party collaboration rather
than than competition. In their work on the Cartel party model, Katz and Mair
thus suggest that the presence of party patronage may induce parties to collaborate
on an arrangement for sharing the spoils (Katz & Mair, 1995). They essentially view
the political elite as risk averse and therefore prone to pursue strategies that a¤ord
them a stable access to the rewards. The more abundant the spoils, the smaller the
chance that parties will want to leave it up to voters to determine who takes all and
who takes nothing. Whether the attempts to inuence the pay-o¤ structure is mainly
directed at sharing patronage privileges, securing state subventions and the like or
also extends to collaboration on policy-making and government is naturally crucial
to its consequences for democracy. If it is limited to collusion on some privileges for
the political class, it may not pose much of a threat to the quality of democracy, but
if the collaboration is more far reaching, it could curb the opportunities for voters
to choose between genuine alternatives. In any case, if power-sharing does indeed
tend to occur with high structural pay-o¤ variability, then this would also diminish
vulnerability as just discussed.
Competition Indicators in Empirical Studies
Finally, in the review of the empirical studies, a number of specic indicators
of competition were mentioned, which were not directly covered by the discussion
above. Firstly, the frequency of elections has been used as a measure of competition.
However, the frequency of elections is unlikely to play an independent role. Like
electoral availability, its e¤ect on incentives depends on other factors. In conjunction
with high vulnerability the frequency of elections could expect to keep parties more
continuously engaged in the e¤ort of securing electoral support. However, when vul-
nerability is low, no real impact on incentives is to be expected. Secondly, measures
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that equate greater equality of strength (measured in seats or votes) of parties, or
greater correspondence between vote shares and time in government with greater
competitiveness simply fail to capture the incentives facing parties. At least the
risk that they do not correlate outside the context of two-party competition is very
high. Thirdly, a measure of incumbency e¤ects was proposed by Strøm, which cap-
tures whether there is a higher tendency for voters to drift away from governments
than vice versa. However, in line with the discussions above, it can be argued that
whether voters generally tend in one or the other direction would be less important
than whether there is a real threat of turn-over in government. If voters consistently
punished incumbent governments regardless of what they did, there would in fact
be little incentive for those in o¢ ce to exert themselved. Finally, he also proposes
a measure of responsiveness, which counts the proportion of winners(those who
have gained votes or any absolute majority) in the rst government formed after
an election. This should show how sensitive government formation is to changes in
electoral support. However, any system with a stable untouchablemajority govern-
ment would score high, and it therefore cannot be used as measure of the strength
of the competitive pressures.
1.4.3 Identifying the Competitor
For an empirical study of competition, a fundamental question is naturally how
the competitor is dened. In empirical work on competition the most common
approach is to use parties as the competitive unit, but as mentioned coalitions and the
individual candidate have also been used in connection with studies of vulnerability.
Which conception is more correct depends on the functioning of the political system
under investigation. The manner in which rewards are obtained or lost is the key
property, since this is what may confer incentives on the individuals who ultimately
act. If individual candidates were largely independent of their party a¢ liation in their
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e¤orts to obtain o¢ ce and policy inuence and parties had no signicant inuence
on their behaviour, there is obviously no reason to suppose that we can infer much
from the electoral proximity of parties. These would in such case have little more
substance than mere labels. However, to the extent that parties successfully control
access to the rewards sought by candidates, we can assume that competitive forces
a¤ecting the fortunes of parties result in active responses to such pressures. The
argument by Comiskey that in some multi-party systems, the relevant competitor is
the coalition rather than the individual party would be supported by this approach.
The successful access to rewards of o¢ ce and inuence may in fact depend on the
collective success of a group of parties, rather than on a single one. To capture the
competitive pressures, it would therefore be logical to investigate the threats facing
the coalition as a whole.
The question of who the competitor is can of course also be approached from
another angle, namely that of the voters choice. The question here is whether
the competitive unit corresponds to the unit providing what is demanded. This
correspondence is crucial since it ensures that the preference expressed can relate to
the output (legislative/governmental performance) as well as complete. If voters are
not given a choice of a policy package for the country, but a choice of representatives
with certain ideas about what policies should be pursued, it has consequences for
what we can expect competitive pressures to accomplish. If voters are not given a
choice over naloutcomes, it is di¢ cult to imagine a greater competition will induce
greater responsiveness to median voter preferences for such outcomes. It becomes
very complicated for voters both to place responsibility for past accomplishments as
well to project consequences of the votes cast for future acts of government. It might
therefore be expected that competition is less e¢ cient under circumstances where
the unit presenting choice to voters is di¤erent than the unit organising government.
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1.5 The Barriers to Entry: Outline of Empirical
Research
The result of the discussion above can be summarized in three simple propositions.
Firstly, political competition should primarily be understood and analyzed as an
incentive structure. It was proposed that competition in politics is dened as the
e¤ort to win electoral support made to obtain legislative power and/or executive
o¢ ce. Consequently, when we want to capture di¤erences in competitiveness, it is
necessary to identify those conditions that provide incentives for political competitors
to make more or less e¤orts to secure electoral support. Secondly, it was suggested
that such incentives arise primarily from the degree of contestability and vulnerability
observed. Both dimensions can be expected to inuence the behaviour of those in
power and di¤erent hypotheses concerning the character of these e¤ects can be made.
Thirdly, it was discussed that the competitive unit should be dened as the unit by
which success or failure in accessing o¢ ce and legislative inuence is determined in
a given system. The following study will focus on the question of how to measure
the degree of contestability in democratic systems. The empirical question of how
constestable democracies are requires, however, that the questions of who enters,
what is entryand what prevents entrymust be addressed rst.
Regarding the who, it is possible to cast both individual candidates as well as
parties in the role of the competitor, as discussed above. What unit is chosen nat-
urally depends on what is meant by entry and it directly inuences what barriers
are identied. However, since political parties play a clearly more dominant role
in the electoral contests in the group of democracies that will be considered here,
parties are regarded as the relevant unit (c.f. below). Parties are also clearly the
more important players in government formation and thus for the dimension of vul-
nerability. If we want to compare how open democracies are to new competitors, it
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is therefore suggested to identify and measure the barriers that may prevent parties
from succeeding in this e¤ort.
A clear understanding of what denes entry constitutes the next step on the way
to identifying the barriers that may prevent it. In accordance with the discussion
above, the important property of the threat to entry is how it inuences the incentives
established parties have to secure electoral support. In my view, this necessitates
considering entry in two stages, namely in terms of access to winning votes (partial
entry), as well as in access to seats (full entry). As long as new parties do not obtain
seats, it is obvious that they will be excluded from directly partaking in legislative
acts and in government formation. In addition, knowledge that entry in the represen-
tative institutions is highly unlikely may encourage the represented parties to collude.
However, the fact that parties outside parliaments cannot themselves snatch these
coveted prizes from the hands of the established parties, does not necessarily make
them harmless. Electorally successful new parties may alter the representational
strength and thereby potentially also who gets what after the election. Even in the
absence of full entry, established parties may therefore be pressured by such threats
to secure their electoral base. Arguably, the strongest form of barrier is therefore
the barrier that prevents new parties from winning votes, as it blocks both types of
threats from arising. On the other hand, the strongest form of entry is undoubtedly
full entry as this most e¤ectively prevents collusion and keeps parties occupied with
securing electoral support. Naturally, not all entry, be it into the electoral market
or the representative institutions, is necesarily a threat to existing parties. It is not
inconsquential how great a vote or seat share new parties take. Nor is it irrelevant
wherein geographical or ideological terms the point of entry is for how it a¤ects
the established parties. A new party with a four percent seat share may be inconse-
quential in one system, but completely change the government formation process in
another. If a new party enters in the middle of the righ-left ideological divide, it may
be a pivotal player in negotiations, if it enters on the extreme right, it may never be
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considered relevant. It is, in my view, di¢ cult to dene abstract criteria for when
entry becomes signicant and threatening as it depends on the characteristics of the
party systems. In the following study, I have therfore chosen to limit myself to the
identication and measurement of the obstacles to entry and leave the question of
what consequences such entry may have in di¤erent systems.
The nal question concerns the barriers to entry in politics. Bartolini identies
three types of barriers, namely an ex antebarrier, which concerns requirements
to become a recognized participant at elections, a representational barrier, which
denes how votes are translated into seats, and nally a barrier constituted by the
incumbentsadvantages in terms of campaign laws and access to resources. While the
rst two suggested barriers are clear, I would argue that the term chosen for the third
barrier is a bit ambiguous since incumbentsadvantage can also be found in the design
of the ballot access laws and the electoral rules. However, others have also mentioned
barrier e¤ects in the conditions for access to resources and campaign regulation in
studies of party systems, new party formation and entry (e.g. Katz&Mair, 1995;
Hug, 2001; Bowler, Carter & Farrell, 2003; Abedi, 2004).
I suggest organising the empirical investigation around answering the following
three questions that dene di¤erent aspects of entry: How di¢ cult is it for a party to
1) register as a participant at elections? 2) to become recognized by the electorate?
3) to win representation? Four di¤erent types of barriers can be identied which are
relevant to answering these questions. The rst two barriers inuence entry into the
competition for votes, while the two latter ones concern the competition for seats.
The Registration Barrier concerns the level of di¢ culty involved in getting access
to the ballot, which is the logical rst step to entry. This barrier has been included in
studies of new party formation and entry, but the approaches taken to measuring it
vary a great deal (Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2001; Abedi, 2004). The second
barrier is the Recognition Barrier, which refers to the costs of being recognized by
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voters as alternatives to existing parties. A high recognition barrier will therefore
undermine the ability of new parties to gain electoral support. It considers factors
that may facilitate or hinder new parties in their e¤orts to campaign and obtain
publicity. Only few comparative studies consider this dimension, and those who do
look exclusively at the existence of state assistance for partiescampaigning e¤orts
(Hug, 2001; Bowler, Carter & Farrel, 2003; Abedi, 2004). The Representation Bar-
rier expresses the extent of disadvantage su¤ered by small and new parties under
di¤erent electoral systems and thus captures how di¢ cult it is to obtain seats. This
is undoubtedly the barrier most well studied. Numerous studies include it, but the
indicators chosen to capture it vary a great deal. Finally, it is possible to dene an-
other barrier that essentially seeks to answer the same question as the representation
barrier. Instead of looking only at the properties of the electoral system, however, it
also takes the extent of electoral availability into consideration. As discussed earlier,
electoral availability can be viewed as a precondition to both entry and vulnerabil-
ity. The Accessibility barrier will consider thus assess how the combination of the
electoral system and the electoral availability combine to make representative insti-
tutions more or less accessible to new parties. To my knowledge, this aspect has
not been included as a barrier measure in previous studies. In this way, the research
proposed considers both institutional and non-institutional factors to capture the
openness of the political system.
As will be discussed further below, the cases chosen for the empirical analysis
reect my intention to ad the dimension of vulnerability to it at a later point and
thus be able to study the joint e¤ects of the two dimensions of competition on political
performance and electoral attitudes. While such e¤ects of contestability will not be
tested in this study, I propose to test the e¢ cacy of the barriers - and validity of
the measures proposed - on the number of new parties actually entering. As will be
discussed further below, the number of new parties entering depends on many other
factors apart from the strength of the barriers to entry. However, to the extent that
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the barriers identied matter, it is reasonable to hypothesize that this has an e¤ect
on observed party entry. The hypothesis is that each of the barriers to entry will
deter new parties from entering by hindering their participation, campaigning e¤orts
to win electoral support and reducing their chances of obtaining representation.
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Studying the Barriers of Entry and
Their Impact
The research proposed consists in an analysis of the barriers to entry in political
systems and their e¤ects. As discussed above, the barriers can be expected to in-
uence the behaviour of elected representatives and governments and can thus be
hypothesized to have consequences for political processes and outcomes. The inves-
tigation of such e¤ects will not be dealt with here, however, but rather be left for a
later study where the dimension of vulnerability is also included. The cases chosen
for the present analysis reect, however, the intention to expand the analysis in this
manner at a later stage. In the present analysis, an intermediary dependent variable
- namely the number of new parties entering - has instead been chosen to test the
e¤ect of the barrier measures suggested. The main function of barriers is naturally
to keep new parties from entering the democratic contest and institutions. As dis-
cussed, we can therefore expect high barriers prevent new parties from entering. In
the following, the choices made with respect to case selection and research design will
rst be described, secondly the hypotheses will be dened operationally and nally
some methodological issues concerning the prediction of the dependent variable and
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the use of statistical methods will be addressed.
2.1 Case Selection and Research Design
In order to test causal hypotheses concerning the e¤ects of competitiveness on polit-
ical performance and popular attitudes, a signicant concern is the ability to control
for other sources of inuence on the dependent variable than that stemming from
variation in the independent variable. This can be done in two ways. The rst
is by including as high a number of cases as possible. A higher number of cases
enables a more rigorous testing of causal claims by means of statistical techniques,
and ceteris paribus increases the ability to control for other sources of inuence
on the dependent variable(s). The ability to control for other inuences depends,
however, on the existing variation on the relevant dimensions in the cases them-
selves. Another `naturalsource of such control is therefore to select cases that are
as similar as possible with respect to conditions that might inuence the dependent
variable(s). In other words, we need a most similar case research design since this
maximizes our ability to ascribe variation in the dependent variable to the inuence
of the independent variable outcomes1. Unfortunately, the real world imposes quite
signicant limitations to selection of cases of democratic polities. However, the cases
included in this study are drawn from countries with a long uninterrupted history
of democracy, and relatively similar levels of socio-economic development. On the
one hand, countries with a longer history of democracy provide for the possibility
of drawing more cases from the same national context and thus increase control of
contextual factors in a longitudinal comparison. This can often be more di¢ cult in
a cross-national comparison of cases. On the other hand, to investigate the possible
inuence of competitiveness on attitudes to democracy, the longevity of the regime
1See, for instance, Pennings, Keman and Klinnijenhuis, 1999 for a description of this
approach.
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may prove to be an important source of control for other transitionalfactors. Fi-
nally, similarity with respect to the level of socio-economic development is important
when investigating the possible impact of competitiveness on welfare policies or other
aspects of economic performance as well as attitudes to democracy.
In light of these considerations, it was decided to include the following 21 countries
in the analysis; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 18 of
these are long standing democracies and the time period covered was thus 1950-2000.
Greece, Portugal and Spain are more recent democracies and were only included for
the period 1980-2000. A time lag before observations begin is thus introduced from
the end of the second world war in the case of the rst group of countries and from
the introduction of democracy in the latter in order to increase the probability that
the e¤ects observed are related to the competitive dimensions measured and not
caused by transitional factors. In relation to this study, the re-establishment of
party systems in many countries after WWII would naturally lead to the formation
of a high number of new parties and in this way be less comparable to numbers ob-
served in subsequent decades (c.f. below). But also for other e¤ects, it is reasonable
to expect a minimum period of learningfor both voters and political elites before
the competitive incentives may be expected to take e¤ect. Since the strength and
duration of such transitions have di¤ered from country to country, the reason for
beginning observations in 1950 (and 1980) for all of them is also pragmatic and has
to do with the fact that decades are used as the units of observation for most of
the analyses (c.f. below). The countries all belong to the group of so-called rich
or industrialized democracies and are thus comparable with respect to the levels of
economic development.
The next question concerns what democratic institutions in the countries for
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which barriers to entry are considered. In some countries, the solution is simple
inasmuch as there is only one national representative institution for which elections
are held. However, in other there are two (bicameral systems) or three (bicameral
and presidential). If we want to consider the impact of contestability on political
outcomes, it is necessary to arrive at a measure of contestability, which takes into
account the costs of entry to all institutions that give access to signicant policy
inuence and government o¢ ce. However, since the purpose of this research is partly
exploratory and aims to develop hypotheses concerning what barriers inuence the
costs of entry as well as construct indicators to measure them and test their e¤ects,
it was decided to only consider lower houses of parliament in the present study.
Regarding the units of observation (=cases), it can be argued that the natural
pick would be the individual election to these institutions. As discussed in the theory
chapter, competitiveness is measured in terms of the potential impact of next election
on the incentives facing the present incumbents. It is also the choice that would yield
the highest number of cases for the analysis and allow the greatest possible variation
to be captured. But consideration for the explanandum - the number of new parties
- makes it necessary to use time periods as cases for the analysis of the e¤ects of
the barriers. This implies loss of variation in the independent variables, but as I
shall argue below, this is necessary for the investigation of e¤ects. The research will
therefore only use the individual election as a case for certain tests of the validity
of indicators and their co-variation and otherwise rely on decades as the unit of
observation.
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2.2 Predicting Prevented Entry: Methodological
Considerations
Testing for the e¤ects of barriers on the entry of new parties is somewhat tricky.
Apart from the di¢ culties that arise in connection with making valid barrier indi-
cators, which will be discussed in the following chapters, the problem is that the
putative e¤ects of the barriers are virtually impossible to measure directly. Infor-
mation about potential parties that are deterred from even trying to register or
attempt to do so but fail to meet requirements is hard to come by. Likewise, we
cannot directly observe whether the parties running for elections manage to become
known to the electorate at large and in this way full the necessary requirements
for electoral gains. The e¤ect that is most directly observable is the e¤ects of the
representation barrier, which can block vote-winning parties from gaining seats. But
that is only a part of the possible e¤ects of this barrier. As will be discussed further
later, poor prospects of obtaining representation can deter parties from forming in
the rst place, and voters may withhold support for the new parties for the same rea-
sons. We are therefore chasing counterfactuals: the parties that do not register, fail
to win votes or seats. Resorting to variation in the number of new parties entering
as a proxy of those deterred or prevented from doing so appears to be the only viable
alternative, and it is also in di¤erent forms the one adopted in the studies of fac-
tors inuencing electoral registration of new parties discussed below (e.g. Harmel &
Robertson, 1985; Willey, 1998; Hug, 2001). This solution entails, however, equating
fewer or no entries with deterred entries, which is not without di¢ culties. If no new
parties form to contest elections, this may simply be expressive of lack of demand
for new alternatives rather than being due to deterrence of potential contenders.
Likewise, even if a high number succeeds in obtaining place on the ballot, we cannot
be sure that others were not simultaneously deterred. And the same logic extends
to the electoral success of new parties. If new parties do not obtain votes, it may
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be because they do not have su¢ cient resources to campaign and become known to
voters. However, it is equally possible that voters are fully aware of what the new
parties have to o¤er but simply prefer the established alternatives. Only when it
comes to winning seats do we have the possibility of observing a direct e¤ect, inas-
much as the representation barrier manifests itself by not allocating seats to parties
that win votes. However, as mentioned, we cannot be sure that the prospects of fail-
ing to win seats deter parties from participating or voters from giving their support
at the polls. And the full e¤ects may therefore remain hidden. Using variation in
the number of new parties entering at elections is therefore not a perfect dependent
variable for barriers.
As mentioned above, using variation in the number of parties entering as the
dependent variable makes it necessary to carefully consider the unit of observation
chosen. In the studies of new party entry referred to above, two use countries in
a specic time period as cases (Harmel & Robertson, 1985 and Willey, 1998), and
the other uses the individual election (Hug, 2001). While the individual election in
many ways would be ideal, I would argue that using time periods is necessary. The
problem related to the individual election as the unit of observation arises because
of the rather large di¤erences in the frequency of elections in the countries from
which the cases are drawn. For the ve decades included, Norway and Italy have, for
instance, only held 12 elections compared to 20 in Australia and Denmark and 25
in the U.S. If we use the individual election as a case, we therefore have a situation,
where a completely di¤erent picture of new party entry emerges depending on the
unit of observation chosen. For instance, a total of 5 new parties participating at
elections in both Norway and Denmark during the period 1950-2000 would mean that
there is no variation to be explained by the barrier measures used. At this level of
observation, the cases yield identical values for the dependent variable. But if we use
the individual election as the unit of observation, Denmark might yield 15 cases with
no new party observed and 5 cases with a new party. Norway could, on the other
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hand, present 7 cases with no entry and 5 with entry. The model would therefore
suddenly have signicant variation to explain - 5 cases of entry for both, but 15 cases
of non-entry in Denmark versus just 7 in Norway. The choice of unit of observation
is therefore a crucial one, and I would argue that observing variation at the level of
the individual election is misleading. Firstly, while elections provide occasions for
the entry of new parties, they cannot be construed as causes of entry. In other words,
there is no reason to believe that more elections will lead to more party formation.
At least not of the credible kind. Theories of party formation typically consider the
presence of incentives for the political elites that organise them, as well as of demand
for representation (c.f. below) and these factors are rarely very short-term. It is
possible that some parties form spontaneously in response to a particular situation
and would organize entry only for an election here-and-nowbut loose momentum if
they had to wait two years for an occasion to enter. I would argue, however, that this
is probably not the typical scenario and that the large di¤erences in the frequency of
elections therefore create an articial variation in the dependent variable if elections
are used as units of observation. I therefore suggest that the unit of observation is
a decade in each country. Taking each country for a 30-40 year period, as done by
Willey and Harmel & Robertson would hide too much variation in both independent
and dependent variables.
Finally, it is possible to argue that the full e¤ects of barriers on the observed
rate of entry can only be captured in a globalmodel considering the full range of
factors that inuence party formation. In their comprehensive studies of new parties,
Harmel and Robertson (1985) and later Hug (2001) discuss and test the inuence
of a number of di¤erent social, economic and institutional factors on the frequency
with which new parties arise. They, for instance, hypothesize - and nd evidence to
support - that countries that are larger, more culturally and socially diverse, with
stronger economical inequalities or have a stronger dimension of post-materialism
will tend to give rise to more parties than other countries due to di¤erences in
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representational needs. Furthermore, they propose that political factors such as
the number of dimensions (cleavages) and parties already represented by the party
system and the type of institutions such as parliamentary versus presidential or
federal versus unitary can also play a role by inuencing both how much demand
there is for additional representation and the institutional incentives provided2. The
authors also test the impact of the ballot access (registration barrier) and electoral
systems (representation barrier) within such global models of new party formation
and success. Since the purpose here is not to explain di¤erences in the number of
new parties participating but rather to construct indicators of barriers to entry and
test their validity by testing their e¤ects on the number of new parties entering,
the potential impact of factors that stimulate new party entry will not be actively
considered, however. In evaluating the results, it is therefore necessary to be aware
that the model is incomplete in relation to explaining variation in the dependent
variable. Finally, the results of the studies above will be discussed in relation to the
ndings reported below.
2.3 The Hypotheses: Dening the Dependent Va-
riables
Four di¤erent barriers to entry were identied in the theoretical discussion above.
It has been argued that each individual barrier dened can be expected to present
di¢ culties at a specic step in the process of entry. How the specic e¤ects expected
can be measured needs to be specied. In many ways, the simplest to specify and
2Cox also discusses the openness of parties themselves as a determining factor for the
incentives to form new parties. If parties are not strong in the sense that they have clear
policies and control candidate selection, Cox argues that individual actors have no incentive
to begin a new party, but will instead choose to run under an already existing party label
(Cox, 1997).
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predict is that related to participation in elections. When we address the barriers to
winning votes and seats, there are more ways of constructing the dependent variable
and more factors potentially interfere in the causal relationship suggested. Below,
each of the hypothesized e¤ects of the barriers is stated clearly and the specic
conguration of dependent variable dened.
Hypothesis 1. A higher Registration Barrier can be expected to reduce the
ability of potential new parties to participate in elections.
Empirical test: The higher the Registration Barrier, the lower the number of new
parties 1) registered at elections 2) the maximum number participating at any one
election.
Hypothesis 2. A higher Recognition barrier can be expected to make it more
di¢ cult for new parties to become known to voters and thus to gain votes.
Empirical test: The higher the Recognition Barrier, the lower the number of new
parties 1) obtaining at least 1 percent of the votes 2) obtaining at least 4 percent of
the votes and 3) the maximum number obtaining at least 1 percent of the votes at
any one election.
Hypothesis 3. A higher Representation barrier can be expected to lower the
chances that new parties participate, gain electoral support and seats.
Empirical test: The higher the Representation Barrier, the lower the number of
new parties 1) registered to participate 2) maximum number registered to partici-
pate 3) obtaining 1 percent of the votes 4) maximum number obtaining 1 percent of
the votes 5) obtaining 4 percent of the votes 6) obtaining 1 percent of the seats 7)
obtaining 4 percent of the seats
Hypothesis 4. A higher Accessibility barrier can be expected to lower the
chances that new parties win seats.
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Empirical test: The higher the Accessibility barrier, the lower the number of new
parties that obtain 1) 1 percentage of the seats 2) 4 pct of the seats.
With respect to the rst hypothesis, the question of how to dene participation
emerges. Previous studies including this dimension have included all parties that
eld candidates in any of the electoral districts on which data were obtainable. How-
ever, as will be argued in further detail in the chapter dealing with the registration
barrier, there are theoretical as well as pragmatic reasons related to the quality of
the available data that make it necessary to introduce stricter criteria for dening a
party as participating(c.f. chapter 4).
With respect to hypotheses 2-4, there are di¤erent possibilities when it comes
to dening the dependent variable for the electoral and representational success of
new parties. Willey, for instance, uses the percentage vote for new parties as such,
whereas Harmel and Robertson use an approach similar to the one suggested here
only that they include more categories3. Counting the number of parties according
to whether they pass vote or seat shares of 1 and 4 pct. is naturally somewhat
arbitrary. As a dependent variable for the Recognition barrier, it can be argued that
the vote share should reect a level, where it is reasonable to say that voters at large
probably know of the party in question - that is, it must have `passedthe recognition
barrier. It can be argued that higher vote returns is highly likely be more powerfully
inuenced by the demand for them rather than just knowledge of them. However,
demand and not just recognition plays a role in all cases, and there is thus no single
correct measure. The same considerations apply to the choice of dependent variables
for the share of seats obtained.
3They categorize vote-winning parties in 6 categories: 0-1 pct votes, 1-5 pct votes,
5-10 pct votes, >10 pct votes but no seats, up to 10 pct seats, >10 pct seats, cabinet
participation (Harmel and Robertson, 1985:510).
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Dening a new party
The question now is how to identify a new party. Firstly, any organisation present-
ing candidates under a common label at an election is regarded as a party. Secondly,
all such organisations elding candidates for the rst time at an election in 1950 or
after are classied as new. As stated above, the new parties that serve as dependent
variables to the recognition and representation barriers are counted if they obtain 1
or 4 pct or more of the vote and seat shares respectively. Moreover, a new party is
registered in year it obtains the specied vote or seat share rather than the rst year
it presented candidates. This implies that the same party may gure as a new party
in the category of minimum 1 pct of the votesand then be counted as a new party
in the category of minimum 4 pct of the seatsa decade later. In terms of organi-
zational history, the party is obviously not new when it wins the seats, but in terms
of entry into the parliamentary arena, it is. This method of counting is designed to
be sensitive to possible e¤ects on entry of changes in the size of barriers. If a party
has participated with weak results in several elections, but suddenly benets from
more favourable conditions and as a result succeeds in winning the specied votes or
seats, its entryshould not fail to be recorded only because it is not a rst or second
time contender per se. In other words, the focus is on new party as the vehicle of
entry rather than new party as an organization. It is of course possible that barriers
inuence the time it takes new parties to gain momentum. That is, in high barrier
systems new parties may need more time to gain votes and seats than in low barrier
systems. Such e¤ects are not studied here, however, and by not classifying only those
running in the rst one or two elections as new, such e¤ects are in fact discarded.
Since it is the protective e¤ects of barriers we are after, I believe the all-important
consideration should be whether entry is indeed prevented rather than on whether
it is subject to possible delays.
This only answers part of question of how to count new parties. Studies of
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new parties typically operate with di¤erent categories not all of which are relevant.
These include mergers of pre-existing parties, parties that change their names and/or
reform, those that split o¤ from an existing party (members of an existing party
decide to form a new one) and nally genuine new parties (emerge without help
from members of existing parties) (see Hug, 2001:11-15 for overview). In this study,
I have chosen to include mainly the genuinely new and the parties that split from
existing ones - subject to some exceptions.
Mergers of pre-existing parties, as well as those that change name or reform,
are generally excluded on the following grounds; For a study of contestability, the
interesting question is whether represented parties are shielded from new competitors
from the outside, not whether parties already inre-organise or reform to present
a di¤erent type of competitive challenge to them. Moreover, the barriers we are
interested in can only really be expected to be e¢ cacious gatekeepers vis-à-vis parties
that actually have to go through the steps of registering, winning recognition and
representation. Genuinely new parties as well as splits generally have to do this, while
mergers or parties that change names will typically be able to rely on organisational
resources, public renown as well as representation in parliaments. Another argument
for excluding mergers is that high barriers may encourage parties to merge in order
to compete better. Norris for instance argues along these lines when claiming that
a higher representation barrier induces party mergers (Norris, 2004). The causal
expectation that higher barriers prevent entry of new parties - and we therefore
observe fewer - would be reversed in the case of mergers. Counting the outcome of
such mergers as new parties would therefore inevitably blur the results - at least if
it is not kept as a separate category. Exceptions to the rule of omitting mergers are
necessary, however. If a party is the result of a merger of two pre-existing parties
where neither of the formateurshave crossed the relevant threshold of success (and
thus already been counted as a new party), it is counted as a new party. That is, if
two parties which have elded candidates at previous elections but each earned less
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than 1 pct of the votes merge to form a party that succeeds in winning more than
1 pct of the votes, it is counted as a new party in that category. Likewise, if two
parties that have not managed to pass the 4 pct threshold merge and form a party
that does, it is counted as a new party at that level. Here we are clearly dealing
with situations where the merger cannot be interpreted as a simple re-organization
of insiders and by not counting such cases, we would leave out obvious cases of new
party entry on grounds of their organizational histories.
The question remaining now is how to evaluate splits from existing parties. While
genuine new parties are obvious examples of new contenders that have to face a whole
battery of barriers, splits are not always obvious cases of new entry. On the one hand,
discounting a party because its founders were previously members of one of the
existing parties seems highly restrictive. Previous membership in an existing party
or even membership in parliament is not an automatic ticket inand splits can face
exactly the same challenge as the genuine new with respect to registration, obtaining
recognition and representation. Although it should be observed that in some - but
far from all - countries membership in parliament entails exemption from registration
costs (c.f. later). On the other hand, when splits represent a solid fraction within an
existing party, it is clear that they may already command organizational resources
and be known to the public. It can be argued that such parties are instances of
re-organisation of insidersrather than examples of new entry. However, it is often
di¢ cult to distinguish on basis of existing sources between cases where a new party
is classied as a split because some of its founders were previous members of an
existing party or because it represents a genuine fraction of a pre-existing party and
carries with it the organisational resources and renown of the former. In my view, not
counting any of them would entail leaving out many cases that should be included.
Moreover, it is clear that the higher the barriers - at least the representation barrier
- the stronger the disincentives for existing parties to split. In this way, we might
expect higher barrier to result in fewer splits (opposite of mergers). Therefore, it as
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a general rule all splits from existing parties except when the motherparty ceases
to present candidates when major fractions split o¤ from it. The new parties that
split from it can it such cases be expected to incorporate its resources rather than
have to start from scratch4.
2.4 Using Statistical Methods
The investigation of whether the di¤erent barriers have the expected e¤ect on entry
of new parties necessitates the use of statistical techniques. The type of data, the
nature of the hypothesized relationships and the character of the pool of data used
raises certain general questions that need to be considered, however. First, and most
fundamentally, it is important to observe that we are not dealing with a standard
statistical sample. Inferential statistical techniques rely on the assumption that the
data fed into the models stem from a random sample. The tests of signicance
inform us of the probability that the relationships observed in the sample also exist
in the population as a whole. Although the political systems selected here do not
constitute the population of democracies in the world, they practically constitute
the population of longstanding democracies. In any case, the data pool cannot
easily be construed as a random sample. This being the case, the question is what
purpose is served by using statistical methods for other than descriptive purposes.
That is, does it serve any purpose to report signicances of the ndings? What,
if anything, does it tell us if the models and coe¢ cients pass tests of signicance?
Statistical methods are used and tests of signicance are reported by all but a few
scholars in the eld, who analyse apparent populationdata comparable to those
4The new parties that arose from the division of the Belgian Party system along the
linguistic divide during the 1960-70s have thus not been counted, nor have the temporary
split of the Japanese Socialist party into a left and a right wing in the 1950s been included.
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used here5. There are also arguments sustaining this approach, although those using
them rarely discuss them explicitly. The most common argument is that such data
can be regarded as a random sample from the population of all possible universes,
i.e. a sample from a type of super population. This approach entails accepting
that the data could have been di¤erent, that the population data is a simple random
sample from an underlying distribution and that the social processes generating the
data are stable enough to make it realistic to imagine a large number of identical
and independent trials (Berk et. al, 1995:428). Not all concur that such a thought
experiment is warranted or provides a sound basis for scientic conclusions as Berk
et al discuss. Instead of choosing sides in the debate, I have opted for a somewhat
eclectic approach to the matter. In recognition of the shaky status of the arguments
that passing the tests of signicance is necessary to accept the validity of a hypothesis
even with apparent populationdata, I will not regard a hypothesis rejected solely
based on failed signicance tests. If coe¢ cients or di¤erences in mean values are in
the expected direction and have a reasonable degree of strength, there are no strong
reasons for rejecting them in my view. However, I will consistently report the tests
of signicance, as is commonly done, for two reasons. One the one hand, so that the
results can easily be compared to the results obtained by others, and on the other
because the signicance tests gives us valuable information about how consistently
the variation observed in the dependent variable can be related to variation in the
independent variables.
The next question concerns the type of statistical techniques employed consider-
ing the type of data. Here again I have chosen an mixed approach. In the analyses
that follow, I have chosen to use non-parametric methods (measures of association
and tests of di¤erences of means) wherever possible. One advantage of these methods
5Berk et al. use the term apparent population to describe data sets containing for
instance all nations on a continentor all cities in country X. (Berk, Western and Weiss,
1995)
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in the context of this study is that they do not require interval data (some of the
variables are ordinal), nor do they suggest a particular distribution (the normal dis-
tribution in the case of OLS-regression). On the question of distribution, statistical
theory informs us that the assumption of normal distribution of data in the popula-
tion can be dispensed with when the sample is su¢ ciently high. Healey states as a
rule of the thumbthat we need at least 100 cases to be sure that the sample size o¤-
sets the inuence of a non-normal population distribution, although others may set
it lower (Healey, 1996:148)6. In this study, the number of cases typically lies between
80 and 94 and thus below the recommended amount. Moreover, the variables used
here deviate strongly from the normal distribution. Naturally, we are in a grey-zone
for the simple reason that they are not genuine sample data, as just discussed. It is
therefore di¢ cult to evaluate the importance of this question to the problem of test-
ing the hypothesized relationships. However, non-parametric methods provide more
conservative estimates in general, and using them wherever possible can therefore
be regarded as a more cautious approach to testing relationships. The drawback of
the non-parametric methods is that variation is lost since they test the relationship
between variables by rst transforming these into ranks. That is, the individual
values are ranked in relationship to each other, but in the process the magnitude of
the di¤erences disappear. A numerical sequence of 1, 5, 6, and 30 is transformed
into 1, 2, 3 and 4 and consequently we lose information on the gaps separating the
individual scores. For the dependent variable, this is not a major problem, since the
number of new parties per decade has limited range and only little information may
be lost using this method. Nevertheless, as shown in the subsequent chapters, this is
not the case for the non-ordinal independent variables. And for some of the analyses,
6The Central Limit Theorem states that if repeated random samples of size N are
drawn from any population, with mean u and standard deviation x, then, as N becomes
large, the sampling distribution of sample means will approach normality, with mean u
and standard deviation = xp
N
0(Healey,xx:142). For signicance tests it is the sampling
distribution rather than the sample or population distribution that is important.
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the loss of information is considerable. There is no ideal solution to this problem,
and I have therefore chosen to use parametric statistics (OLS-regression, ANOVA)
alongside the non-parametric ones in the bivariate analyses. This also has the ad-
vantage that it becomes possible to compare the results of the bivariate analyses to
the nal multivariate ones, which for want of non-parametric methods has to make
use of parametric ones.
The multivariate analyses thus rely on parametric statistics - in this case OLS
regression - to estimate individual and combined e¤ects of several barriers within one
model. This entails, however, a violation of the assumption of interval level data, as
some of the indicators are ordinal. This is obviously not ideal, but di¢ cult to get
around given the type of data used and the methods available. Another problem of
the OLS-regression model is the assumption of linear causal relationships. There are
di¤erent ways of investigating whether such e¤ects are present, however, and these
are used in the nal chapter to assess the extent of the problem.
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Who gets access to the voting booth, where the composition of the ruling elite is ulti-
mately determined, is pivotal to political outcomes. Not surprisingly, a key struggle
in the edgling western democracies of the 19th century centered exactly on the issue
of who is granted access and who is kept outside. The institutional structures we as-
sociate with modern democratic government were thus often in place long before the
mass of people obtained the right to use them, making access the main contentious
issue (see Dahl, 1989). Following the lift of the major restrictions to universal partic-
ipation, however, the question of admission to the electoral process in the established
democracies has passed from the limelight to oblivion. This would seem perfectly
natural considering that the rights to participate have remained essentially unchal-
lenged in the post-war period. Only in cases where parties have advocated views
seen as subversive to the preservation of democracy itself, have parties been directly
barred from nominating candidates1. The protection of the right to participate does
not mean, however, that it is free to use this right. The recent exceptionally narrow
1Article 21 of the Basic Law of West Germany recognizes only parties that accept the
principles of democratic government. The law was originally intended to block parties of
the extreme right from returning to power, but it has also been used to ban the Communist
Party (1956-1969) (Willey, 1998:665).
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margin between the top candidates in the US Presidential elections in November
2000 and 2004, with its concomitant allegations of state-level irregularities with dire
consequences for national politics, rekindled widespread interest and debate on the
costs and barriers that exist to participation, be it as candidate, party or voter. In
the eld of comparative politics, access to the ballot has only recently been included
in studies as a factor to be reckoned with, and evidence that the requirements that
matter is ambiguous.
The provision of meaningful choice at elections, and unfettered exercise of the
same, naturally requires an electoral process which is not simply open to voters and
politicians pro forma, but is so de facto. All the countries we consider democratic
grant the right of participation, as candidates or voters, to virtually all their citizens,
but this does not imply that it is equally easy to make use of this right everywhere.
As Nassmacher writes: `The inalienable right to participate is inextricably linked to
obvious practical di¢ culties(Nassmacher, 2003: 5). Engaging in almost any type of
activity involves incurring a cost. Should the costs of political involvement, however,
reach a level where participation becomes seriously impeded, the very function of
democratic elections may be undermined. To be persuaded that popular preferences
are adequately reected in the composition of the representative institutions, we
need to be condent that neither demand nor supply is subjected to bias. If, on
the one hand, the desire to vote is stied by cumbersome procedures in place, and
sections of the population consequently refrain from voting, voices that could tip
the balance of power between political parties competing may be left unheard. On
the other hand, if potential parties or candidates are deterred from presenting their
programs to voters, we cannot be sure that the range of alternatives o¤ered to voters
provides an adequate match for their preferences. Participation costs play di¤erent
roles, however, depending on whether we are looking at the demand or the supply
side of the electoral market.
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Most would probably agree that enhancing the democratic process entails keeping
the costs of voting as low as practically feasible. Regulating access of parties and
candidates to the ballot calls for di¤erent measures, however. In the former case, the
incentive - in rational terms - to participate is virtually absent, as expressed by the
famous paradox of votingrst formulated by Downs. According to this paradox
two facts conspire to dampen the participatory zeal of rational electors; On the one
hand, the miniscule chance that any individual vote will exert a decisive inuence on
the outcome, and on the other, the guarantee that the potential costs and benets
of future government actions are conferred on all, irrespective of whether they have
voted or not (Downs, 1957). Imposing costs on voting is therefore likely to diminish
participation rates, while no appreciable positive e¤ects for democracy would be
reaped thereby. Rather the contrary, several have argued that raising costs leads not
only to a drop in turnout, but also to a reduction of the representativeness of the
turnout, as less resourceful sections of the population may be more disinclined to vote
(Lijphart, 1997; Mahler, 2002). In the case of parties and candidates, the situation
with respect to the incentives to participate is reversed. For them, the incentives
to participate are evident. The prospects of power, prestige or more humbly just a
paid position clearly have a certain pull. But in addition to such legitimate aims
(legitimate since the goal is to get elected) non-political motives, such as obtaining
publicity for commercial, organizational or private purposes or quite simply to play
a prank, could induce people to make a bid for a place on the ballot (Katz, 1997:
255). So if simply voicing ones wish to run were su¢ cient to be put on the ballot,
two problems could arise. On the one hand, the ballot might become long and
unwieldy, and thereby serve to blur, rather than clearly represent, the choice voters
are called on to make. On the other hand, unrestricted access could make it di¢ cult
to sustain the rights to nancial aid, free publicity and the like, which in some
systems are conferred on all those that stand for election to ensure that all are given
a fair chance to be elected. Identifying and enforcing a level of cost, which will
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deter non-serious candidates from running, while at the same time not depress the
participation rate of sincerepoliticians, can be viewed as ideal2. Whether the costs
actually imposed on would-be contenders, which are normally justied with reference
to such considerations, actually live up to this ideal is a di¤erent matter.
In the following, the requirements made for accessing the ballots will rst be
described and compared, and then their possible e¤ect on deterring participation of
new parties will be assessed.
3.1 Ballot Access Requirements
All 21 countries included in this study oblige parties or candidates to full certain
conditions to obtain a place on the ballot, but the requirements vary signicantly in
kind as well as in degree. Three di¤erent types of legislation can be identied, which
are used alone or in combination and are applied at the level of the electoral district
or at the national level3.
The rst type requires contenders to evidence a certain level of popular support
by submitting a petition. In some countries, the petitions, in terms of number of
signatures required, are so low that hardly any cost is incurred by fullling it. In
others, collecting the necessary signatures makes higher demands on the resources
of contenders. The second type of requirement involves payment of a ling fee or a
monetary deposit. In the case of a ling fee, the money is simply the cost of partici-
2Nassmacher writes To some extent precautions against frivolous candidates are le-
gitimate as long as such discrimination does not exclude new political movements from
e¤ective participation in the political competition(Nassmacher, 2003:14)
3The information used on ballot access requirements is from Katz (1997), Hug (2002),
Katz and Mair (1992). In the case of Portugal, information was obtained directly from
the Ministry of Interior. For Japan the information stems from Shuugiin Chousa-kyoku
Daini Tokubetsu Chousa-shitsu, "Senkyo-Seido Kankei Shiryou-shuu" (November, 2002)
and was made available by Kenneth McElwain.
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pating, in the latter the sum is reimbursed on the condition that the party/candidate
succeeds in garnering a specied amount of votes. It is therefore only a `realex-
pense for those unable to obtain enough votes to qualify for reimbursement. There
is a clear tendency to use petition requirements in the party-oriented systems, while
deposits seem to be the preferred choice in candidate-oriented systems. There are
several exceptions to this pattern, however. Finally, a few countries allow contenders
to enter the race if they receive the nomination of a recognized party. Nomination is,
however, always used as an alternative path to the ballot rather than the only one.
Another di¤erence between systems concerns the universality of the requirements.
That is whether all parties have to register for the elections or whether only new par-
ticipants face these costs. Eleven countries in this study e¤ectively grant exemption
from fullling requirements to the parties that are already represented in parliament
(or in the case of Sweden have registered once and continue to present candidates at
elections), while in the remaining ten countries all parties regardless of status have
to full the requirements. In the latter group eight of ten use nancial deposits, and
with possible exception of Canada and UK before 1985, the conditions for reimburse-
ment are set so low that most parliamentary parties are protected from loosing much
(see Appendix A for overview of ballot access laws).
When comparing the requirements that have to be met, it is important to observe
the di¤erence between requirements applied at the district and the national levels.
Most systems set criteria for participating at the district level, and thereby give
parties the possibility for registering participation in just a few districts. They can
thereby pay a lower `price than if they were to eld candidates in all. In a few
countries, however, the requirement is set at the national level and gives access to
placing candidates in all the districts (e.g. Denmark, Sweden). In order to get an
idea of the comparative size of costs entailed for parties aiming to compete nationally,
the ballot access legislation will be compared on the basis of the national total. That
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is, for countries where requirements exist at the district level, these are added up
to the total for running in all districts. The descriptive comparison is divided into
two parts; First, for the countries using petitions and secondly for those requiring a
deposit or fee.
3.1.1 Countries using petition requirements
For the rst group, a chart showing the number of signatures that had to be collected
by a party at the end of the 20th century were it to eld candidates in all districts
is presented in gure 3.14. The US was omitted from the chart, since it deviates too
much from the rest of the group to allow us to observe variation among the other
countries.
As can be seen from gure 3.1, the countries using petition requirements can
be placed in two di¤erent categories: those asking parties to present less than 7500
signatures and those requiring 20,000 or more5. There are none in between. In
the category of high requirements we nd all the larger European nations Germany,
Italy and Spain and only one small country, Denmark, whereas the low requirement
category only contains smaller countries. Moreover, Denmark is the only country
in this group where the requirements are truly national. In the others, new parties
could choose to lower the costs of participation by elding candidates in fewer dis-
4Austria is included in the petition group, as well as the fee/deposit group, presented be-
low since it both types of requirements. For the other countries using both types (Canada,
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, UK) the district petition requirements are so
low (<25) that they do not need to be considered. For Germany the petition require-
ment shown is that for the land lists rather than the single member constituencies since
this would be the better option for new parties with dispersed electorates. If the single
member districts are also included approximately 50,000 extra signatures would have to be
collected.
5In Finland, the requirement is not a petition, but rather the formation of electoral
associations in each district with 100 members in each. Due to the fact, that more than
mere signatures must be collected the total membershipof 1500 is multiplied by 5.
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Figure 3.1: Ballot Access Laws: Petition Requirements
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tricts. For the three large countries, the amount of signatures needed to run in one
`districtranges from 500-2000, a clearly lower barrier. Unless a partys appeal is to
a geographically concentrated electorate, however, pursuing such a strategy would
of course entail lowering the national vote share it is possible to obtain.
As mentioned, the US stands out in this group of countries. For a new party to
qualify a full slate of candidates for the House of Representatives, it had to collect
approximately 1,600,000 signatures in 1994 - which is about 45 times more than
Germany, which has the 2nd highest petition in the group (Winger, 1994)6. In
addition to the petition requirement, three states use fees. If parties were to run
in all districts in the three states, it would presently have to pay 230.000 US$ - an
6The petition requirements in 2002 amount to a national total of approximately
1.100.000.
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amount which is non-refundable7. Democrats and Republicans do not have to collect
signatures to secure themselves a place on the ballot8.
In terms of historical developments, there have been few and relatively modest
changes in the other group of countries, while for the U.S. some major changes have
been observed. For instance, California is reported to have had a petition requirement
of 660.000 signatures (or 66.000 members) in the 60s, while it is presently around
80.000. Commenting on long-term developments Winger writes, `From 1888 to 1931,
ballot-access laws were rather mild. In 1924, only 50,000 signatures on a petition
were required to place a new party on the ballot in 48 states (a gure that represents
0.15% of the number of people who had voted in the previous election). During
the 1930s, ballot-access laws became signicantly restrictive, as they required new
parties to gather more signatures and le for application earlier and earlier in the
campaign year. Still, it was not until the 1960s that compliance with ballot-access
laws became extremely di¢ cult(Winger, 1994).
A further clear di¤erence between the US and the other countries is that ballot
access laws are not determined centrally in the US. The institution for which the
elections are held has, in other words, no say in the matter. Instead the states legis-
late independently on ballot access to the federal institutions, and, as a consequence,
wide variation in the existing laws can be observed. Some states ask new parties
to collect only a few hundred signatures, while the petition size in others lies in the
vicinity of 200,000. Moreover three states, as mentioned, use fees rather than peti-
tions as a means to get on the ballot, and six states do not allow the party a¢ liation
of candidates to be stated on the ballot. The lack of some form of harmonization
of the laws does appear somewhat odd, especially in light of the fact that in all the
7The states are Florida (6% of annual salary of House member approx. 9000 US$),
Louisiana (600 US$) and Oklahoma (500 US$). Costs are per district.
8While Democrats and Republicans are secured a place on the ballot, candidates for
Democratic primaries would have to collect a total 138,996 to access the ballots for this
contest (Winger, 1994).
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other federal systems, the laws are issued by national government and the stipulated
criteria for access are either identical in absolute terms, as in Australia, Canada and
Switzerland, or are so in relative terms as di¤erences are congruent with variations
in population size of the constituent states, as in Austria, Belgium and Germany.
Until now petitions have been compared in absolute terms, but they can also be
compared on the basis of their size relative to the total electorate. In a recent study
of new party entry, it is argued that the petition requirements, as a barrier to entry,
should be seen in relation to the size of the total electorate rather than in absolute
terms (Hug, 2001). Whether this is a valid argument will be addressed later, but
it is interesting to investigate whether the di¤erences observed are mainly explained
by the sizes of the countries in question.
Figure 3.2: Ballot Access Laws: Relative Petition Requirements
Relative Petition Requirements (1990)
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Comparing the petition sizes in this way, yields a distinctly di¤erent pattern as
seen from gure 3.2. The gap between the larger and smaller countries is clearly, and
unsurprisingly, reduced. The US retains its position as the country with the highest
petition, but it now appears only somewhat (60 pct) higher than Denmark with
2nd highest petition in the group. From these two countries there is a considerable
gap down to the 3rd country, Norway, whose petition requirements are only about
25 percent of the Danish ones. The three larger European countries on the other
hand now appear more similar to the smaller ones; Germany is only slightly higher
than Austria and Belgium, and on the same level as Finland. Italy and Spain are
only slightly higher, while Sweden and Switzerland remain at the bottom of the
distribution.
It is clear, therefore, that whether we compare the ballot access signatures in
absolute terms or in relation to the total electorate in a country makes a considerable
di¤erence, both in terms of the ranking of countries where only the US retains its
position, as well as in terms of the distance observed between the levels observed. The
number of signatures required, of course, does not tell the full story. Ancillary laws,
stipulating requirements related to the procedure to be followed in the collection,
validation, timing and submission of the petition, is likely to a¤ect how di¢ cult it is
to full the requirement9. Moreover, there may be national di¤erences with respect
9Richard Winger for instance writes of West Virginia (US) that Third party and in-
dependent candidates for o¢ ce (other than president) must circulate their petition before
the primary. It is a crime for any petition circulator to approach anyone without saying
"If you sign my petition, you cannot vote in the primary." The law can be enforced be-
cause it is illegal for anyone to circulate a petition without rst obtaining "credentials"
from election o¢ cials for this purpose. Furthermore, it is impossible for third party or
independent candidates (not running for president) to ever know in advance if they have
enough valid signatures because if anyone who signs a candidates petition then votes in a
primary, the signature of that person is invalid. For candidates, it is impossible to know
who will actually vote in the primary, and it is too late to get signatures after the primary.
(Richard Winger, 1999). Katz writes Often these (signatures collected in the U.S.) must
be collected within a narrowly dened time period, an inconsequential requirement when a
few hundred names are involved, but potentially insurmountable when talking about many
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to how easily people are persuaded to sign petitions. Lack of more than anecdotal
information on these factors, however, makes it impossible to evaluate how such laws
may a¤ect the validity of indicators based on mere numbers.
3.1.2 Countries using fees or deposits
The second group of countries using nancial deposits/fees are presented in gure
3.3 showing the costs a party would incur if it were to eld candidates in all districts.
Japan was omitted from the chart, since it deviates strongly from the rest of the
group.
Figure 3.3: Ballot Access Laws: Fee/Deposit Costs
Fee/Deposit Costs (1995)
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Here again the main di¤erence observed is between the group of small and large
thousands. (Katz, 1997: 260)
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countries. As seen from gure 3.3, four of the smallest countries, Austria, Greece,
Ireland and New Zealand are relatively similar with costs varying between 4000-6000
US$, but in the former two countries, the sum paid is a fee rather than a deposit,
and thus cannot be reclaimed whatever level of electoral support is obtained. The
UK clearly has the highest requirements of the countries on the chart, followed by
a smaller country, the Netherlands, which has a cost level of approximately 60 pct
that of the UK. Then there is a considerable distance to France with less than half
the sum of the Netherlands, followed by Canada10 and Australia. In absolute terms,
Japan imposes costs of an entirely di¤erent order than the other countries, and is
therefore discussed separately below.
As for petition requirements, the size of the countries in question appears to play
a role. It would therefore be useful to compare the level of cost in relation to the
total wealth of the countries, and here again the chart portraying the costs in relative,
rather than absolute terms yields a di¤erent picture as seen in gure 3.411.
As seen in gure 3.4, Austria and Greece remain in the bottom of the group,
while Australia, Canada, and Ireland now appear very similar, followed closely by
France and New Zealand. Canada distinguishes itself from this sub-group, however,
by having much stricter conditions for return (15 pct. of the vote compared to 4 in
Australia and 5 in France). The Netherlands here clearly emerges as the 2nd most
expensive country for parties run. However, the Dutch rules guiding reclamation are
much more lenient. Obtaining as little as 3
4
of the electoral quotient (=0,5 pct of
the national vote) entitles parties to be reimbursed in the Netherlands, while it is
5 pct in the UK and 10 pct in Japan. Japan, not included in the chart, retains its
10The ballot access legislation in Canda was changed in 2001. Presently, candidates must
pay a deposit of C$ 1000 (approx 650 US$), which is refunded in full conditional only on
fullment of certain reporting requirements.
11The national fee/deposit costs are seen in relation to the GDP in Purchasing Power
Parity (that is the GDP controlled for di¤erences in price levels) for the respective countries
(Source: OECD)
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Figure 3.4: Ballot Access Laws: Relative Fee/Deposit Costs
Relative Fee/Deposit Costs (1995)
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position as the most expensive country, but correcting for GDP total, Japan (1992)
was slightly more expensive than the Netherlands, but its conditions for return much
higher.
Japan is therefore the most expensive in absolute as well as relative terms. It
distinguishes itself not only by the exorbitant deposits presently asked of candidates,
but also by its history of changes. From 1994 each candidate was required to deposit
around 25,000 US$ in a single member district, and 50,000 US$ to be put on the
ballot in one of the eleven multimember districts (or the same amount be a candidate
in both, 1995 exchange rates). This would mean that a new party presenting just
one candidate in all PR districts, where in general the expectation of higher chances
of winning representation, would have to pay 550,000 US$. To be represented in all
single member districts, and present just three candidates in all the multi-member
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districts, would cost around 8,600,000 US$, which is 16 times more than the costs
of elding candidates in all districts in the UK. To participate in all single-member
districts and present enough candidates to win 50 pct of the PR seats would cost
14,4 million US$. That we are dealing with a barrier of entry of quite a di¤erent
order than in the other countries becomes particularly obvious when we consider
the district level candidate costs in other countries. In the UK a candidate had to
deposit around 850 US$, which is the highest fee required in any of the candidate
oriented systems (and 14 times higher than New Zealand, the lowest in that group).
Paying this deposit, however, amounted to an investment roughly equivalent to 4 pct
of the GDP per capita for that country. A sum, which quite clearly is well within
the range of possibility for the vast majority of the population. In other words, if a
candidate were committed to supporting a new party that does not have the means
to sponsor his or her candidacy, deciding to participate anyhow would only entail a
relatively minor sacrice of personal resources. In Japan, on the other hand, running
in a PR district would cost around 120 percent of the GDP per capita, and as such
constitute a considerable investment of resources likely to be beyond the nancial
ability of the average citizen. A candidate deciding to run will therefore have to be
independently wealthy, be backed by resourceful sponsors or by a party with ties to
such donors.
Moreover, the chances of being able to garner enough votes to qualify for recla-
mation are small for new parties. For the single member districts more than 10 pct
of the vote is needed (only Canada with 15 pct has had a higher reclamation thresh-
old), while for the multimember districts, parties can reclaim deposits only for the
candidates on their list that were elected. If there are just two candidates compet-
ing for each of the 200 seats to be lled by these elections some 10 million US$ are
inevitably transferred to the state treasury at each election. For the PR level, the
ballot access legislation presents powerful disincentives for parties to present more
candidates than they believe they can get elected. The Japanese legislation is in
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this sense unique; In no other party-oriented system do we nd similar provisions
militating against inter-party competition for seats. Even in the candidate-oriented
systems there is no comparable incentive, inasmuch as the conditions for return are
normally set at such a level that all but the smallest parties can expect to get the
deposits back.
Another way in which Japan di¤ers from the other countries in this study is
by the number and direction of changes the ballot access laws have been subjected
to. Since 1950 the deposit has been raised 6 times and while part of the changes
simply adjusts the sum to take account of price developments, there has been an
increase in the real value of the deposits required from approximately 19 times the
GDP per capita in 1950s to 54 times the GDP per capita in the 1990s. For most
of the other countries the tendency has been exactly the opposite, not because of
changes in deposit, but due to changes in the real value of the sums demanded. To
get an overview of ballot access costs for the entire period, it is naturally important
to investigate such changes over time. This is done by presenting the costs in relation
to the GDP per capita for the countries and periods where data are available (see
note on calculations in Appendix A.2.). Figures for the U.K. for the 1950s and 1960s
are excluded from the chart (see gure 3.5), since they di¤er so much from the rest
that the graphic presentation su¤ers.
The gure 3.5 reveals two things; Firstly, there is a clear downward trend in the
real costs of accessing the ballot for most countries. The only country consistently
countering this trend is Japan, and partly the Netherlands. In the latter country,
there was an increase in 1989, which made the costs in the 1990s 6,5 times larger
than in the 1960s. But as mentioned the reclamation vote share is set at just half a
percentage of the votes and serious contenders therefore have a fair chance of getting
their deposit back. In Japan the increase in real value is only 2.5 times the level of
the 1950s, but the starting point was, as described above, much higher. Secondly,
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Figure 3.5: Fee/Deposit Costs over Time
Ballot Access Costs Over Time
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temporal analysis of the costs reveals that deposit costs that in todays currencies
appear very reasonable were more signicant burdens in the past. UKs average
total costs in the 1950s and 1960s were at 365 and 243 times the GDP per capita
respectively. This far exceeds the present costs in Japan. Furthermore, the 150 GB£
district deposit was equal to approximately 60 and 40 pct of the GDP per capita for
the two decades. At the district level, the U.K. in the 1950s had, in fact, exactly the
same price for running as Japan has for its single member districts today (and for its
multi-member districts in the beginning of the 90s). The strong decrease witnessed
for the U.K. is caused not by changes in law, but by changes in the value of money
and the GDP per capita. In fact, the U.K. increased its deposits from 150 to 500
GB£ in the mid 1980s (accompanied by a lowering threshold of reclamation from
15 to 10 pct.), but since decade averages is used and due to monetary changes, the
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increase is not visible on the chart above. Likewise, the real value of the deposit
required in France was of much higher value in the 1960s than it is today, but here
the decline over time is also evident.
It is di¢ cult to interpret the changes in ballot access laws in Japan as other than
a conscious strategy to prevent new parties from participating on the part of the
party, which has wielded government power alone in most of the post-war period.
Moreover, since parliamentary parties are not exempt from paying the deposits, it
would seem not only a strategy to make it di¢ cult for outsiders to enter, but also
to reduce district level competition. In any case it is clear that pressure is put on
all parties or candidates contesting elections to develop strong ties with rms and
organizations with su¢ cient resources to sponsor their electoral participation. The
other countries in this group have abstained from such tactics.
3.1.3 Other costs of organizing ballot access?
There are reasons, however, for considering that the costs of ballot access are not
fully captured by the sum of the district level requirements, as presented above. The
division of the electoral arena into distinct arenas a¤ects how many ballots there are
to access. In some countries, there are relatively few di¤erent ballots that parties
have to be represented on to solicit the support of the whole electorate. In others,
parties have to organise to be present on several hundred ballots in order to be
available to all voters. The division of the ballot implies two things. Firstly, access
to many rather than few ballots probably imposes di¤erent transaction costs for
parties. Secondly, and probably more importantly, parties have to organise internally
to present candidates on the ballots. Where a few dozen candidates may su¢ ce to
present voters everywhere with an alternative in the Netherlands, it would take
several hundreds to achieve the same in the U.K. The costs of organising would
81
Chapter 3. The Registration Barrier
undoubtedly be higher in the latter case. Parties, like all other forms of organizations,
do not arise spontaneously in response to demand. They have to be created and
sustained. And in assessing the costs of such an endeavour, size in terms of members
running for o¢ ce, may be an important factor. It is inherently more di¢ cult to
mobilize many than few, especially when no immediate rewards can be o¤ered in
return for time and e¤ort spent, as discussed by Olson (Olson, 1971). This would
typically be the case for new parties trying to enter, unless the initiators are already
an established political elite, for example split from a party of prior a¢ liation, who
already have a certain clout and strong prospects of being victorious at the polls. It
would then also be reasonable to expect that organizations unable to o¤er material
benets, or strong prospects of such, would be likely to attract people motivated
primarily by personal convictions, with the result that it may be more di¢ cult to
forge the compromises necessary to present a coherent alternative to voters. How
the electoral arena is divided in this manner is, however, determined by the electoral
systems. The crucial variable is the number of districts it denes. But since the
barrier e¤ects of the electoral system (which strongly depends on the number of
districts) is considered in chapter 6, it would not be fruitful to consider its impact
under ballot access as well. It should, however, be kept in mind that electoral
systems may not only impact the prospects of representation for parties and thus
their incentives to participate, but are likely to have an e¤ect on the formation and
participation costs of parties as well.
3.2 Measuring the registration barrier and testing
its e¤ects
There are three comparative studies, in which an attempt is made to gauge the
inuence of ballot access laws on the electoral participation of new parties, which
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use such variation in order to estimate the impact of this and other factors on the
participation rate of new parties.
The rst study is Harmel and Robertson (1985), who opt for an ordinal clas-
sication of ballot access laws in 19 democracies. They devise three categories of
easy, moderate and di¢ cult, containing 14, 3 and 2 countries respectively. It is not
stated how each country is classied nor on what basis. We are instead referred
to the authorsinterpretation (Harmel and Robertson 1985:504). The explanatory
power of these categories is then tested on three di¤erent dependent variables; all
new parties registering participation at election in a country in a period of 30 years,
a subset consisting only of those forming naturally, that is excluding splits, mergers
and electoral alliances, and nally the number of successful (those who have obtained
representation) of the latter group. No support is found for the hypothesized e¤ect,
however. It is worth remarking on the fact that countries are given a single score on
ballot access, and variation over time is therefore not included.
The second study, which attempts to explain party formation and include ballot
access as an explanatory variable is by Hug (Hug 2001). He takes a somewhat
more sophisticated approach to constructing an index of the costs imposed by the
legislation in place. Instead of using ordinal categories, he constructs two separate
continuous indices. The rst indicator is the number of signatures required divided
by the total number of voters. The second is the electoral deposit or fee required
(at the national level) as a fraction of GDP per capita. The di¤erence between
fee and deposits and the conditions for return of the latter are ignored. Rather
than using the countries as cases, as above, national elections play this role, which
has the e¤ect of allowing for variation in both independent and dependent variables
occurring within each country over time. The dependent variable he employs is the
number of new parties registering for the rst time at each election (counting only
genuine new parties and splits from existing parties). The relationship found between
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deposit/fee costs and number of new parties is negative as expected, but as Hug writes
surprisingly weak12. The petition on the other hand shows a stronger relationship
leading him to conclude that at least one element of the ballot access costs has a
considerable impact on the likelihood of party formation(Hug, 2001: 101). Hug
attributes the positive results obtained, compared to the non-nding of Harmel and
Robertson, to the indicators chosen and argues that the ordinal categories used by the
latter hide important variation. In the multivariate analysis, however, it is reported
that positive correlations are found between both petition and deposit requirements
and the dependent variable instead of negative, as we would expect. The reversal of
the direction of the e¤ect is not acknowledged explicitly, but Hug concludes on the
basis of the weakness of the correlation that formation costs (including also public
party nancing) fail to have a strong direct impact on the emergence of new political
parties(Hug, 2001: 119).
The third and most recent study is by Abedi, who considers the ballot access
requirements for petition, deposit and conditions of return, as well as demands for
recognition of candidacy (Abedi, 2004). He devises a ranking on the basis of how
highly each country scores separately on each of the dimensions. It is not clear
whether district or national costs are used, but it would appear that the district
requirements are used, since these are the ones cited in the text. The method used
results in a rank ordering where countries that use both types of requirements in-
evitably end up at the top of the scale and those only using one type end up at
the low end. Denmark, which, as reported above, is one of the countries with the
highest petition requirements in absolute as well as relative terms, somehow ends
up with the third lowest score. Japan is assigned a middle ranking with the U.K.
12The nding with respect to deposits is supported by within country evidence from
U.K., before and after the increase from 150 to 500 £ , reported by Katz. He comments
that even after substantial recent increases in some countries, the deposits required still
are insu¢ cient to discourage a large number of candidates whose support is trivial(Katz,
1997:255).
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a few notches above and with Belgium immediately below, and Austria comes out
as having the toughest requirements. The rankings, which are constant over time,
are then used to analyse relationships with other variables than the participation of
parties at elections, and so are not relevant to this study13.
The lack of positive ndings linking the ballot access requirements to party elec-
toral participation could be interpreted as an indication that registration is not an
important barrier in the sense that it does not o¤er represented parties much pro-
tection from new competition. Before accepting such a conclusion, a more careful
consideration of some points related to the study of ballot access and its e¤ects,
however.
Firstly, the cases included in the two studies just described di¤er from the ones
included here. This is particularly important, since the two cases with the highest
requirements are either not included or appear in a di¤erent form. Japan is not
included in the rst two studies and in the case of the US, the ballot access laws as
well as the number of new parties participating refers to competition for the o¢ ce
of president rather than congress. This would seem to make it less comparable to
the parliamentary institutions that are the objects of analysis in the other countries,
and furthermore the ballot access requirements for the o¢ ce of the president are
signicantly lower than those for congress (Winger, 1994). It may well be that the
level of requirement in the other countries constitutes an insignicant obstacle to
entry, and that registration only truly serves as a barrier in present-day Japan and
the US or historically in the U.K. and France. It would therefore be necessary to
include these two in the analysis and to have a closer look at whether they deviate
from the pattern of new party participation observed elsewhere.
13Abedi reports a signicant correlation between the ballot access indicator and the
indicator made for state support to parties and candidates. Both dimensions attempt to
measure how far parties protect themselves from new competitors. Furthermore positive
correlations between ballot access requirements and the combined vote shares of Anti-
Political Establishment Parties, but these are insignicant (Abedi, 2004:100-101).
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Secondly, there is a problem with how ballot access is conceived, which a¤ects the
appropriate denition of both independent and dependent variables. In the studies
described above, no distinction is made between parties that access the ballot every-
where and those merely appearing on the ballot in a single or a few constituencies.
The category of new parties in both studies therefore includes parties with complete
as well as partial coverage of the electoral districts. The costs of running in all
districts (universal coverage), which Hug explicitly uses as the independent variable,
could logically be expected to exert an inuence on the number of new parties partic-
ipating in all districts, or at least a signicant share of these, but not necessarily on
the number of new parties simply participating irrespective of their coverage. Only
to the extent that parties refrain from running even in a few constituencies, because
they anticipate not being able to bear the costs of running in all at future elections,
is it reasonable to expect an e¤ect on participation in individual constituencies. If
explaining the number of parties participating regardless of how much ground they
cover, using the district level cost rather than the national costs might be a more
important explanatory factor.
The third issue concerns the base line of comparison, that is, whether petitions
or nancial costs should be compared in absolute or relative terms. As was shown
above, the perspective taken alters both the ranking of countries as well as the
distance between them considerably. Hug is somewhat inconsistent in his approach
to this question. Petitions are compared on relative terms, that is, the size of the
petition relative to the total electorate. Deposits/fees, however, are compared in
absolute gures corrected only by di¤erences in individual nancial capacity (GDP
per capita) rather than the total wealth of the country. The other authors do not
discuss the issue.
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3.2.1 Comparative Indicator of the Registration Barrier
There are, as discussed, two important issues that a¤ect how the indicator is con-
structed. The rst is the question of national versus district level costs and partici-
pation. The second is the question of relative versus absolute costs.
The criteria used to devise an indicator for ballot access costs naturally hinges on
the e¤ect sought. The important question for this study is to identify the role ballot
access plays for party competition, that is, to what extent parliamentary parties are
shielded by ballot access barriers from competitive threats. The problem is then
how to dene a competitor in this context. If we consider all new parties that
register for elections `somewhereas new competitors, the problem is that parties
only competing in a few districts are put on equal footing with parties with universal
presence. When only a negligible fraction of the electorate is given the opportunity to
vote for a party, per denition it can not threaten to cut into much of the electoral
base of other parties, nor would it, in most systems, stand much of a chance of
exerting inuence on national politics. But regardless of the potential for very small
parties to play pivotal roles in government formation and legislative processes under
certain circumstances, when conceiving of competition in strictly electoral terms, it
would be erroneous to conceive of it as a proper competitor. The issue that needs to
be settled is only what degree of electoral coverage is necessary before a party would
qualify as a competitor.
Electoral markets are, as mentioned, often divided into several arenas of com-
petition and the structure of demand is never exactly identical across these arenas.
The variation across arenas in combination with the electoral plays a strong role in
determining what a competitive strategy with respect to coverage would be. If a
partys actual or potential electorate is concentrated in a limited number of electoral
districts, there is naturally no reason for it to run in all. Partial coverage would be
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su¢ cient for exhausting its share of the electoral market. Each party will naturally
di¤er with respect to the concentration of its vote (Caramani, 1997). But even par-
ties with highly dispersed electorates will at times be confronted with districts where
they have no real chance of wining seats and therefore have weak incentives to run.
The districts that are known as safebecause they always return the same partisan
candidate to o¢ ce, present strong disincentives to the participation of others. Cox
argues, however, that strategic withdrawal is not a costless strategy in the long run.
Absence from districts where the chances of winning are low is dangerous in the long
run, since it is likely to have the unintended consequence of erasing a party from
voterspolitical map and therefore make re-entry under more favourable conditions
di¢ cult (Cox, 1997). The case Cox uses to `provehis point, however, may not have
strong relevance for politics in an era of mass media and nationalised politics. He
attributes fatal importance to the decision of the Liberal party in the U.K. in the
opening decades of the 20th century, to withdraw from a number of districts. By this
act, it relegated itself from a position as a main contender to one of near irrelevance,
according to Cox. He argues that a party to stay competitive has to retain presence
in districts, even where its chances of winning seats in the present are minimal. If
it doesnt, it will not be able to benet from future changes in the popular mood.
That such considerations play a role in party decisions nds support in the observa-
tion that most large parties do in fact retain a presence even in districts where the
prospects of winning a seat are very remote indeed (see below). However, if voters
are oriented towards politics at the centre - as reected in national news media - the
importance of activism at the national level may far outweigh any potential benets
of presence on the ground. Being erased from the electoral map, such as Cox claims
happened to the Liberal Party, may well be a phenomenon of the past. Voters in
the era of mass media may be more likely to `erase those who do not appear in
newspapers or TV, rather than those absent on the ballot they put their cross on
every few years.
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Recognizing, on the one hand, that what constitutes competitive coverage by
parties varies according to the location of its potential voters combined with the
possible inuence of strategic long-term considerations and on the other, that the
term new competitor does imply at least posing a potential threat to the electoral
base of established parties, makes the choice of a cut-o¤point di¢ cult. Surely parties
do not need to run in all districts to be counted, but running in just a few in a system
where there are hundreds does seem to stretch the concept beyond reasonable limits.
I therefore propose the following;
Ballot access is dened as the costs of participation in all districts. The national
costs are chosen because the electoral structure in the countries investigated here
imply that the typical number of districts allowing parties to full their `quotaof
potential votes lies much closer to the national total than the national minimum. As
will be demonstrated in chapter 6, for the vast majority of the countries included
in this study, the average geographical concentration of partisan votes implies that
parties must be present in more than 2/3 of the districts in order to collect their
votes14. This means that running in fewer districts would entail losses in electoral
support for most parties. Moreover, in most countries the represented parties, with
the exception of regional parties, actually eld candidates in over 90 pct of the
districts. This holds for countries with PR electoral systems, as well for plurality
systems. Choosing the national costs, of course, means not taking into account
the advantage that partial coverage may have for new parties. By being able to
participate in a limited amount of districts, such parties can test their electoral
appeal and gradually increase coverage over a couple of elections if there are signs of
success. Accessing the ballot `graduallymay in fact be a more manageable task than
having to take all in one stride. Congruent with the choice of national level cost, the
testing on new party participation will be sensitive to the question of coverage (cf.
14Only in two countries, Belgium & Switzerland are the competing parties votes concen-
trated in a number of districts less than 2/3s of the total.
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below).
The next question concerns whether to conceive of costs in relative or absolute
terms. In favour of relativising, an argument could be made that new parties in
larger countries (population/wealth) ceteris paribus can draw on a stronger base of
resources and thus full requirements more easily. Contradicting this would be the
argument that new parties facing an uncertain electoral future are hardly in a position
to fully reap the advantages of scale. Considering the di¤erence between petition
requirements in the US and Denmark is instructive for understanding what is at stake.
If costs are relativised the two cases look fairly similar, as already discussed. However,
it is intuitively clear that collecting 1.6 million signatures requires organizational
resources of quite a di¤erent order than 20.000. A key di¤erence lies in the transaction
costs involved for the group of political entrepreneurs in persuading a high number of
corporate or individual sponsors to lend support to their cause. In Denmark relatively
few actors can organise collecting the necessary signatures, while in the US a much
higher number need to be involved for the endeavour to succeed. The presence of a
larger pool of signatures or higher levels of nancial wealth in larger countries cannot,
in my view, be expected to o¤-set the costs of building the organisations it would
require to mobilize them. Put di¤erently, national abundance of money or signatures
does not ow automatically to those in need of them. Endeavour is needed to reap
the benets of abundance, and it is highly probable that the constraining factor is not
the presence of resources per se, but the mobilization of them. Especially when the
demand on the resources is, in any case, innitely much less than what is available, so
agents tapping into them do not come close to exhausting them. Moreover the higher
the risk that the enterprise fails, that is that the objective of not only participation
but of representation and inuence is achieved, the more di¢ cult it would be to
attract the assistance needed. Ballot access in the US would therefore seem a far
more overwhelming task than it is in Denmark. When evaluating the comparative
size of the barriers, I would, in light of these considerations, argue that a comparison
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in absolute terms comes closer to being an accurate representation of the barrier
to entry. This does not mean that a 20.000 signature barrier, which in Denmark
might perform an adequate (or more than adequate) gate-keeper function, would be
su¢ ciently high to keep the ballot manageable in a large country such as the US.
One might expect ceteris paribus that more individuals/groups would want to form
new parties - and be capable of doing so - in larger than in smaller countries. To
keep the number of entrants at the same level larger countries may have to use higher
requirements than in smaller ones, but this of course also entails that the barrier is
higher.
The nal issue concerns how to handle the di¤erences between petition and
fee/deposit requirements. Having two separate indicators aggravates the problem of
the small N, and furthermore, there is, as mentioned, a tendency for countries with
majoritarian electoral institutions to employ nancial requirements, while countries
with PR-systems tend to use petitions. To be able to separate the e¤ects of the elec-
toral system from these, it would be an advantage to be able to identify a method for
putting all on a common scale. The method I suggest involves translating petition
costs to nancial costs by setting a price for signatures. 5000 signatures are thus
equated with 1 GDP per capita. The background for this choice is the estimate,
that if one person were to collect around 20 signatures a day for a working year (240
days), he/she would be able to collect 5000. On top of this e¤ort of course comes
administrative costs, which would be covered by the di¤erence between an average
annual wage and the GDP per capita. Whether more signatures could be collected
on average or whether the administrative costs are much higher for an e¤ort of this
nature is uncertain and there is nothing in the literature to assist with making this
decision.
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3.2.2 Dening Participation: The Dependent Variable
Before the testing, a short comment on the data used is necessary. As mentioned
above, the testing of the registration barrier (and other barriers) made by Hug relied
on data on all parties recorded to have participated in national elections. The infor-
mation on the new parties was collected from a variety of sources, and did not rely on
any cut-o¤ point, neither with respect to the share votes won or number of districts
covered. The same approach is taken by Willey, as well as Harmel and Robertson
in their studies of new parties. Deploring the lack of information on smaller parties
aggregated in the `other partiescategory, in the International Almanac of Electoral
History by Mackie and Rose, he consults other sources, such as newspaper accounts,
to break the `othercategory into its constituent parts (Willey, 1998:637-8). Like-
wise Harmel and Robertson state `no new party that could be identied in available
sources is excluded from this study, regardless of size or electoral strength(Harmel
&Robertson, 1985:508). The problem in this approach is two-fold. On the one hand,
there appears to be an element of chance involved with respect to the number of
parties that make it to o¢ cial records. This means that di¤erences in frequency may
not reect real di¤erences in participation rates, but di¤erences in how meticulously
events are recorded. On the other hand, the lack of a cut-o¤ point with respect to
district coverage creates a situation, where, if all new parties participating somewhere
are counted, the numbers can be quite astronomical.
In order illustrate how these two problems a¤ect the data, it is useful to cite
a few cases; In New Zealand 1950-1972, a period for which very detailed district
level data are available, 20 new parties presented candidates at national elections15.
Only 4 of these, however, participate in more than a single district and only 1 party
elds candidates in more than 20 pct of the districts of them. Moreover, the list
15The data set on district level electoral results for New Zealand was made available by
Prof. Jack Vowels Waikato University, New Zealand.
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that Hug provides for this period includes only 5 parties for this period, and two
of these only participate in 1 district. Obviously the sources he has consulted have
used some criteria for inclusion, but they are not consistent. Similarly, Willey lists
16 new parties in New Zealand for the entire post-war period, which is less than the
number for the shorter period mentioned by the detailed records referred to above.
For the United Kingdom 1950-1997, where detailed district level results are also
available, some 69 new parties have participated at elections. But of these only 4
of elded candidates in more than 20 pct of the districts, and the majority of these
only participated (or received votes) in a single district. Hugs lists counts 30 until
1989 (56 for the same period in the district level data set), while Willey counts 12
for the entire post war period. For Spain, some 44 new parties (using a lower cut-o¤
point of 0.01 pct votes) were on record for the two elections 1993 and 1996, and the
most successful of these, receiving 0.55 pct of the national votes, only participated in
a small number of districts16. The problem is of course that the chances of detecting
any e¤ects that the ballot access laws may have are likely to fail if a clear criterion
with respect to inclusion of cases is not applied. The di¤erences between the sources
are simply too large as these examples demonstrate.
The ideal dependent variable for this study would of course be the total number
of parties that have registered to participate and the number of districts that each
have elded candidates in. This would allow us to test the real variation in partici-
pation and the extent of coverage. Furthermore, it would allow us to systematically
compare, whether even parties that obtain low returns still succeed in accessing or-
ganising general participation in the districts, or whether this is reserved for parties
obtaining more support at the polls, and thus supposedly more resourceful. How-
ever, the district level data available for many countries does not allow such detailed
comparison. For the data on Western Europe, for instance, a lower cut-o¤ point of 5
16The data are available on the web site of the Spanish Ministry of Interior
(www.elecciones.mir.es)
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pct. vote share at the district level is employed for all the countries, except the U.K.
(Caramani, 2000)17, which means that for a number of smaller parties, we cannot
see how many districts they eld candidates in. And for the remaining countries,
the district level records available also di¤er somewhat with respect to the degree of
detail (and for Japan district level data is available only 1947- 1990).
In light of this, I decided to test the e¤ect of the barrier using di¤erent dependent
variables. Firstly, testing the number of parties elding candidates in >.25, >.50
and >.75 pct of the districts respectively, making use of the information where it
is available. Secondly, in recognition of the lack of data on coverage in all cases,
the number of new parties obtaining more than 1 pct. of the votes will be used as
a complementary dependent variable. Furthermore, decade averages of the number
of new parties, rather than the number per election, will be used to control for
di¤erences in the frequency of elections. Since there are signicant di¤erences in
the number of elections in the di¤erent countries, counting new parties per elections
would mean that countries with more elections would have to `producemore new
parties than countries with few elections, if the conclusion that they are a¤ected by
higher barriers is to be avoided. Finally, in recognition of the fact that there may
be periods of high demand for new parties, as well as periods of low demand, the
maximum amount of new parties participating at any election in a given decade is
included as a supplementary test of barrier e¤ects.
3.2.3 Statistical Tests and Discussion of Results
In the following the relationship between the variables will be examined by use
of di¤erent methods. Both OLS regression and non-parametric correlation will be
used to analyse the relationship as discussed earlier (see 2.4). The rst test of
17Only the data set for the U.K. shows electoral results for parties obtaining lower vote
shares.
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Vote
All >0.25 >0.50 >0.75 >1pct. >0.5  dis. >1pct.vote
Registration Barrier 0.07 -0.31** -0.32** -0.27** -0.29** -0.36** 0.31**
(0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.005) (-0.004)
Constant 0.52** 0.20** 0.18** 0.14** 0.19** 1.16** 1.30**
R2(adj) 0.01 0.09** 0.09** 0.06** 0.07** 0.12** 0.9**
N=84
District Participation Decade Maximum
** p<0.01 level *; p<0.05 (two-tailed) - standardized coefficients reported, normal coefficients ( )
OLS Regression
Regressor  Dependent Variable: New Parties Participating
Table 3.1: The Impact of the Registration Barrier on the Number of New Parties
Participating
the hypothesis that a higher registration barrier leads to lower number of parties
participating uses the following model: Number of New Parties Participating =
0 + registrationbarrier+"
As can be seen from the results of the regression analysis summarized in table 3.1,
there is a marked improvement in explanatory power in the regression analysis when
district coverage (or vote share) is taken into account versus when simply all parties
are counted18. The category containing all new parties is poorly predicted with an
R2of just 1 pct (non-signicant) and furthermore the coe¢ cient is in the `wrong
direction. That is, instead of registration costs deterring participation, it appears
to be encouraging it. When district coverage of new parties is taken into account
the explanatory power is markedly improved. What level of coverage is chosen does
not change the explanatory power much, however. The standardized coe¢ cents
across the dependent variables reecting district coverage are all moderately strong,
18The number of cases is 84. In 12 cases information on ballot access requirements was
missing (typically for 1950s and 1960s). See Appendix I.
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The Registration Barrier
Vote
All >0.25 >0.50 >0.75 >1pct. >0.5  dis. >1pct.vote
Kendall's tau 0.19* -0.19** -0.15** -0.15** -0.13 -0.21** -0.08
Spearman's rho 0.25* -0.26** -0.29** -0.20* -0.17 -0.28** -0.09
N=84
Non-Parametric Correlation
 Number of New Parties Participating
District Participation Decade Maximum
 **p<0.01; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
Table 3.2: Correlation of the Registration Barrier and the Number of New Parties
Participating
negative and signicant. Very similar results are obtained when participation is
measured by a minimum of 1 pct vote share. It can also be observed that the
explanatory power is greatest for the category containing the maximum numbers of
new parties per decades. The non-standardized coe¢ cients are very low, however,
indicating that large changes in the registration barrier are needed to exert much of
an inuence on the number of new parties participating.
The next analysis of the relationship between the registration barrier and the
number of new parties participating makes use of non-parametric statistical methods.
As can be seen from the correlations coe¢ cients 3.2, similar results to the above
OLS regression are obtained. Again the category of all new parties stands out due to
its positive coe¢ cients compared to the negative coe¢ ents for those taking district
coverage or vote share into account. The Kendalls tau indicates that knowledge of
the ranking of registration costs will reduce errors in predicting the ranking for most
of the dependent variables some 15-20 pct. The category of the number of parties
obtaining 1 pct of the vote is again least well predicted (low and insignicant) and
the category containing the maximum per decade number of new parties with 50
pct district coverage is again predicted best. The Spearmans rho likewise reveals
96
Chapter 3. The Registration Barrier
a rather weak association between the registration barrier and number(s) of new
parties. For both non-parametric measures, the results are signicant - almost all
the 1 pct. level - in all cases except for the category of new parties obtaining a
minimum of 1 pct of the votes.
On basis of the statistical analysis, it is fair to conclude that the registration
barrier has a weak but nonetheless signicant reductive e¤ect on the number of new
parties participating19. The e¤ect is only apparent when the district coverage of new
parties participating is taken into account, however. If all parties irrespective of how
many districts they participate in are included in the dataset, then the registration
barrier instead appears to have positive e¤ect on participation rates. The analysis
does not give us much of a clue, however, as to whether all variation in registration
costs matter. From the presentation of the cases, it was evident that there is (and
has been) large variation in the values and it is probable that ballot access e¤ects
on new party participation only become apparent over a certain threshold. To get
an idea of this, it is necessary to take a closer look at the relationship. From the
graphic presentation of the relationship between the registration barrier and the
decade maximum number of new parties with an above 50 pct. district participation
and winning 1 pct or more of the votes, it can be seen that the relationship between
the variables is not linear (see gures 3.6 and 3.7).
From the gures, it can be seen that most cases have GDP per capita costs of
below 5 and furthermore it looks as if variation below this range makes little di¤erence
to the rate of new party entry. But at which level the registration costs may begin
to matter is di¢ cult to say. The number of cases that would allow for a proper test
of the relationship between ballot access requirements above this threshold level is
19Two other conversion factors for translating petition into nancial costs - equating the
GDP per capita with half (2500) and double (10000) the number of signatures per person
- was also tried. This did not change the results very much, however, and generally only
resulted in a slight (around 1 pct) lowering of the adjusted R2.
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Figure 3.6: The Maximum Number of New Parties Participating (>50 pct Districts)
small. A closer look at the cases with high requirements may be helpful.
The cases where the registration barrier is very high give some indication that
participation has been deterred. Looking at the U.K. over time, for instance, there is
not a single new party in the three decades 1950-1980 that organises participation in
over 25 pct of the districts. There are several parties that eld candidates in the elec-
tions in the 1960s-1970s, but who only in the 1980s manage to present themselves in
more than a just a few. For instance, the British National Party is seen participating
at elections from 1964, but only in 1983 do they run in as many as 64 districts - and
the same pattern can be observed for the National Front and the Workers Revolu-
tionary Party that also begin with few districts and only expand to a higher number
in the 1980s. The Green party, which in 1992 presented candidates in 255 constituen-
cies, started out with just 7 and 52 in the 1970s, and then expanded to 110 and 134
in the elections of the 1980s. We might, of course, be observing a normal growth
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Figure 3.7: The Maximum Number of New Parties Participating (>1 pct votes)
pattern of new parties that begin in a few constituencies and then gradually build
up their organisation in response to support, to cover more ground. If we compare
with parties in countries that similarly employ single member districts but have low
registration barriers (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), a similar tendency for new
parties to begin in fewer constituencies and then expand can be observed. But there
is a clear di¤erence. In the latter countries, the new parties start out covering many
more districts, and then they expand much faster. Typically they reach a signicant
coverage at their second election. Moreover, there are clearly more of them. With
respect to the registration barrier of the U.K. in the 1990s, which is much lower than
in the preceding decades but still comparatively high, it is notable that two parties,
the Natural Law Party and Referendum Party, present themselves in 298 and 547
constituencies respectively (of 651 districts) and obtaining just 0.18 and 2.7 pct of
the votes. Participation in many districts may still represent a challenge, but it is at
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least not impossible for parties which receive only little support at the polls20.
Observing the pattern of new party participation in the United States in the
post war period, the e¤ects of the registration barrier are evident. There are only
two parties in the period that manage to organise ballot access in over 25 pct of
the districts, and both do so in the 1980s and 1990s. The Libertarian party, which
had participated since the mid 1970s and at its peak nominated candidates in 120
constituencies in 26 states (1992), and Natural Law party, which was present in 16
states and 154 districts in 1992. While it may be true, as for instance Cox (1997)
and Willey (1998) argue, that the incentives to form parties is lower in the U.S.,
due to the nature of the parties and the open primaries, than in the other countries
in the group, it does seem telling that out of the 18 new parties that did form and
participated in House elections between 1950-1999, none of them managed to access
more ballots.
In the case of Japan, it is not so easy to assess the extent of the deterrent e¤ect
from numbers alone. But it may be instructive to look a bit closer at the new parties
that participated. In the 1950s-70s, there are 5 new parties. All except one are
splits from existing parties, however, and only 2 of these nominate candidates in
the majority of the districts. And if electoral success at the rst election can be
used as a measure of resourcefulness, then both of these are resourceful as they take
about 9 pct of the vote share each. The other two parties, which are also splits, are
only present in 8 and 34 districts (of 130 possible) and do not make any noteworthy
expansion in the following elections. The only genuinely new party runs in about half
of the districts, but does not expand in the following elections either. In the 1980s
where the participating fees are signicantly increased, there are no new ones. In the
20Commenting on the impact of the increase in the deposit in 1985, Katz concludes
that the size of the deposit primarily a¤ects the number of independent and fringe party
candidates, while the threshold [which was lowered from 12.5 to 5 pct.] a¤ects the costs
of competition for small (and not so small) parties that will present candidates regardless
(Katz, 1997: 260).
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1990s, major changes in the party system take place, and there are a number of new
parties splitting o¤ from the established ones. Unfortunately data on participation
in districts is lacking, so it is not possible to know how widely they participated. It
would naturally require proper case studies to assess how the participation fees may
a¤ect the decisions of parties to eld candidates in districts in Japan.
Finally, there are some countries which fall into the group of intermediate-high
requirements for some periods. That is France (1960s-70s), Ireland (1960s) and the
Netherlands (1990s). For the Netherlands, there are 4 new parties participating in
the 1990s, but data on many districts they participate in is not available, since their
electoral returns were very low. For Ireland in the 1960s there is just one new party
(Democratic Party), and it nominates candidates in just 10 pct of the constituencies.
New parties participating in subsequent decades tend to present themselves in at least
25 pct of the districts, but this may be caused by other factors, of course. In the case
of France, district level data are absent, as electoral results have been aggregated at
the level of the 90 regions rather than the 460-470 primary districts. So all that can
be said is that in the 1960s and 1970s there are 3 new parties that participate, two
of these elded candidates in over 75 pct of the regions and one in just over half.
While there is evidence to support that ballot access in the countries that have very
high requirements actually prevents participation, it is di¢ cult with these data to
establish, at what exact level it is reasonable to say that the ballot access actually
constitutes a barrier to be reckoned with.
A separate test was made of the countries using petition requirements since they
(with the exception of the U.S.) fall into the group with low requirements as oper-
ationalized here. The lack of any apparent e¤ects of ballot access requirements for
these cases could be related to an erroneous translation of petition to nancial costs.
It was not possible to establish any meaningful results by statistical methods, how-
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ever21. Evidence from the individual cases tends to support the conclusion that the
registration barrier doesnt keep new parties out. The countries with the high peti-
tion requirements, Italy, Spain, Germany and Denmark, have all regularly witnessed
new parties participating with a high coverage of the districts. And in all of these
countries, there are recorded cases of parties with low popular support (1-2 pct vote
share) that have participated in over 75 pct of the districts22. In this connection, it
is worth citing within country evidence from Denmark, where petition requirements
were doubled in 1965 (from 10.000 to 20.000 signatures). Pedersen refers to a study
on the process of registering for elections in Denmark, where it is found that of 43
parties attempting to be accepted in the period 1915-75, only 3 had failed (Pedersen,
1991). This does indicate that party competition was not been seriously hindered by
the ballot access laws in this case.
In conclusion, it can be said that ballot access is not a major obstacle for new
parties in the large majority of the countries in the period studied here. Only two
countries, Japan and the US, have consistently applied very high requirements, which
are likely to have deterred participation. Historically, The United Kingdom also had
very high barriers until the 1980s when requirements fell to more manageable levels.
They are still high,however, and likely to challenge potential contenders. France
(1960s-1970s) and Ireland (1960s) also imposed high costs of registration, but in
subsequent decades these can not be regarded as high.
21In fact, there was a sligth postive (not signicant) correlation between petition require-
ments and the number of new parties participating.
22Examples of parties with low electoral returns and district participation over 75 pct:
Germany: German Peace Union 1961 (1.9 pct), Spain: Democratic Reform Party 1986
(1.pct), Italy: Radical Party 1976 (1.1. pct), Denmark: Unity List 1987 (1.3 pct).
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The Recognition Barrier
Ignorance may well be the most important barrier shielding established parties from
competitive threats emerging from outside the political institutions. Discrepancies
between the performance of existing parties and electoral preferences are not su¢ -
cient in themselves to propel new parties into public o¢ ce. However worthy a cause
espoused and however strong the disenchantment of the public with its current polit-
ical leaders, if a new contender does not succeed in establishing itself in the mind of
the public as a viable alternative, it stands little chance of gaining electoral support
- even if it has obtained a place on the ballot. Since the information that needs to
be transmitted is typically multifaceted and furthermore aims to induce voters to
act, the task is not an easy one. The resources needed for bridging the gap between
anonymity and renown, the special opportunities and obstacles presented to succeed
in this e¤ort, make up the recognition barrier to entry in politics.
The most direct barrier to recognition new parties can encounter is obviously
if they are directly prevented from disseminating information about themselves by
the authorities. This type of barrier does not appear to have distorted the electoral
process in the countries included in this study, however. The democratic rules of the
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game, including the right to campaign for the registered participants at elections,
have largely been observed1. Nevertheless, equal rights to campaign do not entail
equal opportunities for all to do so. The challenge facing parties in their e¤orts to
emerge from obscurity may instead vary signicantly across countries and time.
The question is, however, what specic factors inuence the level of di¢ culty
involved in obtaining recognition for new parties. Until now, only little research
has been devoted to this issue, and the few studies that address it focus exclusively
on di¤erences in the level of state support for electoral campaigns (Abedi, 2004;
Bowler, Carter & Farrell, 2003; Hug, 2001). Considering that the level of assistance
typically provided is unlikely to be su¢ cient in itself to provide parties with the
level of exposure necessary, it not unreasonable to suggest that there may be more
to the story than that. In order to identify other possible barriers or facilitators to
recognition, it is necessary to give careful consideration to how parties can transmit
information as well as how it is received. The success of any e¤ort to communicate
a message depends on both sender and receiver. As Gunther and Mughan write
`the political e¤ects of this information [from the mass media] are shaped by the
interaction between its use by elites and the receptivity of individual citizens who are
the targets of political messages(Gunther &Mughan, 2000: 444). It can therefore be
argued that the recognition barrier is determined by the costs and opportunities for
relaying messages to the public, as well as the propensity for the public to acquire
information made available to them. And there is no reason to assume from the
outset that such communicative conditions do not vary across countries or time.
The rst part of the chapter is consequently devoted to exploring possible sources
of barriers (and facilitators) to recognition at the two ends of the communicative
1There have been instances, such as the exclusion of the Communist Party in New
Zealand from access to air time in the 1960s (Bowler, Carter & Farrell, 2003). But such
cases appear to have been rare and none of the studies concerned with formation and entry
of new parties take this actively into consideration (Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2001;
Willey, 1998)
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e¤ort. A wide range of possible barriers will be considered and the feasibility of
subjecting them to empirical analysis briey assessed. Five factors are identied,
which are then subjected to further empirical analysis and testing in the second part
of the chapter.
4.1 Sources of Barriers
4.1.1 Barriers in Reception of Political Information
Barriers to recognition are not likely to stem from decient provision of information
alone. Inadequate reception of the information parties `put outabout themselves
may present an equally serious hurdle to new parties trying to make a name for
themselves. The implications of this dimension for the comparative costs of commu-
nication will be explored by rst considering the consequences of the generally low
level of interest in and knowledge of politics observed, and secondly, by considering
the implications of di¤erences in how attentive electorates are to political news.
Ignorance, short-cuts and barriers
A perfectly informed electorate would undoubtedly provide ideal conditions for entry
of new parties, since it would remove the advantage incumbents have by already being
well known to the public. New parties would simply have to present their platform,
and if this, and its candidates, were more to votersliking than the already existing
ones, they would be elected. Both theory and reality militate against the credibility
of this scenario, however. Theoretically, there are strong arguments that the average
citizen will invest only little time in informing him or herself about politics. As
Downs argued there is simply a shortage of rational incentives to devote resources to
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this (Downs, 1957: 246). Gauging from observed levels of interest in and knowledge
of politics, it appears that the Downsian prediction is not far o¤ the mark. Decades
of research has only served to conrm over and over that most citizens have only
scant knowledge of politics and take little interest therein. As two scholars recently
commented, `The widespread ignorance of the general public about all but the most
highly salient political events and actors is one of the best documented facts in all
of the social sciences(Lau & Redlawsk, 2001)2.
The consistently low levels of knowledge displayed by the vast majority of the
worlds democratic citizens are undoubtedly one of the most unsettling factors in the
equation sustaining democracy. The hazard of voter ignorance is that it belies the
very idea of democratic rule, namely government constrained by citizensinterests
and preferences. Not all have been willing to succumb to the view that democracy
is naught but a ction, however. A number of political scientists have instead been
at pains to salvage both the dignity and democratic value of voterschoices. While
these scholars do not fail to acknowledge the factual ignorance of politics displayed by
most citizens, or the fact that they pay little attention to politics, they fail to accredit
this basic reality quite the devastating e¤ects on the integrity of vote-decisions that
others tend to do.
The `know-nothingscan, it is argued, make `good-enoughand even quite rational
choices (Lupia &McCubbins, 1998). Drawing on the insights of cognitive psychology,
the focus is shifted from the limited information actually retained by each individual
to the mechanisms whereby we humans in many arenas deal with a complex envi-
ronment and manage to navigate in situations of `informational overload. Rather
than basing decisions of careful weighing of facts, so the argument goes, `human be-
2The conclusion refers primarily to surveys of voter knowledge in the US (e.g. Bennet,
2003). Shifting attention to other established democracies gives little cause for signicant
revisions of the picture of a generally uninformed electorate, however (e.g. Vettehen et al,
2004; Popkin and Dimock, 1999).
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ings have adaptively developed a large series of cognitive heuristics or shortcuts that
allow them to make `pretty goodjudgements most of the time(Lau & Redlawsk,
1997: 586). The key is the so-called cues or short-cuts, which serve as substitutes
for detailed information. As Lupia and McCubbins claim `when substitutes for de-
tailed information are available, then people who have limited information can make
reasoned choices(Lupia & McCubbins, 1998: 36).
What is not discussed by these scholars, however, is how heuristic short-cuts
might inuence the chances that new parties are recognized as alternatives. And it
can in fact be argued that it is not inconsequential which cues people use. Briey
considering the impact of some frequently mentioned cues can serve to illustrate the
point. Using `partyas a cue for voting decisions would for instance tend to close the
system to outsiders (as discussed by Fiorina, 1981). If the landmarks on the political
map of the average voter are established party names, which in turn are associated
with certain key positions, values and behaviours, their movements are inevitably
conned to these. Using ideology as a short-cut can be expected to have a more
open e¤ect. New contendersentry might be facilitated if the public were to base
their decisions on ideological cues. Rather than having to communicate an entire
set of policy proposals, a few ideological references can be su¢ cient to get across to
people. The obstacle parties may encounter in this respect might instead lie in the
ideological space itself, that is, whether it is already crowded and monopolised by
established actors. Using endorsements by known actors - including unions, business
associations, churches, media organizations etc. - might be expected to have a more
conservative e¤ect. At least in times of stability, endorsements are likely to bias the
status quo. Betting on newcomers is generally - although of course not always - a less
secure way of ensuring that members interests are protected. Endorsements may
therefore prove a di¢ cult resource to procure. Finally, personality traits of political
candidates have- in line with the prominent role of television - been attributed an
ever stronger role as cues for voters (e.g. Wattenberg, 1991). This tendency might
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put establishment parties on an equal footing with newcomers, since there is no
reason to believe that either would be in a particularly privileged position to attract
`likeablecandidates.
While it is interesting to speculate on how low levels of political knowledge cou-
pled with the use of di¤erent heuristic devices may a¤ect the openness of the political
arena, it is di¢ cult to move beyond that. It is not unreasonable to presume that not
all types of cues are equally important everywhere, as the extent ideological polariza-
tion, partisan identication, the role of organisations of civil society etc. are known
to vary (e.g. Dalton &Wattenberg, 2000; Franklin et al. 1992, Bartolini & Mair,
1990; Inglehart, 1990). However, systematic comparative research into the relative
importance of cues in electoral decision-making does not exist, as most research has
focussed on the US, and it is therefore not possible to pursue the question further
here (Dalton, 2000)3.
Public Attention to Political Information
A politically well informed and interested electorate would certainly provide the most
level playing eld for the competition between old and new parties. But, as discussed,
such conditions are unlikely to obtain anywhere and incumbents will therefore always
enjoy a strong advantage simply by being known to electors. However, it can be
argued that di¤erences in the level of attention the public pays to political news will
inuence the chances that new parties might succeed in being noticed. For a new
party to be recognized as an alternative to existing ones does not require that the
3Much of the primary research on political cognition and political sophistication is
based on the American public. One may argue that many of the cognitive processes being
studied transcend national boundaries: Americans presumable think about politics in ways
that are similar to other publics. However, we also know that political structures can a¤ect
political perceptions and cognition. The non-ideological and complex structure of American
politics, for example, creates much di¤erent dynamics for electoral choice than a polarized
parliamentary system(Dalton, 2000: 921)
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public is thoroughly acquainted with its policy proposals and candidates, no more
than voting for the already represented parties does. It does require, however, that
the party is seen or heard enough times to be remembered. Greater attention paid
to news about politics would therefore - ceteris paribus - increase the chances that
new parties are recognized. The question is of course whether electorates di¤er in
this respect.
There are a number of studies that bring evidence that national electorates in
fact do di¤er with respect to how attentive they are to news about politics and
consequently how well informed they are (see Milner, 2002: 53-66). Unfortunately,
comparative data on how much time people in di¤erent countries spend following
political news is not available and neither is information about relative di¤erences
in knowledge levels. However, a number of studies have revealed that there are
clear di¤erences with respect to how much political information di¤erent types of
media provide, and popular media consumption patterns consequently indicate how
exposed they are to political news. As will be argued below, media use can therefore
be used as a proxy indicator for consumption of political information. It is therefore
possible to suggest the following hypothesis for empirical testing:
 Higher public exposure to political information lowers the recognition barrier.
Before proceeding with the empirical testing of this proposition, the issue of
barriers arising at the transmitting end of the communication will be considered.
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4.1.2 Barriers in Transmitting Political Information
Political information: Availability and Suppliers
The possibilities for communicating with the public have vastly expanded in the post
war period and caused a radical transformation in the nature as well as sheer mag-
nitude of societal information ows. The much discussed revolution in information
technologies and their spread during the second half of the 20th century has pro-
foundly impacted society and with it of course also its politics. Driven by changes
in technologies and communication infrastructure, the channels of communication
available have multiplied drastically and made information an ubiquitous and easily
accessible commodity for citizens from all walks of life4. The expansion of media
systems has had far reaching implications for various aspects of the cultural, social
and political life of nations. In the area of political communication, the impact has
certainly been profound. On the one hand, there has been a massive increase in the
amount of information transmitted, the speed with which it travels and its reach. On
the other, the emergence of mass media organizations has crowded out other actors
providing information on politics, including political parties themselves5.
4The most radical changes with respect to the transmission of information in the post
war period have occurred in the broadcast media, particularly television. From the incep-
tion of regular broadcasts typically occurring in the course of the 1950s, television rapidly
expanded its reach. Already by 1970 an average of 270 per thousand inhabitants in the
established democracies owned a television set and the vast majorities of the populations
could be counted among the regular viewers. The development of radio preceded that of
TV by some decades, but also expanded in this period (UNESCO, 2002). The so-called
new media appeared later and in the 1990s still only played a marginal role for election
campaigns.
5As Hallin and Mancini comment that the mass media has become a central social
institution to a signicant extent displacing churches, parties, trade unions, an other tradi-
tional organizations of civil society as the central means by which individuals are connected
to the wider social and political world(Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 33). Dalton and Wat-
tenberg further observe that not only have parties lost ground with respect to the general
ow of information on political a¤airs, but also in relation to their own electioneering ef-
forts. They write: The mass media are assuming many of the information functions that
110
Chapter 4. The Recognition Barrier
As a result of these developments, it is possible to hypothesize that recognition
has generally become easier for new parties to obtain. Firstly, because technologies
of communication have made transmission of information easier with the result that
there has been a steep increase in the amount available and in the facility with which
the public can acquire it. Secondly, because the costs of communication no longer
necessarily fall on parties themselves. The growth of a specialized media industry
has arguably had implications for organizational and resource demands being made
on political parties - be they new or established. In a certain sense, a burden has
been lifted from the shoulders of political parties, as they no longer have to bear
the full costs of communicating with the public. As both generators and carriers
of political messages to the public, parties depended on commanding considerable
organisational resources, such as a membership that could be mobilized to campaign,
close ties to organisations of civil society that could be relied on to relay messages
on their behalf or access to economic resources enabling them to communicate to the
public through their own newspapers. This would of course seem to make the task
facing new parties trying to obtain public recognition quite formidable, since such
resources would have to be mobilized before electoral support could be attained.
Testing whether the expansion of media systems has had the e¤ect of reducing
the recognition barrier would either require a comparison of periods before the devel-
opment of mass media and after, or alternatively examine di¤erences in the post-war
period according to the di¤erent rates of expansion of the reach and dominance of
the mass media (i.e. primarily the broadcast media). In the former case, testing
would move outside the period limits for the study, in the latter it would be neces-
sary to acquire precise information about the dominance of mass media as sources
of information over time. And to my knowledge accurate comparative data of this
political parties once controlled. Instead of learning about an election at a campaign rally
or from party canvassers, the mass media have become the primary source of campaign
information(Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000:11-12)
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nature are not available6. Moreover, due to strong similarities among the countries in
this study with respect to the timing of the introduction and development of broad-
cast media, there is a risk that relying on approximations will result in an indicator,
which is very close to the simple passing of time - and thus overlap with a number
of other phenomena as well.
While the e¤ects of these changes in communication technologies and identity
of suppliers cannot be analysed further here, it is necessary to consider the bias of
suppliers with respect to the content of the information conveyed.
Media Systems and `Insider-Bias
The mass media can facilitate the entry of parties without independent resources for
communicating. There are no indications, however, that obtaining coverage in the
mass media is always costless, nor is it likely that all actors have the same chances
of getting attention in the media. Established parties and political gures are natu-
rally advantaged with respect to media attention. As the lead characters of political
dramas and natural suppliers of political news, they are guaranteed a place in the
limelight. For new parties, the task is di¤erent, since they have to establish their
relevance. If the media were neutral in their selection and presentation of informa-
tion about politics, the barrier might be the same for new parties everywhere. But
as the pundits never grow wary of pointing out, in the selection of news and stories,
in how they are told, as well as in the space they are accorded, the media, inten-
tionally or inadvertently, colour their material. The question is, however, whether
it is meaningful to suggest that national media systems - comprising the totality of
media outlets in a given country - might exhibit di¤erent degrees of bias with respect
6UNESCO provides data on the number of radio and television receivers in each country
from the 1970s onwards. However, apart from information about when regular broadcasting
began in the di¤erent countries, data on reach of mass media before the 1970s are not
available.
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to coverage of politics in general and in their openness to new parties specically.
A number of scholars do in fact argue that national media systems tend to di¤er
quite signicantly with respect to their coverage of politics (e.g. Hallin & Mancini,
2004; Humphrey, 1996; Blumler, 1992; Kuhn, 1985; Seymour-Ure, 1974). On the
basis of the evidence amassed on the di¤erent systems, there is in fact little reason
to suppose that parties in di¤erent systems have similar opportunities for communi-
cating to the public through the mass media. As Semetko for instance comments `the
conditions under which politicians attain visibility through the media di¤er widely
across countries, depending on the media systems(Semetko, 1996). The question
is `justwhat specic features of the media systems are likely to play a role for the
e¤orts of new parties to obtain publicity. On this topic there is little direct help
to nd in the literature, as this question has not, to my knowledge, been subjected
to systematic comparative research. However, media scholars discuss a number of
di¤erent characteristics, which directly or indirectly may inuence the openness of
the media to actors outside the political establishment. In the following, I will briey
review these features with a view to identifying those possible to subject to further
empirical analysis and testing.
Firstly, the extent of diversity or concentration in national media systems might
be expected to inuence their accessibility to new actors. The higher the number of
independent editorial units, and the greater variety of information communicated,
the greater we might expect the chances that new parties get publicity to be. The
tendency towards increasing concentration of ownership as well as the reduction in
number of independent outlets (in the press system) over the past fty years could
therefore be interpreted as a move in the direction of more closed media systems.
However, as several have pointed out, `realdiversity is di¢ cult to measure empir-
ically (e.g. Voltmer, 2000; Picard, 1998; Humphrey, 1996). The problem is that
concentration - whether on the dimension of ownership or the number of outlets -
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does not correspond directly with the number of independent editorial units or with
message diversity. On the one hand, common ownership does not necessarily en-
tail uniformity in message and political viewpoints7. On the other, multiplicity of
outlets is no guarantee for message diversity either due to the widespread practice
of outsourcing news production to specialized agencies8. Apart from the di¢ culties
in obtaining data on the relevant dimensions, there is therefore also a problem in
construction of valid indicators of this phenomenon, making it di¢ cult to pursue
this further here.
Secondly, the criteria employed by media organisations for selecting a `good story
are likely to play an important role. Countless media scholars have commented on the
spread of a `media logic, which implies that abiding social and economic problems
lose out to short-term events with higher `entertainmentvalue in the competition
for media attention9. Mughan and Gunther comment that scholars agree that the
`notion of a `media logic- according to which television is seen as privileging candi-
dates over party, program, or policy-relevant issuesis a ubiquitous phenomenon, but
also qualify this by saying that `this logic is not felt equally strong in all countries
(Mughan & Gunther, 2000:403)10. Many argue that this tendency is enhanced in
national media systems when commercial competition for audiences is strong, but
7Demers has shown that top editors at the chain-owned newspapers enjoyed no less
professional autonomy than those at independently owned ones, and that corporatization
and globalization of the media have not been associated with a shrinkage in the diversity of
ideas available to mass publics (Demers, 1999: chapter 7)(Gunther & Mughan, 2000:423)
8As Picard writes most studies of media content have shown that di¤erent units of a
medium and di¤erent media tend to provide relatively similar content, programming and
views because of commercial concerns(Picard, 1998: 213).
9As Mazzolini et al. for instance write the media, by virtue of their espousal of new
values - such as timeliness, proximity and prominence - tend to focus upon dramatic and
transitory issues rather than on prolonged analyses of social and political phenomena
(Mazzolini, 2003: 226)
10It has been argued that the spread of the media logic constitutes the basis for a
convergence of media systems. However, as Hallin and Mancini point out there is an
important ambiguity about whether this is essentially a professional or a commercial
logic(Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 253)
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journalistic cultures, popular demand and individual media types may be equally
determining. As Hallin and Mancini point out there is an `important ambiguity
about whether the media logic `is essentially a professional or a commercial logic
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 253). A strong predilection for interesting personalities,
novelties, scandals or crises no doubt provides ample possibilities for entry into the
lime light for actors with an aptitude for providing the media with stories matching
these criteria11. While undoubtedly providing an easy way into the public eye for
some new parties, it should of course be kept in mind that the `media logiccan work
to the detriment of parties that have little to o¤er on those terms. Assessing the
relative strength of `media logicin di¤erent media systems is not possible, however,
and it is therefore not feasible to investigate its e¤ects comparatively.
Thirdly, it has been argued that journalist cultures simply vary strongly with
respect to how they interpret and practice their political roles. In some cultures
journalists see it as their task to advocate particular views and participate in setting
the agenda, while in others this is perceived to be the task of established political
actors (Patterson, 1998; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004). It is for instance described
how the partisan `impartiality, which is aspired to in some cultures, such as the
American press, is interpreted by journalists as fairly reporting the viewpoints of
representatives of the main parties12. Furthermore, it has been argued that journal-
11There are many accounts of populist or extremist parties that have enjoyed extensive
coverage simply because they deliver provocative statements challenging established con-
ventions or actors, and therefore provide a novelty and crises-feelto the stories that can
be transmitted to the public. As Mazzoleni writes Neo-populist leaders...appear at all
times to be astute exploiters of free advertisingand in fact rely mostly on this kind of
free mediato gain coverage and exposure, rather than on paid advertising (Mazzoleni,
2003:15).
12As one American newspaper editor is quoted saying After thinking it over, it became
obvious to me that the fairness I was so fond of extended only to those who won or
came in second. I had never even entertained the possibility of covering minor-party
candidates, either during the campaign or in the election results(Byrd, 1998). Likewise,
the impartiality practised by the BBC in its coverage of political a¤airs has, some argue,
also manifested itself in balanced coverage of the major parties and therefore not necessarily
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ists in some cultures, more than others, are trained to interpret politics as a `strategic
game(Patterson, 1993). In addition to other consequences of this approach, the fo-
cus on `winnersin a game perspective can make life doubly di¢ cult for parties in
systems, where new parties for other reasons have a hard time getting in. There
is thus little doubt that di¤erences in professional cultures may play an important
role for the e¤orts of new parties to obtain publicity13. The absence of more than
anecdotal evidence of such di¤erences, and the di¢ culty in obtaining it per se, makes
it impossible to consider this dimension further, however.
Finally, the degree of `political parallelism- understood as the links between the
media and political parties14 - in media systems is likely to inuence the situation for
political outsiders. As Mughan and Gunther, for instance, argue `the emergence of
political television has helped to transform party systems by giving unprecedented
publicity to parties (such as the Liberals in Britain) that had been largely ignored
by a partisan press aligned with the governing Conservatives and Labour, or to new
parties, like Berlusconis Forza Italia..(Gunther & Mughan, 2000: 417). A media
system, whose constituent parts are closely a¢ liated or identied with established
political actors, can simply be expected to paint a di¤erent picture of reality than
more independent media systems. As Mazzoleni put is, `The Political reality ordered
and structured by the media is closely correlated with the degree of the integration
of the media into the political system and with the unique patterns of relations
between the media institutions and the political establishments existing in di¤erent
national contexts (Mazzoleni, 2003: 13). Further, Entman writes `In a national
beneted other actors (Burns, 1977 cited in Mughan & Gunther, 2000: 11).
13Commenting on Australian media, Mazzoleni for instance writes: national media...
had for decades cynically portrayed political reality as a simple choice between the two
major parties to the detriment of the minor parties (Mazzoleni et al, 2003: 220).
14Hallin and Mancini adapt Seymour-Ures term Party-Press Parallelismto a broader
concept of Political Parallelism, which they dene as the degree and nature of the links
between the media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media
system reects the major political divisions in society(Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 21).
116
Chapter 4. The Recognition Barrier
context where governmental political control over media organisation is stronger,
and partisan news media coverage is more common, the political interests of both
the media and political elites are much closer (Entman, 1989)15. Since established
political parties would generally not a¤ord new parties much space in the limelight,
if they can help it, the nature of the links between the political establishment and the
media systems is likely to determine the chances that new parties obtain coverage as
well as what kind of coverage they get. Moreover, while the data available on this
dimension is far from complete, there is enough information available to allow for
its inclusion. The hypothesis, which will be subjected to empirical analysis, can be
formulated as follows:
 The stronger the links between the established party system and the media sys-
tem, the higher the recognition barrier.
Before moving to the operationalization and empirical testing, other relevant
hypotheses will rst be considered.
Direct Communication
The pivotal role of the mass media notwithstanding, the paths of direct communica-
tion are neither hermetically sealed nor irrelevant to the electoral contest. It is clear
that the methods and the relative importance of direct communication have changed
over the post war period in line with the expansion of the mass media. The question
is, however, whether it is possible to assess di¤erences in the costs of direct commu-
nication across countries and time. The role of the state through laws regulating the
activities of political parties, as well as the properties of the `target groupof the
communication need to be considered;
15Cited in Mazzoleni 2003: 13
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Firstly, there are notable di¤erences between countries with respect to the laws
that regulate partiescampaigning e¤orts as well as their nancial status. Di¤erences
in rules on disclosure of and ceilings on contributions, tax breaks for contributors and
parties, bans on specic sources of income or limits on expenditure etc., are likely
to constrain or enable parties with respect to mobilizing resources and campaigning
(Alexander,1989; Alexander & Shiratori, 1994; IDEA, 2003). Bans on advertising in
television, along with expenditure ceilings, may for instance have the e¤ect of putting
new and established parties on a more equal footing, while tax breaks for contributors
may make it easier for all parties to attract resources. It is very di¢ cult, however, to
assess the implications of the di¤erent types of legislation in their national context,
and consequently to assess their comparative barrier e¤ects. The focus here is con-
sequently on the two most direct forms of assistance, namely state guaranteed free
access to media in the course of electoral campaigns and direct nancial assistance.
State funding or free access to exposure in the media can play a particularly impor-
tant role for groups trying to organize politically. As Nassmacher writes `the harsh
reality is that it is often the lack of nancial resources which prevents the leaders
and supporters of such groups [politically relevant groups in society] from achiev-
ing political participation through representation which would foster the democratic
protection of their interests (Nassmacher, 2003:1). Even if such assistance is not
su¢ cient in itself, it may prove important for less resourceful actors. As mentioned
earlier, state support for parties has been included as a variable in other studies too
(Abedi, 2004; Bowler, Carter & Farrel, 2003; Hug, 2001). The expectation is simply
that more generous terms of free access to media and nancial assistance will lower
the recognition barrier.
Secondly, to determine the costs of direct campaign both the means of commu-
nication, as well as properties of the `target groupmay be important. As already
mentioned, the expansion of media systems in the post war period implied a shift
in votersattention towards mass media at the expense of other sources of informa-
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tion. For parties this has implied a shift in the means of communication, from more
labour-intensive forms - such as door-to-door canvassing or town-hall meetings - to
more capital intensive forms, namely advertising. Whether this shift has implied an
increase in the costs of communicating with voters, is not an easy question to settle,
however. It is clear that a shift of this nature favours parties who mobilize funds more
easily than manpower, but with respect to absolute levels, it is di¢ cult to compare.
The other consideration concerns the costs of reaching the `target groupin a direct
information e¤ort. It is intuitively clear that the number of people new parties need
to reach with their messages will make a signicant di¤erence for the costs incurred.
Whether a new party tries to obtain recognition with 5 million or 40 million voters
will inuence the resources required to succeed. It is also likely, however, that other
factors than the sheer number of people enter the equation for determining costs.
Population density might be particularly important if face-to-face methods are used,
whereas an advertising strategy is likely to be more strongly a¤ected by factors such
as the number and relative reach of media outlets. How to measure this feature will
be addressed further below.
Three hypotheses related to the costs of direct communication can thus be for-
mulated on the basis of the discussion above:
 The more generous the terms of free access to media for new parties, the lower
the recognition barrier
 The more generous the terms of nancial assistances for new parties, the lower
the recognition barrier
 The higher the costs of reaching the electorate in a direct campaign, the higher
the recognition barrier
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4.1.3 Overview of Hypothesized Barriers
In the preceding section, no less that fteen di¤erent factors were discussed, which
can be expected to inuence the height of the recognition barrier. Of these, ve were
singled out for further empirical analysis and testing. The lack of data and/or the
di¢ culty involved in measuring the phenomena in question render it impossible to
consider others. For the sake of overview, each of the hypothesized relationships is
illustrated in gure 4.1 on page 121. The ve hypotheses to be considered in the
following section are highlighted.
Compared to the registration barrier, it is obvious that the barrier to recognition
is much more di¢ cult to capture. Quite another level of complexity is involved in
modelling information ows in a society than ballot access, and identifying conditions
that may facilitate or block such ows is consequently more demanding. Given the
number of di¤erent factors that may inuence the ease with which new parties can
obtain recognition, it is also likely that predicting di¤erences in the number of parties
actually succeeding in winning recognition will be di¢ cult. However, in the following
each of the hypotheses will be operationalized and tested in turn.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of Hypothesized Recognition Barriers
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4.2 Public Exposure to Political Information
The rst proposition made is that greater public exposure to political information
increases the likelihood that new parties are recognized. As mentioned, comparative
data on how much time people in various countries spend on following political news
is missing. Instead, it was suggested that media consumption patterns provide an
indication of how much news on politics people are exposed to. In the following, the
argument that use of di¤erent types of media may indeed give us an indication of
di¤erences in exposure to political information will rst be developed. Since television
and newspapers on average are the top two sources of information on politics in the
countries studied here, and more information on these is available, only these two
media are considered16. After that, a brief description of the di¤erences in national
markets for the di¤erent media types will be explored, and nally the indicators will
be dened and their e¤ects on the number of new parties winning votes tested.
4.2.1 Can we infer from media consumption to exposure to
political information?
Consumption patterns: Use of television and newspapers as sources of
news
With respect to the sources of information on politics that people use today, there are
strong similarities with respect to the role of television, while the use of newspapers
is subject to greater variation. Since the inception of regular broadcasts, which in
16Gunther and Mughan comment The lack of comparative research (which is probably a
product of the high level of fragmentation of radio, which consists of hundreds or thousands
of local broadcasting stations in most countries) is unfortunate, since many radio stations
provide the most voluminous and intensive ow of political communications of all the mass
media(Gunther & Mughan, 2000:419)
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most countries occurred in the course of the 1950s, television has developed from a
marginal position into being the most important source of information for citizens
in all countries, and also as the media most trusted to provide reliable information
(Dalton, 1996; Eurobarometer, 1999)17. There is considerable variation in how much
this medium is used, however. The number of hours people in various countries
spend watching television on a daily basis thus varies considerably with citizens in
some countries spending almost twice as much as in others18. On the other hand,
the frequency with which people follow the news on television varies quite modestly
across countries, and appears to be unrelated to the number of hours spent in front
of the screen. A recent survey of EU countries for instance reveals that in audiences
for daily news there is only a 20 pct. di¤erence between the keenest and least
interested viewers, and the gap is reduced to a mere 10 pct. if we compare those who
watch news daily or several times a week19 (Eurobarometer, 1999). It is of course
not impossible that the di¤erences may be somewhat larger if the non-European
countries or developments over time are included. However, it seems reasonable
to suggest that variation in how much citizens in various countries follow news on
television only contributes marginally to how exposed national electorates are to
political news.
Turning to the role of the press as a source of information, a very di¤erent picture
emerges. There are very large cross-national di¤erences in the role newspapers play
17In the U.S., where regular broadcasts began in 1950, only 20 pct cited television as
their only source of information on politics in 1960, but already by the mid 1980s this
gure had risen to 60 pct. (Clark and Rempel, 1997 cited in Milner, 2002)
18According to the Audiovisual statistics report 1995 people in Austria and Sweden spend
a little more than half as much time in front of the television as they for instance do in
Spain, U.K. and the U.S.
19The keenest audience for news is found in Finland where 83 pct. state that they follow
the news on a daily basis, and the least interested are found in France where 60 pct say
they do the same. However, the di¤erence from top to bottom is a mere 10 pct. (94/84)
if we compare those who watch news daily or several times a week in the two countries
(Eurobarometer, 1999).
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as a source of information on politics. In some countries, such as Japan and Sweden,
following news in the daily press is practically as common as watching news on
television, although in others, such as Greece or Portugal, reading the newspaper is
an activity conned to a much smaller group, and the vast majority relies instead on
television to inform them of current events. According to the same survey referred
to above, some 70 pct of the population read the paper on a daily basis in the EU
country with the most avid newspaper readers, while only 16 pct do the same in the
country with the smallest readership20. While it, as mentioned, is not possible to
infer from the amount of hours a population spends on average watching television
to how frequently they watch the news, there is a clear correlation between national
newspaper circulation gures and how frequently people report using them as a
source of information on politics. There are some di¤erences in ranking of countries
according to circulation gures and survey data, but by and large they are congruent.
All the countries, where over half of the population report reading news in the press
on a daily basis, thus fall into the group of countries with a circulation above 300
per thousand inhabitants, and vice versa (Eurobarometer, 1999).
Gauging from the evidence reviewed here, we would expect the main cross-
national di¤erences in degree of exposure to political news to stem from di¤erences
in the readership of newspapers21. As many have pointed out, however, the supply
20According to the survey, some 70 pct. in Finland report reading the news on a daily
basis, while only 16 pct. do the same in Greece. Comparing the groups of who follow news
in the press on a daily basis or several times a week, doesnt narrow the gap much: 83 pct.
in Finland against 30 pct. in Greece (Eurobarometer, 1999)
21Radio also provides an important source of information in a number of countries, but
it is di¢ cult to nd systematic data on use of this medium for all the countries. While
we therefore loose information about exposure to information on the radio by omitting
this, there is some indication that this may not be grave. According to the Eurobarometer
survey (1999) there is a tendency for higher use of radio as a source of information to be
correlated with the use of newspapers. The ve countries that have the fewest newspaper
readers are the same countries where fewest listen to news on the radio. Nevertheless, use
of the two media is not perfectly correlated for all countries and information is therefore
invariably lost.
124
Chapter 4. The Recognition Barrier
of political information by di¤erent kinds of broadcasters and press should also be
considered.
Media Types, Political Coverage and E¤ects on Citizensknowledge
Both the format and strength of commercialism inuence the extent to which di¤erent
media cover political news. Firstly, the format arguably sets tangible constraints
on both the form and quantity of information that can be conveyed. Television is
typically viewed as subject to greater constraints than newspapers in this respect.
Its reliance on pictures to convey messages, as well the more acute limitations on the
attention span of audiences, induce reductions in the quantity as well as complexity
of the information conveyed22. Secondly, the strength of commercial forces tends
to reduce the focus on politics. Given that politics, as discussed earlier, is not
the ruling passion of the average citizens life, lling the media with di¤erent types
of entertainment or sports is likely to attract higher numbers of viewers, readers
or listeners. Commercially run media outlets, especially when under pressure to
maximize audiences, are therefore likely to allocate less time and space to politics, as
well as portray it in more entertaining ways. Due to di¤erences in format, however,
television is more vulnerable to commercial inuences than the press. As Postman
and Powers write, `every time a newspaper includes a feature which will attract a
specialized group, it can assume it is adding at least a little bit to circulation. To
the degree a television news program includes an item of this sort...it must assume
that its audience will diminish(Postman and Powers, 1992)23.
Public service broadcasting, wholly or partially shielded from market forces, has
widely been perceived as a bulwark against the e¤ects of commercialism on tele-
22Mughan and Gunther argue that television by nature has inherent propensity to em-
phasize candidates and personalities over parties and their programs to compress presen-
tation of information(Mughan and Gunther, 2000: 15).
23Cited in Milner (2002: 97)
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vision. Typically public service has been charged with the tasks of educating and
informing the public on a wide range of cultural, social and political a¤airs, in ad-
dition to providing entertainment. Moreover, its greater independence of audience
ratings, public service television has also generally provided more coverage of polit-
ical a¤airs, as well as more serious in depth analyses and debate programmes than
commercial television has (e.g. Peter, Lauf & Semetko, 2004; Blumler, 1992; Kuhn,
1985)24. It can therefore be argued that public service television has therefore been
instrumental in exposing the public to more politics. There is no comparable dis-
tinction for the press, however. The public service arguments used for interference
in broadcasting have never been used as an argument for similarly interfering in the
market for newspapers. However, a distinction is often made between `qualityand
tabloid newspapers, with the latter representing the more `commercializedelements
generally providing less information about political a¤airs25. Both types compete on
market terms, however.
Finally, a number of studies reveal that di¤erences in the prominence accorded
to politics in di¤erent media are not without consequences for their users. Firstly,
whether people have a predilection for television or newspapers is important to how
informed they are of politics. On the whole, newspapers have the better track record
with respect to informing citizens. As Milner summarizes research on the topic:
`individuals who read newspapers on a daily basis invariably average signicantly
higher rates of knowledge than those who do not(Milner, 2002: 90). The e¤ects
of television on citizensknowledge of political a¤airs are more ambiguous. Some
24As Semetko concludes in a recent study of election campaign coverage in four countries,
public service channels...aired more substantive issue stories than the private channels
(Semetko, 1996: 11).
25In terms of conveying policy-relevant information, Gunther and Mughan write that
in general the print medium continues to perform well in this regard, even if there is
considerable variation in individual newspapers performance within and between nations.
At the low end on the continuum are Britains..daily tabloids(Gunther & Mughan, 2000:
429)
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surveys have shown that television watching has a non-existent or even negative
impact on what people know, and in light of this the growing importance of this
medium might be regarded as fatal for e¤orts at cultivating an informed citizenry26.
However, there is considerable evidence that whether people watch public or com-
mercial channels matters for how informed they are. Studies of the e¤ects of news
watching in countries dominated by public service television thus consistently report
positive e¤ects, while those conducted in countries with commercial dominance are
more equivocal (see Milner, 2002: 95-97 for review of evidence).
In light of the relationships described, I would argue that using national market
shares of public television and the readership of newspapers as proxies for the extent
of exposure to political information is a valid approach, although not all variation
can be captured in this way.
4.2.2 National Television and Newspaper Markets
Before proceding to test the hypothesis proposed, the di¤erences in national televi-
sion and press markets will be briey described and some problems related to the
operationalization, validity and variation of the indicators will be addressed.
Audiences for Public Broadcast Television: Markets and Trends
There is signicant variation between national systems in the balance of public and
private broadcasting, although these have diminished considerably over time. In
most of the countries included in this study, and almost all of the European ones, the
26As Norris summarizes research on the e¤ects of television watching in the U.S.: the
hours people spent watching television was negatively correlated...people who watch a great
deal of television know less about politics(Norris, 1996: 478)
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broadcast media were at their inception fashioned as nationwide state monopolies27.
This structure was motivated by a mix of political, technological and economic reali-
ties. Politically, broadcast media were seen as a matter of public interest. A mixture
of awareness of the potency of the new media and of the limitations to the diversity
of possible supply, dictated by technological and economic factors, generally made
state monopolies the preferred solution. However, some countries such as the U.K.
and Finland opted instead for so-called dual systems where public service TV co-
existed with commercial broadcast companies. Outside Europe, Japan, and to lesser
extent Canada, likewise established competitive systems with a strong presence of
public service. Only two countries, namely the U.S. and Australia, have consistently
had commercially dominated markets where public service television never obtained
noteworthy market shares. And in the case of the U.S. these have been negligible.
The diversity of broadcasting models was signicantly reduced, however, as a result
of the wave of deregulation that swept over Europe in the 1980s. Virtually all public
service monopolies were broken during this decade and the following, and the typical
scenario in European broadcast in the 1990s was instead one of competition between
commercial and public channels. Public service television has remained dominant
in many countries, where it has retained up to 50 pct of the marked shares. Only
in few of the prior monopolies, e.g. Belgium and Greece, have audiences for public
TV dropped below 30 pct following the entry of commercial channels (see Eurostat,
1995; Smith, 1998; Blumler, 1992; Kuhn, 1985; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Due to
these developmental trends in television markets, it should be observed that, for the
main bulk of the cases, the market shares of public service television drops drastically
in the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, while high levels are observed before that.
Dening public television exclusively in terms of ownership may be misleading,
however. As mentioned above, a central issue for the extent of informational and
27Radio broadcasting typically began in the 1920s and 1930s, while for most countries
regular television broadcast began in the course of the 1950s.
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news programming is how shielded the broadcast organisation is from commercial
forces. And in this respect the nancial basis as much as the ownership of the or-
ganisations can be expected to play a role. The `purepublic models can be dened
as those whose nancial basis is entirely non-commercial. That is, the broadcasting
organisations are nanced by the public purse through some form of grant, taxation
or licence fees28. According to Sepstrup, however, such di¤erences in revenue basis
had little - if any - impact on the services provided during the period of public ser-
vice monopoly since there was no competition for prot with other providers. It was
therefore easy to distinguish the commercial public service organisations from their
purely commercial counter parts during the era of public monopoly. After the open-
ing up of television markets to commercial competitors, di¤erences in the nancing
of public service broadcast are more likely to play an important role, however. Re-
liance on advertising income in the competitive environment can pull public service
television in the direction of their commercial counterparts and serve to diminish
the di¤erences between the two types. It has also been argued that the public ser-
vice television in several countries has lost some of its distinctive character following
the liberalization29. The lack of systematic information on the extent to which the
`publicnessof various public service providers has su¤ered from the loss of monopoly
status, makes it di¢ cult to actively consider this dimension, however. The conse-
quence is that market shares for public service television may not be as accurate an
indicator of exposure to political news for the 1980s and 1990s.
28This type of pure public service (or non-commercial public service) was for instance
originally used in Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. A higher number of systems
have instead consistently relied on a mixed revenue model, where a part of the income
stem from advertising (commercial public service) including Austria, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.
29The reform of PS broadcast in New Zealand to compete on market terms has raised
concerns for loss of public service values (Comrie & Fontaine, 2005) and similar concerns
have also been raised for the quality of public service in, for example, the Netherlands
(Van Praag & Van der Eijk, 1998). Gunther and Mughan comment that With deregu-
lation...the general trend has been a decline in the substantive informational content of
political communications(Gunther & Mughan, 2000:439).
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Finally, it should be mentioned that di¤erences between commercial broadcasters
as well as between public service broadcasters, with respect to their coverage of
politics is a potentially blurring factor. Partly as a result of di¤erences in national
regulation requiring them to provide a certain amount of `public serviceprograms,
such as news, and partly as a result of di¤erences in demand, television providers
vary cross-nationally with respect to their coverage of politics (Mughan & Gunther,
2000:430-31; Blumler, 1992).
Newspaper Readership
Newspaper markets have exhibited much more stability in the post war period than
broadcasting. The printed press was, in many countries, already an established
source of information by the end of the 19th century, while it followed later in others
typically reecting national di¤erences in literacy rates. In the post war period
the evolution of newspapers has not followed the same clear-cut growth trajectory
as the broadcast media, but instead experienced a more mixed fate; The average
readership of newspapers has been subject to a modest decline. The circulation of
daily newspapers has thus declined from 300 per thousand inhabitants in 1970 to 270
in 1995 in the 21 countries (Source: UNESCO)30. However, it should also be noted
that the output in terms of pages and areas covered by the individual newspapers
has generally clearly expanded in the same period.
As can be seen from table 4.1 (page 132), the di¤erences in market shares of
newspapers are large as well as relatively stable in this period. At the top, we
nd Norway, Japan, Finland and Sweden, where the daily circulation of newspapers
average 500-600 per 1,000 inhabitants and at the bottom, the Southern European
countries Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, where newspaper circulation remains
below 150 per 1,000 inhabitants. The very low market shares of newspapers in
30Figures from previous decades are not available.
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these countries can partly be explained by the fact that widespread literacy was
acquired later and overlapped with the establishment of broadcast media. As can be
seen, the levels are relatively stable. Only in the case of Norway do we see a marked
increase in readership and for the U.K. and New Zealand signicant downward trends.
Otherwise, the gures for each country are relatively stable over the period. As
mentioned, there may be di¤erences between quality and tabloid newspapers as to
how much they cover politics. But it is not possible to compare newspaper markets
on this dimension due to the lack of data. It should be observed, however, that
countries with very low readership hardly have any market for tabloids (Hallin &
Mancini, 2004). One reason for this is that the segments of the population that are
potential consumers of tabloids in these countries, simply do not read newspapers at
all. On the other hand some countries, such as the U.K., tabloids have a signicant
share of the market. The extent to which exposure to news on politics is captured
by the gures on circulation may therefore be somewhat overstated for some cases
with intermediate to high circulation.
The circulation of newspapers therefore gives us an indicator of exposure to po-
litical news, which reects stable di¤erences between the countries and does not vary
greatly over time.
4.2.3 Test of the hypothesis
The hypothesis that greater public exposure to information about politics leads to
a lowering of the recognition barrier will rst be tested by a separate testing of the
two indicators proposed, namely the audience shares of public service television and
the circulation of newspapers. Then the combined e¤ects of exposure through these
two media will be investigated. The three dependent variables are the number of
parties obtaining at least 1 pct of the votes, at least 4 pct. of the votes, and nally
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1970s 1980s 1990s
Australia 352 299 290
Austria 315 331 325
Belgium 234 226 173
Canada 204 218 187
Denmark 352 365 324
Finland 440 525 500
France 224 193 193
Germany n.a. n.a. 318
Greece 121 140
Ireland 225 211 164
Italy 131 99 103
Japan 528 566 578
Netherlands 313 318 309
New Zealand 333 330 238
Norway 405 487 601
Portugal 46 55
Spain 87 100
Sweden 539 527 488
Switzerland 391 442 403
U.K. 447 407 360
U.S.A. 285 265 228
Newspaper Circulation 1970-2000
Table 4.1: Newspaper Circulation 1970-2000
the decade maximum number of parties obtaining no less than 1 pct of the votes (see
chapter 3).
E¤ects of Market Shares of Public Service Television
Precise data on the size of the audiences for television - public or private - is not
available for the whole time period, but only for the late 1980s and 1990s. The indi-
cator proposed is therefore based on information on the market structure (monopoly
versus competitive) and descriptions of the strengths of public service television for
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all the cases 1950s-1970s. The proportion of the population actually watching televi-
sion, which is likely to have varied substantially across countries particularly in the
1960s as it was just beginning to expand its reach, is not taken into account due
to the lack of accurate data. As in the previous chapter, decades are used as cases,
but the 1950s are only included for the three countries (US, France and U.K.) where
broadcasting began prior to or in 1950. In the other countries, regular broadcasting
began in the course of the 1950s, and only the cases from 1960s onwards are therefore
included. An ordinal indicator with three categories was created to reect di¤erences
in the market shares of public service television. The score of low was given, where
market shares are below 33 pct, medium, where it falls between 33-66 pct, and nally
high for market shares above 66 pct. The latter category typically contains the cases
of public service monopoly.
1) High: Austria (1960-00), Belgium (1960-1980), Denmark (1960-1990), France
(1960-1980), Germany (1960-1980), Greece (1980s), Ireland, Italy (1960-1980), Neth-
erlands (1960-1980), New Zealand (1960-1990), Norway (1960-1990), Portugal (1980s)
Spain (1980s), Sweden (1960-1990), Switzerland (1960-1990).
2) Medium: Belgium (1980s), Canada (1960-90), Denmark (1990s), Finland, Ger-
many (1980-), Italy (1980-), Japan, Netherlands (1980-), New Zealand (1990-), Nor-
way (1990-), Sweden (1990-), Switzerland (1990-)
3) Low: Australia and U.S.(whole period), 1990s: Belgium, Canada, Greece,
Portugal, Spain.
The cases of Japan and Italy in the 1990s were excluded from the tests, since
major changes in the party systems took place - partly as a result of corruption
scandals - leading to an `abnormallyhigh number of new parties winning vote shares.
The possible inuence of the market shares of public service television is investigated
by testing its e¤ects on the mean number of new parties obtaining votes. The results
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Market Share of
>1pct >1pct, max >4 pct
Low Mean 1.13 0.93 0.47
(<1/3) N 15 15 15
Std. Dev. 1.06 0.80 0.64
Medium Mean 1.41 0.97 0.83
(1/3-2/3) N 29 29 29
Std. Dev. 1.45 0.87 0.85
High Mean 2.03 1.40 0.83
(>2/3) N 35 35 35
Std. Dev. 1.34 0.88 0.82
All Mean 1.63 1.15 0.76
N 79 79 79
Std. Dev. 1.37 0.88 0.80
Kruskal Wallis *
ANOVA
*p<0.01; **p<0.05 (two-tailed)
New Parties
Public Service TV
Table 4.2: Public Service Television Market Shares and the Number of New Vote-
Winning Parties
are summarized in table 4.2. Both parametric (ANOVA) and non-parametric tests
(Kruskal Wallis) of signicance are reported.
The results of the analysis lend support to the hypothesis that higher consumption
of public televison provides better conditions for new parties. As can be seen in table
4.2, there is a clear increase in averages from the system with low public service shares
to those with high for the number of parties obtaining over 1 pct. of the votes. In fact,
there is almost a doubling of the average from the lowest to the highest category. The
di¤erence in means is furthermore signicant at the 5 pct. level in the Kruskal Wallis
test. This same pattern can be observed for the maximum numbers observed at any
election31. However, a similar trend cannot be observed for the group of electorally
31The di¤erences in means using ANOVA was signicant only at the 5.8 pct. level for
the category of parties winning at least 1 pct of the seats, while it was only signicant at
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successful parties (> 4 pct. vote shares). Although the group with medium and high
shares public service television contains a higher number of parties than that with
low shares, whether there is medium or high audience for public service appears to
have no impact.
E¤ects of Newspaper Readership
The second factor, which may inuence how much information voters receive about
politics, is the extent of newspaper readership. As an indicator of the di¤erences
in newspaper readership, the circulation of dailies per 1000 inhabitants is used and
on basis of this, an ordinal indicator was created. Three categories were created:
the score of low was given to cases where the circulation is under 250, medium for
circulation between 250 and 400, and nally the score of high was given to cases
where circulation is over 400 copies. Figures on circulation were only available for
the period 1970-2000, but since di¤erences in newspaper readership are known to
be relatively stable (Gustafsson & Weibull, 1996; Hallin & Mancini, 2004), ordinal
scores are also given to 1950s and 1960s based on previous levels.
The results, as summarized in table 4.3 , disconrm the hypothesis very clearly.
Higher newspaper readership appears to have quite the opposite e¤ect of what was
expected. For the number of parties obtaining 1 percent or more of the votes, there
is a marked decline from the category containing few newspaper readers to that
containing a high number. A similar but less strong e¤ect can be observed for the
maximum number of new parties. For the group of electorally successful parties
with vote shares at 4 pct or more, we can also observe a small decline, although the
di¤erences in numbers here are much smaller. However, none of the di¤erences in
means pass the tests of signicance.
the 8 pct level for the category of maximum number of parties per election. The latter
passed test of signicance at the 8 pct. level in Kruskal Wallis.
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Newspaper Readership
>1pct >1pct, max >4 pct
Low Mean 1.88 1.15 0.73
(<250) N 33 33 33
Std. Dev. 1.75 0.97 0.84
Medium Mean 1.49 1.14 0.68
(250-400) N 37 37 37
Std. Dev. 1.10 0.86 0.78
High Mean 1.13 0.92 0.63
(>400) N 24 24 24
Std. Dev. 0.90 0.78 0.71
All Mean 1.53 1.09 0.68
N 94 94 94
Std. Dev. 1.34 0.88 0.78
New Parties
(Circulation per 1000)
None of the results pass tests of significance
Table 4.3: Newspaper Readership and the Number of New Vote-Winning Parties
Exposure to Share of Public Television
Political Information High Medium Low
Newspaper High Very High High Medium
Circulation Medium High Medium Low
Low Medium Low Very Low
Table 4.4: Indicator on Exposure to Political Information
Combined Indicator of Exposure to Political Information
Before drawing any conclusions about the e¤ects of higher consumption of infor-
mation on politics, it is necessary to make a test of the joint e¤ects of the public
television viewership and newspaper readership. A new ordinal variable was therefore
created in which scores are given to cases on the basis of their combined scores on
public service television shares and newspaper readership. The scores were assigned
as indicated in the matrix table 4.4 .
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Exposure to
Political Information >1pct >1pct, max >4 pct
Very Low Mean 1.43 1.14 0.71
N 7 7 7
Std. Dev. 0.98 0.69 0.76
Low Mean 1.33 0.80 0.47
N 15 15 15
Std. Dev. 1.88 0.94 0.83
Medium Mean 2.33 1.56 0.94
N 18 18 18
Std. Dev. 1.53 0.98 0.87
High Mean 1.44 1.03 0.84
N 32 32 32
Std. Dev. 1.05 0.78 0.81
Very High Mean 1.33 1.33 0.50
N 6 6 6
Std. Dev. 0.82 0.82 0.55
Total Mean 1.62 1.14 0.76
N 78 78 78
Std. Dev. 1.37 0.88 0.81
None of the results pass tests of significance
New Parties
Table 4.5: Exposure to Political Information and the Number of New Vote-Winning
Parties
The hypothesis that greater exposure to information about politics, taking the
combined e¤ects of television and newspaper consumption into account, was then
tested for e¤ects on the number of new vote winning parties.
The results summarized in table 4.5 do not lend support to the hypothesis, how-
ever. The cases containing the highest exposure to information about politics have
averages of new parties obtaining 1 pct of the votes that are slightly lower than those
containing the lowest exposure, and the categories containing high and low exposure
return very similar averages. For the category containing the number of parties with
over 4 pct of the votes, the highest exposure category clearly returns lower averages
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than the lowest exposure category does, while the opposite is the case for the averages
contained in the high exposure versus the low exposure groups. There is, in other
words, no clear direction, which can support the hypothesis that exposure to politi-
cal information gives better chances for new parties to obtain recognition. Instead,
common for all three dependent variables is that the category of inter-mediate expo-
sure contains the highest averages. The only conclusion congruent with the results is
therefore that high exposure or low exposure to information is equally unfavourable
to new parties.
Di¤erent E¤ects of Newspapers and Television?
It is likely that we are not tapping into a simple dimension of exposure to information
about politics with the indicators on newspaper readership and public television
shares. Given that the bivariate relationships between the market shares of public
service television and newspaper readership with the dependent variables pointed in
opposite directions, it is necessary to check whether the direction and strength of
the relationships remain when the e¤ects of the other media are taken into account.
Since there is no multivariate statistical method for ordinal variables, a regression
model was applied. The hypothesized relationships are tested with the following
model: Number of Vote-Winning Parties = 0 + pstv+ np-readers+"
The results of the regression analyses summarized in table 4.6 are clear and
signicant only for the categories containing average numbers and decade maximum
of parties obtaining over 1 pct of the votes. For the former, the variance explained
is 15.7 pct., and the coe¢ cient for PSTV share and Newspapers are strong and
point in opposite directions and are highly signicant. The two variables do not
predict the maximum numbers per decade as well, but the direction is the same. The
cause of this di¤erence may lie in di¤erences between the two types of media, with
television providing better conditions for exposure of new parties to the electorate
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Regressor
>1 pct >1 pct, max >4 pct
Public Service TV  0.27**  0.23*  0.14
(0.48) (0.27) (0.15)
Newspaper Readers -0.30** -0.17 -0.08
(-0.52) (-0.19) (-0.06)
Constant 1.5** 0.9* 0.53
R2  0.16**  0.08*  0.02
N=79
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
standardized coefficients reported, normal coefficients in ( )
Dependent Variable: New Parties
OLS Regression
Table 4.6: The Impact of Public Service TV and Newspaper Readership on the
Number of New Parties
than newspapers do or simply a¤ecting electoral behaviour di¤erently. However, the
regression model explains none of the observed variance of the number of new parties
obtaining over 4 pct of the vote shares. Therefore, even if these di¤erences in media
supply and consumption do appear to matter for the number of parties that obtain a
minimum of recognition and electoral support, they do not make much of a di¤erence
for how many obtain a higher level of support.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, it is possible that the extent to which established
political parties wield inuence over media systems intervene in the relationships
proposed. It is therefore necessary to review evidence of such e¤ects before drawing
any conclusions.
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4.3 Political Links to the Media Systems
The next question to be investigated concerns the strength of the links between
established political parties and the media system. The hypothesis proposed above
is that stronger links between the established party system and the media system
will make the recognition barrier higher. Stronger links imply a stronger inuence of
parties and government over the media or a stronger congruence of interests between
the media and established parties, which is likely to reduce the chances that new
parties will be able to obtain coverage - at least of a favourable kind. The nature
of the links with the press and broadcast television are di¤erent and only for the
latter is it possible to construct a meaningful indicator of di¤erences in the extent of
inuence. However, a brief review of both will be made.
4.3.1 Political Links to Press and Broadcast Television
Political Parties and the Press
There is a conspicuous lack of examples of executive dominance or interference
with the press system among this group of countries. Where governments have
interfered in the press market by o¤ering subsidies or tax breaks, it is generally ac-
knowledged that the aim has been to maintain readership levels and/or guarantee
diversity rather than to inuence the contents (Humphreys, 1996: 102-107)32. Po-
litical parties have, on the other hand, played a very direct role. Newspapers were
once perceived as an intrinsic part of partiesmobilization strategies, and as crucial
to their success and survival. In many countries newspapers owned or managed by
political parties were once dominant voices in the media landscape, but the party
32An exception to this is found in Greece, where governments have attempted to inu-
ence newspapers by o¤ering subsidies, secret funds and a widespread practice of keeping
journalists on the state payroll (Østergaard, 1997)
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press that accompanied the formation of the party systems in the 19th century had
already diminished considerably in strength by the middle of the 20th century in
most countries (Seymour-Ure, 1974). In the few places where it held out longer, it
declined steadily in the decades following the second world war and by now, it is
virtually extinct. As Farell and Schmidt-Beck comment `the party press, where it
still exists, has mostly turned into an instrument of internal communication(Farrell
& Schmitt-Beck, 2002: 7). The absence of parties in the management of newspapers
does not vouch for an impartial press, however. As Seymour-Ure discusses, advocacy
and support of particular parties or ideologies may be driven by the personal inter-
ests and preferences of independent owners or sta¤, as well as reect a strategy to
target readers of a particular political persuasion. Many observers claim, however,
that the strength of this type of parallelism between the press and party systems
has also generally waned over time. Mounting competitive pressures, following in
the wake of the expansion of broadcast media, has along with changes in popular de-
mand, induced newspapers to broaden their political appeal in search of readers and
advertisers alike (e.g. Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Gunther & Mughan, 2000; Voltmer,
2004). Notwithstanding this general trend, it is important to observe that national
press systems to this day di¤er quite signicantly in this respect. In their compara-
tive work on national media systems, Hallin and Mancini describe that the press in
a number of Southern European countries has retained a strong tradition for using
the press as a means for ideological expression and political mobilization. Although
they point to a weakening of this tendency from the 1970s onwards, market forces
have arguably not accomplished the same watering down of ideological content here
as elsewhere, mainly due to signicant structural di¤erences33. Furthermore, they
point to di¤erences in the extent of partisan alignment of press in central and north-
ern European countries, as compared to the press in North America, although these
33There is thus a smaller market for newspapers in these countries, as described above,
and the readership largely consists of educated minorities with distinct political and cultural
identities within society (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 90-97)
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have converged in the post war period (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Voltmer, 2004). Un-
fortunately, the lack of reliable data on the strength of the di¤erences between the
countries - and on developments over time - makes it di¢ cult to construct a reliable
indicator of the links between the press and the established party system.
Political Control of Broadcast Television
The broadcast media have an entirely di¤erent history of ties to the political
system. Rather than close a¢ liation with particular parties, the broadcast media
have in most countries been closely associated with the state, as mentioned above.
The public nature of the broadcasting organisations can be regarded as a strength,
as discussed in the previous section. But while the public nature of the institutions
has allowed them to escape the side-e¤ects of commercialism, it has at the same
time made them prey to the interests of those who wield political power. Rather
than being above politics, broadcast organisations have typically been highly politi-
cised organisations (Kuhn, 1995; Blumler, 1992; Humphrey, 1996). As Humphrey
comments `A marked congruence can be demonstrated between structures of broad-
casting and the particular character of the respective political systems. In the past
at least, politics has played a key role in dening the shape of the national broad-
casting systems and, not infrequently, in intruding upon the broadcastersfreedom
(Humphrey, 1996: 111).
The means by which elected politicians have exercised inuence over the broad-
casting organisations have ranged from very direct types of intervention to more
subtle and indirect ways. Humphrey classies the models according to the pat-
terns of politicisation practices into three di¤erent types: the `arms length inuence,
`multiparty/group dominatedand nally the `executive or single party dominated
type34. A classical example of the rst type is the British BBC, which has earned a
34Hallin and Mancini describe the broadcast governance systems by using four types,
namely the government model, the professional model, the parliamentary/proportional
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reputation for independence from the political leadership. A high degree of institu-
tional autonomy coupled with an agreement between the political parties to refrain
from interfering in its running, has made it possible for the BBC to stay aloof from
day-to-day politics, and made it a credible source of political news to people with
di¤erent political persuasions. This does not mean that the BBC, and other similarly
styled broadcasters, has not been accused of bias, however. While its impartiality in
a partisan sense may not be an issue, accusations of elitism and lack of social repre-
sentativity have frequently been levelled against it. The use of the term `arms length
inuenceby Humphrey, rather than describing it as `autonomousor `professionalas
Hallin and Mancini do, is indicative of the authors acknowledgement of this problem.
Another institutional solution, which has prevailed in much of continental Europe,
integrated social and political accountability mechanisms in the broadcast organisa-
tions rather than leaving its running to professionals. Instead of autonomy as a path
to impartiality, these have instead actively included delegates from social and political
groups, whose task it is to guarantee a balanced partisan and social representation in
the programs. With respect to governance of Austrian broadcast, it is, for instance,
described that `Organisational and control structure is designed to ensure that all
signicant views of society are fully and fairly represented in its operations(Euro-
media Research Group, 1997:7). There are di¤erences, however, in how much parties
involved have penetrated the organisations. For Austria and Germany it is described
that parties have played a strong role, not only through representation on boards,
but by appointments of sta¤ at all levels of the broadcasting organisations, while the
governance of the Scandinavian broadcasters, for instance, have been more hands o¤
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 167-168). In the case of Belgium, it is reported that ties
to the party system were so close that `the composition of the board of public service
representation model and the civic/corporatist model. The professional model corre-
sponds to the arms length inuence, but the others overlap (Hallin & Mancini, 2004:
30-31).
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broadcasting changed every time a new election was heldand further that `members
of the board of directors dene themselves explicitly as being `mandatoriesof the
political parties35. Likewise for Spain, it has been reported that the members of the
board are `unambiguously appointed as party representatives(Hallin and Mancini,
2004:107).
Finally, there are a few countries, including Greece, France and Italy, where
broadcasting for long periods has fallen more directly under executive or single party
dominance. In the case of France, the broadcast organisation (RTF) was originally
held directly accountable to the Ministry of Information and interventions in editorial
decisions were not infrequent. Similarly, government controlled broadcast organisa-
tions were also seen in Greece in the 1980s, as well as in New Zealand and Ireland in
the 1950s. Italys model, on the contrary, has been dubbed the partyocratic model.
Until the mid 1970s broadcasting was dominated by a single party, where after more
parties were allowed a share of control. And as Mazzoleni comments the parties did
not remain aloof from the running of the broadcast organisation. On the contrary,
`the parties had placed their yes-men from the governing body down to the television
channels and news services. The partiesinuence was (and to a certain extent still
is) extensive(Euromedia Research Group, 1997: 127).
While the governance of broadcast organisations is well described in the literature,
there have been no systematic attempts at assessing the bias of the news services
produced by these organisations. However, reviewing evidence of the independence
of journalists in some of the highly politicized broadcast organisations, Hallin and
Mancini write that `they leave both agenda setting and the interpretation of polit-
ical reality to other political actors, particularly representatives of political parties
and other organized groups, whose comments usually dominate the news(Hallin &
Mancini, 2004: 119). In this context, a recent study by Rösler of the content of news
35Burgelman, 1989:179-80 cited by Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 169.
144
Chapter 4. The Recognition Barrier
services in 8 countries, which identies important di¤erences between these is also
interesting. Although the study focussed on foreign and not domestic political cov-
erage, he observes signicant di¤erences with respect to the actors covered. Rösler,
for instance, reports that the Head of Government appears twice as much in the
German, Austrian and Italian news services, compared with the Norwegian, Danish
and American (Rösler, 2004: 286). This might indicate a di¤erence between systems
dominated by commercial and independent public service systems and those where
political governance of the broadcast typically plays a stronger role. How strongly
inuenced the news and other political programs are by the political interests of
those in power is not easy to say, however, and it is possible that the e¤ects in many
cases are moderate as some claim they are36.
Informal Sources of Political Inuence
Finally, it is also necessary to briey mention other conditions that perhaps make
independent media organisations vulnerable to political inuence. Firstly, there is
some evidence that commercial broadcasting has been susceptible to political in-
uence due to its dependency on government for having licenses awarded (Weare,
Levy & Raphael, 2001)37. Secondly, it has been argued that commercial markets can
develop dependencies on the political systems for economic reasons. Competitive
pressures can induce cut-backs on news related research and thereby increase the
dependency on political actors - be they political parties, interest organisations or
government itself - as sources of information. Both in terms of credibility as source
and command of resources, it has been argued that government enjoys a particularly
36Gunther and Mughan describe the bias of even the more politized broadcasters, such
as Italy and Spain, as modest(Gunther&Mughan, 2000: 436-437)
37Weare, Levy and Raphael argue that the licensing process creates possibility and means
for politicians to meddle with broadcasterseditorial decisions. They provide evidence that
newspapers with broadcast holdings write editorials that are more positive towards political
incumbents (2001)
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privileged position as news supplier (Edwards, 1986; Underwood, 1998)38. Finally, it
should be noted that extensive use of government or party sources need not only be
induced by market conditions, but can also arise from journalistic practices. Jour-
nalists may develop close ties to the political actors they cover as a means of getting
information, and several point out that such ties may inuence their choice of sto-
ries and their content (e.g. McCargo, 1996)39. It is not possible to assess, however,
how strongly a¢ liated national media systems are to political actors through such
`informalchannels.
4.3.2 Test of the hypothesis
The hypothesis that stronger links between the established party system and the
media system heighten the recognition barrier will be examined in the following.
As discussed, limitations with respect to the data available make it impossible to
estimate the extent of political control over the press. The focus is therefore solely
on broadcast television, and given that it is the most important source of information
on politics in all of the countries, it is likely that if political inuence over the media
plays a role for recognition, it should above all be observable in television markets.
It is therefore reasonable to re-state the hypotheses to be tested as: the greater the
political control over broadcast television, the higher the recognition barrier.
In order to assign scores to national television markets reecting the extent of
38As Edwards writes, The more authoritative and credible the source the easier it is
to accept statements without checking and the less expensive is news-making(Edwards,
1986:174). Underwood argues that the consistent cut-backs on news sta¤ and simultaneous
growth in government public relations sta¤ is congruent with the high proportion of news
that originate with public relation sources in American media (Underwood, 1998: 179).
39In the case of Japan, it is for instance reported that Journalists, especially newspaper
reporters, have long enjoyed privileged access to politicians through a system of kisha
(journalists) clubs, a system which allows for a cosy rapport between reporters and their
sources, but often works against the public interest(McCargo, 1996: 251)
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political inuence exerted over them, both the governance of public broadcast organ-
isations and their market shares must be considered. First, public broadcast organi-
sations were given scores of high, medium and low according to their dependence on
political parties and government. The score `lowwas given to broadcast organisa-
tions that function largely autonomously of the political leadership (the professional
or `armslength-inuencemodels), a score of `mediumwas assigned to organisations
where established political parties have strong voice within the organisations, but
these nonetheless function with a great deal of autonomy, and nally the score of
`highwas given to broadcast organisations where the political leadership (be it gov-
ernment, a single party or a plurality of parties) observe a more interfering style.
The following scores were assigned:
1) Low: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland (1970-), Japan, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., U.S.
2) Medium: Austria (1970-), France (1990-), Germany, Ireland, Netherlands
(1970-), New Zealand, Spain (1990-)
3) High: Austria (1960s), Belgium, France (1950-1990), Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands (1960s), Portugal, Spain (1980s).
Secondly, these are combined with the market shares of public service television
(as measured above). The scores are assigned as indicated in table 4.7. Political
control over broadcasting is only hypothesized to have an e¤ect in systems where
they have a high or medium share of the market.
This indicator of the extent of political inuence over broadcast television was
then tested for e¤ects on the number of new parties winning a minimum of 1 and 4
pct of the votes respectively, as well as the maximum number observed winning at
least 1 pct of the votes at an election. The results are summarized in table 4.8.
As can be seen from table 4.8, the results do not lend support to the hypothesis
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Political Influence on Share of Public Television
on Broadcast TV High Medium Low
Political High Very High High Low
Control Medium High Medium Low
of PBO Low Low Low Low
Table 4.7: Indicator on Political Inuence on Broadcast Television
that political inuence over broadcast markets depress the number of new vote-
winning parties. Across the categories, low over medium to high, there is hardly
any di¤erence in the average number of parties obtaining over 1 pct of the votes.
Moreover, for the cases of very high political inuence on broadcasting, where we
Political Influence on
>1pct >1pct, max >4 pct
Low Mean 1.47 1.02 0.67
N 43 43 43
Std. Dev. 1.24 0.74 0.78
Medium Mean 1.50 1.25 1.00
N 8 8 8
Std. Dev. 1.20 1.04 0.76
High Mean 1.46 1.08 0.77
N 13 13 13
Std. Dev. 1.05 0.76 0.93
Very High Mean 2.69 1.77 1.00
N 13 13 13
Std. Dev. 1.75 1.09 0.82
Total Mean 1.68 1.18 0.78
N 77 77 77
Std. Dev. 1.36 0.87 0.80
Kruskal Wallis
ANOVA *
New Parties
Broadcast Television
**p<0.01; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
Table 4.8: Political Inuence on Broadcast Television and the Number of New Vote-
Winning Parties
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might expect the strongest deating e¤ects on the number of new parties, the average
number is instead much higher. One possible interpretation of this is that strong
attempts at steering information ows by the political leadership provokes a reaction
in the form of more new challengers and also of more electoral support for these.
For the category of successful parties - that win at least 4 pct. of the vote, however,
this e¤ect is not apparent. There are no more successful parties in the category of
very high inuence than there is in the category corresponding to medium inuence
over broadcast television markets. Only the di¤erence observed for the number of
parties obtaining at least a percentage of the votes comes close to passing tests of
signicance, however.
In light of this nding, it is necessary to check whether the positive e¤ect of
stronger public service television on the average number of new parties obtaining at
least 1 pct of the votes observed above can be attributed to cases where such public
service in closely a¢ liated to the political establishment, or whether in fact also
higher shares of public service has this e¤ect on its own. The cases were therefore
divided into the following four groups: 1. Commercial systems: all systems with
low market share for public service television. 2. Mixed Systems: all systems with
medium market share of public service and no higher than medium political control.
3. Public Service Independent: all systems with high market share of public service
and low political control. 4. Public Service Political: all cases with high market
shares of public service television and high or medium political inuence, or medium
market shares and high control.
As can be seen from the table 4.9 (page 150), the results are somewhat ambiguous
and do not lend support to the hypotheses. The two categories where public ser-
vice dominates return di¤erent averages. But the highest averages are found where
political inuence is strong rather than where it is not. Furthermore, strong inde-
pendent public service cannot be associated with higher numbers than either mixed
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Public Service Shares &
>1pct >1pct, max >4 pct
Commercial Mean 1.21 1.00 0.50
Domination N 14 14 14
Std. Dev. 1.05 0.78 0.65
Mixed Mean 1.61 1.13 1.00
N 23 23 23
Std. Dev. 1.50 0.87 0.85
Public Service Mean 1.50 1.00 0.50
Independent N 14 14 14
Std. Dev. 0.85 0.68 0.65
Public Service Mean 2.08 1.42 0.88
Political N 26 26 26
Std. Dev. 1.55 0.99 0.86
Total Mean 1.68 1.18 0.78
N 77 77 77
Std. Dev. 1.36 0.87 0.80
None of the results pass tests of significance
New Parties
Political  Influence
Table 4.9: Television Markets and the Number of New Vote-Winning Parties
or commercial systems. Instead, we observe the highest average numbers of new
parties over 1 pct and 4 pct respectively in the categories of mixed and politicized
public service. Furthermore, none of the results are signicant. In short, there is not
evidence in favour of either the expected positive e¤ect of public service television on
the success of new parties, nor of the expected negative e¤ect of political control over
television markets. Before discussing the reasons for this non-nding, the hypotheses
concerning direct communication will rst be tested.
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4.4 Direct Communication: Costs and Opportu-
nities
In the discussion above, three factors were identied that can be expected to inuence
the costs of a direct campaign to reach voters. The rst two concern the nature of the
assistance provided by the state for partiescampaigns in connection with elections.
The third concerns the costs of reaching the electorate. Each of the hypotheses will
be operationalized and tested in turn.
4.4.1 Free Access to Media (Television)
The rst hypothesis states that more generous terms of free access to media for
new parties will lower the recognition barrier. Access to free exposure in television
is granted by many countries to parties in connection with elections and provides
parties with the opportunity for presenting themselves to voters. Only two studies
have included di¤erences in access to media as an explanatory variable. Bowler,
Carter and Farrel investigate whether changes in media access has an e¤ect on the
e¤ective number of parties and also in the proportion of independents - and nds
a correlation only with the latter (Bowler, Carter & Farrel, 2003: 94-95). Abedi,
in a study of anti-establishment parties, constructs a joint indicator, which takes
account of both nancial support and conditions for media access, and distinguishes
between systems where support is granted to all versus those where support is based
on previous electoral performance (Abedi, 2004: 95). A similar approach in the sense
of considering the basis of access will also be used here, while separate indicators of
access to nance and media will instead be made.
An ordinal indicator containing four categories was created, reecting the strength
of support for new parties. First, those that grant equal television exposure for all
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parties participating in elections (`All Equal); Second, those that grant access to
all, but employ a clear criterion in the allocation of air time based on size of par-
ties (that is, time is granted in some form of proportionality to electoral support;
`All Proportional); Third, those that do not have any rules on the matter (`None);
And nally those that grant only represented parties access (`All Rep.). The dif-
ferentiation between the latter two categories is to investigate, whether advantage
granted to incumbents may exacerbate the competitive situation facing new parties
(See overview of country scores in Appendix B.2.).
Not surprisingly perhaps, the category in which free access is not granted to any
of the parties includes two countries where the state has never played a strong role in
broadcasting, namely Australia and the U.S. In the former case, legislation to grant
free airtime to parties was introduced in the beginning of the 1990s, but the supreme
court struck it down soon after. The only other country currently not grant granting
free access is Switzerland, but here all parties presenting candidates in a minimum
number of cantons are entitled to buy equal shares of time. The category where
free access is granted only to the represented parties contains the largest number of
cases. Looking at developments in legislation over time, however, there is a clear
trend towards making terms of access that better conditions for new and smaller
parties40. The cases contained in the categories of `All Equaland `All Proportional
are therefore typically later in time. The possible inuence of the rules were tested
on the number of new parties (see table 4.10).
The results in this case clearly support the hypothesis, although none pass tests
of signicance. The two categories (All Equal and All Proportional) with the best
conditions for media access clearly return the highest averages on all three dependent
variables. The category which was expected to put new parties in the most di¢ cult
situation, namely that with access to represented parties only, returns slightly higher
40Changes in legislation on media access in Ireland (1987), Italy (1975), Japan (1974)
and New Zealand (1990) all lowered the threshold of eligibility for free media time.
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Free Access
>1pct >1pct, max >4 pct
1 Mean 2.20 1.60 1.10
All Equal N 10 10 10
Std. Dev. 1.14 0.70 1.10
2 Mean 1.81 1.29 1.05
All Prop. N 21 21 21
Std. Dev. 1.40 1.06 0.80
3 Mean 1.14 0.86 0.43
None N 14 14 14
Std. Dev. 1.03 0.77 0.51
4 Mean 1.53 1.07 0.63
All Rep. N 30 30 30
Std. Dev. 1.55 0.83 0.76
Total Mean 1.63 1.16 0.77
N 75 75 75
Std. Dev. 1.38 0.89 0.81
New Parties
to Television
None of the results pass tests of significance
Table 4.10: Free Media Access and the Number of New Vote-Winning Parties
averages than the category where no advantages to the incumbent parties are given,
however. There is therefore no evidence here in support of an incumbency e¤ect.
However, the only di¤erences in means that come close to passing tests of signicance
are those for the group of successful parties.
4.4.2 Financial Assistance to Political Parties
The second type of state intervention concerns nancial support to parties. Hug
examined the e¤ects of party nance on new party participation and found a positive
e¤ect, but uses a dichotomous variable and thereby fails to distinguish between
systems that support parties with low electoral returns and those that reserve this
for larger and/or represented parties (Hug, 2001:102). Since it is not reasonable to
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Access to Financial
>1pct >1pct, max >4 pct
1 Mean 1,67 1,50 0,83
<1pct N 6 6 6
Std. Dev. 1,21 1,05 0,75
2 Mean 1,91 1,45 0,91
<4pct N 22 22 22
Std. Dev. 1,57 1,10 0,81
3 Mean 1,20 0,80 0,56
None N 41 41 41
Std. Dev. 1,45 0,81 0,81
4 Mean 1,67 1,11 0,67
>4pct. N 18 18 18
Std. Dev. 0,69 0,47 0,77
Total Mean 1,51 1,08 0,69
N 87 87 87
Std. Dev. 1,36 0,89 0,80
Kruskal Wallis *
ANOVA *
**p<0.01; *p<0.05 (two-tailed)
New Parties
Assistance
Table 4.11: Access to Financial Assistance and the Number of New Vote-Winning
Parties
expect nancial support given only to larger or represented parties to have a positive
e¤ect on the number of new parties, an indicator taking into account the minimum
vote shares necessary to qualify for support was made. Moreover, as Katz and Mair
argue, state subventions to established parties may pose a barrier to the emergence
of new parties (Katz & Mair, 1995). The cases were therefore divided into countries
that o¤er support to parties of small sizes (<1pct and < 4pct), not at all, or only to
those represented or obtaining vote shares above 4 pct. However, it was not possible
to also include consideration for the sums actually o¤ered.
As can be seen from table 4.11, the direction in di¤erences of averages is consis-
tent with the hypothesis for both the number of successful parties and the maximum
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number of parties obtaining over 1 pct per decade. In the latter the results fur-
thermore passed the test of signicance. With respect to the number of electorally
successful parties, the average numbers are also higher for the categories where sup-
port is o¤ered to parties with lower vote shares than 4 pct, although as for the others
a lower threshold for receiving support does not make a di¤erence. Nevertheless, it
should also be observed that the number of cases where nancial support is o¤ered
to parties with 1 pct or less vote returns is very small. There is thus evidence that
nancial support to parties matters, although the di¤erences between the categories
were not as large as those observed for access to media.
4.4.3 Costs of Reaching the Electorate
The nal test concerns the costs of reaching the `target group, that is, the electorate.
As discussed, a number of factors may inuence these costs; How many people mes-
sages have to be delivered to is obviously important, but also the population density
- especially for face-to-face communication strategies - or the number of media out-
lets and their relative reach - particularly for advertising campaigns in the media -
matters for the costs involved. Marketing agencies routinely make assessments of the
costs of marketing specic products to consumers in various countries taking such
factors into account41. But to my knowledge such cost assessments do not exist for
political `products, so a less precise measure must be relied on.
As a measure of the relative costs of reaching the electorate in a direct communi-
cation campaign in di¤erent countries, I propose that di¤erences in total spending on
advertising in each country may provide a good indicator. A countrys total spend-
ing on advertising (adspend) reects not only di¤erences in the costs of reaching
consumers, however, but also the level of economic activity and wealth. To control
41The World Advertising Research Centre for example produces cost-estimates for mar-
keting products to consumers in di¤erent countries, which companies can buy.
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Costs of Reaching Voters
>1pct >1pct, max >4 pct
Pearsons R -0.25* -0.24* -0.22*
Kendall's tau -0.12 -0.06 -0.07
Spearman's rho -0.16 -0.08 -0.09
N=94
Correlation Analysis
New Parties
** p< 0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
(Adspend Total, 2001 wealth corr.)
Table 4.12: Costs of Reaching Voters and the Number of New Vote-Winning Parties
for this, the total adspend was corrected for such di¤erences (as expressed in GDP
per capita). Since gures on total advertising spending (adspend) in the group of
countries were not available for the whole period, but only from 1991- present day,
the totals for 2001 and 1991 in USD were used. Since we could expect the di¤erences
between countries to be relatively stable over time, this should not be a problem. It
was also found that the gures for 1991 and 2001 were almost perfectly correlated
and only the results using the gures for 2001 are reported. A simple statistical test
of whether a correlation can be identied between total `wealth-correctedadspend
(2001) and the three dependent variables is presented in table 4.12. Similarly to the
previous analyses, both parametric and non-parametric measures are presented.
As can be seen from the results (table 4.12), the correlations are all in the expected
direction, but also somewhat weak. The correlations measured by Pearsons R are
clearly higher than the non-parametric measures of association, and only the former
pass tests of signicance. This di¤erence is not surprising, since the non-parametric
measures are based on rankings and thus `diminishthe magnitude of the di¤erences.
Further, since there are large di¤erences in total adspend values, and we expect
these to matter, the non-parametric measures of association do not give us good
indications of the strength of the association. Suspecting that the United States,
because it is signicantly larger than the other countries, and hardly has any new
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parties with electoral success in the period, might contribute unduly to the strength
and signicance of the correlations observed, the tests were repeated without this
case. In addition, while the direction of the correlations was maintained, both the
strength and the signicance vanish. Pearsons correlation coe¢ cient is only 0.11
for the category of parties obtaining at least 1 pct. of the votes, while it is a mere
0.02 and 0.06 for the categories containing the decade maximum over 1 pct and the
successful parties respectively42.
On the basis of this bivariate analysis, there is no evidence to support that the
costs of reaching voters by direct communication strategies contributes to lowering
the number of new parties. However, this is not conclusive evidence of its irrelevance.
In their study of the determinants of new party formation and success, Harmel and
Robertson argue that larger states are likely to give rise to more new parties than
smaller states, as a consequence of the generally larger diversity of interest commu-
nities that exist within them. Following the argument that parties full a represen-
tational need in society, they argue: `It follows that the greatest representational
needs should be found in those countries marked by cultural and social diversity and
hence that the greatest number of new parties should be found there. Countries with
large, plural, heterogeneous populations and countries that are highly sectionalized
have, by denition, diverse populations(Harmel & Robertson, 1985: 502-503). The
conspicuous lack of di¤erence between larger and smaller states found here (as well
as in their study), may simply be because the challenges of organising on a larger
scale deters many potential parties from engaging in this venture or diminishes their
ability to get votersattention.
42A separate test of correlation between number of voters and the dependent variables
was also made. And, as for Adspend total, the correlations as measured by Pearsons R
were all in the expected direction, and only slightly weaker than for adspend. (>1 pct:
-0.22; >1pct max: -0.18 and >4pct: -0.17). Only for the number of parties obtaining at
least 1 pct vote did it pass tests of signicance, however.
157
Chapter 4. The Recognition Barrier
4.4.4 Combined Tests of Direct Costs
The results of the bivariate analyses were clearly congruent with the hypothesis that
state support to parties in the form of free access to media or direct nancial support
facilitates recognition of new parties. Only for some representations of new party
electoral success did the di¤erences observed pass tests of signicance, however. The
comparative costs of reaching the electorate, as measured by the number of voters
and total adspend, showed correlation - in the expected direction - with the number
of parties winning votes above the two threshold values chosen. This correlation
became very weak and insignicant, however, once the United States was removed.
The nal item in the analyses concerns the possible combined e¤ects of the three
indicators for direct communication costs. The three indicators of access to media,
nance and nally the total adspend (2001, wealth corrected) were therefore entered
in a multivariate regression model. As mentioned above, there are no multivariate
techniques for ordinal variables and regression analysis is therefore used instead.
The model used to test the hypothesized e¤ects is the following: Number of New
Vote-Winning Parties = 0 + 1media+ 2nance+3reachvoters +"
The variation explained by the model, as indicated by the R2, is just 6-7 pct.
for all three dependent variables (see table 4.13). In addition to being weak, the
models do not pass tests of signicance. The U.S. was excluded from the model,
but the values in brackets refer to the variance explained when it is included. As
can be seen this case contributes considerably to the results, and since it is probably
that registration barrier is an important contributing factor to the low number of
new parties observed, it is reasonable to run the analyses without it. However, even
without the U.S. included, the coe¢ cients for all three indicators have the expected
direction. The coe¢ cients for access to media, in this model, are similar for all
categories of new parties, but only for the category of successful parties do they
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Regressor
>1 pct >1 pct, max >4 pct
Access to Media  -0.17  -0.16  -0.24
(-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.24)
Access to Finance  -0.03  -0.15  -0.02
(-0.02) (-0.13) (-0.02)
Costs of Reaching Voters  -0.20  -0.09  -0.10
(-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
Constant  2.6**  2.03**  1.43**
R2  0.06  0.06  0.07
(U.S. included) (0.12*) (0.15*) (0.13*)
N=79
Dependent Variable: New Parties
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
standardized coefficients reported, normal coefficients in ( )
OLS Regression
Table 4.13: The Impact of the Costs of Direct Communication on the Number of
New Vote-Winning Parties
come close to passing test of signicance. This nding was the same in the bivariate
analysis. The indicator for access to nance shows the weakest coe¢ cients, except for
the maximum number of parties observed at an election where it shows e¤ects similar
to media access. For the costs of reaching the electorate, the standardized coe¢ cient
is the highest for the category of parties obtaining at least a pct of the votes. Only
for the category containing the decade maximum of parties obtaining at least 1 pct
of the votes are the coe¢ cients similar to those seen for access to media; for the other
categories it is very low. Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, the indicator for costs
of reaching the electorate now shows a moderate negative e¤ect, as can be seen from
the standardized coe¢ cients. The negative impact is strongest for the number of
new parties obtaining 1 pct. or more of the votes (similar to the impact of access to
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media), but it is stronger than the access to nance for the other new party variables.
None of the coe¢ cients pass the test of signicance, however.
Interaction E¤ects
The analysis has so far relied on the assumption that the barriers - or facilitators
- have independent e¤ects, but it is likely that the barriers interact and produce
joint e¤ects over and above the individual ones. That is, a single high barrier may
not be su¢ cient to block entry on its own, but if there are multiple barriers fac-
ing a new party the negative e¤ect on electoral success may be tangible. Since all
of the barriers of direct communication identied here show only weak to moder-
ate e¤ects on their own, it would be interesting to investigate whether interaction
e¤ects can be identied. In the following, two di¤erent interaction e¤ects will be
examined. Firstly, it will be examined whether access to media and nance interact
and secondly, it will be examined whether all three direct communication barriers
interact. The method for testing the relationships proposed involves rstly trans-
forming each of the 3 variables into z-scores, secondly creating the two interaction
terms: 1) Interact Media&Finance = Z-AccessMedia  Z-AccessFinance) 2) Inter-
act All Direct Costs = Z-MediaAccess  Z-FinanceAccess  Z-CostsReach. Finally
the e¤ect of the interaction terms will be tested in a multivariate model43. The
model used to test the rst hypothesis is: Number of New Vote-Winning Parties =
0 + 1(media  finance) + 2media+ 3nance+ 4reachvoters +"
The results of the rst analysis investigating the existence of interaction e¤ects
of the rules on nancial support and media access are summarized in table 4.14.
As can be seen, there is some evidence in support of the hypothesis although it is
not consistent across new party categories. For the two categories of new parties
obtaining at least 1 pct of the votes, the coe¢ cients for the interaction term are
43The method is described in Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical
Analysisby Brambor, Clark and Golder. Political Analysis (2006) 14:63-82. An example
of the procedure can also be found in Tavits (2004).
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Regressor
>1 pct >1 pct, max >4 pct
Interaction Term  0.01  0.06  -0.13
(AccessMedia•AccessFinance)
Access to Media -0.17 -0.15 -0.26*
Access to Finance -0.01 -0.13 -0.61
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.20 -0.11 -0.07
Constant -0.10 -0.00  0.06
R2  0.06  0.07  0.08
(U.S. included) (0.12) (0.15*) (0.14*)
N=79
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
standardized coefficients reported
OLS Regression
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Table 4.14: Interaction E¤ects in the Direct Communication Barrier (1)
negligible. However, for the category of successful parties including the interaction
term results in slightly more variance explained by the model and furthermore the
coe¢ cient for the interaction term is negative as expected. It is not large, however
and it should of course be observed that the model does not pass tests of signicance.
The next question is whether we can explain more by taking the possible inter-
action of all three barriers of direct communication into account. The model used to
test this hypothesis can be written as follows: Number of New Vote-Winning Parties
= 0+ 1(media  finance  reachvoters) + 2media+ 3nance+ 4reachvoters +"
As can bee seen from the results of the multivariate regression analysis summa-
rized in table 4.15, the results do not give any evidence in support of an interaction
e¤ect - quite the contrary. The coe¢ cients for the interaction term are positive
across all three categories. For the maximum number of parties obtaining at least 1
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Regressor
>1 pct >1 pct, max >4 pct
Interaction Term 0.11 0.02 0.12
(Media•Finance•ReachVoters)
Access to Media -0.20 -0.16 -0.27*
Access to Finance -0.03 -0.15 -0.05
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.22 -0.10 -0.13
Constant -0.12 1.15 -0.02
R2 0.07 0.06 0.08
(U.S. included) (0.13) (0.15*) (0.14*)
N=79
OLS Regression
Dependent Variable: New Parties
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
standardized coefficients reported
Table 4.15: Interaction E¤ects in the Direct Communication Barrier (2)
pct of the votes, it is negligible, however. On basis of the analysis presented here,
there is thus no consistent evidence to support that the individual barriers of direct
communication produce in concert over and above their individual e¤ects. Only a
weak interactive e¤ect between the conditions for access to media and nance could
be observed in the model predicting the number of successful parties.
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4.5 Multivariate Analysis and Discussion of Re-
sults
Concerning the rst dimension examined, namely the extent of public exposure to
political information, which results from the particular mix of demand and supply
structures in each country, the tests did not conrm the original hypotheses. The
market shares of public service television displayed a consistent, but insignicant,
positive e¤ect on the number of new parties obtaining minimal vote shares, but only
the di¤erence between low and medium public service shares had a positive e¤ect
on the number of electorally successful parties. The e¤ect of newspaper readership
pointed in the opposite direction, however, and the indicator combining newspaper
readership and shares of public service television seemed to indicate that too high or
too low levels of information were equally unfavourable to new parties. A multivariate
analysis of the separate impact of newspaper readership and public service television
consumption revealed, however, that the two sources of information pull in opposite
directions. With newspaper readership having a clear depressing e¤ect on the number
of new parties obtaining minimal vote shares and public service television having the
opposite e¤ect. None of these e¤ects were observable for the group of electorally
successful parties, however.
The tests including the dimension of political control over broadcast organisa-
tions did not conrm the hypothesis that greater political inuence over television
succeeds in depressing the rate of new party success. Instead, the contrary appears
to be the case for the number of parties obtaining at least 1 pct of the votes. This
may be because demand for new parties is higher in these cases, or simply because
politicization of broadcast organisations is not e¤ective in steering the information
reaching to public - either because they receive it through other sources, or because
journalists in the broadcast organisations generally have enough leeway to employ
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professional rather than political criteria in the selection of material. However, again,
there was no clear variation in the average number of parties obtaining over 4 pct of
the votes across the categories.
Finally, the observation that the cases with high political control over broadcast
television was associated with higher means of new parties, led to an additional
test to uncover whether the positive e¤ect of higher market shares of public service
television observed earlier, should in fact be attributed to the cases with high political
control of broadcast. And in fact, this was found.
The results related to direct communication were more encouraging. In the bi-
variate analyses more generous terms of nancial support and free access to media
were associated with higher averages of new parties (all types), while the deating
e¤ects of the costs of reaching the electorate were only apparent when the US was
included, once this case was removed, the e¤ects virtually disappeared. The multi-
variate analysis (excluding the US) conrmed the results as the coe¢ cients observed
all had the expected direction - although none were signicant. Free access to media
displayed the strongest e¤ects across all three types, while access to nance showed
an e¤ect on the maximum number of new parties observed at an election. Somewhat
surprisingly, the costs of reaching the electorate now proved to have an e¤ect compa-
rable to that of access to the media on the number of parties obtaining just 1 pct of
the votes, while the e¤ects on the other categories were more moderate. It was then
investigated whether the barriers have interaction e¤ects. There was no evidence to
support that this is the case, however.
Before dismissing the hypotheses concerning the inuence of the media system
indicators, it is necessary to investigate how much variance can be explained by
combining the di¤erent indicators of the recognition barrier in one model and rela-
tionships hold up when the e¤ects of other variables are controlled for.
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Regressor
>1 pct >1 pct, max >4 pct
PublicService TV Market Share  0.13  0.07 -0.01
Newspaper Readership -0.30* -0.15 -0.02
Political Influence PublicTV  0.00  0.04  0.07
Access to Media -0.14 -0.14 -0.23
Access to Finance -0.01 -0.12 -0.00
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.12 -0.09 -0.07
Constant 2.8** 1.9* 1.48*
R2 0.16 0.10 0.07
N=79
OLS Regression
Dependent Variable: New Parties
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
standardized coefficients reported
Table 4.16: The Impact of the Recognition Barrier Indicators on the Number of New
Vote-Winning Parties
The model used to test the hypothesized e¤ects is: Number of New Vote Winning
Parties = 0 + 1pstv+2np-reader+3media+4nance+5reachvoter+"
The results of the multivariate regression analysis are summarized in table 4.16.
As can be seen from the results, the model best explained is the number of new parties
obtaining at least 1 pct of the vote share. For this group some 16.3 pct of the variation
(R2) is explained. However, the coe¢ cients are not always in the expected direction.
Public Service TV market shares have a positive e¤ect, but only on the number of
parties obtaining 1 pct of the votes. For the group of successful parties the coe¢ cient
is tiny. Surprisingly, the political inuence over broadcasting organisations appears
to have a slight positive e¤ect on the number of parties obtaining at least 4 pct of
the votes, but no e¤ect on the number of parties obtaining over 1 pct of vote shares
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and a very weak e¤ect on the maximum number of parties with over1 pct of vote
shares observed at an election. Newspaper readership has a strong deating e¤ect
on the number of new parties with over 1 pct of vote shares - which is furthermore
signicant - but it has hardly any e¤ect on the number of new successful parties. Of
the three indicators of direct communication costs, only the access to media shows
a moderate e¤ect on all three dependent variables. It is also the only factor which
appears to determine variation in the number of successful parties. However, it
should also be observed that the costs of reaching voters has a negative e¤ect on all
dependent variables. The standardized coe¢ cients are weak, but still stronger than
in the bivariate analysis.
4.6 Conclusion: Capturing the Recognition Bar-
rier
The question is what conclusions can be drawn concerning the recognition barrier.
None of the hypotheses aimed at capturing the role played by the mass media,
whether on the demand or supply side, were supported by empirical evidence. The
hypothesis that greater exposure to political information, measured by higher con-
sumption of media known to provide more extensive coverage of political news, would
facilitate recognition was not consistent with the evidence. In fact, one of the indi-
cators of such exposure, namely newspaper readership, appeared to have the exact
opposite e¤ect. Furthermore, the expectation that greater political control over na-
tional television broadcasting would make it more di¢ cult for new parties to break
through also disconrmed, and again actually the opposite appeared to be the case.
There are many possible reasons for these ndings. Firstly, it is possible that the
indicators chosen of the phenomena in question may be too crude. While this is
certainly true, I would argue that the problem is less related to this and more to
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the dependent variables chosen. The number of new parties winning certain vote
shares is a crude indicator for the recognition of new alternatives, particularly as the
numbers do not yield any information about the resources possessed by the parties
that make it. Secondly, it is highly probable that media consumption taps into other
dimensions than the mere exposure to political information. Newspaper reading may,
for instance, have a stabilizing e¤ect on electoral behaviour by strengthening existing
partisan preferences. Newspapers typically have a political prole, and the choice
of what newspaper to read may both reect and reinforce partisan preferences and
therefore reduce vote switching. Television is generally more `catch-allin its prole
and may therefore have the opposite e¤ect. Or the reasons may lie in the medium
itself, that is, people may be more easily swayed by appeals from new alternatives
when they see them `in personon television than when they read about them. The
depressing e¤ects of higher newspaper reading could therefore be unrelated to the ef-
fects of this medium per se, and instead express the greater dependence on television
in countries where readership is low. Thirdly, with respect to the lack of an e¤ect
from political control over national broadcast television, the problem may lie with
the dependent variable, but it could also relate to the issue itself. Blocked access to
certain media outlets, such as television, may strengthen e¤orts to go through other
channels and may also provoke a counter reaction of greater openness on the part of
other media. Media systems may for such dynamic reasons be very di¢ cult to de-
scribe as more open or closed per se - even if individual parts can be so characterised.
Finally, while the mass media undoubtedly play a crucial role for recognition, it is
possible that single events determine exposure much more than structural features
and that theory will therefore fall short in trying to predict di¤erences.
As a comparative measure of the recognition barrier, the only solution is to rely on
the three indicators of the direct communication costs. In the nal chapter analysing
the combined impact of the barriers to entry, these three indicators will therefore
represent the recognition barrier.
167
Chapter 5
The Representation Barrier
5.1 Introduction
Having secured a place on the ballot, and at least some degree of recognition in the
electorate, a new party faces the nal barrier, namely that of obtaining represen-
tation. Access to seats is facilitated or impeded by two factors, namely the share
of votes obtained and the electoral system. Electoral systems invariably inuence
political processes and outcomes. The structure they impose on the choice o¤ered to
voters and the mechanism they employ to translate electoral support for candidates
and parties into parliamentary representation are widely recognized as important
determinants of static as well as dynamic features of the party systems that evolve
within their framework. As Sartori writes, electoral systems are the `most manipula-
tive instrument of politics(Sartori, 1997). Arguably, the most important property
of electoral systems is that they pose a barrier to the entry of smaller parties. By ex-
cluding or limiting new or small parties from representation, the fragmentation of the
party system is reduced and parliamentary parties shielded from new competition.
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Identifying an indicator, which captures the barrier or `strength1 of the electoral
system, is not easy, however, and several solutions have been proposed and used in
comparative research. In the following, the strengths and weaknesses of these indi-
cators will rst be discussed, and it will be suggested that the E¤ective Threshold
suggested by Lijphart has clear advantages compared to other types (Lijphart, 1994).
Problems related to its estimation as well as its denition, make it necessary to ex-
amine the method for calculating it, and I propose also to identify a new indicator.
Such an indicator of the national electoral barrier, the Threshold of Proportional-
ity, is therefore developed, and tests of its validity are made. Finally, the e¤ect of
the representation barrier, thus measured, is tested on the number of new parties
participating, winning votes and seats.
5.2 Indicators of the Electoral System Barrier
To capture the size of this barrier posed by electoral systems, three main types of
indicators have been employed in comparative research. The simplest, and probably
also the most widely used, is the dichotomous classication of proportional (PR) ver-
sus plurality-majoritarian systems, initially proposed by Duverger (Duverger, 1972).
A more recent but also problematic addition to this classication scheme is the inser-
tion of the class of mixed-systems as an intermediate category. P. Norris as well as
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge use combined/`mixedsystems as an intermediary
category between PR and majoritarian systems. Norris uses this ordinal classi-
cation as an explanatory variable to account for various phenomena including the
level of party fragmentation, while Woldendorp et al. uses it to explain government
duration (Norris, 2004: chapter 3; Woldendorp et al., 2000). Implicit in this scheme
is the assumption that mixed systems by combining features found in proportional
1The term strengthof the electoral system coined by Sartori is also frequently used to
refer to the barrier property of electoral systems (Sartori, 1997)
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and plurality systems also fall between the two in terms of their e¤ects. The reality
is, however, that they di¤er greatly with respect to their barrier e¤ects, with some
resembling PR-systems and others majoritarian ones (Massicotte and Blais, 1999;
Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). Moreover, as many have pointed out, signicant
variation between the systems remains hidden when they are lumped together in
just two or three categories. More nely tuned indicators have therefore frequently
substituted these in comparative studies.
One such set of indicators is based on the observed deviance from proportionality
between votes and seats obtained by parties2. Disproportionality indicators o¤er a
continuous measure of the distortions introduced by the electoral systems and have
on occasion served as proxies of the electoral barrier in comparative research (e.g.
Strøm, 1989; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Lijphart, 1999). However, the underlying
assumption that the size of the barrier of electoral systems consistently covaries with
observed disproportionality is not a valid one. Disproportionality is caused by a
conjunction of factors of which electoral rules constitute but one set. A source of
constraint, whether it stems from the district magnitude, legal threshold or alloca-
tion formula, is necessary but not su¢ cient on its own to produce disproportional
outcomes. The party system, that is the number of parties running and their rela-
tive electoral success, co-determines the level of disproportionality observed. Strong
increases in the number of parties and the degree of fragmentation will only have
a marginally deating e¤ect on the proportionality of outcomes if the constraining
properties of the electoral system are very weak, as evidenced by the consistently
proportional results observed, for instance, in the Netherlands despite signicant
changes in the party system. The lower the district magnitude or the higher legal
thresholds, however, the greater the scope for the party system to inuence dispropor-
tionality. In single-member district systems, for example, the number of parties and
2See Lijphart (1994) and Pennisi (1998) for a review of the di¤erent indicators of dis-
proportionality.
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their relative vote shares explain the great variation in disproportionality observed
across countries and time. Likewise for systems using legal thresholds, signicant
variation can be traced back to the degree of fragmentation - even if the thresholds
are relatively low, if many run but fail to pass them, the recorded disproportional-
ity will be high3. Since we know that increased fragmentation of the party system
leads to a lowering of the vote share necessary to win seats (see further below), and
that more parties may be encouraged to participate when the barrier is perceived to
be lower, the covariation of disproportionality indices with the fragmentation of the
party system in stronger systems brings on problems of validity, when we use them
as a proxy of the barrier4.
A third, and more promising approach to capturing the electoral barrier, used by
an increasing number of scholars in the eld, consists in constructing a measure on
the basis of characteristics of the electoral rules themselves. Indicators of this type
rely mainly on the constraining e¤ect of the district magnitude, which at times is also
simply used directly, but some also include consideration for the potential impact of
the electoral formula, the number of parties running and lately also the number of
districts5. Following this method, scores are produced which are independent of the
concrete electoral outcomes and thus less subject to random uctuations. Among
these, the E¤ective Threshold used by Lijphart in his large comparative study of
electoral systems has emerged as a particularly popular indicator of the electoral
3See Penadés,1997; Lijphart, 1994; Rose, 1987 for a discussion of the causes of dispro-
portionality.
4Sartori remarks on this fact that this least-proportional proportionality may not show
up in our measures, and this for the simple reason that poor propotionality penalizes the
smaller parties and eventually wipes them out. (Sartori, 1997). Bartolini and Mair refer
to variations in the disproportionality potentialbetween electoral systems thereby high-
lighting the di¤erence between the observed outcomes and the nature of the rules (Bartolini
and Mair, 1990:39)
5For instance, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994), Monroe and Rose (2002), Willey (1998)
employ the district magnitude to investigate the e¤ects of electoral systems.
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barrier (Lijphart,1994)6.
The E¤ective Threshold, which Lijphart denes as the vote share with which
parties have a 50-50 chance of winning their rst seat, builds on and incorporates
earlier work on electoral thresholds. Operationally it is identied as the mid point
between the thresholds of inclusion, originally dened by Rokkan (1968)7, and its
logical complementary, the threshold of exclusion, proposed by Rae, Hanby and
Loosemoore (1971). Apart from the fact that the E¤ective Threshold is straightfor-
ward to interpret, it shares the advantage with disproportionality-based measures in
being continuous8. At the same time it avoids the main pitfalls associated with the
latter. It yields stable scores for systems with unchanged rules and produces similar
scores for countries with identical institutions. Moreover, contrary to disproportion-
ality scores, the values of the threshold co-vary with the number of parties in the
system in a way that is congruent with the logic of the barrier. The more parties
competing, the lower, rather than higher, the indicator values. The psychological
e¤ect of electoral rules implies that parties and voters may be deterred from par-
ticipating if the chances of success are deemed too slim or conversely encouraged if
conditions are seen to be favourable. The presence of more parties should therefore
give us lower rather than higher estimates of the barrier as the threshold does9.
Recent criticism pertaining to its operational denition and measurement in prac-
tice has, however, challenged its position as the standard measure of the electoral
barrier. This problems raised, as well as the solution proposed to solve these, will be
discussed in the next section.
6A number of recent comparative studies use the E¤ective Threshold as an indicator (
e.g. Hug, 2001; Powell and Vanberg, 2000; Anckar,1997).
7The threshold of inclusion was called the threshold of representation by Rokkan (1968).
8Pendades does, however, criticize out that Lijpharts method of assigning values to
plurality systems results in a semi dichotomous variable (Penades, 1997)
9The short-cutformula proposed by Lijphart does not take the number of parties into
account, however (Lijphart, 1994).
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5.3 Threshold Denition and Estimation
Given the widespread use of the E¤ective Threshold as an indicator of the electoral
barrier in comparative research, it is naturally important that it is estimated cor-
rectly. The comprehensive critique recently delivered by Taagepera of the method
used by Lijphart to estimate the E¤ective Threshold therefore calls for careful con-
sideration (Taagepera, 2002). Essentially, Taagepera introduces two revisions that
both have signicant impact on the calculation of this threshold.
Firstly, he rightly points out that the way in which the E¤ective Threshold was
estimated by Lijphart implied a failure to distinguish between the district and the
national levels. In spite of the fact that the formulas used to calculate the thresholds
of inclusion and exclusion were initially developed for the district level, they are used
in the E¤ective Threshold to estimate the size of the threshold at the national level.
The criticism applies not only to the E¤ective Threshold but also to similar measures
such as the E¤ective Magnitude that use the same approach (Shugart and Taagepera,
1989). The failure of the E¤ective Threshold to take the di¤erence between district
and nationwide levels into account has, according to Taagepera, led to consistently
misleading estimates. He therefore proposes a method for including national level
factors to enhance the precision of the scores.
The second and, as will be argued, less convincing argument presented by Taage-
pera contains a critique of the method for estimating the mid point between the
thresholds of inclusion and exclusion used to calculate the E¤ective Threshold. Re-
ferring to earlier work (Taagepera, 1998 & 1999), Taagepera argues that instead
of taking the arithmetic mean (average) of the two thresholds we should take the
geometric mean which has the e¤ect of producing signicantly lower scores.
Finally, Taagepera proposes a revised formula which is launched under the name
of the Nationwide Threshold of Representation. It shares denition with the E¤ective
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Threshold, but is `simplycalculated di¤erently: including national level factors in
the formula(s) and using the geometric mean to estimate the mid point between the
inclusion and exclusion thresholds. However, the newmethod of calculation overturns
established conventions about the constraining properties of electoral systems. The
scores assigned to the majoritarian systems fall in the same range and often below
those of the PR-systems. To support the claim that these scores are more accurate,
Taagepera evaluates them in light of empirical evidence and concludes that they
provide superior estimates to those of their predecessor.
Taageperas work therefore leaves us with a clear dilemma. Either we abandon
rmly established conventions concerning the constraining e¤ects of electoral systems
in the light of the fresh evidence presented, or we reject the Nationwide Threshold
Representation as a measure of this property. In the following, it will be argued
that, at least partly, the latter rather than the former route should be taken. A
number of objections can namely be raised to Taageperas arguments and method.
Below, a detailed critique of the steps taken, and nal results reached, will therefore
be o¤ered. The structure is as follows:
Firstly, it is demonstrated that the argument presented for establishing the mid-
point between the thresholds of inclusion and exclusion contains signicant errors.
At the root of this is a fallacy consisting in a confusion between estimating the centre
of a distribution informing us of the probabilities of parties of varying sizes obtaining
seats on the one hand, and a frequency distribution of party sizes on the other. This
confusion is closely related to the choice of a misleading benchmark, the Empirical
Threshold, for testing the accuracy of both district level and national level threshold
estimates.
Secondly, it is argued that moving the locus of threshold estimation from the
district to national level not only requires inclusion of new factors in the formula to
calculate the threshold values, but forces us to reconsider what the national threshold
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can be used as an indicator of. It is shown that a threshold dened in terms of
winning a seatcaptures but one aspect of the electoral barrier and not necessarily
the most important one for the most common research agendas. To capture the
constraining e¤ect on representation across di¤erent types of systems, it is argued
that we need a threshold dened in terms of attaining proportionality. Such an
indicator, Threshold of Proportionality, is therefore proposed and the next section is
concerned with developing estimates and testing their validity.
5.3.1 The Elusive Mid Point between the Thresholds of In-
clusion and Exclusion
The method used to estimate the E¤ective Threshold (Teff) as well as the Nationwide
Threshold of Representation (Tnat), proceeds by establishing the boundary conditions
for the range of possible outcomes. As Taagepera points out that if we dont know a
particular value, but know that it cannot exceed a given level nor fall below another,
then we can estimate it to be somewhere in the centre of this range (Taagepera,
1999). The Teff , as well as the Tnat, is determined in this way by establishing the
boundary conditions of attaining parliamentary representation, namely the threshold
of inclusion (Ti) and threshold of exclusion (Tx). The Ti is dened as the minimum
share of votes that could win a party at least one seat under the most favorable
circumstances, while its counterpart, the Tx, is dened as the maximum share of
votes a party could gain but still fail to win a seat with under the most unfavorable
of circumstances. In other words, if a party obtains less that the Ti share of votes,
it will certainly fail to obtain seats, while if its vote share exceeds the Tx, it cannot
fail to obtain a seat10.
To determine the `vote share with which parties have a 50-50 chance of winning
10The formulas for calculating the two thresholds for di¤erent formulaic structures have
been developed by di¤erent scholars and are presented in appendix I.
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their rst seat(dening the Teff and Tnat) Lijphart takes the average of the Ti and
the Tx, so that:
Teff =
Ti + Tx
2
Taagepera argues, however, that the geometric mean of the two extremes Ti
and Tx, rather than the arithmetic mean (average) should be used. The formulaic
expression is:
Tnat = (Ti  Tx)0:5
While this distinction may sound very technical and inherently uninteresting,
it is nonetheless important since it strongly inuences the value of the Nationwide
Threshold, especially when the di¤erence between the Ti and Tx is high11. This
will particularly be the case in systems with high number of districts and low district
magnitudes (as particularly is the case in plurality-majoritarian systems). Taagepera
advances theoretical arguments in favour of this choice and subsequently furnishes
empirical evidence to back it up.
The theoretical argument made by Taagepera favouring the geometric mean over
the arithmetic mean is related to assumptions concerning the distribution of the data,
as he explains in some detail in a research note of an earlier date (Taagepera, 1999). It
is here stated that while the arithmetic mean or average gives the centre (median) of a
normal distribution, the geometric mean yields the centre of a lognormal distribution.
11For example, the average of 2 and 50 is 26, while the geometric mean of the two is 10.
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The question would therefore seem to be which type of distribution is the more
suitable one for the data we wish to analyze.
Taagepera expresses strong disapproval of the tendency among social scientists to
use the normal distribution uncritically, and argues that it should under certain cir-
cumstances be replaced by the lognormal. Regarding the properties of the two types
of distribution, it is explained that, whereas the normal distribution extends to both
positive and negative innity, the lognormal distribution has its lower boundary at
zero and only extends into positive innity. Using data with a conceptual lower limit
of zero (e.g. one cannot have negative vote shares) makes the lognormal distribu-
tion more conceptually appropriate. As he points out, however, when the mean of
a distribution is many times larger than its standard deviation, the normal distri-
bution can be used (and is very similar to the lognormal) since the probabilities of
getting the conceptually impossible positive or negative extremes of the distribution
are extremely low. When this is not the case, however, the lognormal should be used
instead. Finally, when seeking to estimate the centre (median) of a distribution,
Taagepera claims that the geometric mean is `always advisable when the ratio of the
largest to the smallest entry is large (say, over 10) even when the best t deviates
from the lognormal. In such a situation the arithmetic mean would basically de-
pend on the largest entries, regardless of the precise size of the smallest(Taagepera,
1999:424). In the research note two very di¤erent examples are given of how the
geometric mean yields more accurate predictions of the median. In the rst, the
minimum and maximum weights of mammals are presented and the geometric mean
used to indicate the median. In the second example, it is the median size of states in
the US which is predicted given our knowledge of the sizes of the largest and smallest
respectively. In both cases the geometric mean gives estimates much closer to reality
than the arithmetic mean.
In the article on the Nationwide Threshold, Taagepera backs up his theoretically
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founded choice of mean for estimating the centre between the Ti and Tx by empirical
evidence. In order to test the calculated estimates of the Tnat, he compares them to an
observed value, the Empirical Threshold (Tem). The Tem is dened as `the vote share
below and above which an equal number of parties have won and failed to win seats
(Taagepera,1989). It can be identied both at the national and district levels, but was
initially proposed by Taagepera to compensate for the failure of theoretical threshold
calculations for the national level as well as a test for the theoretical estimates. In his
original discussion of the empirical threshold, Taagepera explained that `When one
proceeds beyond a single district which uses a standard allocation formula (such as
dHondt), theoretical calculations bog down. Thresholds in terms of nation-wide vote
shares depend on local concentrations of these votes and cannot be calculated, unless
one introduces knowledge about such geographical distribution of votes. Therefore,
theoretical threshold formulas up to now have been restricted to a single district.
(Taagepera, 1989:106). This problem Taagepera now claims to have solved with the
Nationwide Threshold. He demonstrates that the Nationwide Threshold calculated
using the geometric mean between the Ti and Tx yield values closer to the Empirical
Threshold than values estimated by using the arithmetic mean as with the E¤ective
Threshold (Taagepera, 2002)12. Admittedly, using the geometric mean is not the
only cause of estimates close to the Tem, the method for including concern for the
vote concentration also plays an important role. However, as will be shown in section
4, the estimates made on the basis of Taageperas method for including consideration
of the vote concentration, but using the arithmetic mean to estimate the mid point,
fall around 25 pct. Using the geometric mean instead results in scores of just a few
percentage points, which is in the immediate vicinity of the observed Tem values.
12Using the geometric mean is not the only cause of estimates close to the Tem, the
method for including concern for the vote concentration also plays an important role.
However, as will be shown in section 4, the estimates made on basis Taageperas method
for including consideration of the vote concentration, but using the arithmetic mean to
estimate the mid point, fall around 25 pct. Using the geometric mean instead results in
scores of just a few percentage points which is in the vicinity of the observed Tem.
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There are, however, problems in the method suggested. First, Taageperas argu-
ment that the lognormal distribution should be used when the chance of obtaining
conceptually invalid scores assuming a normal distribution is too high appears to
overlook that such problems can be overcome simply by truncating the normal dis-
tribution so that the chances of predicting non-existing values is reduced to a mini-
mum. Secondly, it is di¢ cult to see any inherent reason why it would be advisable
to use the lognormal distribution simply because the ratio from highest to lowest
observation is high. Whether the main bulk of cases fall towards the lower end of
the distribution, as in the lognormal, or around the mean, as in the normal, can only
be determined in one of the two following ways; Firstly, knowledge about the nature
of the data can create an expectation that the underlying distribution is congruous
with a particular shape or secondly, empirical sampling can demonstrate that the
cases fall in a pattern that resembles a particular distribution. The range in the data
set alone o¤ers no help in this respect.
It remains to be explained, however, why the estimates using the geometrical
mean of the Ti and Tx to nd the Tnat, predicts the Tem much more accurately than
those using the average.
Distributions, means and the nature of the data
The rst method for determining which distribution is the more appropriate consists
in considering the nature of the data we wish to analyze. For some types of data, the
value of one case does not a¤ect that of another. A typical example of this would be
the height of people. For others, like party vote shares, they are intimately related.
In dening the empirical threshold as he does, Taagepera implies that the data is
the sizes of parties in terms of vote shares and the frequency of their occurrence. If
we want to estimate the vote share of the party where below it and above it an equal
number of parties have won and failed to win a seat (=Tem), then we are looking for
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a distribution of the frequency of parties with particular vote shares. And it is clear
that the vote shares of parties within a country are intimately connected simply
because they are drawn from the same pool of votes: The higher the percentage
obtained by one, the lower the share available to others. Within a given party
system we have the logical possibility of nding a relatively high number of parties
with low vote shares (say less than 5 pct.), while we logically can nd very few with
high vote shares (say more than 25 pct.). In order to illustrate this point, I produced
a graph of the relationship between number of parties and party size (see gure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Party Sizes and Expected Frequency
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The graph I propose as an illustration of this point shows the relationship between
the sizes of parties and the maximum frequency for each particular size. The line
is drawn on basis of the formula: Frequency = 1
party voteshare . That is, if we know
the only occurring party size is 50 %, then only 1
50%
=2 parties can be contained
in a system, and if the only party size is 25%, then the number is 1
25%
=4. Of
course no party system contains parties with only one size, but I would argue that
it is reasonable to expect that the graph drawn according to this logic shares the
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properties of a graph showing frequency of sizes appearing if we were to draw all
possible samples from a party system. It therefore provides us with an indication of
the frequency with which parties of various sizes can be expected to appear - given
of course that no other factors inuence their sizes. What we can see from the graph
above is then that the probability mass is strongly skewed to the left. This is also
the case for the lognormal distribution as opposed to the normal distribution which
is symmetric around its mean, as can bee seen from gure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Normal and Lognormal Probability Density Functions
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Empirical support for this theoretical argument concerning the distribution of
party sizes can be found in observing the actual frequencies of parties of di¤erent
sizes. The frequency with which various party sizes appear in the party systems of 20
countries covering the time period 1945-2000, encompassing 2659 cases, is presented
in gure 5.313.
13The countries the parties are taken from include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (1974-2000), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal (1975-2000), Spain (1977-2000), Sweden, Switzer-
land and United Kingdom (Source: Mackie and Rose, 1990 and 1997; European Journal
of Political Research various issues 1995-2000)
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Figure 5.3: Observed Frequency of Party Sizes
The rst observation that can be made is that the shape of the histogram (gure
5.3) bears a striking similarity to the graph of expected party size frequencies in
gure 5.1. It is clear that the proposition that frequency is inversely proportional to
size has a rm hold in reality. The vast majority of cases lie on the left side of the
distribution and indeed the mode of the distribution is very low at 0,2 pct. However,
there are also a higher number of cases above 15-20 pct than we might expect and
the line is not smoothly decreasing. This is, however, only to be expected inasmuch
as the sizes of parties is not a random phenomenon. Several factors such as the
advantages of size in campaigning, obtaining seats and access to government provide
clear advantages for larger parties.
This fact is, I would argue, an important part of the explanation for why superior
estimates (i.e. closer to the observed Tem) are made using the geometric mean of the
Ti and Tx. The geometric mean gives much lower estimates of the median than the
average does and thus reects that that the main bulk of the cases lie to the left of
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the distribution. That the median of party vote shares would be accurately predicted
by the geometric mean is then explained by the fact that as is the case for parties
we are dealing with distribution of unit-sizes which are intimately related inasmuch
as their sum is equal to 100 pct. That the median size of mammals is predicted by
taking the geometric mean of the highest and the lowest known sizes, as Taagepera
uses as an example, would seem purely fortuitous, however.
Finally, it should also be observed that if we were to accept to take the geometric
mean between the Ti and Tx; because we assume an underlying lognormal distribu-
tion (which as noted resembles the real distribution), a methodological inconsistency
could be involved. Since the extremes Ti and Tx are given by characteristics of the
electoral system, we would be assuming a lognormal distribution not for the whole
data set, but only for the points between the Ti and the Tx. This has the consequence
that if our Ti and Tx is 1 and 5 pct respectively, we expect the median party size to
be 2.2 pct., whereas if the Ti and Tx are 2 and 15 pct., we can expect 5.5 pct. to
be the median size. In other words the assumed median party size changes with the
features of the electoral system instead of being external to it.
An argument that the median party size is larger in countries with low district
magnitudes could be made, based on the fact larger parties generally have an advan-
tage due to the high barriers to representation of small parties under such systems.
To investigate this, I analysed the frequency of party sizes in single member district
systems (SMD) and multimember district systems (MMD) separately. As can be
seen from the histograms - gures 5.4 and 5.5 - the di¤erence between the median
party size in countries with single member districts (SMD) and those with higher
magnitudes (MMD) is not very big. The median in the former types being 5.35 pct
and in the latter 5.0 pct. (basing the analysis on the same countries and periods
as above). Noticeable, however, is the pattern in the frequency of party sizes that
can be observed in each group, as evidenced by the stronger di¤erence between the
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Figure 5.4: Observed Frequency of Party Sizes in SMD-Systems
means - 13.7 (SMD) versus 10.9 (MMD).
However, these di¤erences albeit as expected are simply not su¢ ciently pro-
nounced to warrant a methodology such as the one suggested, which assumes that
party sizes (especially the median size) vary strongly according the features of the
electoral system.
The Nationwide and the Empirical Thresholds: Equivalent concepts?
While it is clear that the geometric mean - in spite of the problems discussed -
provides a superior method to the arithmetic mean for predicting the median of
a distribution of party sizes, the question is whether this is in fact what we are
looking for. This essentially depends on whether the Empirical and the Nationwide
Thresholds are equivalent concepts as Taagepera claims they are.
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Figure 5.5: Observed Frequency of Party Sizes in MMD-Systems
To answer this question it necessary to revisit the denitions of the thresholds
provided by Taagepera. Both the E¤ective and the Nationwide Thresholds are de-
ned as: `the vote share, with which parties have a 50-50 chance of winning their rst
seat(Lijphart, 1994:25; Taagepera, 2002:384). The observable Empirical Threshold,
on the other hand, is operationally dened as `the vote share below and above which
an equal number of parties have won and failed to win votes respectively(Taagepera,
2002). Taagepera claims that the procedure used to identify this vote share implies
that a party has a fty-fty chance of winning a seat at the Empirical Threshold
(Taagepera, 1989:107)14. However in the process of providing an operational den-
14The procedure for identifying the empirical threshold is described as follows: nd the
vote shares for all those cases where a party obtained one seat but no more. Rank these
votes by increasing size. Also nd the vote shares for cases where parties with non-negligible
vote shares failed to win a seat, and rank these shares by decreasing size. The empirical
representation threshold (T) is dened as the vote share (v) such that the number of cases
where a party fails to get a seat with v>T equals the number of cases where a party with
v<T does win a seat. (Taagepera, 1989:106)
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ition of the threshold, the focus is subtly changed from a probability statement of
the vote shares with which parties have equal chances of winning or losing a seat,
to a statement of the frequency of parties with certain vote shares we can expect to
observe. And this is not the same. Only if we had an equal number of parties of all
sizes running at elections could we trust that the vote share above and below which
an equal number of parties have succeeded and failed to enter were representative of
the point of equal probabilities. But as shown above, we can ceteris paribus expect
to nd a higher number of smaller parties than larger ones. This is, I would argue,
one part of the reason that the Empirical Threshold is not a precise test for the Na-
tionwide Threshold scores. We simply cannot expect an equal frequency of attempts
to enter for all party sizes between the Ti and the Tx but rather a sharply declining
one as shown above, and therefore the observations of entry or failed entry are not
representative of the chances of entering alone.
Taageperas own analysis of district level thresholds in Finland, where it is found
that `the empirical threshold is not halfway between the exclusion and inclusion
threshold but tends to be at or even below the inclusion threshold lends support
to this hypothesis (Taagepera, 1989:113). Taagepera suggests that the phenomenon
is caused by electoral alliances, but it is highly likely that we are also observing
an e¤ect caused by the higher frequency of smaller parties and would indeed nd a
similar pattern in systems that do not accommodate such alliances.
The question is whether rejecting the Tem as a litmus test for estimates of the
vote share giving even odds of winning a seat implies simply reverting to taking
the arithmetic mean between the Ti and the Tx. A distinction arises on this point
between the district and national levels. The assumption of perfect proportionality
between increase in vote share and increase in probability of winning a seat between
the Ti and Tx at the district level remains uncontested and it is therefore still valid
to use the arithmetic mean to estimate the mid point. This is then not because we
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are assuming that probabilities follow a normal distribution but simply because the
arithmetic mean gives the centre of any distribution symmetric around its mean -
in this case a linear increase in probabilities per unit increase in size between the Ti
and the Tx, as shown in gure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Party Sizes and the Probability for Obtaining a Seat
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However, for national level thresholds the e¤ect of the frequency distribution on
the position of the Tem is only a small part of the story. The additional factors of
geographical vote concentration and party strategy that emerge at this level intervene
and provide strong explanations for why the national Tem is closer to Ti than the Tx.
As will be argued below, this added complication forces us to reconsider the concept
we want to measure prior to deciding on which estimation-technique to use.
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5.3.2 Dening the Electoral Barrier:a seat or a propor-
tional share?
At the national level we have strong reasons to expect a non-linear relationship
between vote shares and the probability of winning a seat between the Ti and the
Tx. In fact, we would expect a sharp increase in the probability of winning a seat
after the Ti and then a strongly diminishing rate of increase the closer we get to the
Tx. The cause lies in the combination of geographically heterogenous electorate and
party strategy.
Considering the impact of the vote concentration, Taagepera explains that the
threshold for winning a seat at the national level is given by the district level Ti
divided by the share of votes held in one district. For instance, in a plurality single
member districts system, a party might win a seat with 35 pct of the votes in a given
district. But if this partys total vote were concentrated in that district and it held
just 1 percent of the total electorate, then the seat could logically be obtained with
only 0.35 percent of the national vote. Based on this simple observation Taagepera
delivered a sharp critique of E¤ective Threshold as estimated by Lijphart, as well as
similar estimates published prior to his article15. While he claims that the thresholds
estimated were never intended to predict the nationwide vote share necessary to gain
a single seat (as was, however, implied by their denitions), he does point out that
the way in which national legal thresholds were equated with those calculated on
the basis of district level factors, indicated a confusion of the two levels (Taagepera,
2002:386).
The scenario of total vote concentration in one district of course depicts an ex-
treme situation, but the norm is that partiesvote shares vary across the national
territory along with di¤erences in socio-economic, ethnic, religious etc. composition
15The critique also applies to the E¤ective Magnitude proposed by Shugart and
Taagepera (1989).
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of the population. A party that has strong appeal to voters in one constituency
may, as a consequence, hardly have foothold in another. Given variation in electoral
structure across districts, it is obvious that smaller parties running have powerful
incentives to concentrate their campaigning e¤orts in districts where the chances of
winning representation are better. And the other side of the coin is that parties can
economize on their resources by refraining from presenting candidates and/or cam-
paign less vigorously in districts where they are unlikely to win seats anyhow. The
combination of uneven electoral geography on the one hand, and strategic participa-
tion and campaigning e¤orts on the other, therefore creates a situation where parties
with very small vote shares are only slightly less likely to win a seat than much larger
parties are. All that is needed to pass a one-seat-threshold is to have a relatively
strong appeal to the electorate in a single district. It is therefore not strange that we
nd quite a number of parties in single-member district systems who in spite of tiny
national vote shares nonetheless succeed in winning seats. The question is, however,
how interesting the fact that parties may win a seat somewhere is for the attempt to
capture the electoral barrier or in Sartoris terminology the `strengthof an electoral
system?
A glance at the electoral results and seat allocations of the Liberal party in the
UK illustrate the problem of using `one seatas the yardstick of representation; At
its absolutely worst election in the post war period, the Liberal party received a
mere 2.6 pct of the national vote, but managed even so to win 1 pct of the seats. It
thus appeared on that occasion to be only marginally disadvantaged by the electoral
system. 20 years later, in the election of 1974, the same party won an impressive 19.6
pct of the popular vote, but this time the barrier of the electoral system was tangible:
the impressive electoral support translated into a mere 2.2 pct. of the seats. And this
is not an outstanding case. In order to illustrate the problem, proportionality proles
were made for for New Zealand (gure 5.7) and the United Kingdom (gure 5.8).
Proportionality proles were proposed by Shugart and Taagepera to show the e¤ects
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of electoral systems. They show the advantage ratio of parties (%seats/%votes) as a
function of their size (%votes) (Shugart and Taagepera, 1989).
Figure 5.7: Proportionality Prole: New Zealand
New Zealand (1951-1993)
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The rst observation that can be made from looking at the proles of the two
countries is that all observations with a zero-score on the Seats/Votes-ratio (where
no seats are obtained) are crowded close to the national Ti (as Taagepera explains:
Ti= Ti districtdistricts total) - there is not a single observation close to the Tx or even at the
midpoint between the two. In the British case there are 41 cases of failed entry
of 129 observations in the period and none obtained more than 2,5 percent of the
vote and in fact 40 of the cases obtained 0.6 pct of the votes. The U.K. would
thus appear equivalent to a country like Denmark with a legal threshold of just 2
pct in terms of its electoral barrier. In New Zealand, 33 failed entries of 74 cases
can be observed and 22 of the failures obtained below 5 pct, while the rest received
between 5-12 pct. of the vote. Similar observations can be made about the other
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Figure 5.8: Proportionality Prole: United Kingdom
United Kingdom (1950-1997)
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countries with plurality or majoritarian electoral systems. In the Canadian case, out
of 116 observations there are 48 cases of failed entry in parliament and 90 pct of these
obtained shares of less than 1.5 pct. The largest share of votes obtained by any party
in the system that failed to obtain seats was a mere 4.5 pct. If obtaining a seat is
the measure of the threshold, Canada would clearly present a lower threshold than
Germanys 5 pct. In Australia and France the main bulk of those not succeeding
to win a seat are indeed very small parties, although here like for New Zealand we
do nd a few cases where parties as large as 10-13 percent fail to gain access to
parliament. In the case of France for example, there is but a single case of a larger
party being excluded, namely the National Front in 1993 that obtained 12.7 pct
of the vote, but no seats. Apart from this, however, only parties with less than 4
pct ever experienced such total exclusion. The implication of this would seem to
be that the conventional proposition that proportional systems are more open to
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small parties than versus majoritarian systems should be fundamentally revised, as
Taageperas Nationwide Threshold in fact suggests. However, if we instead look at
parties that are strongly disfavoured it is clear from the proles of both New Zealand
and the U.K. that strong negative disproportionality is experienced by parties with
up to 30 percent of the vote.
We clearly miss a big part of what we want to capture with respect to the electoral
barrier by using a one seat criteria as the yardstick of representation. In fact, we end
up with a measure that conceives of representation in formal or dichotomous terms
(yes/no) rather than in substantial (how strongly) terms. While gaining access to
parliament may lend some political credibility to new parties and possibly strengthen
their chances for survival in the long term, it is usually not very important for
national politics that small parties obtain a seat here and there. What is, instead, of
overriding importance for the dynamics of party competition and the fragmentation
of the party system is whether minor parties are likely to be strongly disadvantaged in
the process of seat allocation or simply receive roughly proportional shares. Whether
expansion beyond a few token seats is likely to be hampered or not. In countries
where dominant cleavages are not geographically based, the only parties that can
threaten the political establishment are those that solicit the support of a naturally
dispersed electorate. Parties with localized appeals might win a seat here and there,
but they cannot pose a credible threat to cut into the electoral base of the major
parliamentary parties. Only if a new party were successful in changing the policy
space by inserting a new territorially based cleavage would it be able to obtain a larger
share of votes and benet from systems that give better access to geographically
concentrated electorates. But such transformations of the political space occur only
rarely. As has been demonstrated, the territorial base of cleavages is mostly quite
stable at least in the longer standing democracies (Caramani, 2001).
Constructing a comparative measure of the electoral barrier requires sensitivity to
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how constraints are imposed across systems. In systems with national legal thresholds
the electoral barrier operates like a threshold that can be passed only by those above
a certain size, and then introduces no impediments to expansion beyond that size. In
other systems, as those with small district magnitudes, the picture is more complex.
Some parties enter with a small but concentrated share of the national vote while
some with much larger but dispersed votes fail to win seats. The barrier is neither
a xed vote share, nor does passing it in one district entail escaping its e¤ects in
others. If we choose winning one seat as the criteria of representation, we inevitably
put systems that on average penalize smaller parties on a par with systems that
over a certain size treat them the same as larger parties. A PR-system such as
Sweden with a legal threshold of 4 pct., where winning a seat is intrinsically bound
up with being proportionally represented would, according to Taageperas estimates,
be equated with plurality New Zealand.
The only method which would allow us to measure the average barrier imposed
by a system is to pitch the measure around the vote share likely to result in pro-
portional seat shares. It means setting a higher standard for representation, but in
this way the average disadvantage imposed on smaller parties could be captured. We
would then aim to capture the electoral barrier understood as the vote share with
which parties escape being penalized by the electoral system. This implies, however,
producing scores that are not sensitive to the fact that smaller vote shares may give
parties access to representation. The bottom-line is then that whichever criteria is
chosen, problems of comparability will arise. The determining factor for choosing
a denition if we want a national level comparative measure of the barrier is the
research question. We have to decide what type of representational constraint we are
interested in capturing.
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Estimating the National `One SeatBarrier
If we are looking for a comparative measure of how di¢ cult it is for localized political
interests to gain representation, we could use an indicator dened in terms of attain-
ing `one seatsuch as the Nationwide Threshold. The question of estimation is then
a purely technical one. I would, however, have some hesitations in picking up the
formula proposed by Taagepera for the following reasons. Firstly, as will be further
explained below, the method suggested for considering the potential impact of vote
concentration implies assuming that partiess vote shares are concentrated in half
(or even less) of a countries districts. This is clearly unrealistic for most countries
(c.f. below) and serves only to `articiallydeate scores so that they fall closer to
the Tem. Secondly, there is no reason to assume that the vote share corresponding to
even odds to win or fail to win a seat can be estimated by the geometric mean. In
fact, I would argue that no model can really be developed to predict this vote share,
since it is neither random nor determined by factors we can claim knowledge about
ex ante. We know that the lower limit is given by the Ti and that there is a clear
incentive structure inducing smaller parties to focus their e¤orts in real or potential
strongholds, but that is all. We have no theoretical tools enabling us to predict how
widely parties might cast their net, how many votes they could muster or how these
might be dispersed across the national territory.
One option in this theory void would simply be to use Taageperas Empirical
Threshold, which he initially proposed to compensate for the lack of theoretically
based national measures (Taagepera, 1989). With this we do not get a barrier mea-
sure that tells us the vote share that gives even odds of winning or failing to win a
seat, but one that gives us the typical vote share of parties winning their rst seat in
a given system. Identifying the Tem requires, however, following a rather cumbersome
procedure. Furthermore it varies considerably across systems with identical electoral
rules: from 0.3 in U.K. (1918-1979) to 8 pct in New Zealand (1880-1981). This is
194
Chapter 5. The Representation Barrier
a natural consequence of the fact that the Tem reects a mix of objective constraint
and the actual fortunes of parties that participate. Finally, we can expect the Tem
for countries that only have a short electoral history to yield unstable scores as the
vote share is determined on the basis of only few `trials.
A better option might then be to simply use the Ti. We know that the Tx has
only negligible traction in terms of inuencing the sizes at which parties typically
win seats. The Ti is institutionally the determining factor in this respect and while
we would get a vote share below the typical size of parties entering, we would have
a stable measure which makes sense theoretically and furthermore is very easy to
compute16. However, the e¤ect of the actual electoral structure would be completely
left out.
Dening and Estimating a Barrier of Proportionality
If the research question were instead to require an indicator which captures the av-
erage national representational barrier to representation, then we would be forced to
consider the issue of proportionality. And this is the case in this study. I therefore
propose a new national threshold measure dened as the vote share with which par-
ties have a 50-50 chance of winning a share of seats proportional to their share of
votes. This indicator can be called National Threshold of Proportionality(Tpro).
The denition of the Tpro somewhat resembles the interpretation Lijphart gives of the
E¤ective Threshold as a national measure. As Lijphart writes: `all e¤ective thresh-
olds except national legal thresholds are not only rough estimates but also midpoints
in a range between no representation and full representation. Hence, falling short of
such an e¤ective threshold does not necessarily entail getting no representation at all
16It should be noted that if we, in spite of the lack of theoretical validity, were to use
the formula proposed by Taagepera, we would instead get too high estimates of the typical
vote share with which parties win seats as Taagepera himself points out (Taagepera, 2002).
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as it does when the threshold is a national legal barrier but being substantially
underrepresented(Lijphart, 1994: 29)17. The issue of proportional representation
is clearly brought into play although it is not entirely clear what Lijphart means by
full representation.
The question is then how a threshold of proportionality can be estimated. To do
this, I would suggest simply following the logic indicated by Lijphart in the citation
above. That is, using estimated district level thresholds and relying on a process of a
national level cancelling out of over- and underrepresentation in individual districts.
If we use the district level measure of 50-50 probability to win or fail to win a seat, it
seems reasonable to expect that the wins will evenly compensate for losses resulting
in an overall proportional representation. The issue of how to deal with the impact
of vote concentration on party representation persists, however. To produce a truly
national level indicator, as opposed to the district level based E¤ective Threshold,
we need a method for dealing with this.
In the following section, it will be demonstrated that Taageperas method for con-
sidering the impact of the vote concentration on the national threshold value entails
assuming an electoral geography which is unrealistic for most countries. A method is
therefore suggested for how knowledge of the real vote concentration can be included
when estimating the threshold. The estimates of the Threshold of Proportionality
that are made will then be evaluated in light of empirical evidence.
17Lijphart also brings the issue proportionality to bear on the operational decisions
necessary to make for calculation of the E¤ective Threshold (1994). To decide which
district magnitude should be included in the threshold formula in systems using more than
one tier, Lijphart argues that it is the tier (and district magnitude of that tier) that is
decisive for the proportionality of the results that matters.
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5.4 The National Threshold of Proportionality
That the geographical vote concentration impacts the representation of small parties
hardly constitutes news. As Sartori discusses, the constraining properties of electoral
systems on the party system depends on the electoral structure. Discussing the
circumstances under which plurality electoral systems will lead to a two party system
he writes: `a two party system is impossible if minorities are concentrated in above-
plurality proportions in particular constituencies or geographical pockets(Sartori,
1997:46). The question is just how to deal theoretically with the impact of the
geographical electoral structure on our measures of the electoral barrier. Logically it
can be dealt with in three di¤erent ways.
The rst is the approach semi-consciously taken by Lijphart (1994)18, which
Taagepera criticizes. The underlying assumption of Lijpharts approach is that par-
tiesvote shares are evenly distributed among the districts. This allows him to make
estimates of the E¤ective Threshold on the basis of the same factors that are nec-
essary to estimate it at the district level. The lack of realism in this assumption,
however, leads Taagepera to suggest another way of dealing with the issue. The
method he proposes admits ignorance of its real value and tries to compensate for
this by inserting an estimate instead. The formulaic expression used estimates the
national Ti under assumption of complete concentration and the national Tx under
the assumption of complete dispersion of the vote. The most and least favourable
circumstances for representation. The problem in his method is, as mentioned, that
when we then take the average of the two, we get values of the threshold that reect
18In presenting the E¤ective Threshold, Lijphart does not draw attention to the fact
that an even distribution of the vote must be assumed in order to make the step from
district level thresholds to national ones. However, in discussing how to transform com-
plex legal thresholds in two-tier systems into e¤ective thresholds, Lijphart recognises that
an extrapolation from district to national threshold requires the assumption of complete
homogeneity of the vote (Lijphart, 1994: 37).
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the situation where the votes of parties are typically concentrated in half its dis-
tricts19. Assuming a concentration in half of the districts would be close to the truth
in a country like Belgium, which in electoral terms is split down the middle, but very
far o¤ the mark for most other countries that have far more homogenous electorates.
The result of using an approximation far from the political realities in most countries
we investigate is of course that the estimates we get are strongly misleading. In fact,
as will be shown later, they are mostly more misleading than the scores based on the
assumption of even distribution.
The third approach, which will be developed here, entails measuring the observed
vote concentration and including its value in the calculation of the threshold.
5.4.1 The Factors: individual versus systemic features
Calculation of the threshold requires knowledge of factors internal and external to
the electoral system. The internal factors are the district magnitude and the electoral
formula, while the external factors are the number of parties and the vote concen-
tration. Except for the electoral formula, the factors often vary across the territory.
The district magnitude typically varies within the same system and frequently we
nd a di¤erent number of parties running in each of these. However, while these
variations a¤ect the value of the electoral threshold equally for all parties running,
the vote concentration is party specic and inuences the threshold individually. For
instance the electorates of the Labour and the Conservative Parties in the UK are
highly dispersed, while those of the Scottish National Party and the Welsh Plaid
Cymru are highly concentrated. The result of this is that the latter two parties face
much lower National Proportional Thresholds than Labour and the Conservatives
do. So if we are interested in getting an average estimate of the electoral barrier in a
19Taking the geometric mean between the two would reect a much stronger heterogene-
ity with parties typically collecting in just a a small part of the national territory.
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particular country, the individual party scores must be transformed into a systemic
value taking the relative importance of the respective party thresholds into account.
That is party competition on the left-right cleavage typically cuts across electoral dis-
tricts, so that parties competing on such platforms face highly dispersed electorates.
Other cleavages like linguistic or religious and certainly regional cleavages tend to
have geographically concentrated electorates. If we want a systemic threshold value,
we therefore need to take into account the relative electoral strength of the parties,
and thus the geographical base of the cleavages and weight the scores accordingly.
5.4.2 The Threshold with the Vote Concentration
The question is how real values of the vote concentration can be included in the
formula for calculating the Tpro. To explain how this can be done, it is necessary to
briey review how the vote concentration exerts an inuence on its value. On the
one hand, if the vote of a party is completely homogenous, it means that both Ti and
Tx can simply be calculated without consideration of the number of districts. If, on
the other hand, the vote of a party is completely concentrated in one district, both
will be lowered in proportion to the number of districts in the system as Taagepera
has explained (Taagepera, 2002). Let the national level and district level thresholds
be written Tin and Txn and Tid and Txd respectively and let Des signify the number
of districts in a system. Then the relationship can be expressed as follows:
Tin =
Tid
Des
Txn =
Txd
Des
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What we need therefore is a measure of the vote concentration, which can replace
the number of districts (Des) in the denominator in such a way that when the vote
moves toward total dispersion it comes close to 1 and when it moves towards total
concentration it equals the number of districts used in the particular electoral system
we want to estimate the threshold for. Among the existing measures of national vote
concentrations, however, none can be found which fulls these criteria (see review of
these in Caramani, 2002). So a di¤erent approach to measuring vote concentration
has to be taken. I suggest the following steps are taken;
First, the Herndalh-Hirshman concentration index (HH) is applied to the dis-
tribution of partiesvote shares across districts. This means taking the number of
votes a party has obtained in a given district and dividing it by its total vote. Each
district vote fraction thus obtained is then squared for all districts. Let v be the
fraction of a partys total vote and i be each district, the formula can be stated as
follows:
HH =
X
(vi)
2
The second step is then to estimate the number of districts that the partys vote
is mainly concentrated in. This can be found by taking the inverse of the HH. The
measure thus found can be called the e¤ective number of districts (Deff) since it is
similar to the e¤ective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).
Deff =
1P
(vi)2
Deff gives us a measure of how many districts a given partys vote is dispersed
over. If a party obtains 100% of its votes in one district only, we get the value 1. On
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the other hand, if electoral strength is invariable across districts, we get the number
of districts used in the system. This score then gives us the opposite of what we
need. But if we take the number of districts in the system and divide it by the Deff
we will get a measure that can be used in the manner suggested above. This measure
can be called the e¤ective vote concentration, Veff , and the formula for calculating
it, is written as follows:
Veff =
Des
Deff
It should be observed that Veff as a measure of concentration is equivalent to the
variance. Although the scores obtained fall within widely di¤erent ranges, Veff and
S2 scores for partiesvote concentrations were found to correlate perfectly (pearsons
r =1). The perfect correlation is explained by the fact that Veff is in fact equal to
the variance (S2) plus a constant:
S2 = Veff   x2
To get a score for each country that reects its electoral structure, as discussed
above, a weighted Veff value is calculated. This can be done by taking the sum of
the Deff for each party multiplied by the partys share of the total vote. The number
of districts is then divided by this system-Deff to get the system-Veff . This has the
advantage over a similar weighting directly of the Veff scores of each party, that it
prevents very small parties with very high Veff scores (in systems with high number
of districts) from exerting undue inuence on the systemic value.
SystemVeff =
DesP
Deffi  vi
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The formula for the National Proportional Threshold using the systemic E¤ective
vote concentration and the district threshold of inclusion and exclusion can then be
expressed as follows:
Tpro =
Tid + Txd
SystemVeff  2
The appropriate formulas for calculating the thresholds of inclusion and exclusion
can then be inserted. Whether a standard formula is used to calculate the district
Ti and Tx for all systems as is done by Lijphart and Taagepera, or whether one lets
the formula vary according to the allocation rules used and the number of parties
running is then up to the user (the formulas for di¤erent formulaic structures and
the short cut formulas are listed in Appendix C.1.).
The e¤ect of vote concentration on the threshold some further consid-
erations
In order to avoid a misinterpretation of the Tpro, it is necessary to consider a bit
more carefully how Veff interacts with party size in inuencing its value. While the
argument presented by Taagepera regarding the lowering of the threshold accord-
ing to increases in vote concentration holds for the example given, there is not a
straightforward relationship between the two.
Firstly, it should be noted that Veff scores have a natural upper limit for parties
depending on their size. Given that all constituencies have the same size, a party
obtaining 30 pct cannot exceed a Veff score of 3.3, while one of 10 percent cannot
exceed 10, since this would signify that the total vote is concentrated in 30 and 10
pct of all the districts respectively. Very high Veff scores are consequently reserved
for very small parties, whose vote can actually be contained in just one or a few
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districts.
Secondly, one should be aware that a higher Veff for a party does not always
translate into more advantageous seat allocation20. The optimal vote concentration
for a given party, that is the vote concentration that will maximize its seat share,
depends on the share of votes obtained. To illustrate how this works a graph is
presented which shows the Veff scores that would lead to the maximum share of
seats possible for a party running in a system with 100 single member districts and
with only two parties running.
Figure 5.9: Vote Concentration, Party Size and Maximizing Representation
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A party winning just over 25 pct of the vote could potentially win 50 pct of the
seats if its votes were dispersed evenly over 50 districts and thus had a Veff =2, while
a party of just over 1 pct of the vote would need a Veff of 50 to obtain a maximum
of 2 seats.
20The tendency for larger parties to be less optimally represented due to strong concen-
tration of votes has already been pointed out (Taylor and Johnston, 1979; Grofman et al.,
1997)
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Moreover, the e¤ect of the vote concentration not only varies according to size,
but each unit increase in Veff for a party of the same size not only has a non-linear
e¤ect on its seat share, but can have directly opposite e¤ects. A party receiving
25 percent of the vote running the same system as described above would get a
proportional seat share if its entire vote were contained in just 25 of its districts
(Veff=4). If its votes are dispersed completely evenly in half the districts (Veff =2)
it will increase its seat share to 50 pct, but a further decrease in vote concentration
leading it to receive the same share of votes in each district (Veff=1), would have
the opposite e¤ect, since it will receive no seats at all. There are many combinations
possible of vote shares the di¤erent districts and the same vote concentration score
for a party may cover a very fortunate situation where it just gains enough votes
to win a seat in many districts and loses just a few or a situation where it comes
close in many districts but only wins a few. The Veff measure cannot capture such
situations accurately. As is the case for the e¤ective number of parties, the same
Veff score can be produced by several vote concentration scenarios and some of these
may be more opportune for the party in question than for others21.
A good illustration of the dilemma is found in the New Zealand election of 1990.
The Labour party gained 47,8 pct of the total vote but just 28,9 pct of the seats,
while the National Party with just 35,1 pct of the vote took 70,1 pct of the seats. The
Veff scores of the two parties do not help us to explain this blatant misallocation
of seats, since the values were very similar: Labours Veff being 1,09 while the
National Partys was 1,08. At the following election in 1993, the results were far
more proportional; The National Party obtained the same share of votes but this
time only 50,5 pct of the seats, while Labour with only 34,7 obtained 45,5 pct of
the seats. Again, however, the Veff scores for that election were closely similar: 1,12
21Dunleavy and Boucek demonstrate that di¤erent combinations of party numbers and
party vote shares may lead to similar e¤ective number of parties scores. As a result they
recommend that the index is interpreted carefully (Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003).
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for Labour and 1,14 for the National Party. The example clearly illustrates that
the Veff cannot be used to predict the advantage ratio (%seats/%votes) for larger
parties, while it o¤ers much more secure predictions when we are dealing with minor
and very small parties. This is clear when comparing the Country Party of Australia
or Bloc Quebecois of Canada with the Liberal Party in the U.K. The two former
have Veff scores in the range 4,5-6,5 and vote shares ranging from 5-15 pct. typically
been overrepresented, while the Liberal Party with similar vote shares but Veff scores
typically between 1,5-2,5 has been strongly disadvantaged under the same electoral
rules.
The examples serve to illustrate that the vote concentration measure must be
used with some care in connection with threshold calculations. However, since the
threshold values primarily serve the purpose of predicting the openness of the political
system to minor and new parties, we are concerned with predicting what the chances
are for these to attain fair representation. For such parties running in systems with
small district magnitudes facing a heterogenous electoral structure will facilitate
easier access to representation than will a homogenous one. In other words these
systems will o¤er space for a more fragmented political representation.
5.4.3 The Estimates of the National Proportional Threshold
- Internal and External Validity
To show how Tpro compares to the Teff of Lijphart and Tnat of Taagepera, all three
types of estimates for 22 systems used in one of the 21 countries in the period 1950-
2000 are presented in tables 5.1 and 5.2(Taagepera, 2002; Lijphart, 1994). Countries
using legal thresholds are not represented in the tables and the results for single
member district systems (plurality-majoritarian) and multi-member district systems
(proportional or mixed) are presented in separate tables. Unlike the Tpro, where the
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Country Vote Conc.
Tpro Tnat Teff V
eff
Australia (1951-98) 37.1 3.6 35 1.41
Canada (1953-97) 27.9 2.4 35 1.41
France (1958-97) 20 1.7 35 1.57
New Zealand (1951-93) 32 4.2 35 1.16
U.K. (1950-97) 31.2 1.5 35 1.24
United States (1950-98) 33.7 1.8 35 1.65
Single-Member-District Systems
Threshold Indicators
Table 5.1: The Threshold Estimates for Single-Member-District Systems
original formulas are used to calculate the values, the Tnat and Teff are estimated on
the basis of `short-cutformulas in which both formulaic structure and the number of
parties are disregarded. One should thus be aware that the only feature that causes
the variance across systems for these two types of scores is the district magnitude.
Furthermore the Teff for countries using plurality-majoritarian systems is not based
on calculation, but simply represents `guesstimatesassigned by Lijphart, since the
formula used was believed by him to yield unrealistically high scores (Lijphart, 1994).
Including the vote concentration and the number of parties in calculating the Tpro
solves this problem. In a nutshell, Lijpharts problem in using the number of parties
in plurality systems was essentially that including all running would for some coun-
tries deate the scores articially. Counting parties in proportion to the share of
districts they run in and using a national cut-o¤ point of 2 pct. solves this problem,
however. If a party presents candidates in almost all districts, it counts as one, but
if it only runs in half, it only counts as half. Parties running just in a mere fraction
of the districts are simply omitted. This is a logical consequence of the fact that
parties only a¤ect the threshold values in the districts where they are present and
collect some minimum of votes.
As can be seen from tables 5.1 presenting the single-member-district systems, the
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Country Vote Conc.
Tpro Tnat Teff V
eff
Austria (1953-66) 3.8 3 8.5 1.17
Austria (1970-90) 1 3.3 2.6 1.05
Belgium (1950-91) 2.5 0.8 4.8 1.6
Belgium (1995-99) 3.1 1.5 5.2 1.96
Denmark (1950) 5 0.8 5.5 1.1
Finland (1951-99) 4.7 1.3 5.4 1.3
France (1986) 5.6 1.1 11.7 1.15
Ireland (1951-97) 11.3 2.6 17.2 1.19
Italy (1953-92) 2.4 0.4 2 1.13
Italy (1994-96) 25.7 1.4 28.2 1.32
Japan (1952-93) 9.8 1.4 16.4 1.34
Norway (1953-81) 9.6 1.9 8.9 1.14
Portugal (1980-99) 6.6 1.3 5.7 1.18
Spain (1982-96) 9.14 1.4 10.2 1.23
Sweden (1952-68) 6.1 1.5 8.4 1.06
Switzerland (1951-99) 5.2 1.7 8.5 1.86
Multi-member District and Mixed Systems
Threshold Indicators
Table 5.2: The Threshold Estimates for Multi-Member-District and Mixed Systems
di¤erent threshold scores do di¤er signicantly22. Taageperas Tnat-scores stand out
as consistently lower and fall within a much narrower range than both the Tpro and
Teff scores. Furthermore the ranking of the countries is also signicantly di¤erent.
Both Tpro and Teff places the plurality-majoritarian systems as the ones with the
highest thresholds, but Tnat scores rank these very di¤erently. None of the countries
are assigned a threshold higher than Germany with its 5 pct. legal threshold and
the U.K. and majoritarian-system France have identical values to Switzerland and
Sweden before 1968. The range of calculated (excl. legal thresholds) values is from
0.4 to 4.2, while for the two other scores they vary from around 1 to 35-40. The Tnat
22* Signies that the value is a legal threshold. See appendix for explanation of calcula-
tion of scores for the individual countries.
Information on the electoral systems and number of parties was obtained from Caramani
(2000), Lijphart (1994) and Mackie and Rose (1990;1997). District level electoral results for
the countries of Western Europe is from Caramani (2000), Jack Vowels kindly provided les
on New Zealand, Australia was obtained from Adam Carrs Election Archive (www.adam-
carr.net) and Canada from the Library of the Canadian Parliament (www.parl.gc.ca).
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scores thus make the systems appear much more similar. The correlations found
between the Tnat and the two other thresholds reported above were also weak as
expected. For Tpro and the Tnat the Pearsons correlation coe¢ cient is 0.45 and for
Teff and Tnat it is 0.41.
Between the Teff and the Tpro the di¤erences are smaller. A strong bivariate cor-
relation is found between Tpro and Teff , where Pearsons correlation coe¢ cient is 0.95
for the scores reported above. Moreover one can see that the Tpro scores lend cred-
ibility to the 35 pct. arbitrarily assigned by Lijphart to the single-member district
systems, since it in many cases falls close to this value. The Tpro, however, di¤er-
entiates between the countries in this group. The value for single-member-district
France is only slightly higher than half of Australias. This pronounced di¤erence,
in spite of similar electoral rules, is explained by the higher number of parties as
well as by the relatively high Veff values for France. The data for calculating the
latter value are, however, imperfect and the di¤erence may be smaller in reality (see
Appendix C.2. for notes on the calculation).
It is clear that it matters which method is used to estimate the barrier, but
it remains to be evaluated against empirical evidence which are the more accurate
measures of the barrier. This question will be addressed in the following section.
Are the estimates accurate? - an `eyeballtest
The question is how to test the accuracy of the estimates. A simple, albeit somewhat
impressionistic method, is by visual representation. Producing proportionality pro-
les that show the relationship between the share of votes obtained and the advantage
ratio (%seats/%votes), gives us a method for evaluating whether the T-scores give
fair estimates of the size with which parties obtain proportional representation. Pro-
portionality Proles were in fact developed by Shugart and Taagepera to estimate
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the Break-Even point, which can be interpreted as the empirical counterpart of the
Tpro. The break-even point they suggested should be identied as the point where a
line drawn through the points of the proportionality prole crosses the perfect pro-
portionality line, that is where the advantage ratio = 1 (Shugart and Taagepera,
1989).
The proportionality proles of 5 plurality and 4 low magnitude PR-systems are
therefore presented below. These countries were selected (from the group presented
above) because the three types of T-scores generally di¤er more for them than for
other systems and/or since these have a longer history with stable electoral rules and
relatively stable vote concentrations allowing us to interpret the cases as a result of
the interaction of the two conditions. The Tnat scores are positioned on the x-axis
reecting its denition as measuring the point of entry, while the Tpro is put on the
perfect proportionality line as it seeks to identify where parties have even odds of
obtaining a share of seats proportional to their votes. Finally Teff scores are also
put on this line although its denition places it on the x-axis, its interpretation by
Lijphart resembles the Tpro as do the scores. For the PR-systems the observations fall
somewhat more densely and in the pattern of a line than they do for the plurality-
majoritarian systems, which makes it is easier for the former to evaluate how well
the calculated values capture the mechanics of the electoral systems.
Proportionality Proles for Proportional Electoral Systems As can be seen
from the proportionality proles, representing Norway (gure 5.10 page 210)and
Finland (gure 5.11 page 211), the Tnat score is much lower than the two others, and
also clearly closer to the point where parties are likely to win a seat. The Tpro and
Teff scores, on the other hand, appear to capture the point where parties typically
obtain proportional representation. There is no way of assessing which value is better
than the other since they fall very close and the points are scattered, obscuring the
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Figure 5.10: Proportionality Prole: Norway
Norway (1953-1981)
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point where a line would cross the perfect proportionality line. This suggests that it
is not necessary to take the vote concentration into account when we are calculating
thresholds for countries characterized by homogenous electorates. The di¤erence in
the calculated values is so small that it can safely be ignored. Using Taageperas
method for considering the vote concentration would in these cases take us further
from the truth rather than closer to it.
In order to assess whether the Tpro represents an improvement over the Teff
scores for countries with more heterogenous electorates, three countries, Ireland,
Switzerland and Japan where the scores obtained are very di¤erent, are presented in
gures 5.12, 5.13 and 5.1423.
First, in the case of Switzerland (gure 5.13, p. 213) the inclusion of the vote
23For both Switzerland and Ireland a few tiny parties obtaining very high advantage
ratios were removed to ensure a good graphical representation.
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Figure 5.11: Proportionality Prole: Finland
Finland (1951-1999)
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concentration leads to a lowering of the Tpro compared to the Teff , due to its het-
erogenous electorate24. And in comparing the two scores, the Tpro appears to give
a more accurate estimate than the Teff of where proportional results are typically
achieved. There are only few cases that do not receive seats proportional to their
votes with vote shares larger than the Tpro and those that do are only marginally
under-represented. In the case of Ireland (gure 5.12, p. 212), the Tpro also appears
to be more precise than the Teff 25. Finally for Japan (gure 5.14, p. 214), the same
can be said. As can be seen below the Tpro accurately shows what appears to be the
24This is also the case for Belgium, but since its Veff scores have almost doubled from
1.15 to 2.03 in the post-war period, and it had an electoral reform in the early 90s, it
is di¢ cult to produce a proportionality prole with su¢ cient cases where the parties run
under similar conditions.
25In the case of Ireland, the Tpro is lower than the Teff mainly, but not only, as a result
of considering the electoral structure (Veff ). Also important is that di¤erent district level
formulas were used. The Tpro is based on the Tx of STV-systems, but the Ti of Hare. The
Ti of STV equal 0, which reects a highly impropable situation.
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Figure 5.12: Proportionality Prole: Ireland
Ireland (1951-1997)
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real size of the barrier. All parties with low seat/vote-ratios are below the 10 percent
line and the few cases that have obtained a vote share above it, but failed to pass
the perfect proportionality line, have very high seat/vote-ratios of above 0.85.
But as can be seen from the table 5.1, for many systems with quite homogenous
electoral structures the di¤erence between the two types of scores is not very large.
Only when the electorates are more heterogenous, does it make a clear di¤erence and
the impact is potentially largest in single-member districts systems.
Proportionality Proles for Plurality Electoral Systems The proportional-
ity proles of the plurality electoral systems unfortunately do not yield as clear a
picture as those for proportional systems.
Again it can be observed that Tnat scores generally capture the typical entry
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Figure 5.13: Proportionality Prole: Switzerland
Switzerland (1951-1999)
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point, although in the case of France (gure 5.17 p. 216) , New Zealand (gure 5.15
p.214) and Australia (gures 5.19 p.217, and 5.20 p.218) cases of failed entry with
much higher vote shares can be observed as discussed earlier. It is also clear that
if we want to estimate the barrier small to medium sized parties face, the Tnat is
misleading. Comparing for example the proles of the U.K. (gure 5.16 p.215) and
Finland (gure 5.11 p. 211) that have practically the same Tnat score (1.3 and 1.4),
it is obvious that the identical scores do not give much information about the widely
diverging mechanics of inclusion and exclusion so evident in the diagrams.
The Tpro values for both countries above fall quite close to the Teff -guesstimates
and thus lend credibility to the values assigned by Lijphart. Looking at the proles
above, however, it is impossible to see whether precision is gained from the theoretical
calculation.
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Figure 5.14: Proportionality Prole: Japan
Japan (1952-1993)
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Figure 5.15: Proportionality Prole: New Zealand
New Zealand (1951-1993)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Party Size (%votes)
%
se
at
s/
%
vo
te
s
Tnat
x
Tpro x
Teff
x
214
Chapter 5. The Representation Barrier
Figure 5.16: Proportionality Prole: United Kingdom
United Kingdom (1950-1997)
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Among the single-member-district systems analyzed here, France and Canada
have the most geographically heterogenous electorates. In the case of Canada (gure
5.18 p. 216)there has been an increase in vote concentration in the period examined
(with the success of the Quebec party in early 90s), while it has decreased gradually
in the French case (gure 5.17 p.216). It should be noted, however, that the electoral
data available to calculate the Veff for France was far from perfect (see Appendix
C.2.). The conditions underlying the scores have therefore not been completely
stable. It is, however, interesting to have a closer look at how the Tpro scores represent
the cases here since they di¤er more from the Teff . For France, taking the vote
concentration into account clearly helps give a better estimate of the electoral barrier.
Compared to the Teff , it lies much more in the centre of where the cases fall around
the perfect proportionality line. For Canada, it is more di¢ cult to evaluate which of
the two Threshold estimates is the more accurate. It is also abundantly clear that
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Figure 5.17: Proportionality Prole: France
France (1958-1997)
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Figure 5.18: Proportionality Prole: Canada
Canada (1953-1997)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Party Size (% Votes)
%
se
at
s/
%
vo
te
s
x
Tnat
x
Teff
x
Tpro
216
Chapter 5. The Representation Barrier
the Tpro in the plots does not predict where the cases fall with any great accuracy.
In France, particularly parties obtaining vote shares close to the Tpro have received
both very low and very high advantage ratios. As mentioned earlier, the Threshold
in these types of systems can only seek to capture an average value.
Figure 5.19: Proportionality Prole: Australia
Australia (1951-1998)
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Finally, for Australia two plots were produced; One where the Country and Lib-
eral Parties are regarded as separate (gure 5.19 p.216) and one where they are re-
garded as one (gure 5.20 p.218). Since the parties hardly compete electorally (rarely
present candidates in the same districts) nor in the parliamentary-governmental
arena (they follow each other in government and opposition), there are good rea-
sons for seeing it as one party when analyzing the impact of electoral rules on party
competition. The score of 37.1 is therefore the one most suited to capture the barrier
for Australia. The plots illustrates that the Tpro is lower when the two parties are
regarded as separate, but the lack of parties obtaining 10-30 percent of the votes,
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Figure 5.20: Proportionality Prole: Australia Corrected
Australia (1951-1998)
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makes it di¢ cult to see whether the scores represent good estimates. A further
analysis of the single-member-districts is therefore presented below.
The accuracy of scores for Plurality systems: A Statistical Test Amethod
for circumventing the visual-methodand retain an empirically based evaluation of
the accuracy of the T-values, would be to apply a logistic regression model. Creating
a dichotomous dependent variable, so that all parties being proportionally or over-
represented in the process of seat allocation (advantage ratio 1) fall into the one
category (category P+) and all the under-represented (advantage ratio <1) into
another (category P-). The point where there is a 50/50 chance of falling into one
or the other categories would give us the empirical equivalent of the Tpro. Logistic
regression models exactly seek to predict the probabilities of certain outcomes on the
basis of variation in the independent variable(s).
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Country Australia Canada France N.Z. U.K.
Log.Reg.Estimate 29 (41.9*) 26.3 17.9 36.6 8.2(32.8#)
Tpro 32.1(37.1*) 27.3 20 32 31.2
Tpro-ign. 25.2 25.1 25 25 25
Table 5.3: Logistic Regression Estimates of the Proportional Threshold
In addition to the average Tpro for the period 1950-2000, a row with Tpro ign-
scores made under the assumption of ignorance of the real value of the vote concen-
tration is also included. The method proposed by Taagepera is followed only that the
mean between the Ti and Tx is used (Tpro ign=

Ti
Des
+ Tx

=2). Since it is somewhat
cumbersome to calculate the vote concentration, it would be useful to know whether
much is gained by this in terms of precision. The Logistic Regression scores reect
the size, calculated on the basis of the coe¢ cients reported in the model, at which
there is a 50-50 chance of being in the P+ or P- category26.
* The scores in brackets cover the situation where the Liberal and the Country
party are regarded as one party. Since the two parties neither compete in the electoral
arena (they do not eld candidates in the same districts) nor in the parliamentary-
governmental arena (they are always in government or opposition together), there
are good grounds for seeing them as one when analyzing the impact of electoral rules
on party competition.
# The U.K. contains a very high number of very small regional parties that
26For all countries the constant and the b-coe¢ cient used to predict the threshold are
signicant at the 1 pct. level, except for Australia were it is at the 5 pct. Level. In terms
of how much the models explain, the Nagelkerke R squares vary from a high 71,9 pct for
Australia-2, to a low 33,5 in UK and 33,5 in France. It is quite clear that larger number of
unexplained cases is related to the impact of the high vote concentration of smaller parties
that give then a higher advantage ratio than the model would predict. Examining the
residuals, however, also reveals that larger parties whose advantage ratio fall just below 1
has the same e¤ect on the model t  there are, however, much fewer such cases in the
countries examined here.
219
Chapter 5. The Representation Barrier
succeed in obtaining a seat share higher than their vote share. Since the logistics
estimate of party size was only 8,2 compared to the theoretical estimate of 31.2 pct,
the model was applied again excluding all parties obtaining less than 2 pct of the
national vote and the score is written in brackets.
As can be seen from the table 5.3, the Tpro scores closely follow the values pre-
dicted by the regression model and are mostly closer than Tpro ign. The only ex-
ception to a good t was the United Kingdom, where the regression model estimate
was much lower than the expected. Suspecting that the high incidence of very small
parties with high vote concentrations and advantage ratios above 1 could be the
reason for this, a second regression was run where all parties obtaining less than 2
pct of the vote were excluded. As a result of excluding the very small parties the
value predicted by the model came much closer to the theoretical estimate. While
France and Canada both have many parties with higher vote concentrations than the
systemic value that achieve high advantage ratios, several of these are medium sized
and they thus lower the calculated Tpro values as well as the regression estimates
resulting in more congruent gures. In the U.K. a large number of parties with high
advantage ratios are tiny and therefore have no e¤ect on the calculated Tpro, while
they strongly inuence the logistics regression estimates.
The accuracy of the scores by considering the move to the national level and
including the vote concentration has therefore been distinctly improved. Where the
other indicators are constant across the di¤erent systems, the Tpro values vary with
the national context and they are therefore better indicators of how a particular
system imposes constraints within a particular context. The congruence between
the logistic regression estimates and the Tpro values conrms that the electoral vote
concentration matters to the representational conditions for parties.
The very encouraging results with respect to obtaining estimates close to the
calculated values should, however, be interpreted with some care. Firstly, in con-
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structing the dependent variable, variation is lost. The model does not distinguish
between advantage ratios of 0 and of 0.99, and this di¤erence is very important for
evaluating the impact of electoral systems. To investigate the importance of keeping
this variation, a linear regression model was applied now using the Advantage-ratio
(=%seats/%votes) as the dependent variable. The point of intersect with the perfect
proportionality line (A=1) was calculated yielding scores within a very close range
from those obtained by logistic regression27. These scores of course do not represent
probabilities as do the values predicted on the basis of the logistics regression model.
Only in the case of the U.K. is the di¤erence between the two types of scores palpa-
ble; the regression line changes only little, the parties below 2 pct. are excluded and
the linear regression model is thus less sensitive to the presence of the many small
parties with high advantage ratios, but the adj. R2 is almost doubled from 29,9 to
57,8 pct when the small parties are removed. The explained variance as expressed
by the adj. R2 follows the same pattern as Nagelkerk R2of the logistics model. It
varies from a high 92,2 for Australia to a low 35 pct. in France. Secondly, it is clear
just from simply seeing the scatterplots that there are problems of heteroscedasticity
and the statistical readings based on this data set must be taken with a grain of salt.
The latter is clearly due to the di¤erent vote concentration of the parties causing
much larger variation in advantage ratio scores towards the lower end of the size
range. Entering Veff scores for the parties into the model would hardly do much
good, however, since the e¤ect of vote concentration is far from linear as discussed
above. Size, on the other hand, can be expected to have an e¤ect on the advantage
ratio that is linear. In other words, it is a set of data which is di¢ cult to analyze
with statistical techniques.
27The following values for x (party size) were predicted for the intersect with the perfect
proportionality line: Australia (41,44 ), Canada (31,7), France (19,75), New Zealand (36,6),
UK (37,18) and UK-2 (38,8).
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External Validity: The Reductive E¤ects of the Electoral Threshold
The nal test of what indicator to prefer relates to the question of external valid-
ity of the indicator proposed. If the analysis presented above is correct, then the
Threshold of Proportionality should fare better than other indicators of the electoral
barrier in explaining the number of parties. The reductive strength of the electoral
barrier on the party system is undoubtedly one of its most commonly accepted ef-
fects. In the tests four di¤erent measures of party numbers are included. First,
a simple number of parties competing at elections with a lower cut-o¤ point of 2
pct. to avoid that a larger number of tiny parties may unduly inuence the results.
Secondly, the same number, but weighted according the district coverage (dwas
explained earlier). Finally, the e¤ective numbers of elective (based on vote shares)
and parliamentary parties (based on seat shares) are also included. Both parametric
and non-parametric methods are used to analyze the relationships. The rst analysis
(OLS regression) seeks to test the hypothesized relationship with the following model
where the Representation Barrier is represented by one of the three indicators (Tpro,
Teff or Tnat):
The Number of Parties = 0 + representation+"
From the regression analysis presented in table 5.16, it can be observed that the
Tpro consistently performs better than the Teff and the Tnat in explaining variation in
the number of parties. The adjusted R2 reported for the Threshold of Proportionality
are consistently higher than those of the E¤ective Threshold across all four types of
party numbers. The di¤erence between the two is, however, much smaller than that
between the E¤ective Threshold and the Nationwide Threshold. The latter measure
explains very little of the variation observed, and thus cannot be taken as a reliable
measure of the reductive power of the electoral system.
What might, at rst sight, appear somewhat surprising is that the indicators
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Regressor:  Indicators of the
Representation Barrier Effective Effective
Elective Parliament.
Proportional β-coeff.stand. -0.63** -0.67** -0.52** -0.52**
Threshold β-coefficient (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.58) (-0.54)
Constant  6.9**  6.1**  4.6**  4.0**
R2(adj) 0.40** 0.44** 0.27** 0.26**
Effective β-coeff.stand. -0.57** -0.65** -0.45** -0.49**
Threshold β-coefficient (-0.94) (-0.93) (-0.49) (-0.51)
Constant  6.9**  6.2**  4.6**  4.1**
R2(adj) 0.32** 0.42** 0.20** 0.25**
Nationwide β-coeff.stand. -0.11 -0.23** -0.35** -0.28**
Threshold R
2(adj) 0.8 5.1** 11.9** 7.7**
N=301
**p<0.01; *p<0.05
OLS Regression
Dependent Varibable: Number of Parties
>2pct >2pct(dw)
Table 5.4: The Impact of the Threshold(s) on the Number of Parties
better explain variation in the pure number of parties than the e¤ective number of
parties. The latter takes into account the di¤erences in party vote shares (elective) or
party seat shares (parliamentary) and we might have expected the higher thresholds
to not only reduce the number of parties, but also have the e¤ect of consistently
rewarding larger parties with more seats and votes and thus lead to smaller numbers
of e¤ective parties. Also the lack of stronger coe¢ cients and variance explained
in the case of e¤ective parliamentary parties compared to e¤ective elective parties
is surprising. In Lijpharts study of Electoral Systems and Party Systems, a clear
di¤erence, in both explained variance and strength of the coe¢ cients, was found
between the two. The e¤ective number of parliamentary parties being much better
accounted for than the number of elective parties (with a coe¢ cient of almost double
(0.34/0.55) and the adjusted R2 being more than triple (8 versus 28 pct.) (Lijphart,
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Indicators of the
Representation Barrier Effective Effective
Elective Parliament.
Proportional Kendalls tau -0.54 -0.60 -0.46 -0.49
Threshold Spearmans rho -0.69 -0.77 -0.63 -0.68
Effective Kendalls tau -0.48 -0.57 -0.38 -0.45
Threshold Spearmans rho -0.61 -0.72 -0.53 -0.62
Nationwide Kendalls tau -0.18 -0.11 -0.24 -0.17
Threshold Spearmans rho -0.25 -0.15 -0.36 -0.26
N=301
Number of Parties
>2pct >2pct.(dw)
All p<0.01
Non-Parametric Correlation
Table 5.5: Correlation of the Threshold Indicators and the Number of Parties
1994: 107-111). The intercepts give away at least part of the solution to these two
`mysteries. The regression models thus set the intercepts much lower for both the
e¤ective numbers of parties than for the regular number of parties, and again the
intercept for the number of e¤ective parliamentary parties is set a lower than for
the elective parties. There is, as mentioned, very large variation in the numbers of
parties at the lower end of the thresholds, which furthermore decreases strongly with
increased values of the threshold (violating the assumption of heteroscedasticity),
and where the model sets the intercepts is therefore somewhat fortuitous. It does
not make sense to trust the result that, at a zero-threshold value, the di¤erence
between e¤ective number of parliamentary parties and elective parties would be 0.6.
Logically, there should of course be no di¤erence between the two. However, the
other part of the solution is naturally, that the concentration of votes on parties
depends on many factors other than the electoral system.
The non-parametric measures of association presented in table 5.5 conrm that
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the Tpro is consistently more strongly associated with the number of parties than the
other two. The Kendalls tau indicates a strong 60 pct reduction in error in predicting
the rank of the number of parties with over 2 pct votes shares and district weighted,
while the other dependent variables are slightly less well predicted (around 50 pct
reduction in error). The Spearmans rho also shows strong association between the
Tpro and the number of parties and again consistently stronger than the Teff . The
associations observed for the Tnat are all weak, but signicant.
5.5 The Representation Barrier and the Number
of New Parties
The question is whether the representation barrier has any e¤ects on the entry of new
parties. The possible e¤ects of the registration barrier were tested on the number of
parties participating, while the recognition barrier was tested for e¤ects on the vote
shares of the new parties. We would of course expect the representation barrier to
have the clearest e¤ect on the actual representation of new parties in parliaments, but
it is possible that it also deters new parties from participating, due to slim chances of
succeeding, as well as voters from voting for them for similar reasons. As Duverger
argued electoral systems have mechanical as well as psychological e¤ects (Duverger,
1972). Previous studies have, however, produced equivocal results in support of these
hypotheses. Harmel and Robertson found a signicant e¤ect of the electoral system
on the number of new parties participating, but in the wrong direction. That is, more
parties are seen to form under plurality than PR systems. This is also found by Hug
and Willey, who, as barrier measures, use the Thresholds of inclusion and exclusion,
and both the E¤ective Magnitude (Hug, 2001; Willey, 1998)28. However, all nd
28In the multivariate analysis were all determinants of new party formation are entered,
Hug reports that the threshold of representation considarably decreases the number of
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that if electoral success of new parties is taken into account, the prediction that
electoral systems will inhibit new parties are supported (Harmel&Robertson, 1985;
Willey, 1998). On basis of his results, which identify positive e¤ects of higher district
magnitudes on both the share of votes obtained by new parties and the share of seats
they obtain, and Willey therefore concludes that his ndings provide strong evidence
that the stability of a party system is a function of district magnitude(Willey, 1998:
667). It should be noted, however, that in Willeys analysis the coe¢ cients found
are signicant, but they are also extremely low (0.0004 for vote shares, 0.004 for seat
shares), so that changes in the e¤ective magnitude appears to have little more than
a marginal impact29.
In the following, the e¤ects of the electoral system will be tested on the number of
new parties represented, as well as the numbers having electoral success and simply
participating, starting with the representation of new parties since it is here that
we can expect to see the strongest e¤ects. The relationship between the variables is
examined using the decades as cases as was done for the registration and recognition
barrier analyses. The cases - 5 in all - where there have been major changes in
the Threshold of Proportionality in the middle of a decade are omitted from the
analysis since the averages would thus be strongly misleading 30. Again, for reasons
earlier stated both parametric and non-parametric methods are used to analyze the
relationship (see Chapter 2.4). The rst model used to test the hypothesis can be
stated as follows: The Number of New Parties = 0 + representation+"
parties, while the threshold of exclusion achieves the opposite(Hug, 2001:120). However,
since majoritarian electoral systems have both very low Ti and very high Tx, this nding
points to a positive e¤ect of higher barriers on new party formation - contrary to expecta-
tions. The contradictory nding, however, clearly illustrates that the Tiand Tx cannot be
used as measures of the same phenomenon.
29Robertson and Harmel do not report on the strength of the relationships, only on
signicance and direction.
30These include: Italy, Japan and New Zealand in 1990s and France in 1950s and 1980s.
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Representation Barrier Seat Winning Vote Winning Particip. Decade Maximum
>1pct. >4.pct >1pct >4pct >0.5 dis. >1pct >0.5  dis.
Threshold of Proportionality -0.46** -0.32** -0.29** -0.19 -0.33** -0.24* -0.38**
(-0.04) (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.00) (-0.02) (-0.03)
Constant 1.41** 0.76** 1.81** 0.79** 0.20** 1.26** 1.29**
R2(adj) 0.20** 0.09** 0.07** 0.03 0.10** 0.05* 0.14**
N=91
OLS Regression
Regressor  Dependent Variable: Number of New Parties
** p<0.01; * p<0.05 (two-tailed) - Standardized coefficients reported, Unstandardized in ( )
Table 5.6: The Impact of the Representation Barrier (Tpro) on the Number of New
Parties
The results of the regression analysis are summarized in table 5.6. As can be
seen the Representation Barrier has a clear and signicant reductive e¤ect on the
number of new parties. As might be expected (due to the direct mechanical e¤ects
of the electoral system) the number of new seat winners are best explained. As much
as 20 pct of the variance is explained in the case of the category of parties winning
at least 1 pct of the seats, while only about half of that is accounted for in the
case of the more successful seat winning parties. For the number of vote winning
parties, the Threshold does not seem to have much of an impact. Only 3-7 pct of the
variance is explained implying that voters are not much deterred by the prospects of
wastingvotes on parties that do not gain access to parliament. For both categories,
the barrier is most successful in preventing the entry of the less successful parties.
It appears to be a pattern (also seen in the recognition barrier analyses) that the
number of parties that pass the 4 pct. threshold are less well explained by the
barriers. The prediction of the number of participating is relatively high. Especially
the decade maximum of parties running in at least half of the electoral districts is
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Threshold of Proportionality Seat Winning Vote Winning Particip. Decade Maximum
>1pct. >4.pct >1pct >4pct >0.5 dis. >1pct >0.5  dis.
Kendalls tau -0.40** -0.29** -0.26** -0.15 -0.33** -0.24** -0.36**
Spearmans rho -0.51** -0.36** -0.33** -0.18 -0.44** -0.31** -0.45**
N=91
** p<0.01;* p<0.05 (two-tailed)
Representation Barrier  Number of New Parties
Non-Parametric Correlation
Table 5.7: The Correlation of the Representation Barrier (Tpro) and the Number of
New Parties
well explained with a high coe¢ cient of -0.38 and 14 pct of the variance accounted
for. This might imply that those who start parties are more readily inuenced by
the prospects of sucess than voters are.
As can be seen in table 5.7, the non-parametric measures of association reveal the
same pattern. The representation barrier consistently reduced the number of parties
winning seats, votes and simply participating. The same di¤erences in explanatory
strength as those observed in the regression analysis apply here. Futher all except the
category of 4 pct vote winners pass the tests of signicance in this model implying
that the ndings are robust.
In order to get an clearer overview of the e¤ects of the threshold on the number
of new parties of the di¤erent types, four ordinal categories of the Proportional
Threshold were created31 and the summary means of new parties corresponding to
each of these are presented in table 5.8 (p.230).
There is a clear tendency for lower mean values in the categories corresponding
to higher values of the threshold. The only exception to the pattern is found between
31The ordinal categories are not of equal size, since the number of cases would be very
small for the higher threshold values.
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the 2nd and 3rd categories for the number of parties obtaining over 1 pct of the votes.
Otherwise the trend is consistent across all categories. This is, of course, partly a
result of how the ordinal categories where constructed. Smaller categories at higher
ends of the threshold would have produced higher means in some of these, due to the
inuence of the cases discussed above. However, the di¤erences are clear between
the category containing the lowest threshold values and that containing the highest.
The reduction in mean values from the lowest to the highest categories is strong,
ranging from around 40 to 70 pct., across all but one of the new party measures.
The mean values of the number of parties obtaining over 4 pct of the vote shares
vary very little across the threshold categories and furthermore the di¤erences in this
category are the least robust of all, as was also the case for the regression analysis32.
In the higher threshold systems, there are fewer (about half) of these that actually
obtain representation above the 4 pct level, so the electoral barrier protects the
parliamentary arena from the intrusion of newcomers. The lower threshold systems
almost replicate the numbers of successful parties in the electoral arena to the
successful on the parliamentary arena. Since it is the group of parties obtaining
over 4 pct of the votes that we expect to actually constitute a threat to the party
system, the lack of deterrence is a noteworthy nding. Moreover, it is not caused by
a few deviant cases33. It is evident that while lower threshold systems have a much
higher number of new parties taking smaller vote shares, there is little di¤erence with
respect to the number of parties cutting deeper into the vote share.
It would then appear that high threshold systems are successful in deterring both
participation and preventing representation of small parties but plays a marginal role
when it comes to deterring electoral support of parties that either command more
32The Anova test of di¤erence of means reports a signicance of 0.48, and the Kruskal-
Wallis at 0.81.
33Removing the cases, where major changes in the electoral systems and party system
occurred, such as Italy, Japan and New Zealand in the 90s, only raises the adj. R2 to 3.2
pct.
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IndependentVariable:
Threshold of Seat Winning Vote Winning Participate Maximum Number
>1pct. >4.pct >1pct >4pct >0.5 dis. >1pct >0.5  dis.
0-3.9 Mean 1.68 0.82 2.00 0.82 0.22 1.36 1.59
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Std. Dev. 1.21 0.91 1.35 0.91 0.13 0.79 0.96
4-7.9 Mean 0.89 0.52 1.44 0.63 0.14 1.07 0.89
N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Std. Dev. 0.93 0.70 0.97 0.69 0.15 0.83 0.80
8-19.9 Mean 1.00 0.59 1.53 0.71 0.19 1.00 0.88
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Std. Dev. 0.94 0.80 1.55 0.77 0.26 1.00 0.70
>20 Mean 0.24 0.20 0.92 0.48 0.06 0.80 0.52
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Std. Dev. 0.60 0.58 0.91 0.65 0.07 0.82 0.59
Total Mean 0.92 0.52 1.45 0.65 0.15 1.05 0.96
N 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
Std. Dev. 1.06 0.77 1.22 0.75 0.16 0.86 0.86
ANOVA ** * * ** **
Kruskal-Wallis ** * * ** **
**p< 0.01; *p< 0.05 (two-tailed)
Proportionality
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Table 5.8: The Representation Barrier Ordinal and the Number of New Parties
resources and/or respond to a more substantial electoral demand.
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The Accessibility Barrier
However important the role played by electoral systems may be, they only tell us part
of the story. As impersonal gatekeepers of the representative institutions, electoral
rules determine how much electoral support is needed to win representation. Never-
theless, like the barriers to registration and recognition, the representation barrier is
silent on how easily support can be won. In their quest for seats, parties must break
through multiple barriers, the least visible of these being in the minds of people. As
discussed earlier, the incentive to compete for votes depends on the extent to which
more votes can actually be won. The nal question pertaining to barriers to entry
is therefore whether voters are willing to consider new alternatives, or are so en-
trenched in xed patterns of partisan loyalties that new parties have little chance of
appealing to them. How open voters are to change their partisan preferences denes
how much is at stake at elections, and alludes to the facility with which party for-
tunes may change. The nature of the competitive incentives furnished by elections
therefore depends on the extent and character of electoral availability. However,
electoral availability should be seen in conjunction with the electoral system rather
than independently, as already discussed. The extent of available voters may have
widely di¤ering consequences for the openness of the parliamentary arenas, and thus
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the nature of the pressure represented parties are under, depending on the electoral
rules in place.
This `humanbarrier is, however, of a di¤erent order than the institutional bar-
riers discussed in the preceding chapters. The institutional barriers can protect the
political incumbents from competitive threats even in the presence of electoral dissat-
isfaction and demand for alternatives. The registration barrier directly inuences the
o¤er, the recognition barrier a¤ects the awareness of the o¤er and the representation
barrier can block demands expressed from being represented in the political institu-
tions. Electoral availability is, however, intrinsically linked to demands. Whether it is
`legitimateto conceive of voter behaviour as a form of barrier consequently depends
on the theoretical perspective taken. Adopting a rational choice approach implies
assuming that voters everywhere unfailingly go for the party o¤ering the `packageof
policies and behaviours, which come closest to their preferences, as discussed above.
Inserting the notion that voters may be more or less resistant to change is alien to
the theory - at least in its simple form (Downs, 1957). However, there are other the-
oretical perspectives that introduce the idea that electorates di¤er with respect to
their willingness to change, depending on bonds of a less rational nature (Campbell
et al., 1960). A large body of empirical evidence has been amassed in support of
the idea that voters - and national electorates - di¤er in the extent to which they
identify with particular parties, and therefore also with respect to how easily they
can be persuaded to change their vote (e.g. Goren, 2005; Blais et. al., 2001; Clark
& Steward 1998; Sinnot, 1998; Schickler & Green, 1997). Voters in this conception
do not simply support the party which in terms of promises and behaviours matches
their policy preferences most closely. Instead they may have emotional ties to cer-
tain parties, with which they personally identify, and the act of voting expresses this,
rather than a dispassionate weighing of pros and cons in the policy packages o¤ered.
Probably no one would claim that the bonds of loyalty or identication cannot be
broken by any kind of `deviantparty behaviour, but highly loyal voters are likely to
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give parties more leeway to stray from their preferences, than would those who are
less attached. The consequences of such loyalty need not solely be to invite slack,
however. As Hirshman discusses in his `Exit, Voice and Loyalty, the shelter pro-
vided to suppliers by a market where a signicant share of the consumers stay with
a particular product in spite of some degree of deterioration or emergence of better
alternatives allows the producers to learn and improve their performance. Swift and
decisive consumer reactions to the o¤er would instead force poorly performing sup-
pliers out and by removing the chance to improve, negative long-term consequences
for the o¤er might be the consequence (Hirshman, 1970). While it can be argued
that electoral availability should be considered as a dimension of contestability and
that considering it is necessary for an investigation of whether established parties
operate under a real threat from outside the parliament, it should be recognized that
using it may not t all research agendas1.
In the following, the two sets of questions will be addressed. Concerning electoral
availability, it will rst be discussed how it can be measured, then observable dif-
ferences between countries and over time will be described and nally the extent to
which it predicts new party success at the polls will be examined. After this, it will
be considered how availability interacts with the representation barrier, and how the
two factors combined can provide an indicator of the openness of the political arena
which will be dubbed the Accessibility barrier. Finally, it will be tested how well it
predicts the number of new parties obtaining representation.
1Strøm, for instance, includes volatility as dimension of competition to explain gov-
ernment responsiveness and nds a positive relationship (Strøm, 1989b). Higher volatility
leads to a more e¢ ciently managed economy, appears to be the conclusion of Strøms study.
It begs the question, however, of what exactly causes the volatility observed. At the level
of individual decision-making, if higher average volatility understood as the presence of
voters that are less identied and more sensitive to the performance of political parties,
it makes sense to expect it to induce higher responsiveness from parties. But if volatil-
ity is caused by dissatisfaction of voters with their political leadership, and low volatility
expresses satisfaction, it would seem contradictory to link it to superior performance.
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6.1 Measuring Electoral Availability
Electoral availability is easier to dene theoretically than to measure empirically. To
assess the extent of such availability one of the following two routes can be taken;
the rst consists in an attempt to unravel the mechanisms behind the individual
voters decisions by enquiring into the nature of the considerations that underlie
their choices. By means of surveys, voters can be invited to disclose their thoughts
and feelings about the political parties and the act of voting, as well as report on
actions in the past and intentions for the future. The purpose is to nd out whether -
and to what extent - the actual doings and sayings of parties and other actors play a
role in determining how the votes are cast or whether this basic choice is determined
more by a stable a¢ nity for a particular party linked to social identity. The stronger
votersidentication with existing parties is, the less available they would be to be
won over to new ones. Ideally this would give us a solid measure of the share of
the electorate that would be likely to `swingin response to changes in the perceived
performance of parties, however in practice, the exercise is fraught with di¢ culties
(see e.g. Bruden & Klofstad, 2005; Blais et al, 2001; Bartle, 2003; Sinnot, 1998).
The second approach is simply to infer from their actual behaviour at elections to
how attached they appear to be to particular parties. The simple proposition being
that the more voters change from one election to the next, the more available they
are. For the purposes of this research, there is no other option than to rely on this
method. Survey data on voter attitudes are simply not available for all the countries
included here and covering the whole period under investigation. Data on electoral
behaviour is, on the other hand, readily available and can be used instead2. As will
be discussed further below, using actual vote shifts as a proxy for available voters is
2As Bartels writes, Lacking direct measures of party identication from contemporary
surveys in most other liberal democracies or earlier periods of our own, it seems reasonable
to look for evidence of party loyalties in the continuity of partisan voting patterns over
time(Bartels, 1998:280).
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not without its problems.
The rst important issue is whether information on the net changes can be used
as an indicator of individual voting shifts. This is important since only the latter
gure would express the real extent of availability in the electorate. The problem
is twofold as discussed by Bartolini and Mair (1990). On the one hand, there may
be more individuals changing votes than the aggregate net results reveal. In the-
ory, zero aggregate volatility is compatible with very high levels of individual vote
changes as long as these cancel each other out perfectly. On the other hand, not all
recorded volatility results from voters changing from one party to the other. New
voters enter and old ones exit. Nevertheless, on the basis of a comparison of survey
data on individual shifts and observed volatility for the countries and periods where
such is available, as well as a theoretical modelling involving comparison of number of
possible combinations of individual and aggregate volatility, Bartolini and Mair con-
clude that aggregate volatility is a decent indicator of individual level vote changes
(Bartolini & Mair, 1990: 34). However, even if the two are not highly correlated, it
could also be argued that for the parties competing, the most important factor is the
net changes, not the individual ones. When voters move in opposite directions this
may be because they are responding to di¤erent cues or alternatively, responding
di¤erently to the same cues. Whatever the situation, however, the interesting bit for
parties competing is the net share that moves in the same direction, since it is this
net change (the percentage of the total valid votes) that inuences the distribution
of seats.
As a measure of the systemic volatility, the most common is the Total Volatility
(Vtot), also referred to as the Pedersen index3. It is simply the sum of the changes in
3While this is the most commonly used measure of volatility, it is not the only one
possible. As Grofman and Taagepera demonstrate, a number of formulaic expressions can
be applied to the deviations occurring in vote shares obtained by parties from one election
to another, just as they are applied to deviations occurring between partiesvote shares
and seats shares for disproportionality indices (Taagepera & Grofman, 2004). None of the
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individual parties vote shares from one election to the next, divided by two to give
it a logical upper boundary of 100 and avoid counting each shift twice. Its formulaic
expression is:
Vtot =
X
jPivj
2
The formula can be applied to electoral data in di¤erent ways, however. It was
decided here to `control forvolatility caused by party mergers, but only for `splits
when the party of origin ceases to run. The total volatility is intended as an indicator
of the general propensity for electors to change their vote from one party to another,
and it can be argued that when the original alternatives cease to exist, it forces voters
to change their votes rather than reects their own choice4. Taking such changes
into account would therefore undermine its validity5. Name changes of parties were
ignored for the same reasons. Finally, the `other partiescategory was included as a
party in the calculations, but as the vote percentages in this category are typically
small, it contributes only little to the average scores.
other indices have any obvious advantages over the Pedersen index for the purposes here,
however.
4In their calculations, Bartolini and Mair control for all party splits to the extent possible
(in some cases it is di¢ cult to ascertain as they discuss) (Bartolini & Mair, 1989: 311).
However, whether the formateurs of a new party have a basis in a pre-existing one or not
should not be a dening criteria in my view. If voters stand identied with existing parties,
we would expect them to regard elite defectionfrom such parties with a certain measure
of scepticism. There is therefore no compelling reason for controlling for this in my view.
Naturally, there are cases, where the split is so major that one can argue that the identity
of the original party is altered.This is di¢ cult to estimate precisely, however. Therefore,
if the orginal party keeps running under the same name as before, it is here assumed that
voters attached to the party have the option to remain loyal. If it ceases to exist, however,
this is taken into account (i.e. the vote shares of the split parties are related to the total
vote share of the now abolished motherparty)
5Information on party splits and mergers were based on Caramani (2001), Hug (2001),
Mackie and Rose (1991,1997) and EJPR Political Data Year Books.
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The validity of total volatility as an indicator of electoral availability is, however,
more likely to be threatened by other issues than the technical points discussed
above. The fundamental question for this validity is whether actual behaviour is a
good proxy for potential behaviour. First, we can ask whether it is reasonable to
interpret observed vote changes as evidence that voters are not attached to parties by
organisational or psycho-social bonds, but freely consider voting for any party o¤ering
the best `deal. A voter who does change may be hard pushed by circumstances
to do so, just as a voter who sticks with the same party may not be particularly
loyal. However, while it is di¢ cult to speak with certainty about what prompts the
individual act, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the repetition of a certain act
gives us a clue about its causes. It can be argued that consistently high levels of
volatility in a country does give us a clear indication that a substantial share of
voters do not feel tied to particular parties. The notion that voters could repeatedly
defect, but still maintain very high loyalty thresholds, is not very realistic, however.
Even if we could admit the possibility that the parties in question would continue
to perform poorly, then for the simple reason that being `hard pushedon a regular
basis would probably undermine even the most ardent believers loyalty. Likewise, it
might be argued that it is not very realistic that voters constantly remain with the
same parties without having some sort of a¢ nity for them. However, this situation
is not comparable to the former, since switching to a di¤erent party depends not
only on willingness to do so, but also on having the possibility. And this leads to the
second question, namely how observed volatility is related to the context of choice,
distinct from the basis which informs the choice. As Bartolini and Mair discuss,
a number of institutional as well as ideological factors play a role for the choice
voters are presented with (Bartolini & Mair, 1990). The number of parties, and
the ideological distance between them, clearly inuences the options voters have. In
simple terms, a voter with left-wing political preferences might nd changing from a
social democratic to socialist party an option, but if the only alternative to the social
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Context Free Bound
High Choice HV LV
Low Choice LV LV
Voter Attributes
Table 6.1: VotersInclination, Choice and Total Volatility
democrats is a market-liberal party, there is not real possibility for defection. It can
therefore be argued that when we interpret observed volatility as an expression of
availability, we face the problem that the willingness to consider voting for another
party is not directly reected in volatility. The problem is schematically illustrated
in table 6.1.
As argued above, consistently high levels of volatility can safely be interpreted as
an expression of an available electorate. However, low volatility may be explained
equally well by a lack of choice, as by a bound - or unavailable - electorate. The intro-
duction of a new party may therefore provide a hitherto low volatility electorate with
the occasion to change behaviour. There is, as far as I can see, no way of solving this
dilemma and using total volatility as a measure of availability is therefore necessarily
imperfect. Finally, the total volatility registered at elections, as will be seen below,
is often not either stably high or low across elections, but can uctuate greatly. Sin-
gle elections with high volatility - perhaps caused by single events and crises - may
therefore make even stable identied electorates appear more volatile than they are
when averages are taken. These facts naturally circumscribe the explanatory power
of volatility as an indicator of electoral availability.
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6.2 Aggregate Volatilty: Levels and trends
As can be seen from the calculated volatility values in table 6.2, the levels of volatility
vary considerably across countries as well as time periods. The volatility for the US
(House of Representatives elections) stands out not only by being particularly low
- only 3.1 pct for the whole period on average - but also by being one of the few
cases where the electorate is actually more stable in the 1990s than the average of the
whole period. The relative stability of the American electorate does not appear to be
limited to the House elections considered here. Bartels examines data on electoral
behaviour for presidential elections over more than a century and concludes that
`the unusual political turmoil of the 1960s and 70s has given way to a period of
partisan stability and predictability unmatched since the end of the 19th century
(Bartels, 1998: 297)6. However, the `unusual turmoil he refers to is not evident
in the data on House elections presented here, where the 1960s and 1970s are still
unusually stable compared to other countries. One explanation for this may simply
lie in the lack of choice provided to voters in the U.S. However, several would argue
that the few percentage points aggregate swing observed is probably overstating the
number of stable voters. Basinger and Levine, for instance, claim that voters who
hold `ambivalent partisan attitudesin the U.S. typically constitute approximately 30
pct of the electorate and that the amount has been increasing over the past decades
(Basinger & Levine, 2005; See also Dalton, 2000)7. Neither the alleged trend or
level of potential vote-switchers manifest themselves in the aggregate measures of
volatility, however.
6Not all agree in this interpretation and do claim that partisan attachment in the US
has been on the decline (e.g. Dalton, 2000; Clark & Steward, 1998; Wattenberg, 1990).
7A similar estimate is provided by Dalton and Weldon who write, American partisan-
ship was extremely stable from the 1950s to the early 1960s with party identiers constitut-
ing 70-75 percent of the electorate. But loyalties began to weaken after the 1964 election.
By the 1980s, more than a third of the electorate were non-partisans, and in the 1990s,
Ross Perots third-party candidacy in the two presidential elections pushed the percentage
of partisans down still further(Dalton & Weldon, 2005).
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Country
1950-2000 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Max. St.Dev.
Australia 6.4 4.6 5.8 7.3 3.8 10.4 13.1 3.0
Austria 5.6 4.1 4.0 2.6 7.3 9.6 15.6 4.1
Belgium 9.1 8.0 10.4 6.5 9.5 11.9 16.1 3.8
Canada 11.1 8.7 9.1 6.6 11.4 24.9 42.0 9.7
Denmark 11.0 5.5 8.8 17.1 9.7 12.9 29.1 6.0
Finland 8.3 4.4 7.2 8.4 10.8 11.3 14.6 3.6
France 15.6 21.5 14.1 12.3 13.9 14.6 22.8 4.8
Germany 8.5 15.3 8.5 5.0 6.3 8.4 21.3 4.4
Greece 10.2 11.3 8.7 26.7 8.0
Ireland 9.0 11.1 7.0 5.0 8.2 14.7 16.2 4.5
Italy 17.7 10.7 8.1 8.3 9.1 25.8 38.9 9.2
Japan 9.4 12.2 7.1 5.1 3.8 18.4 24.7 6.4
Netherlands 10.7 6.4 7.9 13.0 9.5 19.0 21.8 4.5
N.Z. 9.8 5.9 4.6 8.9 13.6 15.6 20.8 6.0
Norway 10.4 4.5 5.3 15.6 10.6 16.4 20.3 6.2
Portugal 15.3 17.9 11.8 23.2 8.8
Spain 17.6 21.6 8.4 42.5 14.9
Sweden 7.6 4.8 4.7 6.7 7.9 14.0 15.4 3.8
Switzerland 5.6 2.5 3.8 6.3 7.1 8.1 9.0 2.7
U.K. 7.0 5.0 5.2 8.3 7.8 9.5 15.0 4.0
U.S.A. 3.1 2.9 3.6 3.4 3.1 2.6 6.6 1.9
All 9.0 7.3 7.0 8.0 9.6 12.4 42.5 6.2
Total Volatility in 21 Democracies 1950-2000
Period Averages Special values
Table 6.2: Total Volatility - Absolute Levels and Secular Trends
The countries that follow immediately after the US in having low volatility scores
- including Austria, Australia, Switzerland and Sweden - have period averages almost
double or more than that of the US and three of them experience signicant increases
in the 1990s. For Australia, and to a lesser extent Austria, the low number of parties
and consequent lack of choice may contribute to explaining the low volatility levels,
while Swiss and Swedish voters have not - at least on the face of it - been starved for
options. In Australia, Austria and Sweden, the much higher volatility scores of the
90s are in fact related to the success of new parties, whereas this does not contribute
to the only slightly increased volatility levels in Switzerland during that decade. In a
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comparative study of American and Swedish voters, Granberg and Holmberg argue
that partisan identication has played a strong role in Sweden and that the steady
increase in volatility of Swedish voters over the past decades can in fact be attributed
to the decline of party identication. They also observe that there is no similar trend
for the American voter (Granberg & Holmberg, 2002). For Switzerland, linguistic
and religious segmentation of the electorate, may explain the relatively low volatility
observed.
At the other end of the scale, there are the high volatility countries including the
older democracies such as Italy and Japan, whose very high average is mainly ex-
plained by the politically tumultuous 1990s. For both countries, corruption scandals
contributed to the erosion of support for the established parties and both also intro-
duced major changes in the electoral systems. Neither country experiences unusually
high levels of volatility in the preceding decades. In fact, Japan is unusually stable
in the 1970s and 1980s. France is another case where the average level of volatility is
unusually high, but unlike Italy and Japan, this is a consistent trait. The very high
volatility of the 1950s could be explained in part by the changes in electoral rules,
as well as the constitution, in that country. However, it is possible that the dis-
ruption of the political systems before and during WWII has also contributed, since
higher than average volatility can also be observed in Germany, Italy and Japan,
where new party systems are being established. But as can be seen, the volatility
levels of France remain well above the average in the following decade. Apart from
institutional factors contributing to this, Bartolini and Mair mention the very weak
partisan identication in the French electorate as an important explanatory factor
(Bartolini & Mair, 1990: 247). In Spain and Portugal very high levels are likewise
recorded, which is likely to be associated with the establishment of the party systems
of those countries in the wake of democratisation. They are also the only countries
where there is a signicant drop in average volatility from the 1980s to the 1990s.
Greece, also re-established as a democracy in the 1970s, on the other hand lies at
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average levels.
The fact that the 1990s proved to be a particularly volatile decade is not only
seen in an average for all countries almost double that of the 1950s and some 60 pct
higher than the decade that preceded it, but also evidenced by the fact that 9 of
the 21 peak values observed in the whole period are recorded in the 1990s. Within
countries there is also considerable variation with respect to how stable the level of
volatility is. France stands out by having consistently high levels throughout the
whole period with a standard deviation of just 4.8 compared to its mean of 15.6 pct.,
while countries like Canada, Italy and Spain exhibit large standard deviations.
One possible explanation of the higher volatility levels observed on average for
the 1970s onwards in comparison with previous decades is that it reects a loss of
partisan identication. Some argue that there is evidence of a general decline in
partisan attachments across most long-standing democracies, although the trends
di¤er in strength (Dalton, 2000). This would then also imply a secular trend in
which the electorate has become increasingly more open to consider new alternatives.
Others claim, however, that the evidence is more ambiguous due to large variation
between countries, although trends do point in that direction (Schmitt & Holmberg,
19958). In any case, as discussed, other factors than availability in a strict sense can
contribute to an understanding of the variation observed between countries.
Before examining the relationship between the volatility levels observed and the
number of new parties entering, however, the impact of the electoral system on
volatility will be addressed. Since the electoral system is conceived as a barrier in
itself, it is necessary to examine the extent and nature of its inuence on volatility.
8Schmitt and Holmberg report more ambiguous ndings than Dalton, however. They
write, If there is an overall tendency, it is of loosening party bonds. But specic develop-
ments, by country and party, are so varied that any general overview disguises more than
it discloses(1994:121).
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6.3 The Impact on Volatility of Electoral Rules,
Strategic Incentives and the Party System
The question which will be addressed in the following section is whether the elec-
toral system itself exerts an inuence on electoral volatility. Bowler, Lanoue and
Savoie argue and adduce evidence to support that the electoral rules inuence the
extent of partisan identication. This e¤ect they argue is mediated by the strategic
considerations imposed by the electoral system (Bowler et. al, 1994). Bartolini and
Mair similarly argue that the electoral rules, and changes thereof, can induce vote
switching. They write `If we assume a degree of rationality, then the individual voter
will not merely have to decide on a party preference, but will also have to weigh that
preference against the potential for vote wastage and vote e¤ectiveness(Bartolini &
Mair, 1990:151). Since electoral systems inuence this opportunity structure faced
by voters, it is likely that they also inuence the degree of volatility observed.
Bartolini and Mair examine the proposition that major changes in electoral sys-
tem result in greater than normal changes in partisan distribution of electoral sup-
port. This hypothesis was found amply supported by the data. With respect to
the stable e¤ects of electoral systems, the pattern discerned through analyses of the
data was more blurry, however. Majoritarian systems were initially thought to lead
to higher levels of volatility than PR-systems, due to the imposition of strategic
constraints on the one hand, and due to the impact of bipolarity in government on
the other. The existence of strategic constraints implies, according to Bartolini and
Mair, that changes in the viability of a party from one election to the next in such
systems would induce strategic voter shifts accordingly. The assumption is that such
changes in viability are frequent enough to result in higher levels of volatility in such
systems. Another hypothesis is that the bipolarity often associated with majoritarian
systems promotes retrospective voting - rewarding or punishing the incumbent gov-
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ernment - and thereby similarly encourages vote-switching. Only tenuous evidence
supporting the hypothesized link between majoritarian systems and higher volatility
is found, however, leading them to consider two possible explanations for this. First,
the crude dichotomization of electoral systems in majoritarian versus proportional
systems could be at fault, since di¤erences in the degree of constraint existing in
the category of proportional systems remain hidden. Secondly, the low barriers to
entry of new parties and the higher number of parties associated with PR-systems
could in itself also provide favourable conditions for voter shifts by a¤ording more
choice. And in fact further analysis reveals that party system format does explain
much of the observed variation in volatility. Controlling for the number of parties,
contradictory results with respect to the inuence of the electoral systems emerge,
however. With less than 11 parties, there is generally lower volatility in PR systems
than in majoritarian ones, but when the number of parties exceeds this, the pattern
is reversed. The tests are nally repeated replacing the dichotomous indicator with a
continuous one, namely the Rae index of disproportionality. And both party system
format and disproportionality are found independently associated with higher levels
of volatility, leading to the conclusion that the electoral system constraints do indeed
inuence volatility in the expected direction.
In light of the somewhat ambiguous results with respect to the e¤ects of electoral
systems when the number of parties exceeds 10, as well as the development of a more
accurate indicator of electoral system constraints than the ones used, re-visiting the
question would seem necessary. The rst step in a re-examination of the relationship
is then to test the explanatory power of the Tpro on total volatility by means of a
regression analysis. The results of this simple test are not favourable to the hypoth-
esized inuence of the electoral system on volatility. Regressing the total volatility
on theTpro, yields evidence only of a weak association. The adjusted R2 is a mere 3.3
percent even if it signicant at the 1 pct level. Further, if the U.S., which as observed
has very low volatility levels and also a high number of elections in the period, is
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removed as a case, any evidence of even a weak e¤ect evaporates.
There could be several reasons for this non-result, however. First, it would be
necessary to control for the inuence of major changes in the electoral system, which
was shown to produce higher than normal levels of volatility. The rst election
after each major change was therefore removed from the data set. Furthermore,
the inuence of the number of parties should also be controlled for since they were
found to have a stronger impact on volatility than the constraints of the electoral
system itself. The method for counting parties will di¤er in this analysis, however.
Since voters can only logically be said to have the opportunity to switch between
parties that are present in their electoral districts, the number of parties are weighted
according to the number of districts that they eld candidates in (as above, see 5.4.3).
For some countries, like Denmark or the Netherlands, such weighting by districts
makes little or no di¤erence since parties normally participate in all districts, but for
countries like Belgium, where most run in just half of the electoral districts, or in the
U.K., where many run in just a fraction of the districts, it clearly makes a di¤erence.
In addition, a lower cut-o¤point of 2 pct is used to avoid that very weakly supported
parties exercise an undue inuence on the results when they are unlikely to inuence
aggregate volatility much9.
The multivariate regression model with the number of parties and the propor-
tional threshold as predictors explains 14 pct of the variance (adjusted R2 0.14)- a
result which is signicant at the 1 pct. level. It is the number of parties, however,
that is the strongest predictor accounting for 13.6 pct of the variability in outcome
alone. The coe¢ cients inform us that an increase in the number of parties of 1.3
predicts an increase in volatility of 1 percent, while it takes a 4.7 pct. rise in the
Threshold of Proportionality to produce the same e¤ect (the standardised beta co-
9Only in the event that many parties of 1-2 percent size were to participate in elections
could they signcantly contribute to aggregate volatility. This is not the case in any of
countries included in this dataset, however.
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e¢ cients are 0.45 and 0.11 for the number of parties and the threshold respectively).
Only the coe¢ cient for the number of parties pass the test of signicance, however.
On the basis of these results, it seems that the constraint of the electoral system has
but a marginal e¤ect, albeit positive as initially hypothesized, on volatility.
However, problems of a methodological nature may plant doubts concerning the
reliability of these ndings. First, there are problems of multicolliniarity as demon-
strated by high VIF values (1.968) and the variance proportions, which show that
both predictors have most of their variance loaded on the same dimension. The very
high Pearsons correlation coe¢ cient of -0.701 that describes the relationship of the
number of parties and the Tpro further testies to the presence of a problem. Sec-
ondly, it is necessary to have a closer look at the hypotheses creating a link between
the electoral system and volatility.
It was hypothesized that stronger electoral systems cause vote switching by one
of two mechanisms. On the one hand, strategic incentives can induce voter shifts
from one party to another in accordance with changes in viability. On the other
hand, by association with bipolarity in government, a higher degree of retrospective
voting can be expected to produce higher volatility. However, regarding the strategic
voting argument, Cox has convincingly argued that a number of conditions external
to the electoral system have to be met to bring strategic incentives into play. The
mere presence of electoral system constraints is not su¢ cient in itself. Cox states
that strategic incentives are unlikely to emerge in systems with district magnitudes
larger than 5 even if objective constraints are imposed. At higher magnitudes, he
argues, voters (as well as other actors) loose their ability to predict with any cer-
tainty who is viable and who is not. This knowledge is crucial to induce strategic
behaviour10. Why district magnitudes larger than 5 would undermine the ability to
10However, it should be observed that considering the knowledge condition also brings
volatility into the equation as an independent variable. As Cox points out, the higher
volatility in general, the lower the ability to form clear expectations with respect to viability,
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predict viability is not explained in any detail by Cox and needs to be considered if
the criteria is to applied. Considering how district magnitudes inuence seat alloca-
tion and viability may give us an indication of why it is suggested that magnitudes
over 5 blur predictability; With a district magnitude of 6 and using the Hare largest
remainder allocation formula, a seat can be theoretically be won with as little as
2-5 pct of the votes (if 3-8 parties participate), while a party/candidate can only be
certain to win one with more than 14 pct of the votes. The vote share that would
give a 50/50 chance of winning a seat is therefore around 8-10 pct (See formula in
Appendix C.1.). If voters under such circumstances were to abandon a new party in
the belief that it is unlikely to win seat, the probability that the assumption is proven
false can therefore be considered relatively high. Given that one has to expect a cer-
tain margin of error in predicting outcomes even from modern opinion polls, voting
strategically is inherently risky when the vote shares necessary to win seats are low
and/or when the distance between front-runners and trailing candidates/parties is
small. Statistically, one can routinely count on a sampling error of 3-5 pct for most
polls11, but other methodological problems in polling can at times result in predic-
tions that are much further o¤ the mark12. Given that many voters may also not
be too well informed about the status of `the race, it is not unreasonable to assert
that strategic voting is unlikely to occur at high district magnitudes. However, as
discussed earlier, magnitude is not all that matters. While the largest remainder
method gives a 50/50 seat-chance at 8-10 pct of the votes, it takes a district mag-
which in turn diminishes the incentive to strategic voting (Cox, 1997:122). This hypothesis
has in fact been validated in a previous study (Forsythe et al, 1993).
11For a sample size of 1000, the sampling error is 3 pct.
12The general election in the U.K. in 1992 provides a case in point. Virtually all polls
(including exit polls) showed a lead for the Labour party. Instead, the election gave a clear
victory for the incumbent Conservative party. Explanations for the rather large errors
include such factors as late swings (people who decided at the last minute to vote for
the Conservatives), non-response bias (supporters of the Conservatives were more likely to
refrain from answering), spiral of silence (some supporters of the Conservatives felt under
pressure to give the more popularanswer).
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nitude of 8 to give similar odds using the DHondt method. Furthermore, the latter
method yields higher thresholds of inclusion, which means that the chance of a for-
tunate distribution leading to winning seats at a very low vote shares is non-existing.
For a district magnitude of 6 for example, the Ti is 8-12.5 (3-8 parties). In order to
apply the theory, we therefore need to have at least a rough idea of what vote shares
we consider within the realm of predictability or outside it. In the following empirical
analysis, I propose to set this at 10 pct. That is, electoral systems that give a 50/50
pct chance of winning a seat with a vote share of 10 pct (Tpro= 10 pct) or below do
not provide favourable conditions for estimating viability13. It is of course somewhat
arbitrary, but a cut-o¤ point has to be chosen and considering normal margins of
error in estimates, this is not unreasonable. In addition to considering the impact of
district magnitude on strategic voting, Cox also argues that multi-member districts
accommodate another type of strategic voting than single member districts do. He
writes, `In multi-member districts operating under SNTV or PR, strategic voting
can refer to the strategic desertion of both candidates/list that are `too weak[as in
SMDs] and candidates/lists that are `too strong(Cox, 1997: 121). The notion that
voters would abandon a party of rst preference because it is `too strongis perhaps
a bit strange. Instead of the commonly assumed hierarchical preference structure
with one party in the lead, voters abandoning a party on such grounds would have
preference for a representation characterized by a certain balance of partisan forces.
A preference for such mixed-representation becomes possible in multi-member dis-
tricts, but unlike abandoning the unviable, it does not depend on small magnitudes
to be practised. Quite the contrary. Moreover, it is not strategic in the sense that
13The same unpredictability would render elite level co-ordination di¢ cult too. A party,
which has an excess of votes - in the sense that the same amount of seats could be obtained
with less votes - could try to organize some of its voters to vote for another party (e.g.
coalition partner) who might thereby win. However, if the votes given equal chances to
win a seat is lower than 10 pct, there is a high risk that unpredictable outcomes might
lead to actually losses for the benefactor. Furthermore, such voter mobilization is probably
di¢ cult to organize within individual districts.
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it involves defaulting on support for the preferred candidate/party. In the following,
only the type of strategic voting where considerations of viability induce voters to
abandon preferred parties in favour of others and the electoral system therefore plays
a pivotal role will be considered, however.
The second condition for strategic voting discussed by Cox concerns the number of
participants. In the case of Single-Member-District systems (SMDs) Cox points out
that the number of parties/candidates competing must exceed the district magnitude
by at least two (M+2). If only two parties were competing, voters would have no
incentive to abandon a trailing candidate in order to support a sure winner. But if
there are three candidates, two of which are viable, voters with a preference for the
predicted looser have a clear incentive to abandon him/her and instead lend their
support the preferred one of the top two candidates. Cox does not discuss whether
this `M+2rule applies to multimember districts as well - and it fact it doesnt. In
fact, the `M+rule could simply be reformulated as a simple `3rule applicable to
all systems irrespective of magnitude. Of course, vote switching caused by strategic
voting also presupposes that changes in the viability of one of the parties occur.
Apart from the number of parties competing, it therefore also depends on their
relative electoral strength.
In addition to the number of participants and the type of electoral system, Cox
summarises the necessary conditions for strategic voting in the following points: only
if voters care which of the front-runners win and only if there is no sure winner are
strategic considerations relevant; the tighter the competition between front-runners,
the stronger the pressure for strategic behaviour; it must be common knowledge
who is a front-runner and who is trailing; and nally voters must be short-term
instrumentally rational (Cox, 1997:76).
It is clear therefore that an investigation of the potential e¤ect of strategic voting
on the propensity for vote-switching requires an approach which takes more factors
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than the strength of the electoral system into account. The testing proposed here
entails a division of systems into those where the conditions for strategic behaviour
are met and those where they are not. Whether the preference, knowledge or com-
petitive closeness conditions are met will not be taken into consideration, however,
leaving only the two `structuralconditions described above. These are that the cost
of a seat is no less than 10 pct of the votes (at the district level) and the number of
parties competing is no less than 3.
As the incentive to act strategically is induced in the individual district, using
aggregate data to establish whether the proposed connection between volatility and
strategic constraints is rooted in reality implies making assumptions concerning elec-
toral behaviour. We must assume that changes in the viability of parties/candidates
(which would induce vote switching) are not contradictory across the electoral dis-
tricts with the result that district level changes in partisan support cancel each other
out. The fact that all the countries included in this analysis have nationalised po-
litical systems in the sense that a majority of the electorates are primarily oriented
towards national rather than local politics when they elect parliamentary represen-
tatives, it would seem perfectly safe to assume that votersresponse to national cues
would not be completely contradictory from one constituency to the next even if the
response is of course likely to be di¤erentiated. If an electoral system, therefore, in
combination with party system format, induces any notable changes in the partisan
distribution of votes in the individual district, we can expect this to be observable
at the aggregate level.
The following method for testing whether strategic constraints result in higher
levels of volatility is proposed; the rst election after each major change is left out
for the reasons stated above. The cases are subsequently divided into two categories,
one where the conditions for strategic voting are met, `Present, (average district
Tpro >10 pct and at least 3 parties running) - and where they are absent (`Absent)
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(average district Tpro is maximum 10 pct or less than 3 parties). As mentioned parties
are counted and weighted according to the number of districts in which they run.
But since the `3-partiescriteria refers to whole numbers and weighting can result
in fractions, it was decided to let >0.5 parties count as a whole party. In this way
if a single member district system has 2.4 parties, it is not regarded as fullling the
conditions for strategic voting, while if it has 2.5, it is. Using these criteria to separate
the cases has the following consequences. Firstly, none of the elections in the US
and a number of elections in Australia (1951-55, 1974-75), New Zealand (1951), the
U.K. (1951-59, 1983-1987) do not qualify for the strategic voting group due to the
low number of parties running. The remaining SMD systems - Canada and France -
full the conditions for the entire period14. Outside the SMD systems only few are
eligible. These include Ireland for the entire period, Spain (1982-1996) as well as
Italy and Japan under the Mixed-Member systems instituted in the 1990s (when the
rst election post system change is removed, the case of MM system Japan falls out,
however). In both the latter cases the PR-tier is not designed to fully compensate for
the e¤ects of the plurality districts - as it is in the German mixed system - and the
majority of seats in both cases are allocated in SMDs. SNTV Japan is a borderline
case with an average district Tpro falling just short of the requirement. Since it is just
on the limit, the results of the statistical analysis when it is included it the category
of `presentare reported in the footnotes and in appendix D.1.
A simple comparison of the mean volatility between elections in systems where
strategic incentives are potentially present and those where they are absent as seen
in table 6.3, reveals a di¤erence in mean total volatility of 2.3 pct. The results are
reported signicant at the 0.01 level using the independent t-test and at the 0.05
level using the non-parametric Man-Whitney test. The ndings thus give evidence
14It should be noted, however, that the coverage of French parties is somewhat uncer-
tain since information is aggregated on 90 districts instead of the real number used (See
Appendix C.2.).
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Total
Volatility Absent Present
Mean Vtot 8 10,3 8,7
N 198 89 287
Strategic Incentives
Table 6.3: Strategic Incentives and Total Volatility
in support of the hypothesis15.
It would, however, be a mistake to conclude on this basis that strategic constraints
induce a higher than normal level of volatility. We know that the number of parties
has been shown to be a strong explanatory variable and the inuence of parties
therefore needs to be controlled for. Since multivariate techniques have not been
developed for non-parametric statistical methods, checking for the inuence of the
number of parties demands requires a number of subsequent tests.
Firstly, 9 categories were created for the number of parties and the mean volatil-
ity corresponding to each computed. As can be seen in table 6.4, there is a consistent
rise in average total volatility following the rise in the number of parties. Moreover
the one-way ANOVA and the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis reveals that the rela-
tionship is signicant (p<0.01). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the increase
is consistent apart from a very minor drop in volatility observed from around `7-`9
parties. But these small drops are then followed by a drastic increase in the category
of `10or more parties. Volatility is thus seen to vary positively with the number of
parties more consistently than reported by Bartolini and Mair. In the data presented,
several sharp drops in volatility could be observed when the number of parties in-
15Transferring SNTV Japan to the category containing cases with strategic incentives
present yields the following results; Strategic Incentives Present: 10.0 Vtot, Absent: 7.9
Vtot. Di¤erence pass both tests (independent t-test, man whitney) of signicance at 0.05
level.
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Number of Volatility Cases
Parties Vtot N
2 (1-2.4) 3,8 36
3 (2.5-3.4) 7,3 62
4 (3.5-4.4) 8,7 58
5 (4.5-5.4) 10 47
6  (5.5-6.4) 10,3 32
7 (6.5-7.4) 10,9 28
8 (7.5-8.4) 10,7 9
9 (8.5-9.4) 10,2 7
>10  (>9.5) 16,4 8
Total 8,7 287
Table 6.4: The Number of Parties and Total Volatility
creased16. Although the datasets di¤er in the two analyses, I would suggest that the
main explanation for this di¤erence lies in the way in which the number of parties
is counted. Weighting the number of parties according to the districts they run in
gives a more precise testing of the hypothesis that the more choice voters have the
more likely they are to change their preference from one election to the next.
The next step is then to test whether the relationship between the number of
parties and volatility holds up across systems where incentives for strategic voting
are present and those where they are absent. And as seen from results in table
6.5, it does. The same pattern is repeated and in addition, it is evident that an
increase in the number of parties has a stronger impact on mean volatility in systems
that full conditions for strategic voting than in the other group. The di¤erence
in mean volatility between the Absent and Present categories more than doubles
16The relationship between volatility and party system format is shown for the two
categories proportional and majoritarian systems. Both within each category and when
the two categories are seen together, such inconsistencies in the relationship between the
variables are evinced (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; 158-159)
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Number of
Parties Difference
Vtot N Vtot N Vtot
2  (1-2.4) 3,8 36 - - -
3  (2.5-3.4) 3,8 9 7,9 53 4,1
4  (3.5-4.4) 7 35 11,2 23 4,2
5  (4.5-5.4) 8,3 40 19,6 7 11,3
6  (5.5-6.4) 9,3 27 15,9 5 6,6
>7  (>6.5) 11,4 51 20,1 1 8,7
Total 8 198 10,3 89 2,3
Absent Present
Strategic Incentives
Table 6.5: The Number of Parties, Strategic Incentives and Total Volatility
from the category with the lowest number of parties to the one with the highest
(holding only few cases), although the rise over categories is not a smooth one.
The low number of cases in the category of `Presentat high party numbers makes
the averages observed highly sensitive to single cases17. The persistent di¤erence in
volatility levels depending on whether the conditions for strategic voting are met or
not, as well as the increase in this di¤erence according the the number of parties
running, lends strong support to the argument presented by Bartolini and Mair that
strategic considerations promotes vote switching. That is, vote switching is not
merely stimulated by the number of alternatives voters are presented with but by
changes in viability since such changes would also be more likely when the number
of parties is higher18.
Within each of the two strategic incentives categories (Absent, Present), the
di¤erences in mean volatility reported across the groups represented by di¤erent
17Corresponding to the category of 5parties, removing just one case (Spain 1982) lowers
the Vtot score from 19.6 to 15.9 and the di¤erence between the Present and Absent
categories is 7.6 instead of the very high 11.3.
18See results when Japan is included in the group with strategic incentives present in
the Appendix D.1.
254
Chapter 6. The Accessibility Barrier
party numbers tests positively for signicance using both the one-way ANOVA and
the Kruskal-Wallis test (p<0.01). The results therefore appear to be robust. Testing
the signicance of the di¤erence in mean volatility between the Present and Absent
categories across party numbers conrms this. The di¤erences in mean volatility
values across all party categories pass the Mann-Whitney test of signicance at the
1 pct level. The results of the independent t-test are similar, only that `3-`4pass at
the 5 pct level and the `5-`6pass at the 1 pct level. 1 pct level in both independent
t-test as well as the Mann-Whitney test for non-parametric data. Only the `>7
where there is but a single case in the category with strategic incentives present fails
both tests of signicance.
The above analysis does not address the hypothesized e¤ect of the bipolarity in
government often associated with strong electoral systems, as Bartolini and Mair
suggested. Such bipolarity, they theorised, can induce vote-switching motivated by
a desire to reward or punish the incumbent government on its performance. The
fact that an increase in the number of parties, which we would suspect is negatively
associated with bipolarity, has such a strong e¤ect on volatility seems to indicate
that whatever e¤ect increased retrospective voting may have is overruled by the
richer choice a¤orded by having more parties.
The question is how these conclusions inuence the interpretation of volatility
as an indicator of voter openness to consider new alternatives. It is clear that the
presence of more choice presented by a higher number of parties is consistently asso-
ciated with more actual vote switching, as is electoral system mediated by its e¤ects
on the number of parties and presence of strategic incentives. However, as discussed
above, fewer parties running -and thus less choice- need not signify that the electoral
market is necessarily more `in-elastic, since lower volatility levels is likely to reect
the choice o¤ered. Where few parties are the result of constraints imposed by the
electoral system, we may therefore wrongly attribute such cases with an extra bar-
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rier in the form of an unavailable electorate. Furthermore, the presence of strategic
incentives will - in general - make it more di¢ cult for new parties to win support,
since establishing viability for such parties is more di¢ cult. This means that the
higher volatility associated with such strategic incentives is not indicative of higher
potential for support of new parties. When using volatility as an indicator of voter
availability, it is necessary to be aware of these e¤ects of the number of parties as
well as strategic incentives.
6.4 Measuring the Accessibility Barrier
Even high levels of volatility do not translate into credible threats of entry, however.
Electoral swings are obviously necessary to put a new party into parliament, but
they must reach a critical level determined by the electoral system in order to make
this happen. The presence of a threshold vote share for obtaining seats dened by
the electoral system blocks vote changes below this share from having much of an
e¤ect. Put di¤erently, it is the interaction of the institutionally dened rules and
the electoral behaviour that sets the actual height of the barrier. This means that it
makes little sense to expect identical levels of volatility to have the same e¤ects on
the probability of new parties entering across systems employing di¤erent electoral
rules. For instance, if we see 5 pct of the voters changing party from one election
to the next, we know that this would su¢ ce for a new party to gain proportional
access to the parliament in both the Netherlands and Denmark. The same level of
volatility occurring in Australia or the U.K. would clearly not. The same volatility
levels therefore have di¤erent e¤ects under di¤erent electoral systems. And the same
argument can be made the other way around. Low levels of volatility may make even
relatively low electoral barriers such as Germanys 5 pct insurmountable. Which of
the two, volatility or threshold, is the limiting factor depends on their relative size.
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In order to capture the barrier as produced by electoral rules and electoral avail-
ability in concert, I propose to simply divide the volatility vote share (Vtot) with
the Threshold of Proportionality. The resulting indicator, the Accessibility Barrier
(Abar), can thus be written as follows:
Abar =
Vtot
Tpro
The Accessibility Barrier returns scores above 1 when the total volatility exceeds
the vote share necessary to obtain proportional representation. An Abar of 1 can thus
be said to dene a turning point by representing the point at which entry becomes
feasible. Of course, it is not an absolute due to the fact that party entry can occur
incrementally. The higher the values, the higher also the chances that a new party
obtains representation.
In tables 6.7 and 6.6 the average scores for the Threshold of Proportionality and
the Accessibility barrier are listed with the ranking of the cases (among all the cases
included) based on their scores on each of them. As can be seen, using the Abar
instead of the Tpro as a barrier measure makes little di¤erence for the rank-ordering
of the some countries, such as Australia, whereas for others the change in rank is
considerable, such as Switzerland. In the following section, the e¤ects of volatility
and the Accessbility barrier on the number of new parties will be examined.
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Country
Tpro Abar Tpro-Rank Abar-Rank
Austria (1953-66) 6.6 0.6 20 29
Austria (1970-90) 2.2 2.2 3 13
Austria (1994-1999) 4* 2.4 9 11
Belgium (1950-91) 2.4 3.9 4.5 5
Belgium (1995-99) 2.8 4.1 6 4
Denmark (1950) 5 2.1 14.5 15
Denmark (1953-1998) 2* 5.5 2 2
Finland (1951-99) 4.6 1.8 11 17
France (1986) 5* 3 14.5 9
Germany (1953-1998) 5* 1.8 14.5 16
Greece (1981) 17* 1.6 26.5 20
Greece (1985-1990) 13.1 1.7 25 18.5
Greece (1993-1996) 3* 1.7 7 18.5
Ireland (1951-97) 10.7 0.9 24 25.5
Italy (1953-92) 2.4 3.5 4.5 6
Italy (1994-96) 23.3 1.5 29 21
Japan (1952-93) 9.8 0.8 23 27
Japan (1996) 17 2.9 26.5 10
Norway (1953-81) 9.6 0.9 22 25.5
Norway (1985-97) 4* 3.3 9 7
Portugal (1980-99) 6.6 2.1 18 14
Spain (1982-96) 9.1 1.3 21 22
Sweden (1952-68) 6 1 19 24
Sweden (1970-1998) 4* 2.33 9 12
Switzerland (1951-99) 5.2 1.7 8.5 1.86
* Legal Threshold
Scores Ranking of Cases
Multi-member District and Mixed Systems
Table 6.6: Abar and Tpro Scores and Ranking in MMD- and Mixed Systems)
6.5 Test of E¤ects
The question is now, how far the Accessibility barrier contributes to explaining the
number of new parties winning seats. However, before addressing that question, it
would be interesting to see how far total volatility is correlated with the number
of new parties and their electoral success. We expect the two to correlate both
because new party vote shares is an integral part of the total volatility observed,
as well as because it expresses the electoral availability conducive to new parties
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Country
Tpro Abar Tpro-Rank Abar-Rank
Australia (1951-98) 33.1 0.2 34 33
Canada (1953-97) 25.6 0.45 30 30
France (1958-97) 19.8 0.77 28 28
New Zealand (1951-93) 31.8 0.32 33 31
U.K. (1950-97) 31.2 0.23 32 32
United States (1950-98) 28.1 0.12 31 34
Single-Member District Systems
Scores Ranking of Cases
Table 6.7: Abar and Tpro Scores and Ranking in SMD-Systems
electoral success. However, it would also be interesting to see whether total volatility
correlates with the number of new parties simply participating. The causality can
run two ways. High volatility can express dissatisfaction with the established party
system and a higher number of participating new parties can reect the popular
mood at the election time. But of course, the number of new alternatives can also
contribute to vote switching in itself. Secondly, there is the issue of how well the
accessibility barrier explains the observed variation in the number of new parties
winning representation. The rst analysis tests the relationship with the following
model: The Number of New Parties = 0 + volatility+"
The results of the regression analysis are summarized in table 6.8. A very high
correlation between the number of vote winning parties and the total volatility can
be observed. The highest correlation is found for the group of successful parties,
where the Pearsons R is 0.55 corresponding to 29 of the variance explained. Given
the circularityinvolved this is hardly surprising. The total volatility thus gives us
a good indication of how many new parties succeed electorally. However, as can be
seen total volatility does account for more than 22-29 pct of the observed variance in
numbers of new parties, and it is therefore obvious that volatility in large part reects
switches between existing parties19. The high correlation between the total volatility
19However, the fact that we are counting the numbers of new parties obtaining 1 pct and
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Regressor Participate
>1 pct >4 pct >0.5 dis.
Total Volatility  0.47**  0.55**  0.45**
(0.15) (0.11) (0.02)
Constant  0.27 -0.24  0.00
R2 (adj.)  0.22**  0.29**  0.19**
Pearsons R 0.47** 0.55** 0.45**
N=91
Vote Winning
Standardized coefficients reported, unstandardized in ( )
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
OLS Regression
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Table 6.8: Total Volatility as Predictor of the Number of New Parties
as the number of participating parties - Pearsons R of 0.45 - gives an indication that
more parties tend to register at times when more want to switch party, although we
of course cannot rule out that the causality runs in the opposite direction20.
As can be seen from the non-parametric correlation in table 6.9, the Kendalls tau
and Spearmans rho both demonstrate a strong association between the variables.
As can be seen from the Kendalls tau, knowledge of the volatility levels entails
a 34-37 pct reduction in error in predicting the number of new vote winning and
participating parties. Spearmans rho likewise gives evidence of a high association of
the variables. All are furthermore signicant at the 1 pct level.
The question is now how well the Accessibility barrier predicts the number of
parties winning seats. This hypothesis that it reduces the number of seat-winning
4 pct of the seats respectively, rather than directly measuring their vote shares also implies
that the correlations or explained variance could never be perfect, even if vote switching
only beneted new parties.
20It should be remembered that the data on party participation is not pure, as discussed
in chapter 4. The selection criteria for inclusion in some countries contains a minimum size
of 5 pct vote share in at least one electoral district.
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Participate
>1 pct >4 pct >0.5 dis.
Kendall's tau 0.34** 0.37** 0.37**
Spearman's rho 0.44** 0.46** 0.47**
N=91
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
Non-Parametric Correlation
Total Volatility
Vote Winning
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Table 6.9: The Correlation of Total Volatility and the Number of New Parties
parties will be tested with the following model: The Number of New Parties =
0 + accessibility+"
The results of this analysis are summarized in table 6.1021. As can be seen, the
Abar measure is a very strong predictor of the number of seat winning parties. It
explains as much as 21 pct of the variance for the group of parties obtaining over 1 pct
of the votes but only 11 pct. of the variance observed for successful parties. The same
pattern is observed for the non-parametric measures of association summarized in
table 6.11. Both show a strong correlation, which is, however, weaker for the number
of successful parties that for those winning just over 1 pct. In the correlations
between total volatility and the number of new parties, we saw instead very similar
correlation coe¢ cients for the two types of new parties. This can be taken as an
indication that Abar is a valid barrier measure, whereas using volatility as such a
measure on its own would problematic (as done by Strøm, 1989a). And not just for
theoretical reasons. The other barriers examined - both the direct communication
costs as well as the electoral threshold - explained the number of parties winning
just over 1 pct much better than the number of electorally successful parties. The
Abar in this way `behavesas the other barriers. From a democratic point of view, we
21Five cases were removed from the data-set (France 50s+80s, Italy, New Zealand and
Japan 90s) due to changes in the electoral system mid-decade, which signicantly alters
the Tpro values that the Abar is based on (the same procedure was followed in 5.5.).
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>1 pct >4 pct
β-coefficent stand.  0.47**  0.35**
β-coefficient (0.12) (0.07)
Constant  0.63**  0.36**
R2  0.21**  0.11**
N=91
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
OLS Regression
Regressor: Accessibility Barrier Dependent variable: New Parties
Seat Winning
Table 6.10: The Impact of the Acessibility Barrier on the Number of New Seat-
Winning Parties
might nd consolation in the fact that the barriers in place may successfully weed
out smaller competitors but do not have the same e¢ cacy to block parties for which
there is higher demand. In terms of explaining variance in the number of seat-winning
parties, the Abar represent but a minor improvement compared to the Tpro. For the
latter the adjusted R2 was 20 and 9 pct respectively. The non-parametric measures
of association were, however, clearly lower for the Tpro (Kendalls tau: 0.40/0.29,
Spearmans rho: 0.51/0.36). Which barrier measure to obtaining seats should be
used depends on the type of research question, however. As discussed above, it
depends on what role electoral demand plays in the theoretical model applied. It
can be said that the Abar gives us a measure, which more accurately shows us the
amount of real threat represented parties are under from entry of new parties, while
the Tpro is a better measure of potential threat.
Finally, a comparison of the mean number of new parties corresponding to ordinal
categories of the Abar and the Vtot is presented below, in order to get a better im-
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>1 pct >4 pct
Kendalls tau 0.48** 0.38**
Spearmans rho 0.61** 0.48**
N=91
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
Non-Parametric Correlation
Accessibility Barrier New Seat Winning Parties
Table 6.11: The Correlation of the Acessibility Barrier and the Number of New
Seat-Winning Parties
pression of the nature of the relationships, than correlations coe¢ cients may do (see
table 6.12). The tendency in the mean values is clearly observed. There is a marked
reduction in the mean number of parties winning seats in line with the increase in
Accessibility Total Volatility
Barrier Participate
>1pct. >4.pct >1pct >4pct >0.5 dis.
1. (>4) Mean 2.08 1.00 1.(>15) Mean 3.08 1.83 0.30
N 13 13 N 12 12 12
Std. Dev. 1.32 1.00 Std. Dev. 2.54 1.70 0.26
2. (2-3.9) Mean 1.12 0.71 2.(10-14.9) Mean 1.90 0.81 0.24
N 17 17 N 21 21 21
Std. Dev. 0.68 0.67 Std. Dev. 1.30 0.75 0.24
3.(1-1.9) Mean 1.00 0.67 3. (5-9.9) Mean 1.58 0.73 0.13
N 18 18 N 45 45 45
Std. Dev. 0.97 0.77 Std. Dev. 1.20 0.72 0.11
4.(0-0.9) Mean 0.47 0.23 4. (0-4.9) Mean 0.56 0.06 0.04
N 43 43 N 18 18 18
Std. Dev. 0.83 0.61 Std. Dev. 0.86 0.24 0.08
Total Mean 0.92 0.52 Total Mean 1.65 0.76 0.16
N 92 92 N 96 96 96
Std. Dev. 1.05 0.76 Std. Dev. 1.55 0.97 0.18
All significant at the 0.01 level (Kruskal Wallis and ANOVA)
New Parties New Parties
Seat Winning Vote Winning
Table 6.12: The Accessibility Barrier, Total Volatility and the Number of New Parties
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the Accessibility barrier (corresponding to lower values). The di¤erences between
the 2nd and the 3rd categories are not very pronounced, however. What stands out
in the table is the consistently high di¤erence in means between the 4th category,
where volatility levels fall short of the threshold value, and the 3rd category, where
it just exceeds it. The mean values in the latter category are four times as high
for the number of parties winning 1 pct or more of the seats, while it is ten times
larger for the group winning 4 pct or more of the seats. Finally, the mean values of
new parties in the very low barrier cases are very high. With the Abar, we therefore
have a powerful predictor of the chances that new parties will succeed in winning
representation. Moreover, if we need a simple dichotomous measure, it would make
sense to distinguish between systems where the Abar values fall short of 1 and those
above, since this is where the stronger di¤erences in reductive strength appears to
be.
The di¤erences in the number of vote winning parties, of both types, as well as
those participating also varies strongly across the ordinal categories reecting the
total volatility levels. The di¤erence between the second and third categories again
are small for the group of parties winning just 1 pct of the votes, while it is absent
for the group of electorally successful parties. It is, however, interesting to observe
that there is a marked increase in the number of participating parties between these
two, lending credibility to the hypothesis that more parties tend to register their
participation when at times, when demand for change is higher.
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Do the Barriers to Entry Matter?
In the four preceding chapters, four di¤erent barriers to entry were identied, mea-
sured and their e¤ects on new party entry tested. Two of the barriers identied,
namely the registration barrier and the representation barrier, are largely mechan-
icaland therefore relatively straightforward to measure. The other two were more
elusive. For the recognition barrier, the problem was the great number of factors
which might possibly inuence it, but escape precise measurement. For the acces-
sibility barrier, the problem stems from measuring the key property - namely the
extent of availability - and the solution found entails a certain degree of uncertainty
concerning its validity. In the following, the results of the analyses made in each
chapter will rst briey be reviewed and re-stated. After this review, it will be ex-
amined how important the barriers are for the possibilities of new party entry when
they are combined in one model rather than seen individually. This question will
be explored by means of di¤erent types of multivariate analyses. Afterwards, the
question of temporal developments in the barriers will be addressed. The question
being whether it is possible to identify trends within this group of established democ-
racies that point towards more open or more closed competitive systems. Finally,
the question of what the results signify for the role of barriers to entry for political
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competition is addressed. By evaluating the results of the statistical analysis and
discussing what can be learned from extreme cases as well as those poorly explained
by the model, the foundation is laid for drawing conclusions concerning the value of
the work.
7.1 Review of the Barrier Analyses and Results
The rst barrier studied - the registration barrier - addresses the question of how
di¢ cult it is for new parties to obtain a place on the ballot. A comparison of
the requirements used in the 21 countries was made, and considerable variation
with respect to the conditions new parties have to full to participate in elections
was identied. An indicator of the costs of registration was made, where the total
costs of accessing the ballot in all electoral constituencies was summarized and the
di¤erences between petition and nancial requirements were bridged. The e¤ects of
the registration barrier on new party participation were tested, and a moderately
depressing e¤ect was identied. As expected the e¤ect was only apparent when
participation was dened by a specic share of the electoral districts. A closer look
at the relationship between the variables revealed, however, that the e¤ect was not
consistent (linear), but largely produced by a smaller number of outlying cases. When
these were removed, evidence of e¤ects of the registration barrier disappeared. It was
therefore concluded that ballot access is not a barrier be reckoned with in most of
the countries included in the analysis. Only in some cases including Japan, the US
and U.K. in the whole period studied, as well as France and Ireland in past decades,
it would be a mistake to discard it.
The second barrier - the recognition barrier - is inherently more complex and
therefore also more di¢ cult to capture. A number of conditions that may facilitate
or impede the e¤orts of new parties to become recognized by voters were identied
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and ve of these were singled out for further operationalization and testing. The
rst two hypotheses concerned the role of the mass media, which as the primary
source of information on politics in all countries, could be expected to play a pivotal
role. One hypothesis was that greater exposure to political information, measured
by consumption of media known to provide more extensive information on political
a¤airs, would increase the chances that information on new parties reach voters.
The other was that greater political domination of the mass media, measured by
the extent of political control over national broadcast organisations combined with
their markets shares, would decrease the chances that voters would be exposed to
information on new parties. None of the hypotheses were supported by the results
of the empirical analysis, however. It is highly likely that media system structures
matter to political competition and recognition of new alternatives, but identifying
and measuring the critical properties is not an easy task. Moreover, as discussed, it is
entirely possible that an unfriendly reception in certain quarters of the media system
is compensated for by others in a reaction to this, so that media environments are
dynamic and inherently di¢ cult to describe as open or closed. Finally, with modern
mass media, the most important determinants of exposure may lie in single events
rather than depend on structural features and therefore impossible to theorize about
in a study of this nature. The remainder of the analysis was devoted to measuring
the costs of direct communication with the electorate (as opposed to that mediated
by the media system). Three hypotheses were formulated. Two concerned the role
of the state, as a provider of free access to media exposure and funding. Indicators
capturing how favourable the rules are for new/smaller parties were created and
their e¤ects were tested. Evidence in support of an e¤ect of both indicators was
found, with media access showing the strongest e¤ect. Finally, the costs of reaching
the electorate were hypothesized to vary according to such factors as size, density,
media structure. An indicator of such costs was identied (total advertising spending
corrected for di¤erences in economic wealth) and weak e¤ects on the number of new
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parties winning votes were identied. Finally, multivariate analyses were made. No
interactive e¤ects of the three barriers could be identied and in combination they
only explained a small amount of the observed variance in new voting winning parties.
The third barrier - the representation barrier - stems from the failure of electoral
systems to translate vote shares into equivalent seat shares. A property, which is
probably one of the most well described in the eld of political science. The extent
of the distortions introduced by electoral systems di¤ers considerably across systems
and a number of di¤erent indicators have been proposed to capture the disadvan-
tage these impose on the opportunities for smaller parties to obtain representation.
In order to address di¢ culties related to the denition and practical estimation of
some of these indicators, a new indicator of the electoral barrier, the Threshold of
Proportionality, was developed. The validity of this indicator was tested against em-
pirical evidence and found to perform better both on direct (observed discrepancies
in vote/seat-shares) and indirect (e¤ect on the party system) evidence of validity.
Finally, the e¤ects of the representation barrier, thus measured, were tested on the
number of new parties participating, winning votes and seats. The strongest e¤ects
were observed for the number of new seat-winning parties where a clear reduction
could be observed. For the number of vote-winning parties, the barrier only appeared
to have an e¤ect on the smallest of these and no real e¤ect on the category of elec-
torally successful parties. Reductive e¤ects on the number of parties participating
in elections could also be observed.
The nal barrier - the accessibility barrier - essentially addresses the same ques-
tion as the representation barrier. That is, how di¢ cult it is for new parties to
obtain representation. The question was in this case answered by considering both
electoral behaviour and formal rules, however. As argued, electorates can be more
or less rmly committed to certain parties, and the higher the degree of partisan
loyalty voters evince, the lower the chances that new parties may be able to attract
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electoral support. The actual level of vote switching was used as an indicator of this
phenomenon and the total volatility observed for the countries was examined. It was
found to vary signicantly across countries, but also to exhibit a common tendency
to increase in the last decade of the period. The accessibility barrier was then con-
structed by dividing the scores for total volatility by the threshold of proportionality,
and the resulting measure then tells us whether - and how far - the number of avail-
able voters exceeds the amount necessary to make new party entry into parliament
a realistic scenario. Finally, the e¤ects of the accessibility barrier were tested on
the number of new seat-winning parties. Signicant and moderately negative e¤ects
on the number of new parties winning seats were observed. Taking the degree of
vote switching into account only resulted in a marginal improvement in the variance
explained as compared to using the representation barrier alone, however.
7.2 Combined E¤ects of the Barriers
A proper assessment of the strength of the barriers requires taking the analysis a step
further than the analysis of bivariate relationships permit. The relative strength and
nature of the individual barriers as well as their joint e¤ects e¤ects on the entry of new
parties can only be properly evaluated if they are analysed in a single model. In the
following, three di¤erent types of questions regarding the the barriers will therefore
be investigated by means of multivariate models. The purpose of the rst such model
is to evaluate the relative strength of the individual barriers as well as their their
combined e¤ects on the entry of new parties. The second set of multivariate tests
will explore the question of whether barriers have interaction e¤ects. As will be
discussed in more detail below, it is likely that there is an added barrier e¤ect when
several barriers are high as compared to the situation when several are low. Finally,
the question of non-linear e¤ects of the barriers will be examined by investigating
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the impact of the barriers at di¤erent levels as well as by means of statistical tests
of non-linearity.
Since two di¤erent measures were made of the barrier to obtain seats, namely the
representation and the accessibility barriers, these will be analysed in separate models
with the two other barriers of registration and recognition. The latter barrier will be
represented by the three indicators created for direct communication costs (i.e. access
to media, access to nance and costs of reaching voters). As discussed in chapter
4, only the indicators of direct communication costs showed signs of the expected
impact in the bivariate analysis and only these are therefore included here. The ve
cases that were excluded on methodological grounds from certain of the preceding
bivariate tests are also exluded in the following statistical analysis1. Finally, while the
bivariate analyses were conducted with missing values for the independent variables
of access to media and nance, these are here replaced by mean values to avoid that
many cases are excluded from the analyses2. In the case of the registration barrier,
some missing values were due to lack of information for an earlier decade. When this
was the case, the score assigned to subsequent decade was used in the expectation
that the legislation would not have been subject to drastical changes. Otherwise
mean values were assigned3.
Two separate analyses are made. The rst set of tests assesses the impact of
1In ve cases electoral systems were subjected to major reforms leading to signicant
increases/decreases in the Threshold of Proportionality mid-decade. These include France
in the 1950s and 1980s, as well as Italy, Japan and New Zealand in the 1990s. The average
values for these decades therefore do not reect the actual representation barrier. The cases
of Italy and Japan in the 1990s were also excluded from the analyses of the recognition
barrier due to the major changes in the party system (and abnormally high rate of new
party entry) - see 4.2.3.
2For example, the average score on media access replaces the missing value.
3For an assessments of the e¤ects of this approach, the rst multivariate analysis was
conducted with the missing values. The regression results did not deviate much from the
one where missing values were replaced and the approach would therefore seem sound (see
tables in appendix E.1.).
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the three barriers of registration, recognition and representation, and the second
tests the e¤ects of the registration, recognition and accessibility barriers. Since the
representation and accessibility barriers were suggested as indicators of the same,
namely the barrier to obtaining seats, and furthermore overlap in measurement, it
makes little sense to include them in the same model. Finally, it should be noted
that the assumptions of the statistical techniques used concerning the nature of the
data are not met. The lack of multivariate techniques for ordinal variables makes it
necessary to move outside the methodological comme il faut. The results obtained
must naturally be evaluated in light of this fact.
7.2.1 The Barriers to Entry I: The Registration, Recognition
and Representation Barriers
The following multivariate model testing is intended to shed light on two questions.
The rst is how much of the variation in new party entry is explained by all the bar-
riers identied. The second is how much weight each individual barrier has when the
inuence of the other barriers is taken into account. The hypothesis that the barriers
reduce the number of new parties winning votes and seats will be tested with the fol-
lowing model where the recognition barrier is represented by indicators of conditions
for access to media, nance and the costs of reaching voters: Number of NewParties
=0+ 1registration+ 2media+ 3nance+ 4reachvoters+ 5representation+"
As can be seen from the results of the multivariate regression analysis of the
barriers summarized in table 7.1, the model explains as much as 12 to 21 pct of
the variation in number of new vote winning parties Moreover, the models pass
the test of signicance. The barriers to do not contribute equally to explaining
each of the dependent variables, however, nor do they always appear to pull in the
expected direction. The strongest predictor is the recognition barrier where the
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct >1 pct >4 pct
Registration Barrier -0.15 -0.12  0.09  0.03
Recognition Barriers:
Access to Media -0.32** -0.24* -0.37** -0.24*
Access to Finance  0.00 -0.06  0.11 -0.07
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.06
Representation Barrier -0.06  0.01 -0.39** -0.23
Constant 1.49** 0.66** 0.95** 0.52**
R2 0.21** 0.12* 0.34** 0.16**
N=91
Dependent Variable: New Parties
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
The Barriers to Entry I
OLS regression with standardized coefficients.
Vote Winning Seat Winning
Table 7.1: The Barriers to Entry I: The Impact on New Party Entry
conditions for access to media display fairly strong negative e¤ects on the number
of new vote winners. Only the coe¢ cents for the small vote winners pass tests of
signicance, however. The costs of reaching voters also appears to play a reductive
role, albeit a weak one. Evidence that access to nance matters to new party entry
is virtually absent, however. In addition to the recognition barrier, the registration
barrier appears to play a weakly reductive role. However, as discussed in the bivariate
analysis, it is plausible that the observed e¤ect of the registration barrier is mainly
the result of the high barriers in a few countries. Finally, there is scant evidence
that representation plays a role for reducing the number of new contenders. This
nding conrms the conclusions of the bivariate analysis, but it is surprising that the
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representation barrier does not appear to play even a weak role. As discussed, we
could expect deterrent e¤ects of the representation barrier on both party formation
and voter support for new parties. Instead, the registration and recognition barrier
- represented by access to media and less so by the costs of reaching voters - emerge
as the important factors for entry to competition for votes. It should be observed,
however, that the explained variance in the model is notably reduced if the U.S. is
removed from the data-set, and the coe¢ cients are weakened although the direction
remains the same4.
More powerful results are obtained for the category of seat-winning parties where
a very high 34 pct of the variance in the number of parties winning 1 pct of the
seats is explained by the barriers compared to 16 pct for the number obtaining at
least 4 pct of the seats. The fact that it is possible to explain more variation is
only to be expected since all three barriers potentially exert a direct inuence on
the number of seat-winners. Moreover, the representation barrier has very tangible
mechanical e¤ects on party representation, which can be expected to reduce the
number of new parties successfully entering. It is therefore not surprising that the
representation barrier emerges as the most powerful determinant of the number of
seat-winning parties, although it is almost equal to the conditions for access to media
when it comes to explaining the number of parties winning over 4 pct. The access
to media exposure is also a strong - and signicant - determinant of the number of
parties winning 1 pct of the seats. The fact that the standardized coe¢ cients for this
predictor are stronger for the number of seat-winning parties than for the number
of vote-winning ones is not immediately intelligible, however. The costs of reaching
voters appears to have a weak but consistently negative e¤ect on the number parties
winning representation. The registration barrier and access to nance display tiny
4As the U.S., was seen to inuence the bivariate results of the recognition barrier
strongly. Removing this case from the data set yields the following R2 across the cate-
gories; Vote-winning: >1pct: 0.16, >4 pct.: 0.08.
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and in some cases even positive coe¢ cients and there is therefore no evidence to
support that they play a role. Removing the U.S. from the data set makes little
di¤erence to the results. The explained variance remains largely the same, but it
should be noted that the coe¢ cients of the costs of reaching voters turn positive5.
The overall conclusion that can be drawn on basis of these results is that access to
media is the main determining factor for the number of vote-winning parties, while
the number of seat-winning parties is predicted by both access to media and the
representation barrier. In fact, for the number of vote-winners, the conditions for
media access explain 13 pct. (>1pct) and 7 pct (>4 pct) of the variance on its own
with both models and coe¢ cients passing tests of signicance6. It clearly appears as
the strongest, but not the only factor that matters. For the number of seat-winners,
however, the representation barrier and media access together explain 32 pct and 16
pct of the variance and also in this case the ndings also pass tests of signicance7.
In this case, there is thus little evidence to support that other barriers matter to
prevent entry.
Interaction E¤ects
The next question is whether the barriers have interaction e¤ects. While one barrier
on its own may accomplish little in terms of preventing entry, there is a distinct
possibility that barriers have synergistic e¤ects. Simultaneously high registration,
recognition and representation barriers may e¤ectively prevent entry, while a mix of
high and low barriers may o¤er established parties much less protection from new
5The multivariate analysis without the U.S. returns the following R2values: Seat-
winning: >1pct: 0.31**, > 4 pct.: 0.14*.
6The coe¢ cients for media access to predict the number of vote-winning parties are
-0.36* (>1pct) and -0.26* (>4 pct).
7Predicting the number of seat-winners of >1pct and >4pct respectively, the standard-
ized coe¢ cients for media access are -0.34**/0.24* and for the representation barrier they
are s -0.38**/-0.26*.
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competitive threats. In other words, the may be an added e¤ect over and above the
sum of the individidual barrier e¤ects.
A simple test - blind to the evidence of the relative importance of the barriers that
emerged in the multivariate analysis above - is rst taken. That is, all the barriers are
considered potentially important for the interaction e¤ect. In order to test the hy-
pothesis, the same procedure described earlier (see 4.4.4.) was followed8; Each of the
variables were transformed into z-scores and an interaction term dened as the prod-
uct of the z-scores of the barrier indicators was created9. The hypothesis that there
are interaction e¤ects of all the barriers is tested with the following model: Number of
New Parties = 0+1( registration media  finance  reachvoters  representation)
+2registration +3media +4nance +5reachvoters+6representation+"
The result of the multivariate regression with the interaction term and the in-
dicators representing the three barriers are presented in table 7.2. As can be seen,
there is no evidence of a general interaction e¤ect. The coe¢ cents for the interaction
term are positive across all the categories of new parties indicating an e¤ect contrary
to the expected. None are signicant, however.
It is possible that a mistake is made by including all the barrier variables in
the interaction term. As demonstrated by the multivariate analysis above, not all
barrier measures have the same e¤ect on party entry. It may therefore simply distort
the results to consider all barrier variables relevant to the question. Before entirely
dismissing the idea that there may be interactive e¤ects, it is therefore necessary to
design a more discriminating test which only considers interaction e¤ects between
the strongest barrier indicators, namely the representation barrier and access to
8The method is described in Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical
Analysisby Brambor, Clark and Golder. Political Analysis (2006) 14:63-82. An example
of the procedure can also be found in Tavits (2004).
9A z-score is also known as a standardized value. To obtain z-scores for a variable,
for each case the variables mean value is subtracted and then divided by the standard
deviation.
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct >1 pct >4 pct
Interaction Term  0.35  0.11  0.09  0.23
(Registration•Media•Finance•
Registration Barrier -0.36 -0.19 0.05 -0.11
Access to Media -0.39** -0.26* -0.39** -0.28*
Access to Finance -0.03 -0.07 0.10 -0.08
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.23 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14
Representation Barrier -0.06 0.02 -0.39** -0.23
Constant 1.37** 1.42** 0.92** 0.47**
R2 0.23* 0.13 0.34** 0.17*
N=91
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
The Barriers to Entry I
OLS regression with standardized coefficients.
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Vote Winning Seat Winning
Reach•Representation)
Table 7.2: The Barriers to Entry I: Interaction E¤ects
media. Interaction e¤ects of the two are most likely to occur at the level of entry
into parliaments since both directly inuence the number of new parties that obtain
representation. An interaction term dened as the product of the representation
barrier and access to media was therefore made. Following the same procedure
as above, the interaction term is analysed in a multivariate regression model with
the two original barrier variables. The model that is to test the hypothesis is the
following: Number of New Parties = 0+ 1(media  representation)+ 2media+
3representation + "
Evidence supporting the hypothesis that the representation barrier and conditions
for state guaranteed media access have interactive e¤ects fail to materialize, however.
As seen in table 7.3, the coe¢ cients for the interaction term are positive contrary to
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct
Interaction Term  0.03  0.23
(Media•Representation)
Access to Media -0.32**  -0.31*
Representation Barrier -0.39** -0.22*
Constant  0.93**  0.54**
R2  0.32**  0.17*
N=91
** p<0.01; * p<0.05 (two-tailed)
The Barriers to Entry I
OLS regression with standardized coefficients.
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Seat Winning
Table 7.3: The Barriers to Entry I: Interaction E¤ects of Strong Barriers
what was expected. The results therefore do not then lend support to the hypothesis
that the barriers have joint e¤ects over and above the sum of their individual ones.
Barrier E¤ects at Di¤erent Barrier Levels and Non-Linear E¤ects
The nal question that will be considered is whether the strength of one barrier de-
pends on the level of another. In the analysis so far we have examined the e¤ects of
the barriers with all cases as a single group under the implicit assumption that the
indicators have independent and linear e¤ects on the dependent variables. However,
it is possible that the level of one barrier matters for the strength of the impact of
another. Likewise, it is not granted that all variation in barriers matters equally
for prediction of the number of new parties. In concrete terms, it is possible to
hypothesize that the recognition barrier plays a di¤erent role in systems where it is
generally di¢ cult for small parties to gain representation compared to systems o¤er-
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ing easier access to parliament. Firstly, when the prospects of winning representation
are good, it may be easier for new parties to attract resources for campaigns from
private sponsors. It is reasonable to expect that sponsors are generally less inclined
to lend support to parties whose prospects of winning representation and inuence
are bleak. Secondly, as discussed in chapter 4, it is probable that media covering
elections give more coverage to new parties exactly when they may win access to the
representative institutions. In such systems they are more likely to be perceived as
relevant political players and therefore newsworthy. There is therefore no reason to
believe that the inuence of the recognition barrier is the same independent of the
characteristics of the electoral system. Moreover, the same increase in the electoral
threshold may have a di¤erent e¤ect when the level is high than when it is low. It is
not di¢ cult to imagine that an increase from 5-15 pct threshold to obtain represen-
tation has a stronger negative e¤ects on new party competition than one from 15-25
pct. On the one hand, increases in the lower range are likely to inuence voters more
strongly because those electors who are strategically motivated can be expected to
respond to the increasing chances that their vote will be wasted on a party with
thin prospects of winning representation. On the other hand, electors casting their
vote for new parties when the threshold is already high are unlikely to be moved
by further increases simply because such strategic considerations are unlikely weigh
heavily in their decision-making process. If such consideration had played a strong
role, they would be unlikely to support new parties in the rst place.
In order to investigate this, the cases were divided into two groups; One group
where the Representation Barrier is high (Tpro> 8 pct) and one where it is low (Tpro<
8 pct). The threshold value of 8 pct was chosen to have approximately the same
number of cases in each group, which is necessary to limit the problem that very few
cases in the di¤erent ordinal categories of access to media and nance determine the
relationship (see frequency tables in appendix E.2.). Since there are good reasons
to believe that the registration barrier plays a role for only a limited number of
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct >1 pct >4 pct
Access to Media -0.25 -0.17 -0.27* -0.07
Access to Finance  0.23  0.07 0.25 -0.00
Costs of Reaching Voters  0.16  0.05 -0.01 -0.00
Representation -0.24 -0.18 -0.40** -0.29
Constant 0.49  0.04 -1.36  0.66
R2  0.16  0.08  0.30**  0.10
N=49 (<Tpro 8 pct)
Vote Winning Seat Winning
** p<0.01; * p<0.05 (two-tailed); Standardized coefficients reported
OLS Regression: Cases with LOW Representation Barrier
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Table 7.4: The Barriers to Entry I: Impact when the Representation Barrier is Low
cases, it is left out of the following analysis. The rst analysis looks at the e¤ect of
the recognition barrier indicators and the representation barrier itself among cases
where the representation barrier is low. The model used to test the hypothesized
relationship can be written as follows: Number of New Parties = 0+ 1media +
2nance+ 3reachvoters+ representation+ "
As can be seen from the regression results summarized in table 7.4, media access is
the only of the recognition barrier indicators that appears to have an e¤ect somewhat
comparable to that observed in the multivariate analysis (see table 7.1). It is a much
weaker predictor here, however, and for the number of seat winners obtaining at
least 4 pct of the seats the coe¢ cient observed is very small. The only exception
is for the number of seat-winners obtaining at least 4 pct of the seats where the
coe¢ cient is very small. The coe¢ cients for access to nance and costs of reaching
voters are all in the wrong direction and thus evidently do not play a role. However,
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct >1 pct >4 pct
Access to Media -0.36* -0.27 -0.38** -0.40**
Access to Finance -0.19 -0.20 -0.04 -0.14
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.34* -0.31* -0.08 -0.09
Representation -0.09 -0.09 -0.42** -0.27
Constant  1.69**  0.77**  1.02** 0.67**
R2  0.30**  0.24*  0.40**  0.31**
N=42 (>Tpro 8 pct)
OLS Regression: Cases with HIGH Representation Barrier
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Vote Winning Seat Winning
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 (two-tailed); Standardized coefficients reported
Table 7.5: The Barriers to Entry I: Impact when the Representation Barrier is High
the representation barrier appears to reduce the number of new parties winning
votes in this group as expected. The coe¢ cients are negative and moderately strong,
which was not the case when its general e¤ects on all cases were considered. The
coe¢ cients for predicting the number of seat winners are almost the same as those
seen in the multivariate analysis including all cases above. In terms of variance
explained for the number of vote winning parties, this is nearly halved compared to
the analysis including all cases. For the number of seat winning parties the diminished
explanatory power is only notable for the category of parties winning at least 4 pct.
The question is what picture emerges when we repeat the same analysis in the group
where the represenation barrier is high. The results of this analysis are summarized
in table 7.5.
As seen from the regression results (table 7.5), the recognition barrier appears
to play a much more prominent role when the level of the representation barriers is
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high. All three indicators have notable negative e¤ects on the number of new parties
winning votes. The conditions for media access plays a much stronger role here as
evidenced by the larger coe¢ cients. The access to nance now also appears to play a
part in determining the number of vote winners, as does the costs of reaching voters.
Only the coe¢ cients for the latter pass tests of signicance, however. Even if the
U.S. is excluded from the group (as this might be suspected to unduly inuence the
size of the coe¢ cients), all three indicators return negative coe¢ cients although in
the case of costs of reaching voters, they no longer pass tests of signicance10. The
results are thus relatively robust11. The representation barrier also clearly plays a
weaker role in reducing the number of vote winning parties than in the group above
(coe¢ cients 2-3 times smaller). Finally, the variance explained for the number of
vote winners is very high. As much as 30 pct is explained in the case of the smallest
vote winners and for the more successful ones obtaining at least 4 pct of the votes,
the model still accounts for 23 pct of the variance. Exluding the U.S. brings the
number down 6-7 pct in each case, which is still high. The number of seat winning
parties is even better explained by the model with 40 pct of the variance for the small
vote winners explained compared to 31 pct of the successful seat winners. Here the
representation barrier itself and the access to media clearly play leading roles, as was
also seen in the other analyses. The coe¢ cients observed for the access to nance
and particularly for the costs of reaching voters are smaller as well as insignicant.
Moreover, the U.S. plays a strong role for the coe¢ cients here. If the U.S. cases
10Analysis without the US. >1 pct. vote winners: The R2 drops to 23 pct and costs of
Reach fall to -0.19 (not signicant). The other coe¢ cients remain at the same level. >4
pct vote winners: R2 falls to 16 pct and the coe¢ cients are close to the above.
11Since the cases where the registration barrier is likely to play a role are concentrated
in this group, the analysis was repeated including this indicator. For the number of vote-
winners the registration barrier displays a weak to moderate negative e¤ect, and the (-0.19;
-0.16). The coe¢ cients for costs of reaching voters are reduced to - 0.19 and -0.20, while
the access to nance remains at the same level. Exclusion of the U.S. leads to drop in
coe¢ cients to -0.13 for costs of voters, but the others remain at the same level. The
ndings would thus appear solid.
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are removed, the R2 remains almost the same (2-3 pct. lower), but the direction
of the costs of reaching voters coe¢ cients become positive. The the latter factors
hardly play a role for explaining the number of seat-winners considering the high
representation barrier should not surprise us.
The results thus provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that the recognition
barrier plays a stronger role when the conditions for access to the representative
institutions are less favourable to smaller parties. The hypothesized non-linear e¤ect
of the representation barrier on the number of vote-winning parties was also validated
by the results. The reductive e¤ect of increases in the representation barrier appear
to be stronger in the lower range indicating that strategic desertion from new parties
occur here. When the barrier to representation is already high, changes do not
matter much. The same pattern was not observable for the number of seat winning-
parties where we also expect a more straightforward linear mechanical e¤ect. It
should of course be borne in mind that the coe¢ ents observed were all small. In
order to check whether this is indeed the case or might be articially caused by the
way in which the groups were dened, it is possible to make an additional statistical
test on non-linearity. The presence of non-linear causal e¤ects can be identied
by squaring the representation barrier variable and entering it as a predictor in a
regression model alongside the representation barrier itself (Gujarati, 2003: 226). If
the coe¢ cients for the squared term are strong (and signicant), this is an indication
that non-linear e¤ects are indeed present12. The model used to test the hypothesized
non-linear e¤ects in the representation barrier can be written as follows: Number of
New Parties = 0+ 1representation+ 2representation
2+"
12The following interpretation of results are given: If 1 is positive and 2 negative, it
indicates a parabolic e¤ect in shape of \. That is x has a positive e¤ect on y until a certain
threshold level and then the relationship is reversed. If 1 is negative and 2 positive,
the opposite is the case (i.e. [ shaped). If both coe¢ cients are positive or negative,
it implies that the curve does not change direction, but accellerates or decelerates (see
http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/soc203a/nonlin.html)
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>1 pct >4 pct
Representation Barrier2 -0.12 -0.15  0.09  0.05
Representation Barrier -0.18 -0.06 -0.53** -0.28
Constant  1.6**  0.75**  0.83**  0.54**
R2  0.09* 0.04  0.21**  0.10**
N=91
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed); Standardized Coefficients
OLS Regression - Non-Linear Effects
Regressor
Seat Winning
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Vote Winning
Table 7.6: Non-Linear E¤ects of the Representation Barrier
As seen from the results of the regression analysis summarized in table 7.6, the
expectations concerning the nature of the causal e¤ects are conrmed. For the num-
ber of vote winning parties the squared representation barrier is a strong predictor
- relatively speaking. For the number of small vote winners it is only a bit weaker
than the normal term, while it is three times stronger in determining the group of
successful new parties. Negative coe¢ cents for both the squared and normal predic-
tors indicate a decelerating non-linear e¤ect. That is, strong e¤ects of increases in
the beginning that wear o¤ as values get higher. None of the coe¢ cients are very
high nor are they signicant, which should not surprise us as the representation bar-
rier does not explain much of the variance observed. It would probably require a
di¤erent set of dependent variables - taking vote shares as such rather than numbers
over certain threshold values - to fully capture the e¤ect.
Turning to the number of seat-winning parties, the di¤erence is clear. Here the
squared representation barrier displays only weak - and positive - coe¢ cients that
are around 6 times smaller than those associated with the normal representation
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barrier. This means in e¤ect that all variation in the barrier matters equally for
the number of seat winners, and it is highly likely that the observed e¤ects stem
from its mechanical properties rather than from psychological deterrent e¤ects. As
observed on the e¤ect on the number of vote winning parties, such e¤ects are higly
limited. The rationale behind expecting a non-linear e¤ect of the electoral threshold
lies mainly in its possible deterrent e¤ect on electoral support.
7.2.2 The Barriers to Entry II: The Registration, Recogni-
tion and Accessibility Barriers
The next multivariate model considers the impact of the accessibility barrier with
the two other barriers of registration and recognition. Apart from the value of as-
sessing the relative importance of the accessibility barrier vis-á-vis the other barriers,
the following analysis also serves the purpose of evaluating whether the ndings re-
garding the contribution of the registration and recognition barrier indicators hold
up when the nal barrier indicating the barrier of entry to parliament is di¤erently
measured. Since the indicators of the representation and accessibility barrier are not
very highly correlated (Pearsons R: 0.44), this is not a trivial question. Only the
impact on the number of seat winning parties is investigated since the construction
of the the accessibility barrier means that it is only a meaningful predictor for entry
into parliament (see chapter 6). In the subsequent analyses, the indicator of the
accessibility barrier is reversed to make higher values correspond to a higher barrier
like the other measures. The model used to test the hypothesis that the three barri-
ers reduce the number of new parties winning seats is the following: Number of New
Seat Winning Parties = 0 + 1registration +2media +3nance +4reachvoters
+5accessibility +"
The results of the multivariate regression analysis are summarized in table 7.7.
284
Chapter 7. Do the Barriers to Entry Matter?
>1 pct >4 pct
Registration Barrier  -0.05  -0.06
Access to Media -0.30** -0.18
Access to Finance  0.11 -0.06
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.14 -0.07
Accessibility Barrier -0.34** -0.24*
Constant 0.94** 0.51**
R2 0.33** 0.17**
N=91
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed); Standardized coeff.reported
OLS regression with standardized coefficients.
Regressor
Seat Winning
The Barriers to Entry II
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Table 7.7: The Barriers to Entry II: The Impact on New Party Entry
The results - in terms of variance explained, direction and strength of coe¢ cients -
are comparable to those obtained in the regression model where the representation
barrier lls the place of the accessibility barrier13. The coe¢ cients for the accessibility
barrier are moderately strong, signicant and virtually identical to those observed
for the representation barrier. Also here media access is a strong predictor while
the e¤ects of access to nance are best described as erratic; weakly negative in the
model predicting the number of successful seat winners and positive as predictor for
the number winning at least 1 pct of the seats. The costs of reaching voters gives
13One case, the U.S., has earlier been seen to inuence the results strongly. Removing
this case from the data set yields the following R2 across the categories; Vote-winning:
>1pct: 0.12, >4 pct.: 0.10. Seat-winning: >1pct: 0.30, >4 pct 0.14. Moreover all except
the number of parties winning at least 4 pct of the votes pass tests of signicance at the 1
or 5 pct level.
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evidence only of a feeble e¤ect, but here it is at least in the expected direction. It
is clear that the variance explained depends mainly on the accessibility barrier and
the access to media14.
Interaction E¤ects
As discussed above, it is possible that barriers interact and create syngergistic e¤ects.
That is they have joint e¤ect that are stronger than the sum of the individual ones.
In the analysis above, no interaction e¤ect was identied. So is there is any reason
to expect it will be any di¤erent here? The anwer to this is yes. It is in fact highly
plausible that the recognition barrier plays a much greater role when willingness
among voters to switch to another party is higher and possibilities for obtaining
representation for new parties at the same time are better. It is therefore necessary
to test the hypothesis.
In light of previous ndings, the registration barrier is left out of the analysis and
the interaction term dened as the product of the three recognition barrier variables
and the accessibility barrier (i.e. of their z-scores15) and entered in a multivariate
regression model to explain the number of seat-winning parties16. The model used
to test the hypothesis is the following: Number of New Seat Winning Parties = 0+
1(mediafinancereachvotersaccessibility)+2media +3nance +4reachvoters
+5accessibility +"
As can be seen from the results of the analysis in table 7.8, the evidence of an
14A model with only access to media and the accessibility barrier explain 29 pct of the
variance in the number of small seat winners, while they explain 15 pct of the variance for
the larger ones.
15The accessbility barrier scores are reversed so that higher scores are associated with a
stronger barrier as is the case for the other two.
16A similar analyses with an interaction term dened as the product of the registration,
recognition and accessibility barriers was also made. No evidence of an interaction e¤ect
was found in this case, however.
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct
Interaction Term -0.38* -0.36*
(=media•finance•reach•accessibility)
Access to Media -0.33** -0.36*
Access to Finance  0.09 -0.08
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.13 -0.07
Accessibility Barrier -0.65** -0.53*
Constant  1.03**  0.58**
R2  0.37**  0.21**
N=91
** p<0.01; * p<0.05
The Barriers to Entry II
OLS regression with standardized coefficients.
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Seat Winning
Table 7.8: The Barriers to Entry II: Interaction E¤ects
interaction e¤ect is strong in this case. The coe¢ cents for the interaction term are
negative, strong and signicant for both dependent variables. Moreover, it is the
second strongest predictor of the batch. The other predictors largely behave as we
would expect them to. The strongest predictor is clearly the accessibility barrier while
the third strongest predictor is the conditions for access to media. The two other
dimensions of the recognition barrier again do not pull much weight in the model.
Compared to a model excluding the interaction term, but keeping the other variables
implies a loss of 4 pct in variance explained for both dependent variables (R2= 0.33
and 0.17 for the smallest and largest respectively). The model thus provides relatively
strong validation of the presence of an interaction e¤ect.
As discussed above, the observed interaction e¤ect could indicate that the impact
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct
Interaction Term  -0.22* - 0.13
(=media•finance•reach•volatility)
Access to Media -0.38**  -0.23*
Access to Finance -0.08 -0.08
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.17 -0.09
Total Volatility (Reversed) -0.16 -0.31**
Constant  1.50**  0.66**
R2  0.27**  0.23**
N=91
The Barriers to Entry II
OLS regression with standardized coefficients.
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Seat Winning
** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Table 7.9: Interaction E¤ects of Recognition Barriers and Total Volatility
of the conditions for campaigning is reinforced when voters are willing to change their
position. If this hypothesis is indeed correct, we should also be able to identify an
interaction e¤ect of the recognition barriers and total volatility in predicting the
number of new vote-winning parties. In order to check this, an interaction term
dened as the product of the three recognition barrier variables and total volatility
(reversed) was made and the same procedure as that above followed17: Number of
New Seat Winning Parties = 0 + 1(media  finance  reachvoters  volatility) +
2media +3nance +4reachvoters +5volatility +"
As can been seen from table 7.9, the results of the multivariate regression analysis
lend support to the hypothesis. The interaction factor is negative for both dependent
17The z- scores of the Vtotare reversed in order to make it as the other barriers, where
higher scores are associated with higher barriers.
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variables, although it is not very strong for the number of electorally successful
parties. For the smaller parties it has a notable - and signicant - reductive e¤ect,
however. Moreover, all the other predictors in the model perform as we would expect.
The access to media again proves to be the strongest of the recognition barrier
variables, while nancial support and costs of reaching voters once again appear
to be less important. The total volatility is, not surprisingly, also determining for
the number of new parties winning votes. Compared to a model with the same
variables but without the interaction term, more of the variance is explained. For
the number of new parties gaining at least 1 pct of the votes excluding the interaction
term implies a loss of 4 pct variance explained (R2 =0.23), while for the number of
electorally successful parties it is only 2 pct less (R2 = 21 pct). The ndings thus lend
support the hypothesis that higher electoral availability enhances the importance of
the recognition barrier.
Barrier E¤ects at Di¤erent Barrier Levels
Following the same line of reasoning as above, the nal tests examine whether the
impact of the recognition barrier variables depends on the level of the accessibility
barrier and furthermore whether the e¤ect of the accessibility barrier itself varies
according to its own level. As evidenced by the results of the analysis of the barriers
to entry I, the assumption of linearity does not necessarily hold up to closer scrutiny.
In order to investigate the presence of this type of inter-dependent and non-linear
e¤ect here, a similar procedure to the one taken above was followed; the cases were
divided into two groups. The rst group of cases (lowaccessibility barrier) have
volatility levels that exceed the threshold of proportionality (Abar>1) and in the
other (high accessibility barrier) the total volatility falls short of the threshold
value (Abar<1). As the accessibility barrier was dened as total volatility over the
threshold of proportionality (Abar=Vtot=Tpro), it follows that higher values imply
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct
Access to Media -0.28 -0.02
Access to Finance  0.20  0.04
Costs of Reaching Voters -0.06  0.06
Accessibility Barrier -0.32* -0.25
Constant  1.15**  0.80**
R2  0.27**  0.07
N=44 (Abar>1)
OLS Regression: Cases with 'LOW' Accessibility Barrier
Dependent Variable: New Parties
Seat Winning
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; Standardized coefficients are reported
Table 7.10: The Barriers to Entry II: Impact when Accessibility Barrier is Low
easier access rather than the other way around. The scores were reversed here as
also done above, so that it behaves as other barriers and the results are easier to
understand and compare with the previous ones. A lowaccessibility barrier thus
signies higher Abar scores and vice versa. The following model is then used to test
the hypothesized e¤ects: Number of New Seat Winning Parties = 0 + 1media
+2nance +3reachvoters +4accessibility +"
As seen from table 7.10, the only consistent and fairly strong predictor in the
model is the accessibility barrier itself. The access to media only appears to play
a role for the number of small seat winners. The latter category is also very well
accounted for by the model, while the number of successful seat winners is very
poorly predicted.
The model clearly does a better job of predicting both dependent variables when
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Regressor
>1pct >4 pct
Access to Media -0.28* -0.43**
Access to Finance  0.14  0.04
Costs of Reaching Voters  0.02  0.06
Accessibility Barrier -0.48** -0.18
Constant  3.4**  0.67**
R2  0.34**  0.31**
N=47 (Abar<1)
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; Standardized coefficients are reported
OLS Regression: Cases with 'HIGH' Accessibility Barrier
 Dependent Variable: New Parties
Seat Winning
Table 7.11: The Barriers to Entry II: Impact when Acessibility Barrier is High
the accessibility barrier is at a higher level as the regression results summarized in
table 7.11 testify to. The result thus conform to the pattern observed in the analyses
where the representation barrier is included instead of the accessibility barrier. It
would appear that more di¢ cult access to the representative institutions - however
measured - strengthen the role played by access to media. It should be noted that
also here there is no evidence here of any role played by access ot nance nor of costs
to reaching voters when predicting the number of seat-winners. This conrms earlier
ndings. However, it should be observed that the results for the access to nance are
particularly unreliable in this analysis as there are extremely few cases in the two
categories of favourable support (1 and 5) compared to the number of cases in the
other categories (26 and10) (see appendix E.2.).
When comparing the coe¢ cients for the accessibility barrier in the two groups,
a contradiction emerges, however. It is a much stronger predictor of the number of
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>1 pct >4 pct
Accessibility Barrier2 - 0.65**  -0.52**
Accessibility Barrier -1.04** -0.69**
Constant 1.06**  0.59**
R2  0.32**  0.19**
N=91
** p<0.01 level; * p<0.05 (two-tailed); Standardized Coefficents
OLS Regression - Non-Linear Effects
Regressor Dependent Variable: New Parties
Seat Winning
Table 7.12: Non-Linear E¤ects of the Accessibility Barrier
small seat winners in this group than it was in the other (-0.32/-0.48). But for the
group of successful seat winners, the exact opposite can be observed(-0.25/-0.18). It
is di¢ cult to nd a reasonable explanation for this. Moreover, the very high constant
in the rst model (2-3 times higher than the normally observed) gives reason to
speculate about the appropriateness of the model applied. One explanation for the
somewhat strange results may lie in the nature of the accessibility barrier itself. It is
possible that its properties do not t well in an analysis where linearity is assumed. In
order to identify the presence of non-linear e¤ects, the squared accessibility barrier
is entered in a multivariate regression model together with the usual accessibility
barrier measure (as also done above). The model used to test the hypothesis is
the following: The Number of New Seat Winning Parties = 0+ 1accessibility+
2accessibility
2+"
The results of the regression analysis designed to identify non-linear e¤ects show
beyond a shadow of a doubt that the accessibility barrier does not t in causal
models where linearity is assumed (see table 7.12) . The coe¢ cients of the squared
barrier term are extremely strong and highly signicant as are those of the normal
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barrier. The fact that both are strong and negative indicate that we are dealing
with a strongly non-linear negative e¤ect. Furthermore, the explained variance in
the model is very high. In fact, it alone explains the same as the accessibility barrier
and the access to media did together in the analysis above. These ndings strongly
suggest that statistical methods suited to deal with this type of causal e¤ects are
applied if the accessibility barrier is employed as an explanatory variable.
Conclusion
The analyses above allow us the draw the following conclusions; Firstly, the relatively
limited role of the registration barrier was conrmed. The results showed a mildly
depressing e¤ect on the number of vote-winning parties, but only inconsistently so
on the number of seat-winning parties (in some cases coe¢ cients were positive). In
no cases did the coe¢ cients pass tests of signicance. There is therefore no reason to
overturn the conclusions drawn on basis of the bivariate analysis that the registration
barrier is likely to matter only in a limited number of cases.
The recognition barrier, on the other hand, proved to be a factor to be reckoned
with. Its e¤ects were more evident when the inuence of other barriers were taken
into account than they seemed in the bivariate analysis. Moreover, its e¤ects were
inuenced by other barriers. On the one hand, it played a much stronger role in
cases with a high representation barrier than a low one. As discussed, the added role
of the conditions for campaigning may be caused by the greater di¢ culties involved
in getting media attention under such circumstances. On the other hand, there was
also evidence to suggest that the e¢ cacy of the recognition barrier was enhanced by
higher electoral availability. The all-dominant dimension in the recognition barrier -
the only one with consistently negative as well as fairly strong coe¢ ecients in virtually
all models - was state guaranteed access to media. It proved to be a potent predictor
for both the number of new vote- and seat-winning parties. It may be regarded as
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somewhat surprising that state guaranteed television time for new parties should
prove to have such a potent e¤ect. In addition to the obvious value derived from
getting such public exposure for free, it is possible to speculate that spill-over e¤ects
may be at work. That is, when new parties are given the opportunity to present
themselves on television, this may provide an occasion for media attention. Moreover,
the idea that providing all parties with an opportunity to present themselves to
voters is the task of the state could also be reected in the prevailing media ethos
in such countries. Media players may therefore also see it as their task to inform
voters of new alternatives. Such dynamics may explain why providing air time for
participating parties apparently has such far reaching e¤ects. The role played by
the costs of reaching voters was clearly much less important and its e¤ect was not
consistent across all dependent variables. It only really appeared to play a moderate
role for the groups of countries with high representation barrier where the e¤ect of
all recognition barrier variables was considerably enhanced. And then only for the
number of new vote-winners. As discussed earlier, it is possible that the barrier
e¤ect of increased costs of campaigning in larger countries is o¤-set by a stronger
tendency for parties to form compared to smaller countries. The two tendencies may
in fact cancel each other out. The e¤ects of access to nance, on the other hand,
could best be described as erratic as it often returned positive coe¢ cients. It only
evinced a moderate e¤ect in the expected direction in the group of countries with
a high representation barrier and here played a tiny role in predicting the number
of seat-winners. There is thus no evidence here to suggest that nancial support
provided to parties inuences the emergence and success of new competitors such as
suggested in the theory of the Cartel Party (Katz & Mair, 1995).
Thirdly, and conrming the ndings of the bivariate analysis, the representation
barrier proved to have but a small e¤ect on the number of new parties winning votes.
Apparently, voters are not much deterred by the prospects of not winning represen-
tation. Interestingly non-linear e¤ects were identied suggesting that increases in the
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representation barrier within a lower range has a mildly deterrent e¤ect, but that
similar changes at higher levels fail to register an e¤ect. The mechanical e¤ects on
preventing new parties from getting access to parliaments do not fail to show up in
the results. It was generally the strongest determinant of the number of new seat
winners, although the conditions for access to media was close behind. This e¤ect
was evidently completely linear.
Finally, the accessibility barrier also proved to be a potent predictor of the number
of new seat-winning parties. However, some odd e¤ects were discovered when its
performance at di¤erent levels were examined. As a consequence a test of non-
linearity showed that the indicator has very powerful non-linear e¤ects and that
using it as an independent variable requires methods suited to capture such e¤ects.
7.2.3 The Barriers to Entry: Secular Trends
Having discussed the e¤ects of the barriers, it is interesting to see whether one can
say anything about whether access to elections have become easier or more di¢ cult
over time in the group of countries studies here. Bowler, Carter and Farrel in their
study of electoral access conclude that `the general evolution of these rules (electoral
rules, ballot access, access to media) appears to have been towards a more liberal
environment for all political parties, which on the face of it suggests an easier ride
for small and/or new parties wishing to break into the system. (Bowler, Carter
and Farrel, 2003: 95). In order to compare these developments over time, the mean
values for each of the barriers per decade, as measured here, is presented in table
7.13.
As can be seen, the ndings of the analyses here, seconds the observation made
by Bowler, Carter and Farrel. The general trend is one towards lower barriers and
thus easier access. The strongest decline in any of the barriers over time is seen for
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Decade Registration Recognition Recognition Representation Accessibility
Media Finance
1950s Mean 68.4 3.0 13.8 1.7
N 9.0 17.0 18.0 18.0
Std. Dev. 132.1 0.0 13.4 2.3
1960s Mean 35.1 3.0 2.9 14.4 1.8
N 16.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0
Std. Dev. 77.7 1.1 0.7 13.7 2.8
1970s Mean 21.0 2.8 2.8 13.9 2.5
N 17.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0
Std. Dev. 53.9 1.2 0.9 13.7 4.7
1980s Mean 16.5 2.7 2.7 12.7 2.4
N 21.0 20.0 18.0 21.0 21.0
Std. Dev. 48.2 1.1 1.0 12.9 3.1
1990s Mean 16.7 2.8 2.6 12.6 3.5
N 19.0 20.0 18.0 21.0 21.0
Std. Dev. 50.0 1.2 1.0 12.1 5.9
Total Mean 26.5 2.8 2.8 13.4 2.4
N 82.0 77.0 89.0 96.0 96.0
Std. Dev. 69.4 1.1 0.8 12.9 4.0
The Barriers to Entry: Trends over Time
Table 7.13: The Barriers to Entry: Secular Trends
the registration barrier. As discussed earlier, the reason for this decline is not to
be found in conscious acts on the part of decision-makers to lower the requirements.
Rather, it can be directly attributed the decreasing real value of the sums originally
set for ballot access through payment of fees/deposits. Only in two countries (Japan
and Netherlands) was a contrary trend observed, and the strong general decline is
in reality caused by a few countries (U.K., France, Ireland). For petitions, the trend
has been towards an increase, these have generally been very modest, however (with
the exception of Denmark)18.
Regarding the recognition barrier, it is here represented by the indicators of free
access to media and conditions for subvention of political parties since a `static
measure of the costs of reaching voters was adopted. For the access to media, no
18As described, Denmark increases ballot access requirements from approximately 10.000
to 20.000 signatures in 1960.
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scores are reported for the 1950s since access to media was not a relevant score for
most countries in that decade. The average scores for media access was 3 in the
1960s and by the 1990s is was down to 2.8 implying a trend towards more favourable
conditions for access to television coverage for new parties. However, a small increase
in mean values from the 1980s to 1990s is observable and the direction is thus not
unequivally towards a more easy access. On the question of access to nance, there
is a clear and consistent trend towards a lowering of the barrier. The initial changes
reect the introduction of rules in the area, but as can be seen there is a general
tendency for party nance to be o¤ered to new and smaller parties also.
With respect to the Representation Barrier, there is a very small general tendency
towards a lowering of the threshold of proportionality. That is, for all the countries,
the average has been lowered 1.2 percentage points in the 1990s compared to the
1950s. However, this hardly expresses a general trend. Some countries, such as Italy
and Japan, introduced electoral reforms in the 1990s that resulted in signicant
increases in the threshold, while two countries, New Zealand and Greece, introduced
changes in the exact opposite direction. For the other countries, the changes in
electoral rules have been relatively minor and only resulted in a few percentage
points alteration of the thresholds (with the exception of France19)
Finally, the accessibility barrier clearly declines over time (corresponding to in-
creasing values), and since only minor changes are observed in the average threshold
values, this development can be attributed to the general increase in volatility levels
described earlier. Some of the increased volatility is certainly `circumstantialin the
sense that very high levels of vote switching was observed in connection with major
upheavals in the party systems of certain countries in the 1990s (Japan and Italy).
Nevertheless, the increase does represent a general trend (9 of 21 peak values are
observed in this decade) and it is probable that this phenomenon is a manifestation
19In France the electoral system changed from proportional to majoritarian in the 1950s.
And it has remained thus with a temporary reversal to proportional rules in the 1980s.
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Decade Participate
>0.5 distr. >1 pct >4 pct >1pct >4pct >1pct >0.5 distr.
1950s Mean 1,50 1,00 0,28 0,28 0,17 0,72 0,78
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Std. Dev. 0,24 1,14 0,46 0,46 0,38 0,83 0,73
1960s Mean 1,22 1,56 0,72 1,00 0,50 1,22 1,00
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Std. Dev. 0,14 1,15 0,75 1,14 0,79 0,88 1,19
1970s Mean 1,44 1,83 0,89 1,17 0,67 1,22 1,00
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Std. Dev. 0,13 1,62 0,96 1,34 1,03 0,94 0,77
1980s Mean 1,62 1,33 0,67 1,00 0,52 0,95 0,95
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Std. Dev. 0,14 1,06 0,66 1,00 0,60 0,80 0,67
1990s Mean 1,79 1,95 0,84 1,37 0,89 1,32 1,16
(All) (2.0) (2.43) (1.19) (1.86) (1.24) (1.52) (1.19)
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Std. Dev. 0,20 1,58 0,90 1,26 1,10 0,89 1,12
Total Mean 0,15 1,53 0,68 0,97 0,55 1,09 0,98
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Std. Dev. 0,17 1,34 0,78 1,12 0,84 0,88 0,90
Observed Entry of New Parties over Time
New Parties
Vote-Winning Seat-Winning Maximum
Table 7.14: Entry of New Parties per Decade
of a changed relationship between parties and the electorate, which signals greater
competition for votes between established parties as well as increased competition
from new ones.
In light of the overall trend for a lowering the barriers, it would be interesting
to observe, whether there is a corresponding increase in the number of new parties
participating, winning votes and seats over time. The average number of new parties
per decade is therefore presented in table 7.14. The number in brackets for the 1990s
represents the averages including also the two deviant cases of Japan and Italy.
The strongest decline of any of the barriers was observed for the registration
barrier. However, for the number of parties elding candidates in at least half of
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the electoral districts, there is no clear strong trend towards an increase, although
the number is highest in the 1990s. It is possible that the absence of a clear trend
towards increasing number is partly caused by a problem in the data. Looking at
the category of parties obtaining at least 1 pct of the votes (which was also used
as a complementary measure of participation) a clearer tendency towards a higher
number over the decades is observable. The 1980s represents an exception, however,
with lower averages than those observed for the previous two decades. A similar
trend is, in fact, observable across all measures of new parties. Higher averages
of vote-winning as well as seat-winning parties are observable for each subsequent
decade from the 1950s onwards - with a small reversal of this trend in the 1980s.
However, the 1990s returns the highest averages for all categories without exceptions.
These developments are unlikely to be accounted for by changes in the institutional
barriers described above, as would not seem large enough to produce such changes.
Instead it is likely that these developments are more strongly related to changes in
electoral behaviour. As noted, the accessibility barrier has strongly decreased as a
result of the higher levels of volatility observed.
7.3 Evaluating the Results: Questions Answered
and Questions Raised
Having revisited the ndings of each of the individual chapters, investigated combined
impact of the barriers on new party entry, and nally reviewed trends over time; it
is time to consider what the results signify. What questions have been answered in
the research, and what questions does it raise? The starting point of the research
was the role of barriers for party competition. The arguments reviewed considered
the potential impact on the behaviour of represented parties if these are shielded
from threats of new party entry. The question is whether the barriers found in the
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study o¤er the type of protection we would expect to inuence party behaviour. In
the following, this question will be discussed by addressing the question of how to
interpret the results. Firstly, there is the question of what we can learn from the
variance explained - and unexplained - about the role of the barriers. Secondly, what
is there to be learned from the outliers? Is there anything to be learned from looking
at the extreme cases of high barriers and low barriers? Or going backwards in the
causal chain - can anything be learned from looking at the cases where many new
parties have entered or those where few have? Having discussed these questions, we
are able to better assess the potential relevance of barriers to shaping competition.
7.3.1 Enough `Variance Explained?
As seen above, the barrier indicators developed successfully explained variation in
the number of new parties entering. Between 13 and 32 pct of the variance was
explained in the multivariate models. As expected, how well the barriers explain the
number of vote and seat winning parties di¤ers, but a clear relationship (independent
of extreme cases) was observed in each case (c.f. below). In this sense, the barrier
indicators developed are validated by the ndings, and we can conclude that higher
barriers to entry reduce the rate of entry of new parties.
However, even if the ndings are signicant there is a lot of variance, which is
not explained by the model. In order to evaluate the importance of this for the
role of the barriers in the democracies studied, it is useful to consider why there
is so much unexplained, and what the reasons behind this are. The rst possible
explanation lies within the parameters of the model itself. That is, as discussed in
chapter 2, measuring variation in the number of new parties necessitated using period
averages rather than single elections. This means that variation in the barriers is
lost, and this might reduce the predictive power of the model. For the registration
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barrier, the loss of variation is not grave, however. The requirements were found to
be stable, as well as unimportant to variation in participation, for most countries.
In the countries where ballot costs were seen to matter, and where major changes
in costs were observed, it is unlikely that explanatory force is lost by the use of
decade average costs. For two of the countries, France and Ireland, where costs
decreased as a result of a drop in the real value of money over time, the new parties
participating actually register at the beginning of the decades in question rather than
towards the end (where costs are therefore higher), and for the country where this
decline was strongest (U.K.), no parties enter at all during the period of the strongest
changes. For the representation barrier, signicant variation important for predicting
party entry is denitely lost, but only for relatively few cases. France (1950s&1980s)
and New Zealand, Greece, Italy and Japan in the 1990s. However, all but Greece
were omitted in the nal analyses due to the major changes of the electoral system
mid-decade (and in two cases major changes in the party system). The increase in
variance explained by a more nely tuned approach would therefore be limited. For
the recognition barrier, it is possible that more variation is lost. Rules for access to
nance and media were changed mid-decade for many countries, and whether party
entry occurred at elections before or after the changes is not captured by the model.
It would take a closer analysis of the data to investigate whether we miss important
information by using decade scores. However, it is probably fair to say that we would
not make strides in terms of improved prediction by adopting an approach, which
captures more variation.
It is more likely that examining the limits of the model contributes to understand-
ing the `unexplained. Firstly, a model explaining all the observed variance would
necessarily be one in which all variation in the independent variable matters. But,
in the world we study this is highly unrealistic. As was particularly evident in the
study of the registration barrier, it is highly likely that variation below a certain level
makes no di¤erence whatsoever. Whether 3000 or 5000 signatures need to be sub-
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mitted is unlikely to change the rate of party participation at elections. Those that
are able to collect the smaller amount will also manage the higher ones. Likewise -
as mentioned - there has been a decrease in ballot access requirements in the U.S. in
the post war period, but they are still tremendously high and may well explain the
lack of new parties participating. Furthermore, while the mechanical e¤ects of the
representation barrier are tangible and gradual, when it comes to allocating seats,
its deterrent e¤ects on parties participating and winning votes are not, as was shown
in the analysis. With non linear e¤ects, not all variance can be captured with the
models used. Secondly, on the side of the dependent variable, all variance explained
would mean that the propensity to form parties were exactly the same everywhere.
This is highly unlikely, however, and more potent causes for unexplained variance
can be found in the fact that positive incentives for party formation are not con-
sidered at all. The model seeks to explain party entry only by looking at the costs,
but we would expect party formation and entry to be driven by a combination of
`eliteincentives and popular demand. As discussed in chapter 3, institutional and
socio-economic conditions may explain why more parties form in some countries than
in others. By including them in the model, we might get a better idea of how the
barriers work. But the somewhat modest explanatory power of such stimulating fac-
tors found in previous studies suggests that signicant causes elude measurement20.
A political scandal, a drop in the popularity of the incumbent government or a new
issue on the political agenda may stimulate new party formation and be conducive
to its success. Moreover, the resources commanded by those who incidentally form
the parties we observe are crucial to their ability to break through the barriers. Even
high barriers of all types are unlikely to a¤ect the chances that political entrepreneurs
20Another reason for the lack of strong prediction may also lie in the fact that many of
the measures included - e.g. ethnic-religious diversity, economic inequality etc. - are static.
Neither Hug (2001) or Harmel & Robertson (1985) consider changes over time in these as
a determinant of entry, and while some of the measures proposed may inuence how many
parties there are to represent the interests of citizens, they may not necessarily lead to new
party formation.
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with personal resources like those of Berlusconi in Italy succeed in winning access.
Obviously the uctuations in demand, the skill and resources at the disposal of those
who start new parties cannot be captured by a theoretical model and will thus defy
explanation.
It is clear, therefore, that we should not expect a model of barriers to explain
more than a modest share of the variation actually observed. In this perspective, the
explanatory force of the barriers is as strong as can reasonably be expected.
7.3.2 A Dialogue with the Data: Lessons from Extreme and
Mixed Cases
The next question is what we can learn from the extreme cases of high barriers,
as well as the cases with very high party entry. In the statistical analysis above,
the U.S. was for instance singled out as an outlier, and therefore also omitted in
some of the analyses to see if the hypothesized relationships would remain signicant
even without this case. But the question here is what we might learn from this and
similar cases. Countries in the period 1950-2000, rather than decades, will be used
as basis for the comparison for the sake of simplicity. In the following, the top two
and bottom two countries with respect to barriers will rst be compared, and then
some of the intermediary barrier countries that are `unusualin terms of the observed
party entry will be discussed.
Countries with very high barriers. There are only few countries which have
high barriers of all types. United States is the country where the established parties
are clearly most protected against new competitive threats by barriers. It has the
highest registration barrier observed for any country, the highest recognition barrier -
determined both by the absence of state support for campaigns and costs of reaching
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the electorate - and nally a very high representation barrier (Tpro 33 pct, Abar 0.12).
And the e¤ects of these multiple barriers on new party entry are obvious. In the
entire post war period only one party has obtained over 1 pct of the votes. Not a
single one has successfully garnered more than 4 pct of the votes and consequently
the parliamentary arena has remained outside the reach of new parties. The U.S.
is a clear case where the conditions of contestability - which we normally regard as
a dening feature of democracy - are so unfavourable that it is hardly contestable
at all. The existing parties are e¤ectively granted a monopoly on representation.
However, the lack of entry - or even of pressure to change the rules concerning
access - may also be explained by the fact that parties are very open organisations.
That is, entry of new parties is di¢ cult, but on the other hand, candidate entry
into the party is not controlled centrally. Furthermore, the parties are spacious in
the sense that candidates are free to endorse policies of their own choice, rather
than pressured to support a particular party platform. As discussed by Cox, these
features of parties undermine the incentives political elites/entrepreneurs have to
form parties (Cox, 1997). Apart from the formidable barriers to entry, this may help
to explain why a country with the diversity and magnitude of the U.S., which in this
period witnessed fundamental changes in socio-economic structures, and where there
has been no shortage of new issues gaining prominence on the political agenda, nor
for that matter of political scandals undermining the positions of incumbents that
might be expected to stimulate formation of new parties and ensure them a smooth
passage into o¢ ce. Of course, this open - and uid - character of the parties does
have consequences for the clarity of the choice o¤ered to voters for their legislative
institutions and cannot therefore compensate for the low contestability of elections
seen from the point of view of competitive theory.
Another case of multiple high barriers is that of the U.K. In the rst decades of
the post war period, the registration barrier was very high, and only in the 1980-90s
did it fall to passable - albeit still challenging - levels. The recognition barrier has
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also been high throughout the period due to the lack of access to media and nance
for other than the represented parties, as well as high costs of reaching the electorate.
Finally, access to the parliamentary arena has been protected by high representation
and accessibility barriers (Tpro 35 pct, Abar 0.23) . The pattern of new party entry
also conrms the role of the barriers in this case. In the period studied, there were
but 3 new parties managing to get 1 pct of the votes, and only a single one succeeded
in getting more than 4 pct of the votes. Only one new party managed to get 1 pct
of the seats, while none were more successful. In this case, the low contestability
again e¤ectively protects existing parties from new parties. And unlike the U.S.,
the parties are actually organized actors and so the institutional incentives for party
formation are not absent in this case. This case therefore clearly shows that barriers
can e¤ectively shield established parties from threats of entry.
Countries with very low barriers. At the other end of the scale, there are two
cases where the barriers to entry are extremely low. The Netherlands is undoubtedly
the most contestable country in the group. The registration barrier was negligible
until the 1990s, when higher fees were imposed on participants. However, these are
matched by very lenient terms of return, and will therefore only be a cost for parties
that are very unsuccessful at the polls. The recognition barrier is also very low.
The costs of reaching voters is at the lower end, equal access to media exposure
has been guaranteed to all parties participating at elections since the 1960s, and
funding available to parties with minimal representation in parliament since the
1970s. Coupled with the lowest representation barrier observed in this group of
countries (0.67 pct of the votes to obtain seats) and above average volatility levels in
four out of the ve decades, it is di¢ cult to imagine a more opportune environment
for new party entry. And the conditions do not fail to materialize in high entry
rates. 11 new parties win over 1 pct of the votes during the period, while 5 win
more than 4 pct of the votes. And the numbers are replicated when we look at the
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parliamentary arena. The system is highly contestable, and elections have also been
keenly contested by new parties.
The country with the second highest level of contestability is Denmark. Here
the registration barrier, as discussed, was somewhat high compared to other coun-
tries using petition requirements. But as shown, the level applied clearly appeared
to be insu¢ cient to prevent participation. Likewise, the recognition barrier is also
favourable due to low costs of reaching the electorate and guaranteed access to media
for all parties participating. Funding for unrepresented parties for campaigning pur-
poses was not introduced before the late 1980s, but then the terms adopted were very
favourable. The representation (legal threshold of 2 pct) is only slightly higher than
those in the Netherlands, and furthermore among the lowest in the group. Moreover,
the volatility level has been above average and the accessibility barrier consequently
very low (Abar 5.5). For Denmark also, the observed rate of entry matches the
favourable situation. 10 parties win 1 pct of the votes in this period and 5 parties
manage to get over 4 pct. And again this is mirrored by the numbers winning seats.
Intermediary Barrier Cases and High/Low Party Entry. Comparing the
extreme cases of low and high barriers conrms the expectation that the barriers
in democracies have the power to shape party competition. In the Netherlands and
Denmark, established parties have to calculate with the possibility that new parties
may arise to challenge their positions. In the U.S. and U.K. - especially in the past
- this threat is so remote as to be negligible.
Naturally, if all cases were as clear as the ones described above, there would be a
lot less unexplained variance than there is. It is the `unexpectedperformance of a
number of systems that fall in between in terms of barrier-scores that cause trouble.
Going backwards in causality, that is from observed party entry to the countries and
their barriers may be instructive. For simplicity, we again compare countries for the
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entire period (omitting the 3 countries that were only `infor 2 decades)21. For the
number of vote-winning parties passing the 1 pct threshold, the observed range is
1 to 16 (or 14 without Italy in 1990s) and the average for the 18 countries is 8.2
(median 8.5). For the number of electorally successful parties (>4 pct), the range is
more limited, and goes from 0 to 7 (6 without Italy), while the average is 3.5 (median
3). Some of the countries found at the lower end of this observed party entry include
countries that have barriers to entry in the lower end of the range.
Austria has a low registration barrier, a representation barrier in the lower end of
the scale (Tpro: 2-7 pct in the period)22, although the low volatility levels observed
placed it high on the accessibility barrier until 1970s, where it dropped (Abar 0.6-2.4).
The recognition barrier is a bit more mixed. The costs of reaching the electorate are
in the lower end of the range, but access to media and funding and nance has been
reserved to the represented (but Tpro just over 2 pct 1970-1990, so even small parties
can obtain it). In the period, however, there has been a below average number of new
parties winning at least 1 pct of the votes - namely 6 - and also very few electorally
successful parties, namely 2 that also won representation (only U.K. and U.S. have
lower numbers). And 5 of 6 parties with over 1 pct vote shares, as well as the 2
successful entered in the 1980s-90s. This means that there are several decades with
reasonably low barriers, but not much entry. In the case of Austria, this might well be
explained by the high levels of party identication and encapsulation of the electorate
evidenced by very high membership of parties and the wide range of activities and
benets o¤ered to members (as well as the low volatility). Similar observations can be
made for the case of Sweden, which had low registration and representation barriers
(4 pct legal threshold since 1970, and Tpro of circa 6 pct before that) and a mixed
recognition barrier with low costs of reaching voters, but only access to funding and
21The 3 countries are Greece, Portugal and Spain, which were included for the period
1980-2000 only.
22The values should be compared to a average Tpro for all the countries in the period of
13.8, and a median of 7
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media for represented parties (with the exception of the 1980s, when all participants
were given free air time). Here the number of parties with minimal success is very
low, namely just 4, while the number of electorally and `representationallysuccessful
parties is 3. It is possible in both cases that unfavourable conditions for access to
media and funding make a di¤erence, but at the same time, the number of parties
obtaining even small vote shares is below average. So the below average entry is
likely to be caused by other factors related to the demand and can also in the case of
Sweden be related to party identication (also evidenced by low volatility until the
1990s).
There are also countries where a higher number of parties enter even if conditions
for entry appear to be di¢ cult. France is an example of such a case. The registration
barrier was relatively high until the 1980s, the representation barrier has been high
most of the period (Tpro circa 20 pct), with the exception of the rst part of the 1950s
and one election in the 1980s (legal threshold of 5 pct). Even if its volatility scores
are among the highest in the group, the accessibility barrier was still among the
highest in the group. For recognition the costs of reaching voters are high, while the
conditions for access to nance and media are more mixed. Until the mid 1980s media
exposure was available to all elding a minimum of 75 candidates, after that it was
only for represented parties. But some reimbursement to candidates obtaining 5 pct
of the district vote shares has been available throughout, and the threshold of access
to compensation was lowered in 1988. However, there is a very high number of new
parties winning votes and seats. There are some 14 parties that obtain a minimum
of 1 pct of the votes and at least 5 that obtain more than 4 pct of the votes, and
the same number that obtain over 4 pct of the seats23. It is possible that low party
identication (as also seen in very high volatility levels discussed earlier) contributes
23The many changes and names that appear in the electoral data, particularly for some
of the smaller parties, sometimes makes it di¢ cult to evaluate whether a new entry in the
data represents a new party or an alliance (i.e.) merger of older parties, and the numbers
may therefore not be completely accurate.
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in part to explaining this. But it is also entirely possible, as suggested by Meny, that
the existence of local level institutions where parties can obtain representation on a
proportional basis encourages formation and survival of more parties at the national
level (Meny, 2002).
Other intermediate cases may also assist us in understanding the sources of un-
explained variance. Comparing Australia with Canada with respect to observed
entry is, for instance, instructive. Both have high representation barriers, but the
e¤ects with respect to the numbers entering are completely di¤erent. In the former,
3 electorally successful parties can be observed in the period, which have obtained
maximal vote shares of 8-12 pct. None of them have obtained a single seat, however.
In the latter, the exact same number can be observed with maximal vote shares of
4-20 pct, but in this case, all have obtained seats. For two of them, an important
cause of the easy entry to representation lies in the fact that they were regionally
concentrated. For the last, the amount of votes was su¢ ciently high to gain strong
access. However, in analysing the numbers, Australia performs as we would expect
from a system with high barrier to representation, while Canada looks no di¤erent
from Austria or Sweden in terms of openness.
This very brief description of some of the outliers illustrates that the dynamics
of new party formation and entry cannot be captured by a barrier model. While the
extreme cases t very well with expectations, there are also a number of cases in the
`middle, where prediction of new threats to existing parties by the formation and
success of new ones is not very precise. There are, as already discussed, many factors
related to the institutional and electoral context, which contribute to an understand-
ing of the party entry, actually observed in the individual cases. But naturally, there
are also factors that cannot be gleaned from numbers only. It is entirely possible
that parties that make it in France and those that make it in Denmark or Austria
are qualitatively di¤erent. They may vary with respect to who their founders are -
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already established political elites or new actors - or with respect to the resources
they command. Another very important di¤erence may lie with the platforms pre-
sented to voters. Do the new parties attempt to respond to a neglected issue, or
propose a set of policies that are not on o¤er elsewhere, or are they not really distin-
guishable from the existing ones and might serve more as vehicles for the personal
ambitions of political elites? Investigating whether di¤erences of this nature can be
observed in the characteristics of new parties entering in low barrier and high barrier
contexts might yield important information about the role of barriers for political
representation.
7.4 Do Barriers Shape Competition?
The question that remains is how to evaluate the results in light of the theoretical ex-
pectations that motivated the study. At the outset certain theoretical propositions
concerning the role of contestability for party competition were discussed. These
propositions prompted the empirical research into the empirical foundations of con-
testability, and its variation across countries and time. It is perhaps useful to briey
revisit these before nally discussing the implications of the ndings. The degree
of contestability could be expected to have both direct and indirect e¤ects on party
competition. The direct e¤ects are those expected to inuence the behaviour of rep-
resented parties and incumbent governments by alerting them to the potential threat
of new parties. Protected by high barriers these parties might collude with each other
to act in ways that would not be viable for their survival if new parties could arise
and challenge their positions. But collusion is not the only possibility. Since parties
are not entirely substitutable - as they represent di¤erent interests and advocate dif-
ferent policies - each party may also on its own be less attentive to its electoral base,
if it knows that new parties stand little chance of emerging to challenge its position.
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Indirect e¤ects can also be expected, since easy conditions for entry of new parties
may alter the party system by adding new parties to existing ones, and thus lead
to greater fragmentation. Such fragmentation may in turn inuence vulnerability
and can be expected to undermine it. The two primary dimensions of competition
- as dened here - are thus likely to contradict each other. The extent to which
they actually do, however, is an empirical question and one that can only evaluated
precisely after vulnerability has been measured.
In order to assess the value of this study as a foundation for the investigation of
the direct e¤ects of contestability, I think two questions need to be addressed. Firstly,
there is the question of whether the barrier indicators proposed can serve as reliable
proxies for protection from entry. Or in other words, is it reasonable to expect that
increases in the barrier indicators corresponds to an increase in a sense of safety on
the part of represented party? Secondly, and intimately related to this, there is the
question of how to interpret di¤erences between entry in terms of winning votes,
and entry in terms of winning seats. As discussed in the beginning both types of
entry can be expected to inuence the incentives established parties have to care for
their electoral base, but how do we interpret combinations of high and low barriers
a¤ecting the access to seats and competition for votes respectively?
As discussed above, the question is easily answered in extreme cases. With mul-
tiple high barriers, it is entirely reasonable to expect parties to feel safe from threat
of entry; with multiple low barriers, it would be odd indeed, if political leaders were
to discount such threats. The question is how to interpret the cases in the middle,
where barriers are mixed. First, there is the di¤erence between barriers inuencing
entry into the competition for votes and those a¤ecting seats. Logically, the ones
inuencing competition for votes potentially have the strongest e¤ect since they bar
access to both arenas. Further, even if access to seats is di¢ cult, new parties winning
votes may strongly a¤ect the situation facing represented parties after the elections.
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But as discussed the registration barrier has probably a¤ected some 5 of the coun-
tries in the past, and it was argued that it presently only constitutes a formidable
barrier in two countries (U.S. and Japan) and a denite challenge in one other coun-
try (U.K.). And arguably in these it is su¢ ciently high to curtail competition on
its own. However, this means that for most of the other countries in the study, we
do not need to consider it. This leaves the recognition barrier, where the access to
media was successful in predicting the number of vote-winning parties, so in a sense
we could rely on this to inform us of how safe established parties can feel. Before
accepting this, however, it is necessary to reect a bit on the evidence. As mentioned
above, the prediction of the number of vote-winning parties was very sensitive to the
presence of one case (U.S.), when this was removed only 8 to 16 pct of the variance
in the number new of vote-winners was explained. Even if the ndings were sig-
nicant, are they important? For people in positions of power, is it likely that the
protection o¤ered by not granting free access of new parties makes them rest assured
that they will not be challenged electorally? Di¤erently put, with such a margin of
risk that new parties may succeed in winning votes anyhow, would it be rational
to discount the threat? Furthermore, as shown above, the e¤ects of the costs of
recognition became strong in the cases where the barriers to obtaining represenation
were high. In countries where such barriers are low, it is very di¢ cult to assess how
easily new parties may sucessfully enter the fray of electoral competition. The last
two barriers indicating ease of access to the representative institutions were much
more robust in this sense. They do not depend on any single case to display a strong
e¤ect. Furthermore, there are many cases, where an e¤ective protection of the par-
liamentary arena from new party entry can be observed. Parties winning vote shares
that in other systems would have made them one of the major players are here left
on the outside. In some cases, like Australia, it seems entirely reasonable to expect
that established parties feel safe from threats to their seats - even if new threats to
their electoral shares arise. But is it reasonable to expect that established parties
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in France have always enjoyed the same sense of security? If established parties are
repeatedly exposed to threats from new contenders - in spite of high barriers - is it
not reasonable to expect that this fact may guide their behaviour? Also if, the vote
shares they take inuences their own chances of winning governing majorities. In
order to capture the degree to which established parties have cause to fear new com-
petition, it can be argued that looking at barriers alone is likely to miss important
information. A complementary approach including concern for facilitating factors or
history of entry may be necessary to established whether the lack of `safetyin fact
does have measurable e¤ects on party and government behaviour. How this can be
done is an independent research question in itself, however.
In conclusion, it can therefore be said that this research has accomplished two
things. On the one hand, measures of the barriers to entry in the 21 democracies have
been constructed and their e¤ects on new party entry successfully demonstrated. On
the other, it has illustrated that for a large group of countries that display neither
very high nor very low contestability levels, simply inferring from the barriers to entry
to the degree of pressure established parties are under from threat of entry is not a
viable strategy. An investigation of the e¤ects of competition, as contestability, on
political performance may therefore require an approach, which is sensitive to other
factors than the barriers to entry.
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Registration Barrier:
A.1 Overview of Ballot Access Laws
The information on current requirements for access to the ballot of parliamentary
elections is provided by Katz `Democracies and Elections(1997:256-8), while infor-
mation about changes is taken from Katz and Mair Party Organizations A Data
Handbook (1992) and Hug `Altering Party Systems (2001:178-181). For Japan
the source of information is the House of Representatives Department of Research,
Special Research O¢ ce Number 2, "Electoral System-Related Data Compendium"
(November, 2002)., and for U.S. the information on current requirements was pro-
vided by the Ballot Access organization run by Richard Winger. The requirements
asked of would-be parties and candidates include petitions, payment of fee or de-
posits and nomination from a recognized political party. To make comparison easier
the fee/deposit requirements are presented in national currencies as well as in US$ (
rounded gures using exchange rates of August 2002).
The information about the country requirements are organized in the four cate-
gories:
314
Appendix A. Registration Barrier:
1) Petitition/nomination/electoral support 2) Fee/deposit 3) Condi-
tions for return 4) Changes in the period 1950-2000
Australia: 1) Petition of eligible voters 2)1983-: House of Representatives:
A$250 (140 US$) Senate: A$: 500 (280US$) 3) 4 pct of total 1st preference vote
in district 4). Until 1983: House: 100 A$ returned if 1/5 the 1st preference vote
of successful candidate was obtained (approx. 6-8 pct.); Senate: 200A$ returned if
1/10 of 1st preference vote of successful candidate was obtained.
Austria: 1) Nomination by 3 members of parliament or 1971-: Petition of 200
voters (Burgenland, Kärnten, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg), 400 voters (Oberöster-
reich, Steiermark), 500 voters (Niederösterreich, Wien) 2) 1959- ÖS 6,000 (430US$)
per region. 3) Not returned 4) District petition: 1945-59:100 voters; 1959-71: 200
voters; 1971-: 2-500 voters
Belgium: 1) Nomination by 3 outgoing members of parliament or 500 (Brussels),
400 (Antwerp, Ghent, Charleroi, Liege), 200 (other 25 districts).
Canada: 1) 25 electors in each district 2) C$200 (130 US$) 3)15 pct. of the vote
Denmark 1) 1965-: Representation in outgoing Folketing or petition of 1/175
total valid vote in last election (approx: 20,000 signatures). 4) Until 1960: 10,000
voters; 1965: 1/175 total valid vote
Finland 1) 100 electors form electoral association in each district. 4) Until 1969-:
30 voters form electoral assembly for each candidate. 1969-: only parties propose
candidates: 5000 adherents sign to register a party. 1975-: district association of 100
members.
France 1) None (declaration of candidacy) 2) FF: 1,000 (150 US$) 3) 5 pct. of
the vote cast
Germany 1) Independents: 200 voters (only SM-district). Candidates of parties
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represented by at least 5 members in BT or relevant LT, or representing a national
minority: In S-M seats: signatures of Land executive committee; Land lists, signature
of Land executive committe. Candidates of other parties: In S-M seats: signatures
of the Land executive committee plus 200 registered voters; for Land lists, signatures
of Land executive committee plus one per 1,000 persons entitled to vote at the last
election to a maximum of 2,000.
Greece 1) Petition of 12 voters in district 2) Dr.20,000 (60US$)
Ireland 1) Self-nomination and signature by one other elector of constituency.
2) IR 100 (130US$) 3) 1/3 of constituency quota 4) 1962-: only party candidates on
ballot
Italy 1) Chamber of deputies: Petition of between 500-1,000 electors in each
constituency for list of candidates. Senate: Petition between 350-700 electors
Japan 1) Declaration of candidacy 2) Fee per candidate in thousands of Yen:
1996-: House of Representatives: SMP: 3000 (24,000 US$) PR & Double Candidacy:
6000 (48,000 US$). House of Councillors: Nationwide PR: 6000 (48,000 US$) Re-
gional districts:3000 (24,000US$). 3) House of Rep: Receipt of 20 pct valid vote/
number of members to be elected. SMD: 10 pct of valid vote 4) Fee per candidate
in thousands of Yen: House of Representatives: 1950: 30 1952-:100, 1962-:150, 1969-
:300, 1975-:1000, 1982-: 2000, 1992-: 3000. House of Councillors: Regional Disctrics
the same deposit as for the House of Rep., while Nationwide PR has been exactly
the double since 1956.
Netherlands 1) 1989-: Representation in outgoing parliament or 10 electors in
each kieskring. 2) 1989-:D. 25,000 (11,000US$) 3) Reciept of 3
4
of the electoral
quotient 4) Until 1989: 25electors and 1,000 D.
New Zealand 1) 2 registered voters of constituency 2) NZ$: 100 (50 US$) 3)
Receipt of 1
4
the votes of the successful candidate
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Norway 1) Lists may be submitted by 500 registered voters in a district (19
districts) or by registered party (5000 signatures to register, keeps status unless no
candidates are nominated in two consecutive elections) 4) Party registration until
1990: 3000 signatures
Portugal 1) A party must submit a petition of 7500 signatures.
Spain 1) Nomination by registered party or petition of 0.1 pct electors of con-
stituency (min. 500)
Sweden 1) Registered parties may submit lists of candidates. To register a
party for RD elections requires signatures of 1,500 voters. Parties with members are
re-registered automatically.
Switzerland 1) Petition of 50 electors 4) Until 1985: 15 signatures
UK 1) Signatures of 2 proposers and 8 assentors 2) £ 500 (490US$) 3) Receipt
of 5 pct of the vote 4) Until 1985: 150£ and conditions of return eqal to 12.5 pct of
the vote.
US 1) Varying State level requirements: All (except 2) give access to parties on
basis of obtaining a specied share of voter registration or votes at previous election.
In 27 states it is above 5 pct of the vote cast and in 11 of these it is above 10 pct.
For other parties: Petitions: high e.g. orida: petition by 3 pct registered voters and
verication fee for each one of 3 pct registered voters
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A.2 Calculation of Ballot Access Costs over Time
In order to compare the costs of ballot access across countries and time, the price of
ballot access for each decade was transformed into 1995 prices in USD. The procedure
followed was to convert the price of ballot access in local currency (BAlc) to USD
by using the historical exchange rates. The resulting sum was then transformed
into 1995 values by multiplying it with 100 over the consumer price index value
corresponding to the mid-point of the decade (CPImd). That is (BAlcERhis) = Cost
of BA in 1995 USD; Cost of BA in 1995 USD ( 100
CPImd
) = Value of BA cost in 1995
USD. For relativising the costs, this sum was divided by the average GDP per capita
for the decade in question.
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B.1 Public Service Television and Political Con-
trol of Broadcast Organisation
A brief synopsis of the main features of the television markets and the extent of
political control over public broadcast organizations used to construct the indicators
is provided. The Sources consulted for most of the cases were: Hallin and Mancini
(2004), Smith (1998), The Euromedia Research Group (1997), Humphreys (1996),
Eurostat (1995), Blumler (1992), Kuhn (1985).
Information on audience for public television is taken from the European Audio-
Visual Statistics (Eurostat, 1995) and Media in Western Europe (Euromedia Re-
search Group, 1997) for the European countries. For Australia, Canada, Japan and
U.S. the information provided on audiences is taken from `Television- an interna-
tional history(Smith, 1998). For Japan the chapter on Japan by Ellis S. Krauss in
`Democracy and the Media(Gunther&Mughan,2000). Information on New Zealand
is primarily from Comrie&Fontaine(2005).
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Australia: Regular broadcasts were initiated in 1956 and a dual system with
public and commercial broadcasters was established from the beginning. The public
broadcasters (mainly ABC) have never enjoyed a dominant market position. Ac-
cording to `Television - An International Historythe market share of the two public
broadcasters was around 20 per cent in the 1980s (Jack & Johnson, 1998:219) and
thus comparable to Canada, but data on historical developments are not provided.
The broadcast organisation is described as styled according to the British BBC and
is considered autonomous in relationship to the political system.
Austria: Regular broadcasts began in 1956 and public monopoly on television
maintained until 1996. A High level of political control of broadcasting was exercised
prior to the reform of 1968, where more independence to the broadcasting organi-
sation was granted. A system of proportional representation in appointments to
broadcasting institutions has remained in place, however, and it is cited as example
of the `politics in broadcastingmodel, where established parties exercise inuence
at all levels of the organisation.
Belgium: Regular broadcasts began in 1953 and monopoly on television lasted
until the deregulation act was passed in 1987. However, considerable penetration of
foreign channels is reported to have inuenced viewing of public service television
before that. According to the European Audio-Visual Data, audience shares of public
television were between 20-30 pct in 1995-2000. Boards managing public broadcast
are described as highly politicised and change according to the colour of government.
Members are said to view themselves as mandatories of political parties.
Canada: Regular broadcasting was initiated in 1952 and was initially a public
monopoly. In 1958 this was reversed and commercial television was introduced (1960)
and since then both commercial and public broadcasters have been on the market
(and competed for advertising income). The Canadian market has always had very
high penetration of foreign broadcasters (US). It is stated that audience shares were
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around 20 pct (English) and 30 pct. (French), but it is indicated that shares were
higher in previous decades (Raboy, 1998:164).
Denmark: Regular broadcasts began in 1954, and public monopoly on broadcast
television lasted until the early 90s (1994). According to the European Audio-Visual
Data, audience for public service television was around 40 pct between 1995-2000.
The broadcast organisations are not free of ties to the political parties (appointments)
and the political orientations of the two main public channels are said to diverge.
However, public television is generally considered highly autonomous of parties in
their operations.
Finland: Regular broadcasts were initiated under public monopoly in 1956, but
in 1959 it was replaced by a dual system with both commercial and public service
television. The public broadcast has successfully maintained high viewer-ratings,
however, until this dropped somewhat with an increase in commercial competition
following deregulation in 1986. According to the European Audio-Visual Data, au-
dience shares between 1995 and 2000 were 42-47 pct. None of the sources mention
any political interference in the public broadcast organisation, and from classication
used in Hallin and Mancini, it appears to operate autonomously.
France: Regular broadcasting begun as early as 1935, and television operated as
a public monopoly until the deregulation of 1985 (followed by privatisation of one of
the public channels). In the 1990s the market becomes more commercial, and accord-
ing to the European Audio-Visual Data, audience shares for public service television
between 1995 and 2000 were approximately 42-44 pct. The broadcast organisation
was highly politicized until 1980s and is referred to as a type of paradigm case of
executive domination of broadcast. In the 1980s the socialist government embarks
on reform, but doesnt carry through completely. In 1989, however, organisational
changes rendering it very independent of political leadership were made.
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Germany: Regular broadcasts were initiated in 1952 as public service. Monopoly
on television broadcasts were maintained until mid 1984. According to the European
Audio-Visual Data, audience shares for public service television were around 40-43
pct between 1995 and 2000. With respect to the governance of broadcasting, it is
described as a case of `politics in broadcastingsystem, emphasizing the importance
of political parties in the governance of the broadcast institutions through appoint-
ments at all levels as well as inuence, although not control of, the `social signicant
groupsrepresented on governing boards. Principles of proportionality in inuence,
which is, however, exerted indirectly.
Greece: Began regular broadcasts in 1966 and public monopoly was broken
in law in 1989. The year before that, however, local/regional television channels
had already started up at the initiative of mayors in larger cities. Quickly after
commerical television was introduced, public service television audience shares fell
drastically. Public service only had audience shares of 8-11 pct at the end of the
1990s according to Media in Western Europe. Government control of broadcasting
was very high and the extreme pro-government bias of radio and TV is said to have
been motivated strong social pressures for deregulation during the 1980s.
Ireland: Regular broadcast began late in Ireland, 1961, and public monopoly on
broadcasting was preserved until 1989. However, not until 1998 did a commercial
station begin broadcast. There has always, however, been strong foreign competition
for viewers. During the 1990s the audience shares of public service television were
50-60 pct. The broadcast organisation was granted autonomy from the state in 1960
and is known for being outside direct political inuence much like the BBC (before
that it was described as a government `mouthpiece).
Italy: Regular broadcasts began in 1954 and the public broadcasting system held
monopoly until the mid-1970s. In 1975 private cable television was allowed and in
the years after there was an rapid expansion of local broadcasting. Establishment of
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national commercial networks followed in beginning of 1980s. However, public service
television channels have maintained around half of the market shares. According to
the European Audio-Visual Data, audience shares were 45-50 pct. in 1995-2000.
Governance of public broadcasting in Italy has been described as the `partyocratic
model being dominated until 1974 by one party and thereafter by allowing more
parties to take part. External diversity existed by the division of channels between
parties.
Japan: Regular broadcasts began in 1953 and was a dual system almost from
the beginning. The public broadcaster has always enjoyed a strong position on the
market in spite of strong competition with the commercial stations (and had an
exceptionally strong focus on news services). Precise gures on audience shares are
lacking, however. The broadcast organisation is considered autonomous in relation
to the political system, and is known for being even-handed in its coverage of partisan
politics.
Netherlands: Regular broadcasts began in 1954. Its broadcasting system was
originally strongly pillarized with time divided between broadcasting organisations
linked to existing `pillarswho set standards of broadcasting autonomously. In the
late 1960s a Dutch broadcast organisation was established to produce daily news and
it heralded the beginning of secularization and standardization of public broadcast.
In the mid-1970s, new legislation allowed more neutral organiziations to enter, but
commercial television wasnt introduced before 1989 (legalized in 1990). Public tele-
vision audience shares were around 35-40 pct in 1995-2000 according to the European
Audio-visual.
New Zealand: Public monopoly on broadcasting lasted until deregulation in
the beginning of 1990s. The public broadcaster was re-organised to operate on a
commercial basis. The public broadcasting organisation was practically run by gov-
ernment departments until 1962 when it was reformed. However, although abated
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by reforms, political interference in its operations is reported to have continued after
that.
Norway: Regular broadcasting started in 1960 and operated as a public monopo-
ly until 1988 when national commercial stations started competing. Local television
started from the beginning of the 1980s, however. Audience shares fell to 40-45
pct by the mid 1990s. The broadcasting corporation is highly autonomous, but
it is characterized as closer to the parliamentary model than for example Sweden
(comparable to DK).
Portugal: National public service broadcast began in 1957 and enjoyed monopo-
ly until beginning of the 1992, when two private channels started up. The competition
not only reduced audience for the public stations, but also a¤ected the programming
by introducing competition for advertising. Public service market shares were re-
ported at 44 pct in 1995, but only 30 pct in 2000.
Spain: Regular broadcasting began in 1956 and public monopoly was upheld
until 1988 (in practice until 1989). After deregulation the market shares of public
broadcasting fell to about 50 pct in 1995, which was still upheld in 2000. There
private broadcasters compete strongly with the public channels for advertising with
the result that di¤erences in programming are not so clear. The governance of
broadcasting has been described as party interventionist with a clear slant towards
the political interests of the governing parties (although some observers believe the
inuence is moderate).
Sweden: Regular broadcasting began in 1956 and it was organised as a public
monopoly until 1987. In 1987 rst satellite TV stations and in 1992 rst terrestial
stations were licenced, quickly taking a large share of the market. By the mid 1990s
audience shares of public television were down to 50 pct and in 2000, it was 44 pct.
Swedish broadcast governance is compared to that of the BBC and enjoys a very
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high level of independence.
Switzerland: Regular broadcasting was initiated in 1958 and the public broad-
casting enjoyed monopoly until 1992. The Swiss market is highly segmented, and the
public broadcast system has always faced intense competition from foreign channels.
In mid 90s a Swiss private tv station attempted to enter the market, but closed down
again just after two years. The market shares of public service television in 1995-2000
were 34-36 pct. The broadcast institution SSR was set up as a private non- prot
company with a public mission, and functions independently of political inuence.
United Kingdom: Regular broadcasts began as early as 1935 and functioned
as a public monopoly until 1955. From then on the U.K. has had a dual broadcast
system with strong public service alongside commercial television. The commercial
channel has always been required to provide basic public services such the provision
of news. An increasing commercialization is described for the 1990s. However BBC
retained market shares of 50-55 pct 1995-2000. The public broadcasting organisation
is considered autonomous in relation to the political system.
United States: Regular broadcasting began in 1950 and was o¤ered by com-
mercial channels. Public broadcasting was established in the 1950s and was allocated
frequencies that most tv-sets could not receive at that time. Audience shares have
never developed above a few percent. There are no indications of political instru-
mentalization of public broadcasting.
B.2 Information on Free Media Access
Detailed descriptions of the current rules (1990-2000) concerning media access can be
found in IDEA (2003) and Katz (1997) Historical information is taken from Bowler,
Carter&Farrell, 2003 and Katz&Mair (1992). In the following a brief synopsis of the
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aspects of rules relevant to the construction of the indicator is provided.
Australia: Free broadcasting time is not provided for any parties. A law was
passed in 1991 giving parties access on the basis of public support and seats contested.
However the law was repealed by the Supreme Court the year after, and never was
in force for an election. Score: 3 (1960-00) (According to Bowler et. al and Katz,
Austrialia in year 2000 had introduced free broadcasting time, but according to
IDEA this is not the case. This may be a mistake due to the passing of a law in 1991
granting such access, but which was never enforced as mentioned above).
Austria: No regulation until 1966. From then on, represented parties have been
granted free media time. Time is allotted on the basis of seats in parliament. Score:
3 for 1960s, 4 for 1970-00.
Belgium: Di¤erent laws for Flanders and Waloon; In Walloon: There were no
rules until 1964. The rules adopted granted free media access. Time is allocated
proportional to seats held in the Conseil Culturel. In Flanders: No rules until 1979.
The rules adopted then granted possibility to groups represented in the Culturaad
to make programmes. Time allocated on basis of size. Since 1982 all fractions in
the Vlaamse Raad are entitled to create a broadcasting organisation. Score: A joint
score of 4 is assigned for the whole period.
Canada: From 1960-1974: free airtime to established parties (discretionary for
new parties complying to certain criteria, but never awarded in practice). 1974-:
free air time to all registered parties that present a minimum of 50 candidates at the
elections. Time allocated in proportion to criteria related to size. Score: 4(1960), 2
(1970-00).
Denmark: All registered parties have been granted equal shares of free airtime
during the whole period. Score: 1 (1960-00)
Finland: No formal rules, but informal agreements regulate access to the media.
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According to Bowler, Carter and Farrel, the parties are all granted time to appear in
connection with elections. Information for the 1960s is that all parties are granted
equal time and for 2000, it states that this is in proportion to size. Due to the lack
of precise information on changes and absence of xed rules, a score of 2 is given for
the whole period. Score: 2 (1960-00)
France: 1960s-1984 all parties have been granted free airtime. Parties not rep-
resented in parliament, but presenting a minimum of 75 candidates, were allocated
smaller time slots. Since 1984 only represented parties are granted free air time in
proportion to size. Score: 2 (1960-1980) 4 (1980-00)
Germany: During the whole period parties have been granted free air time in
proportion to votes received, while a minimum time is allotted all registered parties.
Score: 2 (1960-00)
Ireland: No rules until 1965. From then on parties with a minimum share of seats
(7) in parliament were entitled to election broadcasts, while others only were entitled
to short spots on the news. From 1987 election broadcasts were made available to
all parties elding at least 7 candidates. Time allocated on the basis of size. Score:
4 (1960-1990), 2 (1990)
Italy: In the 1960s only parliamentary parties were granted free access to media.
From 1982 media access was also granted to unrepresented parties (conditional on
elding candidates in all districts), but time is allocated on the basis of size. Score:
4 (1960) 2 (1980-00)
Japan: Since the 1960s provisions for free media time have been granted to all
parties, but only since 1994 were equal shares of time granted to candidates of all
parties elding at least 12 candidates at the elections. Score: 2 (1960-1990), 1 (1990s)
Netherlands: In the whole period all parties presenting a list in at least one
district have been allocated equal shares of air time. Score: 1 (1960-00)
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New Zealand: Until 1989 there were no formal rules, but broadcasting organisa-
tion provided parties with free air time for election broadcasts. Not all were granted
time, however. From 1989 all registered parties have the right to free time, which is
allocated in proportion to size. Score: 4(1960-1990), 2: 1990s
Norway: No formal rules, but the broadcast organsiation has granted free air
time to all represented parties (that nominate candidates in over half of the districts
and have a national organisation). Score: 4 (1960-00)
Portugal: Equal air time is granted to all represented parties. Score: 4 (1980-00)
Spain: Air time is granted to all represented parties in proportion to their size.
Score: 4 (1980-00)
Sweden: No formal rules, but the broadcasting companies have generally granted
parliamentary parties free broadcast time at elections with time allocated on an equal
basis. Exceptionally, smaller parties have been granted smaller spots. But for the two
elections in the 1980s all parties participating were granted equal free time. Score:
4 (1960-80, 1990s) 2(1980s)
United Kingdom: No formal rules, but the BBC has granted major parties air
time in connection at election time. From 1960 time was allocated according to size,
but since 1987 all the major parties get equal shares of time. Score: 4 (1960-00)
United States: No rules. Score: 3 (1950-00)
B.3 State Subventions (Financial)
Sources: Katz&Mair (1992); Katz (1998); Bowler, Carter&Farrel (2003), IDEA
(2003). A synopsis covering only the aspects of the rules relevant to the construction
of the indicator is provided;
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Australia: 1950-83: no state subvention. 1984-: Election funding available to
registered parties in districts, where they win at least 4 pct. of the rst preference
votes. Since uneven electoral support makes it highly likely that parties with less
than 4 pct. vote shares at the national level receive nancial support, a score of
2 is given for the period since the rules were introduced. Score: 3 (1950-1980), 2
(1980-00)
Austria: No subvention until 1962. From 1962 subsidies were o¤ered to parlia-
mentary groups with a minimum of 5 MPs but mainly for assistance with parlia-
mentary work. From 1971, nancial support is accessible to parties obtaining under
4 pct of the votes (ca. 2.7) due to change in electoral rules lowering the threshold
of representation, and budget for public relations were included. Since 1975 subven-
tions for party organisations were introduced along with press subsidies. Score: 3:
1950-1970, 2: 1970-00
Belgium: No subventions until 1971. The subsidies introduced were o¤ered to
parliamentary fractions (3 MPs) and only to support parliamentary work. Since
1989 funding for central party organisation is made available for parties represented
in parliament (which is possible with less than 4 pct of the votes). Scores: 3: (1950-
1990) 2: (1990s)
Canada: No subvention until 1974. The rules introduced then reimburse cam-
paign costs of candidates conditional on receiving at least 15 pct of the constituency
votes. Parties are also reimbursed, although the sources do not state what require-
ments have to be met. Scores: 3 (1950-1970), 4 (1970-00)
Denmark: No state subventions until 1965 and then limited to support for
parliamentary work of groups in parliament. Since 1987 subventions in connection
with elections is available to parties receiving a minimum of 1000 votes. Scores: 3
(1950-1990), 1 (1990s)
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Finland: State subventions introduced in 1967 to parties for parliamentary work,
however, only from 1974 is budget for relations with the press included. Scores: 3
(1950-1970) 4 (1970-00)
France: Information on rules in the 1950s is not available. 1960s: Candidates
winning more than 5 pct of the vote are reimbursed for certain campaign expenses.
Since 1988 candidates who win less than 5 pct. of the vote are also entitled to
reimbursement. Parties presenting candidates in at least 75 districts are also entitled
to funds. Since the mid 1990s candidates winning more than 5 pct. receive an
additional sum to cover campaign expenses. Scores: n.a. (1950s), 2 (1960-00)
Germany: State subvention introduced in 1959 to parliamentary parties, but
outlawed in 1966. Since the 1967 election reimbursement per eligible voter introduced
for parties obtaining at least 2.5 pct. of `second votes(or 10 pct of 1st). In 1969 the
threshold was lowered to 0.5 pct. of the second votes. Scores: 3 (1950), 4 (1960s), 1
(1970-00)
Greece: n.a.
Ireland: Introduced state subventions in 1965 to leaders of opposition parties
provided they have at least 7 MPs. State funding to party organizations and cam-
paign subsidies were introduced in the late 1990s to parties winning at least 2 pct.
of the vote. Score: 3: (1950-1960), 4 (1970-00)
Italy: No state subvention before 1974. After that annual funds available to all
parties that win 2 pct. of the votes. In 1993 a law on funding for parties is abolished.
A new law is introduced o¤ering candidates reimbursement for campaign spending
in proportion to vote and to parties winning more than 4 pct of the vote or 3 pct
of the vote and 1 candidate elected. In 1999 reimbursement to all parties polling at
least 1 pct of the votes. Scores: 3 (1950s), 2 (1960-00)
Japan: No state subvention to parties before 1994. After that subventions avail-
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able to parties with at least 5 MPs. Scores: 3 (1950-1990), 4 (1990s)
Netherlands: No state subvention until 1964. The subvention introduced is
for parliamentary parties (minimum 1 MP). During the 1970s expenses in more
areas were covered (e.g. research institutes, 1971; personal assistants to MPs, 1972;
educational institutes, 1975 etc.). Scores: 3 (1950-1960), 2 (1970-00)
New Zealand: No state subvention.
Norway: No subvention until 1966, when assistance to work of parliamentary
parties was introduced. From 1969 a press subsidy was introduced and in 1970
support was also given to central party organisations. In 1977 a threshold of eligibility
for subsidies was set at 2.5 pct of the votes. Scores: 3 (1950-1960), 4 (1970s), 2 (1980-
00)
Portugal: n.a.
Spain: n.a.
Sweden: No subsidy until 1966. Subsidies then introduced to party organisations
of parties winning at least 2 pct of the votes and parliamentary representation. In
1969 press subsidies were introduced. Since 1972 subsidies available to parties with
at least 4 pct of the vote, but no seats. Scores: 3 (1950-60), 4 (1970-00)
Switzerland: No subventions before 1972, when these were introduced for par-
liamentary groups.
Scores: 3 (1950-70), 4 (1970-00)
United Kingdom: No subventions before 1975. The subventions introduced
were available to parties with at least 2 MPs or 1 MP and 150.000 votes. Scores: 3
(1950-1980) 4 (1980-00)
United States: No subsidies for parties.
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B.4 Advertising Spending - The Figures
GDP pc Wealth Adspend Corrected
in 1995 USD Difference Nat. Currency USD (Adspend/WealthDiff.)
Australia 24109 0.83 7218 5414 6520.103269
Austria 33761 1.16 2012 2236 1922.96738
Canada 23080 0.79 8436 5399 6791.932643
Belgium 31022 1.07 2059 1853 1734.289014
Denmark 38968 1.34 9485 1138 847.9104599
Finland 31834 1.10 1145 1030 939.4244518
France 30573 1.05 9455 10505 9976.399863
Germany 32833 1.13 18579 16721 14786.57286
Greece 13675 0.47 1237 1113 2363.108578
Ireland 28981 1.00 1071 964 965.782906
Italy 21311 0.73 7834 7051 9606.445713
Japan 44924 1.55 3963 31704 20490.44961
Netherlands 31415 1.08 3718 3346 3092.464479
New Zealand 18429 0.63 1505 617 972.0738076
Norway 39885 1.37 10743 1182 860.4462129
Portugal 13003 0.45 1483 1334 2978.709252
Spain 17774 0.61 5312 4780 7808.337347
Sweden 33151 1.14 16542 1489 1304.109059
Switzerland 46895 1.62 4152 2491 1542.279318
United Kingdom 22637 0.78 11700 16614 21309.39808
United States 31466 1.08 124389 124389 114777.3743
Average: 29035 1.0
Adspend 2001 (Millions)
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C.1 Formulas for calculation of district level thres-
holds
Below the formulas for calculating the Ti and Tx at the district level developed
by Lijphart and Gibberd (1977) as well as the for plurality rule (Rae, Hanby, and
Loosemore 1971) and STV (Gallagher,1992:486) for are given (source of overview:
Hug, 2001:177). The following abbreviations are used: m= district magnitude, n=
number of parties, Des = number of districts
Plurality d’Hondt Pure Saint-
Laguë
Modified Saint-
Laguë
Largest
Remainder
STV
Tx
If n-1>m 1/2 1/m+1 1/m+1 1/m+1 1/m+1 1/m+1
If m/2<n-1<m 1/2 1/m+1 1/2m-n+2 1.4/ 1.6m-2n+1.6 n-1/mn 1/m+1
If n-1<m/2 1/2 1/m+1 1/2m-n+2 1.4/ 2m+n+2.4 n-1/mn 1/m+1
Ti 1/n 1/m+n-1 1/2m+n-2 1.4/ 2m+1.4-2.4 1/mn 0
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The `short-cutformulas suggested by Lijphart, which omit the number of parties,
are: Tid = 12m and Txd =
1
(m+1)
C.2 Notes on the Calculation of the Tpro and the
Veff
General. For PR-systems the vote concentration is calculated on the basis of the
percentage votes obtained by the parties within each district. This is done to correct
for the large di¤erences in the sizes of the districts (both in terms of magnitude and
number of voters) that are normal in these systems. If the share of each partys total
vote obtained within each district was used instead, the vote concentration would
appear higher than it is and reduce the threshold articially. This correction is not
made for plurality systems, where instead the share of a partys total vote obtained
in each district is used. Because here there is always the same number, namely
one, candidate up for election in these systems, the variation in the electoral sizes of
districts must be actively included as it a¤ects the vote share needed to obtain seats.
1. Australias Veff score was calculated for only the 2 election years of 1955
and 1977, since district level data was not available in machine readable format and
therefore had to be entered manually. However, the Veffscores for the Senate (which
use the states as electoral districts) were calculated and found to be very stable in
the period, and it is therefore reasonable to assume the same for the House. The
values calculated with the nominal party system were 1.54 and 1.31 and an average
of 1.42 was used. When the Country and Liberal parties are regarded as one, the
scores were 1,17 and 1.27 and the average of 1.22 was used in the calculations.
2. The operational decisions underlying the Tpro of Austria (before the legal
threshold was introduced) di¤er from those taken by Lijphart. Since one seat has to
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be obtained in the 1st tier to get access to the 2nd tier allocations, the threshold was
calculated using the largest district magnitude in the primary tier since this is where
we would expect smaller parties to being. Lijphart argued that the 2nd is decisive
for the proportionality of the outcomes uses the 2nd, which is of course true, but he
overlooks that winning a seat in the primary is needed to gain access to allocations
here.
3. For Belgium until 1994, the 2nd tier district magnitude is used (following
Lijphart, 1994)
4. Canadas Veff was only calculated for the two elections of 1974 (1.34) and 1997
(1.55) since machine readable data were not available. The period until the electoral
success of the Quebec party in 1994 was therefore set at 1,4 and the two elections of
1994 and 1997 at 1,55.
5. The Veff scores for France are calculated on the basis of electoral results
aggregated over 94-99 districts, since they are not available by the electoral districts
that have been used. The scores displayed the largest change among the countries
examined here. Before the 1967 election it is above 3 and after it drops to below 2 and
falls gradually until 1997, where the value is 1,6. Comparing to scores obtained when
using scores correcting for di¤erences in size between electoral units, it became clear
that the aggregated units simply contained very di¤erent shares of the electorate.
The score of 1.6. for the 1997 election, which was more congruent with the corrected
scores, was therefore extended to the whole period. When the di¤erence in size
(number of voters) between the units is corrected for, as was done for 1986 elections
with PR-system, the vote concentration is much lower (1.15).
6. For Germany the Veff reported is if the CSU and CDU are regarded as one
party, if they are not the Veff score is an average of 1,3.
7. For Ireland the formula of Ti for Hare was used instead of that for STV the
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latter is 0 and getting close to this seems highly unrealistic.
8.The scores for Italy after the introduction of the mixed system are calculated
in the following way; A Tpro-value is calculated for the PR-system and one for the
Plurality-system: each with its specic formula, district magnitude and number of
parties. The scores are then weighted by the percentage of seats allocated in each
(25 and 75 pct. respectively) and then summed up to give a unied score for the
whole system.
9. Lijphart writes that the droop quota can be used as the Tx of the SNTV. The
Ti is given by the legal threshold (1/4-Hare quota).
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C.3 The Proportional Threshold and the Number
of Parties
Some country markers were given to several cases making it di¢ cult to distinguish be-
tween countries in all cases and due to technical di¢ culties this could not be changed.
However, all the deviantcases are properly marked and should be recognizable.
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The Proportional Threshold and the Number of Parties
(Country Markers)
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Accessibility Barrier
D.1 Conditions for Strategic Voting and Volatility
The results if Japan is included in the category where conditions for strategic voting
are fullled:
Number of
Parties Difference
Vtot N Vtot N Vtot
'2' (1-2.4) 3.8 36 - - -
'3' (2.5-3.4) 3.4 8 7.9 54 4.5
'4' (3.5-4.4) 7 23 9.8 35 2.8
'5' (4.5-5.4) 7.8 37 18 10 10.2
'6' (5.5-6.4) 9.3 27 15.9 5 6.6
'>7' (>6.5) 11.4 51 20.1 1 8.7
Total 8.2 182 10.8 105 2.6
Strategic Incentives
Absent Present
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Do the Barriers to Entry Matter?
E.1 The Barriers to Entry I: With Missing Values
Regressor
>1pct >4 pct >1 pct >4 pct
Registration Barrier -0.19 -0.17  0.17  0.07
Recognition Barriers:
Access to Media -0.20 -0.26* -0.36** -0.23
Access to Finance  0.00 -0.01  0.18 -0.03
Costs of Reaching Voters-0.12 -0.33 -0.20 -0.15
Representation Barrier -0.08 -0.04 -0.46** -0.25
Constant 1.78** 1.42** 2.11** 1.42**
R2 0.19* 0.17* 0.38** 0.17*
The Barriers to Entry I
** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Vote Winning Seat Winning
Dependent Variable: New Parties
OLS regression with standardized coefficients.
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E.2 Barriers to Entry I: Frequency tables
The frequency tables for the two recognition barrier variables - access to media
and access to nance- for the group of counries with high representation barrier
(Tpro>8pct) and low representation barrier (Tpro<8pct) respectively. As mentioned
the statistical analyses assigned mean values in the cases where scores were missing.
Access to Media (1=all equal, 2=all prop, 3=no,4=rep) Access to Finance (1=<1pct, 2=<4pct, 3=no, 4=rep)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Valid 1 10 20 Valid 1 6 12
2 9 18 2 15 31
3 4 8 3 18 37
4 16 33 4 7 14
Total 39 80 Total 46 94
Missing 9 10 20 Missing 9 3 6
Total 49 100 Total 49 100
Freqency table with low representatiion barrier
Access to Media (1=all equal, 2=all prop, 3=no,4=rep) Access to Finance (1=<1pct, 2=<4pct, 3=no, 4=rep)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Valid 2 11 26 Valid 2 6 14
3 10 24 3 22 52
4 13 31 4 11 26
Total 34 81 Total 39 93
Missing 9 8 19 Missing 9 3 7
Total 42 100 Total 42 100
Frequency table with high representation barrier
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Access to Media (1=all equal, 2=all prop, 3=no,4=rep) Access to Finance (1=<1pct, 2=<4pct, 3=no, 4=rep)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Valid 1 10 21 Valid 1 5 11
2 10 21 2 16 34
3 3 6 3 14 30
4 16 34 4 8 17
Total 39 83 Total 43 91
Missing 9 8 17 Missing 9 4 9
Total 47 100 Total 47 100
Frequency table with lowaccessibility barrier
Access to Media (1=all equal, 2=all prop, 3=no,4=rep) Access to Finance (1=<1pct, 2=<4pct, 3=no, 4=rep)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Valid 2 10 23 Valid 1 1 2
3 11 25 2 5 11
4 13 30 3 26 59
Total 34 77 4 10 23
Missing 9 10 23 Total 42 95
Total 44 100 Missing 9 2 5
Total 44 100
Frequency table with highaccessibility barrier
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